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MUM NiC Committed to NucdearExcear Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC May 27, 2005 NRC-05-068 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Docket 50-305 License No. DPR-43 Reportable Occurrence 2005-007-00 In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, "Licensee Event Report System," the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) for reportable occurrence 2005-007-00 is being submitted.
This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.
Michael G !6ffnf/
Site Vice Preside ewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC Enclosure (1) cc:
Administrator, Region l1l, USNRC Project Manager, Kewaunee, USNRC Resident Inspector, Kewaunee, USNRC INPO Records Center sag A N490 Highway 42. Kewaunee, Wisconsin 54216-9511 Telephone: 920.388.2560
ENCLOSURE I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 2005-007-00 2 pages follow
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2007 (6-2004)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to Industry.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOlAlPrivacyService Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byintemet e-(See reverse for required number of mail to lnfocollects=nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory (See re e
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FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant 05000305 I
of 2 TITLE (4)
Unanalyzed Condition: Design Deficiency - Component Cooling Water System Inoperable Due to Pump "Run Out" Conditions EVENT DATE (s)
LER NUMBER (6)
[
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
S N
IFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MO DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NOMO DAY YEAR 03 28 2005 2005 00 05 27 2005 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING N
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR,: (Check all that apply) (11)
MODE (9) 20.2201(b) l 20.2203(aX3)(ii)
X 50.73(aX2)(iiXB) l 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
POWER 000 20.2201(d)
T 20.2203(aX4) 1 50.73(aX2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2x)
LEVEL (10) 0 20.2203(aXl)
= 50.36(cXl )(i)(A)
= 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 73.71 (a)(4)
- _ 20.2203(aX2)(i)
= 50.36(cXl )(iiXA)
X 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71 (a)(5)
- - _ 20.2203(aX2)(ii) 50.36(cX2) 50.73(aX2)(v)(B)
OTHER
._ 20.2203(aX2)(iii) 50.46(aX3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
Specify In Abstract below or in
- _ 20.2203(aX2)(iv) 50.73(aX2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 20.2203(aX2)(v)
= 50.73(aX2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(aX2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
PJAI^J T9=1 i punJ;: FJ IkAR;:P1.-4 r
4 Mary Jo Merholz 1
920-388-8277 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) l MANU-REPORTABLE l l MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FA CTURER TO EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
X NO D
SUBMISSION
(
l l
ABSTRACT On March 28, 2005 with the plant in Refueling Shutdown Mode, a past operability concern was identified with the plant's Component Cooling Water System. Specifically, on January 23, 2002, plant personnel identified a potential "run out" concern with the Component Cooling Water pumps. The condition assumed Component Cooling Water being aligned to both Residual Heat Removal heat exchangers and both Component Cooling Water pumps running. If a loss of power caused the loss of one Component Cooling Water train and the associated train's isolation valve to the Residual Heat Removal heat exchanger could not be closed, there would be a potential concern with pump 'run out' and pump damage for the Component Cooling Water pump that continued to run. The plant's original design did not preclude the Component Cooling Water pump 'run out" condition. There were no safety significant issues involved with this event. Plant design changes were implemented to alleviate the Component Cooling Water pump 'run out" concern. No further corrective actions are necessary. This report involves a safety system functional failure.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKETNUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant 05000305 R
l SEQUENTIAL R
REVMION 2of 2 2005 007 00 TEXT (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
DESCRIPTION
On March 28, 2005 with the plant in Refueling Shutdown Mode, a past operability concern was identified with the plant's Component Cooling Water (CCW) [CC] System. Specifically, on January 23, 2002, plant personnel identified a potential "run out" concern with the CCW pumps [P]. The condition assumed CCW being aligned to both Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchangers [HX] and both CCW pumps running. If a loss of power caused the loss of one CCW train and the associated train's isolation valve to the RHR heat exchanger could not be closed, there would be a potential concern with pump 'run out" and pump damage for the CCW pump that continued to run.
The pump "run-out' concern was determined to be an original plant design issue and was initially resolved by isolating the non-safeguards loads on the CCW system and installing a valve position limiter on a non-critical CCW system flow control valve. Isolation of the non-safeguards loads on the CCW system and the installation of the valve position limiter on a non-critical CCW system flow control valve were completed approximately 49.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> from the time the potential concern was identified. The valve position limiter that was installed was proven effective upon the completion of special operating procedures which verified by testing that a single CCW pump would not experience 'run-out" flow conditions when all CCW safeguards loads, including both trains of RHR heat exchangers were supplied by a single CCW pump.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The plant's original design did not preclude the CCW pump 'run out" condition.
EVENT ANALYSIS AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE This event is being reported under 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), any event or condition that resulted in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety, and 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or system that are needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
This event was initially reported on March 28, 2005 as a IOCFR50.72 non-emergency event under criterion (b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that resulted in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety (reference Event Notification EN 41539).
This report involves a safety system functional failure.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Plant design changes have been implemented to alleviate the CCW pump "run out" concern. These design changes installed valve travel limiting devices on non-safeguards CCW system flow control air operated valves. These modifications limit total CCW flow to prevent CCW pump "run out" under the specified conditions described in this Licensee Event Report.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
None.
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| 05000305/LER-2005-001, Re Reactor Thermal Power Eight-Hour Average Limit Exceeded | Re Reactor Thermal Power Eight-Hour Average Limit Exceeded | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-002, Re Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Assumed to Fall from Postulated Loss of Primary Water Source - Safe Shutdown and Accident Analysis Assumptions Not Assured - Inadequate Design of Pump Protective Equipment | Re Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Assumed to Fall from Postulated Loss of Primary Water Source - Safe Shutdown and Accident Analysis Assumptions Not Assured - Inadequate Design of Pump Protective Equipment | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000305/LER-2005-003, Regarding Inadvertent Reactor Protection Trip While Shutdown - Caused by Procedure Adherence Deficiencies and Inadequate Shift Management Oversight | Regarding Inadvertent Reactor Protection Trip While Shutdown - Caused by Procedure Adherence Deficiencies and Inadequate Shift Management Oversight | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-004, Regarding Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged by Unanalyzed Internal Flooding Events and Inadequate Design | Regarding Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged by Unanalyzed Internal Flooding Events and Inadequate Design | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000305/LER-2005-005, Re Emergency Diesel Generator Exhaust Ductwork Not Adequately Protected from Potential Tornado Winds & Missiles | Re Emergency Diesel Generator Exhaust Ductwork Not Adequately Protected from Potential Tornado Winds & Missiles | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-006, Re Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Postulated to Fall Due to Air Ingestion Through Pump Packing | Re Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Postulated to Fall Due to Air Ingestion Through Pump Packing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-007, Regarding Unanalyzed Condition: Design Deficiency - Component Cooling Water System Inoperable Due to Pump Run Out Conditions | Regarding Unanalyzed Condition: Design Deficiency - Component Cooling Water System Inoperable Due to Pump Run Out Conditions | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-008, Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable Due to Insufficient Net Positive Suction Head | Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable Due to Insufficient Net Positive Suction Head | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000305/LER-2005-009, Re Firearm Discovered During Security Search Process | Re Firearm Discovered During Security Search Process | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-010, Formal Withdrawal | Formal Withdrawal | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000305/LER-2005-011, Re the Setting of a Permissive (P-10) in the Power Range Channels of the Nuclear Instrumentation System Was Outside of Plant Technical Specification Requirements | Re the Setting of a Permissive (P-10) in the Power Range Channels of the Nuclear Instrumentation System Was Outside of Plant Technical Specification Requirements | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-012, Re Residual Heat Removal Pump Run-Out Upon Loss of Instrument Air While Aligned for Sump Recirculation | Re Residual Heat Removal Pump Run-Out Upon Loss of Instrument Air While Aligned for Sump Recirculation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-012-01, For Kewaunee Power Station Re Residual Heat Removal Pump Run-Out Upon Loss of Instrument Air While Aligned for Sump Recirculation | For Kewaunee Power Station Re Residual Heat Removal Pump Run-Out Upon Loss of Instrument Air While Aligned for Sump Recirculation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-012-02, Regarding Residual Heat Removal Pump Run-Out Upon Loss of Instrument Air While Aligned for Sump Recirculation | Regarding Residual Heat Removal Pump Run-Out Upon Loss of Instrument Air While Aligned for Sump Recirculation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-013, Regarding the Throttle Valves to the Turbine Bearing Oil Coolers for the Turbine Driven AFW Pump Could Be Blocked by Debris | Regarding the Throttle Valves to the Turbine Bearing Oil Coolers for the Turbine Driven AFW Pump Could Be Blocked by Debris | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-014, Technical Specification LCO Not Entered for Diesel Generators Inoperable While in Refueling Shutdown | Technical Specification LCO Not Entered for Diesel Generators Inoperable While in Refueling Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-014-01, Re Technical Specification LCO Not Entered for Diesel Generators Inoperable While in Refueling Shutdown | Re Technical Specification LCO Not Entered for Diesel Generators Inoperable While in Refueling Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-015, Kewuanee Both Trains of Component Cooling Water Inoperable During Shifting of Running Equipment | Kewuanee Both Trains of Component Cooling Water Inoperable During Shifting of Running Equipment | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000305/LER-2005-016-01, Re Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Feedwater Pump Motor Failure | Re Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Feedwater Pump Motor Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000305/LER-2005-016, Re Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Feedwater Pump Motor Failure | Re Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Feedwater Pump Motor Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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