ML053010255
| ML053010255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/2005 |
| From: | Widmann M NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Grissette D Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-05-004 | |
| Download: ML053010255 (39) | |
See also: IR 05000425/2005004
Text
October 28, 2005
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: D. E. Grissette, Jr.
Vice President - Vogtle Project
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000424/2005004 AND 05000425/2005004
Dear Mr. Grissette:
On September 30, 2005, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2. The enclosed
integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on
October 17, 2005, with Mr. Tom Tynan and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance which was
determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety
significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is
treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC
Enforcement Policy. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of
the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident
Inspector at VEGP.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room
SNC 2
or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the
Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by Curt Rapp For/
Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000424/2005004 and
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: (See page 3)
SNC 3
cc w/encl:
J. T. Gasser Attorney General
Executive Vice President Law Department
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. 132 Judicial Building
Electronic Mail Distribution Atlanta, GA 30334
T. E. Tynan Laurence Bergen
General Manager, Plant Vogtle Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
Resident Manager
N. J. Stringfellow Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Manager-Licensing Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
Director, Consumers' Utility Counsel Arthur H. Domby, Esq.
Division Troutman Sanders
Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs Electronic Mail Distribution
2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive
Plaza Level East; Suite 356 Senior Engineer - Power Supply
Atlanta, GA 30334-4600 Municipal Electric Authority
of Georgia
Office of the County Commissioner Electronic Mail Distribution
Burke County Commission
Waynesboro, GA 30830 Reece McAlister
Executive Secretary
Director, Department of Natural Resources Georgia Public Service Commission
205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 244 Washington Street, SW
Atlanta, GA 30334 Atlanta, GA 30334
Manager, Radioactive Materials Program Distribution w/encl: (See page 4)
Department of Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
_________________________
OFFICE RII/DRP RII/DRP RII/DRP RII/DRP RII/DRP RII/DRP RII/DRP
SIGNATURE CWR1 GJM1 email BCA1 email NXG fax DCA fax DSS email JAH5 email
NAME CRapp:rcm GMcCoy BAnderson NGarrett DArnett DSimpkins JHickey
DATE 10/28/05 10/28/05 10/27/05 10/27/05 10/27/05 10/27/05 10/27/05
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OFFICE RII/DRP RII/DRP RII/DRS RII/DRS RII/DRS RII/DRS
SIGNATURE SPS email LRM for JXD2 LRM for ADN JLK1
NAME SSanchez WLoo JDiazVelez HGepford ANielsen JKreh
DATE 10/27/05 10/28/05 10/27/05 10/28/05 10/26/05 10/28/05 10/ /2005
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425
Report Nos.: 05000424/2005004 and 05000425/2005004
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Location: 7821 River Road
Waynesboro, GA 30830
Dates: July 1 - September 30, 2005
Inspectors: G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Anderson, Resident Inspector
N. Garrett, Senior Resident Inspector, Surry
D. Arnett, Resident Inspector, Surry
D. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector, Hatch
J. Hickey, Resident Inspector, Hatch
S. Sanchez, Resident Inspector, St. Lucie
J. Kreh, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
(Sections 1EP2-1EP5 and 4OA1)
W. Loo, Senior Health Physicist (Sections 2OS1, 2OS3, 4OA1,
and 4OA5)
J. Díaz Vélez, Health Physicist (Section 2OS3)
H. Gepford, Health Physicist (Section 2PS3)
A. Nielsen, Health Physicist (Section 2PS1 and 4OA1)
Approved by: Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000424/2005-004, 05000425/2005-004; 07/01/2005 - 09/30/2005; Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective
Equipment.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by seven resident inspectors, one
emergency preparedness inspector, and three health physicists. One Green non-cited violation
was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination
Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a
severity level after management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation
of commercial nuclear power reactors is described NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
- Green. An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) was identified
for the failure to provide adequate respiratory protection equipment for emergency
response, compromising the protective actions developed for the plume exposure
pathway for emergency workers.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Emergency
Preparedness cornerstone attribute of Response Organization Performance and
adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the licensee is capable of
implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the
event of a radiological emergency. Failure to provide appropriate respiratory
protective equipment for a required worker could result in the individual being unable
to perform his emergency response function. The finding was evaluated using the
Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Sheet 1. The finding
was a failure to comply that was a planning standard problem, was not a
risk-significant planning standard problem, and did not involve a planning standard
function failure. For these reasons, the inspectors concluded that the issue is of very
low safety significance. (Section 2OS3)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at essentially full rated thermal power (RTP) for this report period.
Unit 2 operated at essentially full RTP until September 18 when the unit was shutdown for a
planned refueling outage.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walk-downs. The inspectors performed partial walk-downs of the following three
systems to verify correct system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve
and electrical power alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and
breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment. Additionally, the
inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to verify that equipment
alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
C Unit 2 nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) system while the number 3 NSCW pump
was out of service for maintenance
C Unit 1 essential chilled water system after significant maintenance
C Unit 1 number 2 condensate storage tank while the number 1 condensate storage
tank was tagged out for maintenance
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down the following eight plant areas to verify the licensee was
controlling combustible materials and ignition sources as required by procedures
92015-C, Use, Control, and Storage of Flammable/Combustible Materials, and 92020-C,
Control of Ignition Sources. The inspectors assessed the observable condition of fire
detection, suppression, and protection systems and reviewed the licensees fire
protection Limiting Condition for Operation log and CR database to verify that the
corrective actions for degraded equipment were identified and appropriately prioritized.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees fire protection program to verify the
requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire
Enclosure
2
Protection Program, and Appendix 9A, Fire Hazards Analysis, were met. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
C Unit 1 train A cable spreading room
C Unit 1 control building level 2
C Unit 1 train A diesel generator
C Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater pump building
C North fire water pump house
C Unit 2 train A NSCW pump house
C South fire water pump house
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities
a. Inspection Scope
Piping Systems ISI. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of the licensees ISI
program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary and the risk
significant piping system boundaries for Unit 2. The inspectors selected a sample of
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section XI required examinations and Code components in order of risk priority as
identified in Section 03 of NRC inspection procedure 71111.08, Inservice Inspection
Activities, based upon the ISI activities available for review. The inspectors also
conducted an on-site review of nondestructive examination (NDE) activities to evaluate
compliance with Technical Specifications (TS), ASME Section XI, and ASME Section V
requirements, 1989 Edition, to verify that indications and any defects were appropriately
evaluated and dispositioned in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI,
IWB-3000 or IWC-3000 acceptance standards. The inspectors observed the following
examinations:
Ultrasonic Testing (UT)
C Component #: 21201-V6-001-B02R, Reactor Head Closure Studs
C Component #: 21201-V6-001-B26R, Reactor Head Closure Studs Weld #: 21201-B6-
003-W05, Lower Cone End Stub Barrel to Lower Shell Barrel-B
The inspectors reviewed the following examination records:
C Weld #: 21201-031-3, Reactor Coolant System pipe to elbow
C Weld #: 21201-042-2, Reactor Coolant System pipe to elbow
C Weld #: 21201-046-2, Reactor Coolant System pipe to elbow
Enclosure
3
Visual Testing (VT):
C Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations above insulation
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W17, 6" Safety Nozzle to Safe End Weld
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W18, 6" Safety Nozzle to Safe End Weld
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W19, 6" Safety Nozzle to Safe End Weld
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W20, 6" Relief Nozzle to Safe End Weld
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W21, 4" Spray Nozzle to Safe End Weld
Magnetic Particle Testing
C Component #: 21201-B6-002-W19, 16" Main Feedwater Nozzle to Shell Weld
Liquid Penetrant Testing
C Component #: 21208P6-002-W01, Pump Casing To 6" Suction Nozzle Weld
C Component #: 21204-063-16, Support H006
C Component #: 21208-411-6, Support H006
The Inspectors reviewed examination records for the following recordable indications to
evaluate if the licensees acceptance was in accordance with acceptance standards
contained in Article IWB-3000 of ASME Section XI.
C Component #: 2-CV-110, CVCS Orifice to Orifice Reducer
C Component #: 21201-B6-003-I10, Steam Generator #3 Channel Head Drain Tube
(WCAP 12907)
C Component #: 21201-B6-001-I10, Steam Generator #1 Channel Head Drain Tube
(WCAP 12907)
C Component #: 21501-024-H003, Hanger U-bolt nuts
C Component #: 21201-P6-002-B25-B32, 1.5" Dia. Sealwater Housing Cap Screws
C Component #: 21501-024-H003, Restraint
The inspectors reviewed the Vogtle, Unit 2, Owners Report For Inservice Inspection,
Tenth Maintenance/Refueling Outage, dated August, 2004, which stated that there were
no reportable indications from last outage.
Qualification and certification records for examiners, inspection equipment, and
consumables along with the applicable NDE procedures for the above ISI examination
activities were reviewed and compared to requirements stated in ASME Section V and
Section XI.
The inspectors reviewed the following three pressure boundary welding activities
associated with ASME Class 1 and Class 2 components were reviewed to verify the
welding process and examinations were performed in accordance with the ASME Code
Sections III, V, IX, and XI requirements.
Enclosure
4
C Weld #: 1K2-1305-157-01, Main Feed Water pipe segment between weldolet and first
downstream elbow
C Weld #: 040502A, Auxiliary Feed Water Pipe to Sweepolet
C Weld #: 040502B, Auxiliary Feed Water Pipe to Elbow
The inspectors performed a review of piping system ISI related problems that were
identified by the licensee and entered into the corrective action program. The inspectors
reviewed these corrective action documents to confirm that the licensee had
appropriately described the scope of the problems. Additionally, the inspectors review
included confirmation that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying
issues and had implemented effective corrective actions. The inspectors evaluated the
threshold for identifying issues through interviews with licensee staff and review of
licensee actions to incorporate lessons learned from industry issues related to the ISI
program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) ISI. The inspectors reviewed the licensees BACC
program to ensure compliance with commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary, and
Bulletin 2002-01, Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant
Pressure Boundary Integrity.
The inspectors conducted a record review and walk-down of parts of the reactor building
that are not normally accessible during at-power operations to evaluate compliance with
licensee BACC program requirements. In particular, the inspectors verified that the
visual examinations focused on locations where boric acid leaks can cause degradation
of safety significant components and that degraded or non-conforming conditions were
properly identified in the licensees corrective action system.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of engineering evaluations completed for boric acid
found on reactor coolant system piping and components to verify that the minimum
design code required section thickness had been maintained for the affected
component(s). The inspectors also reviewed the following licensee corrective actions
implemented for evidence of boric acid leakage to confirm that they were consistent with
requirements of Section XI of the ASME Code.
C CR 205106370, Boron residue present on the pipe coupling between 2HV10953 and
the containment penetration
C CR 2005108224, Accumulation of boric acid build up surrounding nipple below pipe
cap on SI Accumulator #4
C CR 2005108220, Heavy boron build-up residue below pipe cap for series vent valves
2-1208-X4-461 and 2-1208-X4-478
Steam Generator (SG) Tube ISI. The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 SG tube
examination activities conducted pursuant to TS and the ASME Code Section XI
requirements. The inspectors reviewed the SG examination scope, expansion criteria,
eddy current testing (ET) acquisition procedures, ET analysis procedures, the SG
Enclosure
5
Operational Assessment, in-situ tube pressure testing procedures and records and
examination reports to confirm that:
C The numbers and sizes of SG tube flaws/degradation identified was bounded by the
licensees previous outage Operational Assessment predictions. Also, the SG tube ET
examination scope and expansion criteria was sufficient to identify tube degradation
based on site and industry operating experience by confirming that the ET scope
completed was consistent with the licensees procedures and plant TS requirements.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the SG tube ET examination scope to determine
that it was consistent with that recommended in EPRI 1003138 Pressurized Water
Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines and included tube areas which
represent ET challenges such as the tubesheet regions, expansion transitions, U-
bends and support plates.
C The SG tube repair criteria and process (plugging) implemented was consistent with
TS requirements and the licensee was only applying the TS plugging limit at tube wear
locations.
C The ET probes and equipment configurations used to acquire ET data from the SG
tubes were qualified to detect the known/expected types of SG tube degradation in
accordance with Appendix H Performance Demonstration for Eddy Current
Examination of EPRI 1003138 Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator
Examination Guidelines.
C The licensee adequately examined for loose parts indications.
C The licensee adequately evaluated for any contractor deviations from their ET data
acquisition or analysis procedures or EPRI 1003138, Pressurized Water Reactor
Steam Generator Examination Guidelines: Revision 6.
The inspectors performed a review of SG ISI related problems that were identified by
the licensee and entered into the corrective action program to confirm that the licensee
had appropriately described the scope of the problems. Additionally, the inspectors
review included confirmation that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for
identifying issues and had implemented effective corrective actions. The inspectors
evaluated the threshold for identifying issues through interviews with licensee staff and
review of licensee actions to incorporate lessons learned from industry issues related to
the ISI program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were found.
Enclosure
6
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
Resident Quarterly Review. The inspectors evaluated operator performance on July 26,
2005 during licensed operator simulator training associated with Requalification
Segment 20054 and described on simulator exercise guide V-RQ-SE-05401. The
simulator scenario covered operator actions resulting from a loss of class 1E 125V DC
followed by an uncontrolled continuous rod motion and a failure of the plant to trip.
Procedures reviewed are listed in the attachment. The inspectors specifically assessed
the following areas:
C Correct use of the abnormal and emergency operating procedures
C Ability to identify and implement appropriate actions in accordance with the
requirements of the Technical Specifications
C Clarity and formality of communications in accordance with procedure 10000-C,
Conduct of Operations
C Proper control board manipulations including critical operator actions
C Quality of supervisory command and control
C Effectiveness of post-evaluation critique
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following equipment problem and associated licensee CRs
to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees handling of equipment performance
problems and to verify the licensees maintenance efforts met the requirements of 10
CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering
Maintenance Rule Implementation. The reviews included adequacy of the licensees
failure characterization, establishment of performance criteria or 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1)
performance goals, and adequacy of corrective actions. Other documents reviewed
during this inspection included control room logs, system health reports, the
maintenance rule database, and maintenance work orders (MWOs). Also, the
inspectors interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to
assess the accuracy of identified performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
C 2-2103-P4-003, Unit 2 train A number 3 component cooling water pump
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
7
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following five plan of the day (POD) documents listed below
to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from
service. The inspectors reviewed risk assessments and risk management controls
implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with
procedure 00354-C, Maintenance Scheduling, and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors
also reviewed the CR database to verify that maintenance risk assessment problems
were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program,
and appropriately resolved.
C POD for the week of 7/23 - 7/29
C POD for the week of 7/30 - 8/5
C POD for the week of 8/6 - 8/12
C POD for the week of 8/20 - 8/26
C POD for the week of 9/10 - 9/16
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following five evaluations to verify they met the
requirements of NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and NMP-002-GL02,
Corrective Action Program Details and Expectations Guideline. This scope included a
review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory
measures, and the impact on continued plant operation.
C CR 2005106203, Unexpected Engine Not Available light during monthly surveillance
C CR 2005105732, Cooling water leak on unit 2 nuclear service cooling water pump 2
C CR 2005106036, Atmospheric relief valve 1PV3030 oil reservoir empty
C CR 2005106370, Boron residue on Unit 2 accumulator sample line
C CR 2005107704, 2HV0606 would not fully shut when residual heat removal (RHR)
train B was being placed in service.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
8
1R16 Operator Workarounds
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees list of identified operator workarounds as of
August 15, 2005, to assess the cumulative effects of operator workarounds on the
reliability, availability, and potential for mis-operation of a system to verify that there was
no increase in overall plant risk. This assessment included increases of initiating event
frequencies, effects on multiple mitigating systems, and the ability of operators to
correctly respond to abnormal plant conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for
the following four maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the requirements
of procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, for ensuring equipment operability
and functional capability was restored. The inspectors also reviewed the test
procedures to verify the acceptance criteria was sufficient to meet the TS operability
requirements.
C MWO 10523854, Repair of 1-PV-3030, main steam LP4 atmospheric relief inlet
C MWO 20522642, Repair of cooling leak on Unit 2 number 2 NSCW pump
C MWO 20516270, Preventive maintenance of Unit 2 B train RHR pump
C MWO 20411014, Preventive maintenance of Unit 2 A train coolant charging pump
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
Unit 2 Refueling Outage. The inspectors performed the inspection activities described
below for the Unit 2 refueling outage that began on September 18, 2005. The
inspectors reviewed the licensees outage risk control plan to verify that the licensee had
appropriately considered risk, industry experience and previous site specific problems,
and to confirm that the licensee had mitigation/response strategies for losses of key
safety functions. During the cooldown which preceded the outage, the inspectors
reviewed portions of the cooldown process to verify that technical specification cooldown
restrictions were followed. The inspectors confirmed that, when the licensee removed
Enclosure
9
equipment from service, the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with
the outage risk control plan for key safety functions and applicable technical
specifications, and that configuration changes due to emergent work and unexpected
conditions were controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan. During the
outage, the inspectors:
C Reviewed reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure, level, and temperature instruments
to verify that the instruments provided accurate indication and that allowances were
made for instrumentation errors
C Reviewed the status and configuration of electrical systems to verify that those
systems met TS requirements and the licensees outage risk control plan
C Observed decay heat removal parameters to verify that the system was properly
functioning and providing cooling to the core
C Reviewed system alignments to verify that the flow paths, configurations, and
alternative means for inventory addition were consistent with the outage risk plan
C Reviewed selected control room operations to verify that the licensee was controlling
reactivity in accordance with the technical specifications
C Observed spent fuel pool operations to verify that outage work was not impacting the
ability of the operations staff to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system during and
after core offload
C Reviewed the outage risk plan to verify that activities, systems, and/or components
which could cause unexpected reactivity changes were identified in the outage risk
plan and were controlled
C Observed licensee control of containment penetrations to verify that the requirements
of the technical specifications were met
C Reviewed the licensees plans for changing plant configurations to verify that technical
specifications, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and
administrative procedure prerequisites had been met
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following five surveillance test procedures and either
observed the testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in
accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately
demonstrated that the equipment was operable. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed
the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented
appropriate corrective actions for surveillance test problems. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment.
Surveillance Tests
C 24376-1 Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve Control 1PV3000 Channel Calibration
Enclosure
10
C 24705-2, Nuclear Instrumentation System, Power Range Channel 2N42 Channel
Calibration
C 14980B-2, Diesel Generator Operability Test
In-Service Tests
C 14805-2, Residual Heat Removal Pump and Check Valve IST
Containment Isolation Valve Tests
C 14349-2, Containment Penetration No. 49 Excess Letdown and Seal Water Leakoff
Local Leak Rate Test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the following two Temporary Modifications (TM) and
associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design basis documentation
and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to verify that the modifications
did not adversely affect the safety functions of important safety systems. Additionally,
the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 00307-C, Temporary Modifications, to
assess if the modification was properly developed and implemented.
- TM 2052247801, Defeat Unit 2 A turbine exhaust hood low pressure alarm and trip
- TM 2052084801, Unit 2 temporary hot leg RCS level sight glass
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of licensee methods for testing the ANS. The
applicable planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and related requirements contained in
Section IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 were used as reference criteria. The
evaluation criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
Power Plants; Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Report REP-10, Guide
for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants; and the
Enclosure
11
licensees FEMA-approved ANS design report were also used as references.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the ERO augmentation staffing requirements and the process
for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and
timely facility activation. The results of the unannounced off-hour augmentation drill
conducted on November 8, 2004 were reviewed. The inspectors reviewed the
provisions for a backup notification system. The qualification records of key position
ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample
of problems identified from augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last
inspection were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions. The
applicable planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements contained in
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 were used as reference criteria. Documents reviewed
are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the non-administrative Emergency Plan changes and the
associated 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews for Revisions 38, 39, and 40, along with affiliated
implementing procedures changes. No EAL modifications were made in the referenced
revisions, which were issued during the period from December 2004 to May 2005. The
current Emergency Plan is Revision 40. The applicable planning standard 10 CFR
50.47(b)(4) and related requirements contained in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 were
used as reference criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
12
1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions identified through the EP program to
ascertain the significance of the issues and to determine whether repetitive problems
were occurring. The facilitys self-assessments and audits were reviewed to assess the
licensees ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of its EP
program. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensees self-assessments and
audits to assess the completeness and effectiveness of a sample of EP-related
corrective actions. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and related
requirements contained in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 were used as reference
criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and reviewed the emergency plan drill on August 17 to verify
the licensee was properly classifying emergency events, making required notifications,
and making appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with
procedures 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions, 91002-
C, Emergency Notifications, and 91305-C, Protective Action Guidelines. Additionally,
the inspectors observed the licensees critique to verify that performance weaknesses
and improvements were identified.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas
a. Inspection Scope
Access Control. Licensee activities for monitoring workers and controlling access to
radiologically significant areas were inspected. The inspectors evaluated procedural
guidance and directly observed implementation of administrative and physical controls;
appraised radiation worker and technician knowledge of, and proficiency in
implementing Radiation Protection (RP) program activities; and assessed worker
exposures to radiation and radioactive material.
Enclosure
13
Radiological postings and material labeling were directly observed during tours of the
Auxiliary Building and external buildings. Inspectors conducted independent surveys in
the Auxiliary Building to verify posted radiation levels and to compare with current
licensee survey records. During plant tours, control of High Radiation Area (HRA) with
dose rates greater than 15 rem per hour and Very HRA keys and the physical status of
HRA doors were examined. In addition, the inspectors observed radiological controls for
non-fuel items stored in the spent fuel pools. The inspectors also reviewed selected RP
procedures and radiation work permits (RWPs), and discussed current access control
program implementation with RP supervisors.
During the inspection, radiological controls for select work activities in HRAs were
observed and discussed. These activities included the change out of the Unit 2 Spent
Fuel Pool (SFP) filter, activities associated with items being removed from the SFP, and
items being moved into the railroad bay. The inspectors observed workers adherence
to RWP guidance and Health Physics Technician (HPT) proficiency in providing job
coverage. Controls for limiting exposure to airborne radioactive material were reviewed
and operation of ventilation units and positioning of air samplers were also observed.
The inspectors evaluated electronic dosimeter alarm set points for consistency with
radiological conditions in Auxiliary Building. In addition, the inspectors interviewed
workers to assess knowledge of RWP requirements.
The inspectors evaluated worker exposures through review of data associated with
discrete radioactive particle and dispersed skin contamination events. Controls used for
monitoring extremity doses and the placement of dosimetry when work involved
significant dose gradients were reviewed. The inspectors discussed the processes that
would be used if an individual were to have an uptake of radioactive materials.
RP program activities were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20; Regulatory Guide (RG)
8.38, Control of Access to High and Very High Radiation Areas in Nuclear Power Plants;
and approved licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution. CRs and audits associated with radiological
controls, personnel monitoring, and exposure assessments were reviewed and
discussed with RP supervisors. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to
identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues. Documents reviewed
are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment
a. Inspection Scope
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Post-Accident Sampling. During tours of the
Auxiliary Building and SFP area, the inspectors observed installed radiation detection
Enclosure
14
equipment including the following instrument types: Area Radiation Monitors,
Continuous Air Monitors, Personnel Contamination Monitors (PCMs), and components
of the Post-Accident Sampling System. The inspectors observed the physical location
of the components, noted the material condition, and compared sensitivity ranges with
the information contained in the UFSAR.
During equipment walk-downs, the inspectors observed functional checks of various
fixed and portable radiation monitoring/detection instruments. The observations
included source/response checks of PCM and portal monitoring (PM) equipment,
portable ion chambers and telepoles, Small Article Monitors (SAMs), and a Whole Body
Counter (WBC). The inspectors reviewed calibration records and discussed the
functional testing and testing intervals for selected PCM and PM equipment located at
the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) exits. PCM equipment detection capabilities
were demonstrated using a low-level mixed radionuclide source that was passed
through the equipment. The inspectors also observed demonstrations of instrument
calibrations, including a WBC, a telepole, a REM ball, and an Eberline RM-14. The
10 CFR Part 61 analysis for Dry Active Waste was reviewed to determine if calibration
and response check sources are representative of the plant source term.
The inspectors reviewed calibration records for select PCMs, PMs, SAMs, WBCs, and
Eberline RM-14s. In addition, calibration records were reviewed for Unit 2 RE-0005,
Unit 2 RE-0006, Unit 2 RE-0001 and Unit 2 RE-0008 radiation monitors. The records
were evaluated to determine frequency and adequacy of the calibrations. Calibration
stickers on portable survey instruments were noted during inspection of storage areas
for ready-to-use equipment.
Operability and reliability of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed
against details documented in the following: 10 CFR Part 20; NUREG-0737, Clarification
of TMI Action Plan Requirements; TS Section 3; UFSAR Chapter 12; and applicable
licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and Protective Equipment. Selected SCBA
units staged for emergency use in the Control room and other locations were inspected
for material condition, air pressure, and number of units available. The inspectors also
reviewed maintenance records for components of selected SCBA units for the past five
years and certification records associated with supplied air quality.
Qualifications for licensee staff responsible for testing and repairing SCBA equipment
were evaluated through a review of manufacturer training certificates. In addition,
selected Control room operators were interviewed to determine their knowledge of
available SCBA equipment locations, including spectacles (corrective lens inserts) if
needed, and their training on bottle change-out during periods of extended SCBA use.
Respirator qualification records were reviewed for several Control room operators and
Maintenance department personnel assigned emergency response duties.
Licensee activities associated with maintenance and use of respiratory protection
equipment were reviewed against 10 CFR Part 20; RG 8.15, Acceptable Programs for
Enclosure
15
Respiratory Protection; American National Standards Institute (ANSI)-Z88.2-1992,
American National Standard for Respiratory Protection; and applicable licensee
procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution. CRs associated with instrumentation and
protective equipment were reviewed and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the
licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
Introduction. A NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)
was identified for the failure to provide adequate respiratory protection equipment for
emergency response, compromising the protective actions developed for the plume
exposure pathway for emergency workers.
Description. During evaluation of SCBA units staged in the Control room for emergency
use, the inspectors observed ten units fitted with medium respirator masks. On top of
an adjacent emergency planning storage cabinet were two small respirator masks and
three large respirator masks. Through discussions with the licensee, it was determined
that these masks were placed on top of the storage cabinet on about May 2005, when
the licensee had identified the need to provide mask sizes other than medium. The
licensee identified this need based on control room staffing, which included personnel fit
tested for small, medium, and large-sized masks. Prior to May 2005, only medium-sized
masks had been staged in the control room. The inspectors noted that the licensee had
not entered this problem into their corrective action program.
Selected control room operators interviewed by the inspectors were knowledgeable in
the use and operation of SCBA units; however, some of the operators were not aware of
the location of the small and large masks.
A review of Licensee Procedure No. 47013-C, Inspection, Repair, Storage of Self
Contained Breathing Apparatus, showed that the monthly checks did not include the
inspection and storage of respirator masks in the control room which are separate from
the SCBA units. Although HPTs had been inspecting the extra masks during monthly
checks, it was not in their procedure to do so nor had they create any record of these
inspections. The inspectors noted that the licensee provided additional respirator masks
in small and large sizes for SCBA units used by the fire brigade and that these masks
were inside sealed bags with current inspection tags and were placed in a closed
cabinet with a tamper proof seal. In contrast, the extra masks in the Control room were
stored in the manufacturers boxes inside of open plastic bags that had no inspection
tags or a tamper proof seal.
Regulatory Guide 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection, Section 4.5,
states in part, that persons may only be issued face-sealing respirators for which they
have been tested. Prior to May 2005, in the event of an emergency requiring immediate
respiratory protection, the individuals who were fit tested using small or large masks
Enclosure
16
would not have been qualified to use the pre-staged, SCBA equipment and may have
been unable to perform their function as emergency responders. A licensed operator
may need an SCBA in the event the control room becomes uninhabitable, must
evacuate the control room, or must perform emergency response functions in a
hazardous environment outside of the control room.
Analysis. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Emergency
Preparedness cornerstone attribute of Response Organization Performance and
adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that failure to provide appropriate
respiratory protective equipment could result in control room operators being unable to
perform their emergency response functions. The finding was evaluated using the
Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Sheet 1. The finding
was a failure to comply that was a planning standard problem, was not a risk-significant
planning standard problem, and did not involve a planning standard function failure. For
these reasons, the inspectors concluded that the issue is of very low safety significance.
Although the licensee identified the need for additional respirator mask sizes in the
control room, the licensees corrective actions were incomplete in that operators were
not made aware of the location of the new masks and Procedure No. 47013-C was not
updated to include them on the monthly surveillance check. The licensee was not
aware of these additional issues until they were identified by the inspectors. Therefore,
this finding is being treated as an NRC-identified finding. This finding involved the
cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution in the area of resolution.
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) states, in part, that a range of protective actions will
be developed for the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for
emergency workers. Contrary to the above, prior to May 2005, the licensee failed to
provide adequate respiratory protective equipment, i.e., small and large size SCBA
respirator masks, for licensed plant operators with emergency response functions.
Because the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) is of very low safety
significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program (CRs
2005107596 and 2005107597), this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation
(NCV), consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV
05000424,425/2005004-01, Failure to Provide Adequate Respiratory Protection
Equipment for Emergency Response.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems
a. Inspection Scope
Effluent Monitoring and Radwaste Equipment. During inspector walk-downs, accessible
sections of the Unit 1/Unit 2 liquid and gaseous Radioactive Waste (Radwaste) and
effluent systems were assessed for material condition and conformance with system
design diagrams. The inspection included floor drain tanks, liquid waste system piping,
Waste Liquid Effluent Monitor (RE-18), Nuclear Service Water Process Monitors (RE-
Enclosure
17
20A & B), waste gas decay tanks, Containment Vent Effluent Monitors (RE-2565A, B, &
C), Plant Vent Effluent Monitors (RE-12442A, B, & C), and associated airborne effluent
sample lines. The inspectors interviewed chemistry supervision regarding Radwaste
equipment configuration and effluent monitor operation.
The inspectors reviewed performance records and calibration results for selected
radiation monitors, flowmeters, and air filtration systems. For Unit 1/Unit 2 monitors RE-
20 and RE-2565 the inspectors reviewed Control room channel check logs for June
2005 and the two most recent isotopic calibration records. The last two surveillances on
the Unit 1/Unit 2 Containment Purge High Efficiency Particulate Air/charcoal air
treatment system were also reviewed. The inspectors evaluated out-of-service effluent
monitors and compensatory action data for the period August 2003 - September 2005.
In addition, 2-RE-2565A and 2-RE-12442A stack versus sample line flow rates were
reviewed and discussed with chemistry staff to evaluate the adequacy of isokinetic
sampling.
Installed configuration, material condition, operability, and reliability of selected effluent
sampling and monitoring equipment were reviewed against details documented in the
following: 10 CFR Part 20; RG 1.21, Measuring, Evaluating and Reporting Radioactivity
in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials In Liquid and Gaseous Effluents
from Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants; ANSI - N13.1-1969, Guide to Sampling
Airborne Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities; TS Section 5; the Offsite Dose
Calculation Manual (ODCM), Rev. 21; and UFSAR, Chapter 11. Procedures and
records reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Effluent Release Processing and Quality Control (QC) Activities. The inspectors directly
observed the weekly collection of airborne effluent samples from the Unit 2 Plant Vent
(monitors 2-RE-12442 and 2-RE-12444). Chemistry technician proficiency in collecting,
processing, and counting the samples, as well as preparing the applicable release
permits was evaluated.
QC activities regarding gamma spectroscopy and beta-emitter detection were discussed
with count room technicians and Chemistry supervision. The inspectors reviewed daily
QC data logs from January 1, 2005, to September 14, 2005, for High Purity Germanium
(HPGe) detectors No. 1 & 3, and reviewed licensee procedural guidance for count room
QC. The inspectors also reviewed the two most recent calibration records for HPGe
detector No. 1 and the Beckman 6500 liquid scintillation counter. In addition, results of
the 2004 and 2005 radiochemistry cross-check program were reviewed.
Selected parts of three procedures for effluent sampling, processing, and release were
evaluated for consistency with licensee actions. Two liquid and four gaseous release
permits were reviewed against ODCM specifications for pre-release sampling and
effluent monitor setpoints. For two of the gaseous releases, independent calculations
were performed to evaluate reported doses to the public from airborne radionuclides.
The inspectors also reviewed the 2003 and 2004 annual effluent reports to evaluate
reported doses to the public and to review ODCM changes.
Enclosure
18
Observed task evolutions, count room activities, and offsite dose results were evaluated
against details and guidance documented in the following: 10 CFR Part 20 and
Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50; ODCM; RG 1.21; RG 1.109, Calculation of Annual Doses
to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating
Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I; RG 1.33, Quality Assurance Program
Requirements (Operation); and TS Section 5. Procedures and records reviewed are
listed in the Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution. Four CRs and one Quality Assurance Audit
associated with effluent release activities were reviewed and assessed. The inspectors
evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve selected
issues. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) and Radioactive Material
Control Program
a. Inspection Scope
REMP Implementation. The inspectors observed collection of environmental samples
and surveillance of sampling instruments during the licensees weekly environmental
run. The inspectors noted the material condition and operability of airborne particulate
and iodine sampling stations at monitoring location Nos. 3, 7, 10, 12, 16, and 35.
Environmental thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) Nos. 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 35, 44, and 47
were checked for material condition. The inspectors also observed the collection of a
milk sample from Dixon Dairy. The inspectors determined the current location of
selected air samplers, TLDs, and vegetation sampling stations using NRC global
positioning system instrumentation and compared the results with ODCM data. Land
use census results and sample collection/processing activities were discussed with
environmental technicians.
The inspectors reviewed the previous calibration records for the environmental air
samplers and observed performance of the current rotameter calibrations at each air
sampling location by the technicians. The inspectors also reviewed the 2003 and 2004
REMP reports, results of the 2003 and 2004 interlaboratory cross-check program, and
procedures for environmental sample collection and processing. The inspectors
discussed missed samples/inoperable samplers reported in the REMP reports, detection
capabilities, and cross-check results with cognizant personnel.
Program implementation, sampling locations, and environmental monitoring results were
reviewed against: 10 CFR Part 20; Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50; TS 5.5; ODCM; RG
4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal Operation) -
Effluent Streams and the Environment; and Branch Technical Position, An Acceptable
Enclosure
19
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program - 1979. Documents reviewed are listed
in the Attachment.
Meteorological Monitoring Program. During a walk-down of the meteorological tower
and associated equipment, the inspectors observed the physical condition of the tower
and discussed equipment operability and maintenance history with cognizant licensee
personnel. The inspectors compared locally generated meteorological data with
information available to control room operators. For the primary meteorological
measurements of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature, the inspectors reviewed
calibration records for applicable tower instrumentation and evaluated measurement
data recovery for calendar years 2003 and 2004.
Licensee procedures and activities related to meteorological monitoring were evaluated
against: ODCM; UFSAR Section 2.3; ANSI/ANS-2.5-1984, Standard for Determining
Meteorological Information at Nuclear Power Sites; and Safety Guide 23, Onsite
Meteorological Programs. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Unrestricted Release of Materials from the RCA. The inspectors observed surveys of
material and personnel being released from the RCA using SAM, PCM, and PM
instruments. The inspectors also observed source checks of these instruments and
discussed equipment sensitivity and release program guidance with licensee staff.
To evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation,
radionuclides identified within recent waste stream analyses were compared against the
radionuclides used in current calibration sources and performance check sources. The
inspectors also reviewed the last two calibration records for SAM instruments at the HP
Control Point and Unit 2 Containment.
Licensee programs for monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA were
evaluated against: 10 CFR Part 20 and IE Circular 81-07, Control of Radioactively
Contaminated Material. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed audits and CRs
involving environmental monitoring, meteorological monitoring, and release of
radioactive materials. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify,
characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues. Documents reviewed are listed
in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
Enclosure
20
The inspectors sampled licensee records to verify the accuracy of reported PI data for
the periods listed below. To verify the accuracy of the reported PI elements, the
reviewed data were assessed against guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory
Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revision (Rev.) 3, and the NEI Frequently Asked
Questions list.
Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone
- Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
The inspectors reviewed the PI results for the period of May 2004 through June 2005.
The inspectors reviewed HP shift log entries, electronic dosimeter alarm logs, and
licensee procedural guidance for collecting and documenting PI data. CRs were
reviewed for uptakes and abnormal TLD results. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment.
Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone
- Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/ODCM Effluent Occurrences
The inspectors reviewed the PI results for the April 2004 through June 2005. The
inspectors reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public, out-of-service effluent
radiation monitor data logs, and two CRs related to Radiological Environmental
Technical Specifications/ODCM issues. The inspectors also reviewed licensee
procedural guidance for collecting and documenting PI data. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
Daily Screening. As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and
Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or
specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily
screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review
was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed
major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and
reviewing each CR that was initiated.
Annual Sample Review. The inspectors reviewed CR 2005103739 to evaluate the
effectiveness of the licensees corrective actions associated with the licensees failure to
obtain a relaxation of the requirements for NRC Order EA-03-009 prior to the restart of
Unit 1 on April 9, 2005, following a refueling outage. This NRC order required the
Enclosure
21
performance of specific inspections of the reactor pressure vessel head and head
penetration nozzles to be completed prior to the end of the 1R12 refueling outage. The
licensee had performed inspections of the reactor pressure vessel head and head
penetration nozzles during an outage in October 2004. In a written response dated
March 8, 2004, the licensee noted that the visual inspections were limited by
inaccessible areas of the reactor pressure vessel head. In this response, the licensee
requested relaxation from some specific requirements of the order and provided
justification for the request. This relaxation was required in order to restart Unit 1 after
refueling outage 1R12. On May 16, 2005, during a record review following the
completion of 1R12, the licensee discovered that the required relaxation had not been
received from the NRC. The licensee contacted the NRC to determine the status of the
relaxation. On September 13, 2005, the NRC completed an evaluation of the licensees
request and granted the requested relaxation from Order EA-03-009. The inspectors
reviewed the condition report and discussed the resulting corrective actions with the
licensee.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. The fact that the licensee restarted Unit 1 on
April 9, 2005, but had not received a relaxation from order EA-03-009 is a violation of
NRC requirements. This is considered a minor violation because it is a licensing issue
with no safety significance. The licensee had properly submitted a request for the
relaxation in a timely manner with suitable justification. The inspectors determined that
the licensees corrective actions were adequate and would reasonably prevent the issue
from occurring in the future.
4OA5 Other
.1 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/160, Pressurizer Penetration Nozzles and
Steam Space Piping Connections in U.S. Pressurized Water Reactors (NRC Bulletin
2004-01)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees 60-day response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, dated
July 27, 2004, to verify that the licensees inspection activities conducted during this
outage were consistent with the their response. The inspectors conducted an
independent walk-down of the top of the pressurizer to ensure that the physical
conditions of the pressurizer penetrations and welds were clean and accessible for the
prescribed inspections and that there were no debris, insulation, dirt, boron from other
sources, physical layout, or viewing obstructions which could have interfered with the
identification of relevant indications. The inspectors observed or reviewed
documentation for the following components:
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W17, 6" Safety Nozzle to Safe End Weld
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W18, 6" Safety Nozzle to Safe End Weld
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W19, 6" Safety Nozzle to Safe End Weld
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W20, 6" Relief Nozzle to Safe End Weld
C Component #: 21201-V6-002W21, 4" Spray Nozzle to Safe End Weld
Enclosure
22
Reporting Requirements are as follows:
a. For each of the examination methods used during the outage, was the examination:
1. Performed by qualified and knowledgeable personnel? (Briefly describe the
personnel training/qualification process used by the licensee for this activity.)
The licensee used knowledgeable staff members certified as Level II, VT-1
examiners.
2. Performed in accordance with demonstrated procedures?
The inspectors reviewed records and photographs of the bare metal inspection of
the pressurizer penetrations in accordance with procedure ES-MISN-V-715,
Version 1.0, Visual Examination (VT-1). The inspectors also performed and
independent walk-down of the top of the pressurizer to verify the licensees
results.
3. Able to identify, disposition, and resolve deficiencies?
The inspectors concluded that the licensees direct visual examinations were
capable of detecting leakage from cracking in pressurizer penetrations if it had
existed. This conclusion was based upon the inspectors' direct observations of
pressurizer penetration locations, which were free of debris or deposits that could
mask evidence of leakage in the areas examined. The inspectors also verified
that the licensees procedures included guidance for proper disposition and
investigation of any identified deficiencies.
4. Capable of identifying the leakage in pressurizer penetration nozzle or steam
space piping components, as discussed in NRC Bulletin 2004-01?
The inspectors verified that the licensees examination personnel were capable of
identifying any leakage in pressurizer penetration nozzles or steam space piping
components.
b. What was the physical condition of the penetration nozzle and steam space piping
components in the pressurizer system (e.g., debris, insulation, dirt, boron from other
sources, physical layout, viewing obstructions)?
Through discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors verified that the
insulation had been removed so as not to disrupt any potential indications of boric
acid leakage from the pressurizer at these penetration locations. The licensee
personnel performed a direct visual inspection of these pressurizer penetrations.
c. How was the visual inspection conducted (e.g., with video camera or direct visual by
the examination personnel)?
Enclosure
23
The licensees inspection personnel used the direct visual examination technique
along with a handheld mirror.
d. How complete was the coverage (e.g., 360° around the circumference of all the
nozzles)?
The licensee was able to view the entire circumference around each penetration.
e. Could small boron deposits, as described in the Bulletin 2004-01, be identified and
characterized?
The examination personnel were appropriately trained and qualified to identify small
boron deposits as described in the bulletin.
f. What material deficiencies (i.e., cracks, corrosion, etc.) were identified that required
repair?
There were no deficiencies identified that required repair.
g. What, if any, impediments to effective examinations, for each of the applied
methods, were identified (e.g., centering rings, insulation, thermal sleeves,
instrumentation, nozzle distortion)?
There were no impediments for an effective examination.
h. If volumetric or surface examination techniques were used for the augmented
inspections examinations, what process did the licensee use to evaluate and
dispose any indications that may have been detected as a result of the
examinations?
No augmented surface or volumetric examinations were performed.
I. Did the licensee perform appropriate follow-up examinations for indications of boric
acid leaks from pressure-retaining components in the pressurizer system?
There were no indications of boric acid leaks.
.2 (Closed) TI 2515/163, Operational Readiness of Offsite Power
Completion of this TI was documented in NRC Inspection Report
05000424,425/2005003. However, after an NRC headquarters review of the data
provided, additional information related to the TI was requested. The inspectors
collected this information from licensee discussions, site procedures and licensee
documentation. The information was subsequently provided to the headquarters staff
for further analysis.
Enclosure
24
.3 Temporary Instruction 2515/161, Transport of Control Rod Drive (CRD) in Type A
Packages
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed shipping logs and discussed shipment of CRDs in Type A
packages with shipping staff. No shipments of CRDs in Type A packages were made
since January 1, 2002.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On October 17, 2005, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
Tom Tynan and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The
inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during
the inspection.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel:
R. Brown, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
C. Buck, Chemistry Manager
J. Robinson, Operations Manager
K. Dyar, Security Manager
T. Tynan, Nuclear Plant General Manager
I. Kochery, Health Physics Manager
J. Williams, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
S. Swanson, Engineering Support Manager
R. Dedrickson, Assistant General Manager - Operations
NRC personnel:
M. Widmann, Chief, Reactor Project Branch 2
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000424,425/2005004-01 NCV Failure to Provide Adequate Respiratory Protection
Equipment for Emergency Response (Section 2OS3)
Closed
2515/160 TI Pressurizer Penetration Nozzles and Steam Space Piping
Connections in U.S. Pressurized Water Reactors (NRC
Bulletin 2004-01) (Section 4OA5.1)
2515/163 TI Operational Readiness of Offsite Power (Section 4OA5.2)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
13150-2, Nuclear Service Water Cooling System
13744-1, Essential Chilled Water System
13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System
13625-1, Condensate Storage and Degassifier System
Drawings
2X4D133-1, Nuclear Service Water Cooling System P&ID
2X4D133-2, Nuclear Service Water Cooling System P&ID
AX4AJ04-104, Cooled Motor Hot Gas Bypass P&ID
AX4AJ04-139, Emergency Safety Feature Chillers Line Diagram
AX4AJ04-140, ESF Chillers Line Diagram
AX4AJ04-141, ESF Chillers Line Diagram
1X4DB161-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System
Attachment
2
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Procedures
92795-1, Zone 95 - Control Building Level A Fire Fighting Preplan
92820-1, Zone 120 - Control Building Level 2 Fire Fighting Preplan
92833B-1, Zone 133B, Control Building Level 2 Fire Fighting Preplan
92861-1, Zone 161, Diesel Generator Building Fire Fighting Preplan
92855-1, Zone 155, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse - Train B Fire Fighting Preplan
92856-1, Zone 156, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse Fire Fighting Preplan
92857A-1, Zone 157A, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse - Train C Fire Fighting Preplan
92756B-1, Zone 56B, Control Building Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92777B-1, Zone 77B, Control Building Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92778B-1, Zone 78B, Control Building Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92779B-1, Zone 79B, Control Building Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92780-1, Zone 80, Control Building Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92930-1, Zone 530, North Fire Water Pumphouse Fire Fighting Preplan
92931B-1, Zone 531, South Fire Water Pumphouse Fire Fighting Preplan
92921-1, Zone 601, Technical Support Center Fire Fighting Preplan
92860A-2, Zone 160A, NSCW Pumphouse - Train A Fire Fighting Preplan
Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities
ES-MISN-V-411, Version 2.0, Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Pressure Vessel Welds
(greater than 2" in thickness)
ES-MISN-V-715, Version 1.0, Visual Examination (VT-1)
ES-MISN-V-307, Version 1.0, Preservice and Inservice Inspection Documentation
ES-MISN-V-465, Version 1.0, Ultrasonic Thickness Examination Procedure
ES-MISN-V-735, Visual Examination (VT-3)
ES-MISN-V-505, Version 1.0, Magnetic Particle Testing
85060-C, Revision 11.1, Visual Examination For Leakage
14864-2, Revision 1.0, Containment General Leak Inspection
83201-C, Revision 6, Corrosion Assessment
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 2, Transmittal of
2R11 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment, September 9, 2005
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Re: Issuance of Amendments Regarding the
Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program, September 21, 2005
MRS 2.4.2 GPC-37, Revision 11, Steam Generator Eddy Current Data Analysis Techniques For
Vogtle Units 1 & 2
SGS-06-026, Vogtle Data Cop Guidelines
Corrective Action Documents
CR 2004001842, Ultrasonic thickness measurements for ISI Point 2CV-110 were below the
12.5% , mill spec. tolerance.
CR 2005108176, Reduction in wall thickness for piping between CVCS letdown orifices
(2FO0200, 2FO0201, 2FO0202) an valves 2HV8149A, B, C.
CR 2005106370, Boron residue on the pipe coupling between 2HV10953 and the containment
CR 2205108220, Significant amount of boron on 2-1208-X4-478 and 2-1208-X4-461, CVCS
letdown Regen HX Inlet valves
3
CR 2005107942, White reside present on the Bottom Channel Head Drain Tube and Weld on
S/G 1 and 3.
CR 2005107560, While performing procedure 31105-C, Collection of Data for Hideout Return
Calculation, the Unit 2 steam generator sample valves 1-4 (upper and lower) were closed to
assess leakage
CR 2005108378, Hydraulic pump for s/g manway tensioner device was found to be leaking at a
fitting.
CR 2005107322,
Self-Assessments and Audits
Inservice Inspection Program Self-Assessment Report, January 10, 2002
Response Report for 2002 ISI Program Self Assessment, February 7, 2003
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Focused Self Assessment, August 17-19, 2004
Other Documents
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant- Units 1 and 2 CVCS Letdown Line Minimal Wall Thickness
and Evaluation Supporting ISI, April 28, 2004
Owners Report For Inservice Inspection (2R10)
NMP-ES-019, Version 1.0, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
NMP-ES-GL01, Version 1.0, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Implementation Guideline
NMP-ES-GL02, Version 1.0, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Health Report Guideline
NMP-ES-GL03, Version 2.0, Boric Acid Deposit Sampling, Analysis, and Data Evaluation
Program Health Report, August 13, 2004
Program Health Report, May 12, 2005
Corrosion Assessment Leak #: 1208-2005-036
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification
Procedures
18003-1, Rod Control System Malfunction
18034-1, Loss of Class 1E 125V DC Power
19211-C, FR-S.1 Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT
91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Condition Reports
1997037686, 1997037687, 1998000730, 1998000819, 1998000828, 1998000915,
1998000915, 1998000946, 1999000785, 1999001698, 1999001090, 1999001725,
2001000529, 2002002122, 2001002960, 2002003533, 2003002006, 2003002282,
2004151120, 2004151620, 2004151707, 2005106222, 2005106256, 2005103841,
2005106336
Work Orders
00146810, 00146811, 00146812, 20000617, 20001903, 20002199, 20002332, 20003132,
20003239, 20100487, 20101614, 20103011, 20201996, 20202028, 20202029, 20202030,
20202031, 20202032, 20202586, 20302079, 20370476, 20410474, 20410930, 20410934,
20410937, 20450221, 20450216, 20450217, 20501854, 29703180, 29703216, 29703217,
29703248, 29800663, 29802189, 29802190, 29802383, 29802410, 29802516, 29900096,
29900101, 29900097, 29900098, 29900100
Procedures
27080-C, Ingersoll Rand Model 10 X 18 SE CCW Pump Maintenance
System Health Report, Component Cooling Water
4
Section 1R20: Refueling and Outage Activities
Procedures
00309-C, Control of Unattended Temporary Material in Containment in Modes 1-4
11899-2, RCS Draindown Configuration Checklist
12000-C, Post Refueling Operations (Mode 6 to Mode 5)
12005-C, Reactor Shutdown to Hot Standby (Mode 2 to Mode 3)
12006-C, Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown
12007-C, Refueling Operations (Entry into Mode 6)
12008-C, Midloop Operations
13005-2, Reactor Coolant System and Refueling Cavity Draining
14210-2, Containment Building Penetrations Verification - Refueling
14406-2, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification - Shutdown
14900-C, Containment Exit Inspection
18019-C, Loss of Residual Heat Removal
27504-C, Equipment Hatch Emergency Closure
29540-C, Risk Assessment Monitoring
29542-C, Shutdown Risk Assessment
93300-C, Conduct of Refueling Operations
Section 2OS1: Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas
Procedures, Manuals, and Guides
00008-C, Plant Lock and Key Control, Revision (Rev.) 15
00930-C, Radiation and Contamination Control, Rev. 23.1
43000-C, Radiation and Contamination Surveys, Rev. 20
43005-C, Establishing and Posting Radiation Controlled Areas and High Radiation Area Access
Control, Rev. 31
43007-C, Issuance Use and Control of Radiation Work Permits, Rev. 22
43014-C, Special Radiological Controls, Rev. 32
43019-C, Spent Filter Handling Special Radiological Controls, Rev. 7
43300-C, Personnel Decontamination, Rev. 25
45016-C, Investigation, Evaluation and Management of Damaged, Lost, Malfunctioning, or
Alarming Dosimetry, Rev. 6.1
46017-C, Control and Monitoring of Materials in Radiation Controlled Areas, Rev. 30
NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Version (Ver.) 4.0
Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)
RWP 05-100, Perform HP Surveys to Assess Radiological Conditions, Provide Multiple RWP
Job Coverage Activities, and Perform Routine Functions, Rev. 0
RWP 05-0109, Minor Work Task and Surveillances in High Radiation Areas, High
Contamination Areas, and/or Airborne Areas, Rev. 0
RWP 05-0110, Changeout Reactor Coolant Filters in 1-AB-B-15 and 2-AB-B-179 Filter Pits,
Spent Fuel Pool Filters in 1-AB-B-145 and 2-AB-B-176 Filter Pits and Spent Fuel Skimmer
Filters in 1-AB-D-94 and 2-AB-D-83, and All Associated Work Including Transfer to the RPF or
1-AB-D-43 for Filter Disposal, Rev. 2
RWP 05-0113, All Sluices from Demins to Spent Resin Storage Tank in Unit 1 and Unit 2
Auxiliary Building, Rev. 0
RWP 05-0121, Decon Activities Performed in High Radiation Areas, Rev. 0
RWP 05-0148, Remove Tri-Nuke Filters from Spent Fuel Pool and Transfer to the RPF For
Survey/Segregation/and Disposal, Rev. 0
RWP 05-0149, Perform Corrective Maintenance on Ultrasonic Fuel Cleaning Equipment and All
5
Associated Work, Rev. 0
Records and Data
Accumulated Dose for Entry > to Dose Alarm Setpoint Since August 2003
Plant Vogtle Radiological Information Survey Numbers (Nos.) 76006, 76944, 76946, 76957,
and 76971
Corrective Action Program Documents/Audits
Condition Report (CR) 2003002872, A contractor working on RCPs failed to log in on his RWP
and obtain an electronic dosimeter prior to entering containment
CR 2003002966, Carpenter entered the S/G #3 primary platform without HP permission while
looking for a scaffold in loop #3
CR 2005100382, The keys to the Very HRA key box were left in the RPF tool monitor for ~30
minutes by the HP Duty Foreman when exiting the RCA
CR 2005100692, Upon issuance of the Unit 1 Containment cage door key (#1C1), the locked
high radiation area key cabinet was noted to be closed but unlocked
CR 2005103949, Individual received an accumulated dose alarm while calibrating pressure flow
transmitters in 2-AB-A-103
Self Assessment of Health Physics Measuring and Test Equipment (MT&E), Assessment Date:
05/16 - 05/20/05, Plant Vogtle
SNC Fleet High Radiation Area Control Self-Assessment, 12/20/04
Section 2OS3: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment
Procedures
00971-C, Selection and Use of Respirators for Nonradiological Applications, Rev. 2
18035-C, Abnormal Operating Procedures, Rev. 9
24138-C, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Fuel Handling Building Area Monitor 2RE-0008,
Rev. 2
24171-2, Control Room (2RE-0001) Area Monitor 2RX-0001 Channel Calibration, Rev. 7
24624-2, Containment High Range (2RE-0005) Area Monitor 2RX-0005 Channel Calibration,
Rev. 20
24988-2, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Control Room Area Monitor 2RE-0001, Rev. 2
24989-2, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Containment High Range Area Monitors 2RE-0005
and 2RE-0006, Rev. 3
34330-C, Surveillance of the DRMS (Digital Radiation Monitoring System), Rev. 31
43631-C, Calibration of the IPM-7A/8/9 Contamination Monitors, Rev. 24
43634-C, Calibration of the HFM-7A Hand and Foot Monitor, Rev. 10
43651-C, Calibration of the SPM Personnel Portal Monitors, Rev. 12
43657-C, Operation, Use and Calibration of the Ludlum 22OO Scaler Ratemeter, Rev. 8
43669-C, Operation and Calibration of MGPI Dose Rate Instruments, Rev. 6
43670-C, Calibration of Dose Rate Meters, Rev. 22
43673-C, Calibration of the Ludlum 177, Eberline Model RM-14, Eberline Model RM-25 Count
Rate Meters, Rev. 7
43680-C, Calibration of the Eberline Model RM-14S Radiation Monitor, Rev. 4
43689-C, Calibration of the (SAM) Small Articles Monitor, Rev. 4
44022-C, Operation and Calibration of the Whole Body Counter, Rev. 9
47001-C, Selection and Use of Respiratory Protection Equipment Used for Radiological
Purposes, Rev. 12
47002-C, Cleaning and Surveying Respiratory Protection Equipment, Rev. 6
47003-C, Qualitative and Quantitative Fit Testing of Individuals for Respirator Use, Rev. 18.1
6
47004-C, Breathing Air Analysis, Rev. 8
47005-C, Inspection, Repair, and Storage of Respiratory Protection Equipment, Rev. 7
47006-C, Control Issuance and Return of Radiological Respiratory Protection Equipment,
Rev. 11
47013-C, Inspection, Repair, Storage of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Rev. 16
91702-C, Emergency Equipment and Supplies, Rev. 27
NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 4.0
Calibrations, Surveillance Tests, and Licensee Records
2005 OPS Dept Shift Schedule Report, Shift Coverage Week 09/10/05, Four Weeks at a
Glance 08/27/05, 09/03/05, 09/10/05, and 09/17/05.
24138-1, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Fuel Handling Building Area Monitor 1RE-0008,
24138-2, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Fuel Handling Building Area Monitor 2RE-0008,
24171-2, Control Room (2RE-0001) Area Radiation Monitor 2RX-0001 Channel Calibration,
24174-1, Control Room (1RE-0001) Area Radiation Monitor 1RX-0001 Channel Calibration,
24174-2, Fuel Handling Room (RE-0008) Area Monitor 2RX-0008 Channel Calibration, pages
24624-1, Containment High Range (1RE-0005) Area Monitor 1RX-0005 Channel Calibration,
24624-1, Containment High Range (1RE-0005) Area Radiation Monitor 1RX-0005 Channel
24624-2, Containment High Range (2RE-0005) Area Monitor 2RX-0005 Channel Calibration,
24625-1, Containment High Range (1RE-0006) Area Monitor 1RX-0006 Channel Calibration,
24625-2, Containment High Range (2RE-0006) Area Monitor 2RX-0006 Channel Calibration
24988-1, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Control Room Area Monitor 1RE-0001
24988-2, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Control Room Area Monitor 2RE-0001
24989-1, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitors
24989-2, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitors
34330-C Data Sheet 5-1, Surveillance of the DRMS, for surveillance dates between 01/16/03
and 07/29/05
34330-C Data Sheet 5-2, Surveillance of the DRMS, for surveillance dates between 01/15/03
and 07/28/05
34330-C Data Sheet 9-1, Surveillance of the DRMS, Dated 02/15/04, 08/16/04, and 02/21/05
34330-C Data Sheet 9-2, Surveillance of the DRMS, Dated 02/19/04, 02/27/04, 08/22/04, and
08/23/04
43673-C, Calibration of the Ludlum 177, Eberline Model RM-14, Eberline Model RM-25 Count
Rate Meters, Data Sheet 1 for RM-14, Serial Number (S/N) 0104, Dated 09/13/05
47013-C, Data Sheet 2, Inspection and Maintenance of SCBA Units, for Unit HP-0019, Dated
11/1999 to 07/005, Unit FP-019, Dated 02/04 to 07/05, Unit HP-0009, Dated 11/99 to 08/00
and 01/04 to 07/05, Unit FP-009, Dated 07/00 to 09/05, Unit HP-030, Dated 10/99 to 06/05,
and Unit FP-030, Dated 11/03 to 09/05
47013-C, Data Sheet 3, Inspection and Maintenance of SCBA Units (ProCheck3 Test Results),
for facepiece S/N 72127, Dated 06/06/05
47013-C, Data Sheet 1, Monthly SCBA Cylinder Surveillance for FP-XXX and HP-XXX
cylinders (current, unsigned, used for tracking of hydro-test due dates only)
47013-C, Table 1, SCBA Cylinder Location List, dated 12/15/04, manually updated (unknown
date) to incorporate codes 7 (Chem Lab), 8 (RPF), 9 (OSC), 10 (PESB), 12 (OOS), 11 (OOS
Hydro), and 13 (Plant Wilson), still not incorporated in Rev. 15
Calibration of IPM-7A/8/9, S/N VEGP-HP-0636, 07/07/05
Calibration of IPM-7A/8/9, S/N VEGP-HP-0640, 06/03/05
Respirator Qualification Report by Department, Dated September 14, 2005
7
VEGP-FSAR-11 and VEGP-FSAR-12
VMS Quality Assurance Report V1.3, Generated September 13, 2005 (Demonstration of
calibration source check for September 13, 2005), including WBC Daily Calibration Source
Check (energy and efficiency check) for WBC #1 @Dosimetry and WBC #2 @HP Access
Point
Work Order (WO) No. 10202551, Temporary Jumper to 1RX-0001 per Procedure No. 20429-C,
Dated 03/19/03
WO No. 1040174601, 1RE-0001 Area Monitor Control Room, Dated 03/13/03
WO No. 2040123801, 2RE-0008 Area Monitor Fuel Handling Bldg, Dated 04/15/03
WO No. 2040176101, 2RE-0001 Area Monitor Control Room, Dated 08/06/03
CAP Documents/Audits
CR No. 2004151659, HP WBC not functioning properly
CR No. 2005101263, SCBA Spectacles come loose
CR No. 2005101781, Late PM on 2RE008 Isotopic Calibration
CR No. 2005103730, Facial injury while donning an SCBA
CR No. 2005104066, SCBA unit found with "Vogtle Training" cylinder
CR No. 2005107596, Lack of documentation of monthly control room respirators inspections
CR No. 2005107597, Lack of small and large control room respirators masks
CR No. 2005107598, HP Tech responses to portal monitors not consistent
Section 2PS1: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring
Systems
Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Operating Manuals
24972-2, Isotopic Channel Calibration of the Containment Vent Effluent Air Monitors
2RE-2565A, 2RE-2565B and 2RE-2565C, Rev. 6
33015-2, Obtaining Gaseous Samples for Radioactivity Analysis Unit #2, Rev. 1
33037-C, Daily Quality Control of the Gamma Spectroscopy System, Rev. 9
36015-C, Radioactive Liquid Effluent Release Permit Generation and Data Control Computer
Method, Rev. 23
36020-C, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Release Permit Generation and Data Control
Computer Method, Rev. 20
NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 4.0
Records, Data, and Drawings
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 2003 and 2004.
Germanium Detector #1 Calibrations (effluent sample geometries), 10/21/98, 11/8/01, 04/18/03,
04/22/03, 04/23/03, 01/25/04, 01/26/04, and 03/11/04
Germanium Detectors No. 1 and 3, Daily Source Check and Trend Logs, 01/01/05 - 09/14/05
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit Nos. 50137.020.025.G (06/13 - 06/20/05),
50142.026.024.G (06/21/05), 50199.021.037.G (09/07 - 09/14/05), and 50204.021.038.G
(07/14 - 07/21/05, pre-release only)
Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit Nos. 50129.002.057.L (09/14/05) and
50072.001.025.L (05/30/05)
Liquid Scintillation Detector Calibrations, 05/17/04 and 05/17/05
Out-of-service data for Unit 1 and Unit 2 radiation monitors RE-12442 and RE-18, 08/01/03 -
09/01/05
Radiation Monitor 1-RE-2565 A, B, C, Isotopic Calibrations, 10/28/03 and 01/27/05
Radiation Monitor 2-RE-2565 A, B, C, Isotopic Calibrations, 09/10/02 and 01/14/04
Radiation Monitor 1-RE-20 A, B, Isotopic Calibrations, 07/31/03 and 11/08/04
Radiation Monitor 2-RE-20 A, B, Isotopic Calibrations, 05/05/02, 05/21/02, and 01/12/04
8
Radiation Monitor 1-RE-20A, B, Channel Check Logs, June 2005
Radiation Monitor 2-RE-2565A, B, C, Channel Check Logs, June 2005
Results of Radiochemistry Cross-Check Program, 2004 and 2005
Unit 1 Containment Purge Flowmeter Calibrations, 02/05/02 and 07/29/04
Unit 1 Containment Purge System Functional Test, 09/29/03 and 06/17/05
Unit 2 Containment Purge System Functional Test, 10/16/03 and 06/20/05
Unit 2 Containment Purge Flowmeter Calibrations, 06/12/01 and 11/21/03
CAP Documents/Audits
Audit No. VQA-2005-029, QA Audit of Chemistry and Radioactive Waste, 06/27/05
CR 2004001547, Two consecutive points in the upper warning region for efficiency @
1332 KeV on HpGe detector No. 2, 04/20/04
CR 2004003774, Apparent trend in repetitive failures with paper drive associated with
2-RE-2565A, 09/13/04
CR 2004150102, Interlaboratory crosscheck results disagreed with outside vendor lab,
10/08/04
CR 2005101890, Pre-release permit limit of 18000 CFM for the Unit 1 containment purge was
exceeded according to flow transmitter 1FT2565, 03/18/05
Section 2PS3: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) and Radioactive
Material Control Program
Procedures and Guidance Documents
36030-C, Meteorological Tower Monitoring and Data Control, Rev. 16
46024-C, Release of Materials from the RCA, Rev. 7.1
ENV-861, Collection and Handling of Drinking Water Samples for Radiological Analysis,
Rev. 10
ENV-860, Collection and Handling of Milk Samples for Radiological Analysis, Rev. 12
ENV-859, Collection and Handling of River Water Samples for Radiological Analysis, Rev. 11
ENV-858, Collection and Handling of Grass Samples for Radiological Analysis, Rev. 10
ENV-856, Collection and Handling of Sediment Samples for Radiological Analysis, Rev. 9
ENV-855, Collection and Handling of Fish Samples for Radiological Analysis, Rev. 9
ENV-851, Radiological Monitoring - Air Dust/Gaseous Iodine Air Sampling Flow Calibration,
Rev. 6
ENV-850, Collection and Handling of Airborne Dust and Gaseous Iodine Samples, Rev. 11
ENV-612, Quality Control Program, Rev. 7
NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 4.0
Reports, Manuals, and Audits
CQA 2003-81, Southern Nuclear Operating Company Audit of GPC Environmental Laboratory,
May 28, 2003
CQA 2004-126, Southern Nuclear Operating Company Audit of GPC Environmental Laboratory,
June 16, 2004
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Rev. 22
Plant Vogtle 2003 and 2004 Annual Meteorological Reports
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports for 2003
and 2004
Instrument Calibration and Environmental Data Records
10 CFR 61 Waste Analysis, 1st and 2nd Quarters, 2005
Calibration of SAM-9: S/N 0868, 01/21/05
Calibration of SAM-11: S/N 1159 (05/24/05, 04/29/05, 11/01/04), S/N 1223 (05/23/05,
9
12/04/04), S/N 1152 (05/23/05, 12/02/04), S/N 1151 (05/23/05, 12/02/04), and S/N 1158
(05/24/05, 12/02/04)
Surveillance 24681-C, Semi-Annual Meteorological Station 10M Wind Direction Channel
Calibration, 06/29/05 and 01/07/05
Surveillance 24683-C, Semi-Annual Meteorological Station 10M Wind Speed Channel
Calibration, 07/01/05 and 01/06/05
Surveillance 24684-C, Semi-Annual Meteorological Station 60M Wind Speed Channel
Calibration, 06/30/05 and 01/05/05
Surveillance 24686-C, Semi-Annual Meteorological Station 60M Wind Direction Channel
Calibration, 06/30/05 and 01/05/05
Surveillance 24688-C, Semi-Annual Meteorological Station 10M Ambient and 10-60M Delta T
Channel Calibration, 06/30/05 and 01/07/05
VEGP Rotameter Air Flow Calibration Field Sheets, Rotameters #1,3,7,2,6,8,5, 03/15/04
CAP Documents
2003002432, 10m wind speed not responding to expected changes, 09/04/03
2003002996, Found met tower 10m primary wind direction not responding, 10/12/03
2004003089, Met tower chart recorder 60 m wind direction pen is sticking, 07/22/04
2004000287, Met tower 10m and 60m wind speed not reading due to sleet, 01/26/04
2004000867, Met tower aspirator has gone into alarm and appears unreliable, 03/08/04
2004002515, 10m wind direction on primary met tower not functioning properly, 06/11/04
2004003942, Met tower 10m backup temperature on IPC reading high, 09/27/04
2005103153, Review of 2004 meteorological data indicate an abnormally low number of hours
of Stability Class A atmospheric conditions, 05/04/05
2005105684, Air conditioner leaking water inside instrument room, 07/29/05
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
00163-C, NRC Performance indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and
Submittal, Rev. 8.1
Records and Data
Gaseous effluent release permit No. 50199.021.037.G (09/07 - 09/14/05)
Liquid effluent release permit No. 50129.002.057.L (09/14/05)
Out-of-service data for Unit 1 and Unit 2 radiation monitors RE-12442 and RE-18, 08/01/03 -
09/01/05
CAP Documents
CR 2003002418, 1-RE-020A, B went into low voltage power supply alarm, 09/03/03
CR 2003002792, Two mechanics entered the labyrinth area at the west entrance to the
bioshield in search of a snubber and their teledosimeters alarmed when they got near a hot
spot on a reactor cavity drain line
CR 2005101890, Pre-release permit limit of 18000 CFM for the Unit 1 containment purge was
exceeded according to flow transmitter 1FT2565, 03/18/05
CR 2005103166, Individual received a dose rate alarm when he entered into 1-AB-C-94
Section 4OA5: Other Activities
Temporary Instruction 2515/161, Transport of Control Rod Drive (CRD) in Type A Packages
Records
Radioactive Material Shipment Log, 01/02 - 08/05