ML050950107
| ML050950107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/2005 |
| From: | Chamberlain D Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Overbeck G Arizona Public Service Co |
| References | |
| EA-05-037 IR-05-011 | |
| Download: ML050950107 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000528/2005011
Text
April 5, 2005
Gregg R. Overbeck, Senior Vice
President, Nuclear
Arizona Public Service Company
P.O. Box 52034
Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034
SUBJECT: PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - NRC
INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2005011, 05000529/2005011, AND
Dear Mr. Overbeck:
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an in-office inspection conducted
December 1, 2004, through March 4, 2005, regarding the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The inspection evaluated changes made by Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station to the Palo Verde Emergency Plan through the 10 CFR 50.54(q) process.
The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to
safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of
your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of
procedures and representative records and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, one apparent violation was identified and is being
considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of
Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. The
current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at www.nrc.gov; select What We
Do, Enforcement, then Enforcement Policy. The apparent violation involves an apparent
decrease in effectiveness in the Palo Verde Emergency Plan resulting from changes made to
station emergency action levels, as described in §1EP4 of the enclosed inspection report.
The circumstances surrounding this apparent violation, the significance of the issue and the
need for lasting and effective corrective action were discussed with members of your staff at an
onsite inspection exit meeting on March 4, 2005.
Arizona Public Service Company -2-
Before the NRC makes a final enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to
either (1) respond to the apparent violation addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of
the date of this letter or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference. If a conference is
held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a meeting notice to
announce the conference. Please contact Mr. Anthony T. Gody, Branch Chief, Operations
Branch, at 817-860-8159 within 7 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your
intended response.
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a "Response to An
Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2005011, 05000529/2005011, and
05000530368/2005011; EA-05-037," and should include: (1) the reason for the apparent
violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps
that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to
avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response
may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately
addresses the required response. If an adequate response is not received within the time
specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with
its enforcement decision or schedule a predecisional enforcement conference.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations
described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You
will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if you choose to provide one) will be made available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs
document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy,
proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without
redaction.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Dwight D. Chamberlain
Director, Division of Reactor Safety
Dockets: 50-528, 50-529, 50-530
Licenses: NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000528; 05000529; 05000530/2005011
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
Arizona Public Service Company -3-
cc w/Enclosure
Steve Olea
Arizona Corporation Commission
1200 W. Washington Street
Phoenix, AZ 85007
Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel
Southern California Edison Company
Law Department, Generation Resources
P.O. Box 800
Rosemead, CA 91770
Chairman
Maricopa County Board of Supervisors
301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor
Phoenix, AZ 85003
Aubrey V. Godwin, Director
Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency
4814 South 40 Street
Phoenix, AZ 85040
Technical Services Branch Chief
FEMA Region IX
1111 Broadway, Suite 1200
Oakland, CA 94607-4052
M. Dwayne Carnes, Director
Regulatory Affairs/Nuclear Assurance
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
Mail Station 7636
P.O. Box 52034
Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034
Hector R. Puente
Vice President, Power Generation
El Paso Electric Company
310 E. Palm Lane, Suite 310
Phoenix, AZ 85004
Jeffrey T. Weikert
Assistant General Counsel
El Paso Electric Company
Mail Location 167
123 W. Mills
El Paso, TX 79901
Arizona Public Service Company -4-
John W. Schumann
Los Angeles Department of Water & Power
Southern California Public Power Authority
P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C
Los Angeles, CA 90051-0100
John Taylor
Public Service Company of New Mexico
2401 Aztec NE, MS Z110
Albuquerque, NM 87107-4224
Cheryl Adams
Southern California Edison Company
5000 Pacific Coast Hwy. Bldg. DIN
San Clemente, CA 92672
Robert Henry
Salt River Project
6504 East Thomas Road
Scottsdale, AZ 85251
Brian Almon
Public Utility Commission
William B. Travis Building
P.O. Box 13326
1701 North Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78701-3326
Arizona Public Service Company -5-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (KSW)
Senior Resident Inspector (GXW2)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (TWP)
Branch Chief, DRS/OB (ATG)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (GEW)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
Assisting PV Site Secretary (VLH)
Regional State Liaison Officer (WAM)
NSIR/DPR/EPD (REK)
OEMAIL
G. Sanborn (GFS)
SISP Review Completed: ______ ADAMS: : Yes G No Initials: ______
- Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive : Non-Sensitive
EPI:OB ACES C:OB C:PBD C:OB D:DRS
PJElkmann/lmb GSanborn ATGody TWPruett ATGody DDChamberlain
/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
3/23/05 3/24/05 3/25/05 3/26/05 3/31/05 4/5/05
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Dockets: 50-528, 50-529, 50-530
Licenses: NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74
Report No: 05000528; 05000529; 05000530/2005011
Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company
Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
Location: 5951 S. Wintersburg, Tonopah, Arizona
Dates: December 1, 2004 through March 4, 2005
Inspector: Paul J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved Anthony T. Gody, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
-I- Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000528; 05000529; 05000530/2005011; Arizona Public Service Company; December 1,
2004, through March 4, 2005; Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3; Review of Changes to
The inspection was conducted in-office by a regional emergency preparedness inspector. The
inspection identified an apparent violation. The significance of the issue is indicated by its color
(Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 609, "Significance Determination
Process," or by the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement VIII. The NRC's program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified Findings
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
- The inspector identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for implementing a
change to emergency action levels, which decreased the effectiveness of the emergency
plan. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 99, "EPIP Standard Appendices,"
Revision 2, removed from two emergency action levels site boundary exposure rate as
measured in the environment as a classifiable condition.
Implementation of changes to emergency action levels, which decreased the
effectiveness of the emergency plan was a performance deficiency. The finding is more
than minor because removal of a classifiable condition from licensee emergency action
levels has the potential to impact safety, and licensee implementation of a change to
their emergency plan, which decreases the effectiveness of the plan without prior NRC
approval, impacts the regulatory process. This finding is an apparent violation of
10 CFR 50.54(q). The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action system
as Condition Report/Disposition Request 2774185 (Section 1EP4).
-II- Enclosure
Report Details
1. Reactor Safety
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector performed an in-office review of Revision 29 to the Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station Emergency Plan, and Revision 2 to Emergency Plan Implementing
Procedure 99, EPIP Standard Appendices, both submitted September 1, 2004.
Emergency Plan Revision 29 implemented changes to the on-shift staffing of the shift
technical advisor and satellite technical support center communicator, as previously
approved by the NRC. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 99, Revision 2, revised
Appendix A (Emergency Action Levels) and Appendix P (Emergency Action Level Basis)
as follows:
- Changed the dose threshold in Emergency Action Levels 3-1 and 3-2 from
1000 mrem per year to 0.1 mrem per hour.
- Changed the dose threshold in Emergency Action Levels 3-8 and 3-9 from
1E4 mrem per year to 1 mrem per hour.
- Changed the dose threshold in Emergency Action Levels 3-14 and 3-15 from
100 mrem per hour to 100 mrem received at any time.
- Changed the dose threshold in Emergency Action Levels 3-17 and 3-18 from
1000 mrem per hour to 1000 mrem received at any time.
- Changed Emergency Action Levels 3-16 and 3-19, from "Site Boundary dose rate
> 100/1000 mrem/h deep dose equivalent (DDE) as measured with portable
instrumentation OR valid dose projection > 100/1000 mrem TEDE [total effective
dose equivalent] or > 500/5000 thyroid CDE [committed dose equivalent] at the
Site Boundary to "Field survey result or valid dose assessment indicates
> 100/1000 mrem TEDE or > 500/5000 thyroid CDE at the Site Boundary."
These revisions were compared to their previous revisions, to the criteria of Nuclear
Energy Institute 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,
Revision 2, to the NRC Safety Evaluation transmitted to the licensee March 19, 2004,
and to the requirements of 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
to determine if the revisions decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
b. Findings
Introduction. An apparent violation was identified for implementation of a decrease of
effectiveness in the licensees emergency plan, in violation of the requirements of
10 CFR 50.54(q). The licensee implemented a change to their emergency action levels,
-1- Enclosure
which removed a classifiable condition from one emergency action level at the Site Area
Emergency level, and one at the General Emergency level.
Description. The NRC identified that on September 1, 2004, the licensee implemented a
change to its emergency action level scheme, which was an apparent decrease in
effectiveness of the licensees emergency plan, because a previously classifiable
condition based on exposure rate measured in the environment was removed from two
emergency action levels. Specifically, Emergency Action Levels 3-16 and 3-19 were
changed from, Site Boundary dose rate > 100/1000 mrem/h deep dose equivalent as
measured with portable instrumentation OR valid dose projection > 100/1000 mrem
TEDE or > 500/5000 thyroid CDE at the Site Boundary, to "Field survey result or valid
dose assessment indicates > 100/1000 mrem TEDE or > 500/5000 thyroid CDE at the
Site Boundary."
The inspector determined that, as revised, the previously classifiable condition, "site
Boundary dose rate > 100/1000 mrem/h deep dose equivalent," was removed from the
emergency action level scheme. The revised emergency action levels did not continue
to meet the standards of 50.47(b)(4) because they were inconsistent with the licensee's
approved technical basis, NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, in that, example Initiating
Conditions AS1 and AG1 include classification based on field survey results (DDE). The
inspector also determined that revised Emergency Action Levels 3-16 and 3-19 could not
be implemented as written because field survey results would not directly indicate TEDE
or thyroid CDE values and the licensee did not provide methods for the emergency
director to determine TEDE from field results.
The inspector reviewed emergency plan implementing procedures associated with dose
assessment and development of protective action recommendations, and interviewed
emergency response organization personnel. The inspector noted that Emergency Plan
Implementing Procedure EPIP-01, "Satellite Technical Support Center," Step 7.2.2,
requires the radiological field assessment team to inform the radiological coordinator if
any emergency action level thresholds were exceeded. The inspector noted that
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPIP-01 was not revised, with two changes
to Emergency Action Levels 3-16 and 3-19, and that the classifiable condition of
>100/1000 mrem/hr DDE remained as a site area emergency/general emergency,
respectively. The radiological field teams would report both open and closed window
dose rate readings to the radiological coordinator. During interviews, the licensee
indicated that both the operations support center and the emergency operations
facility would use this data in conjunction with Emergency Plan Implementing
Procedures EPIP-02, "Operations Support Center Actions," and EPIP-04, "Emergency
Operations Facility Actions," to also convert the field data into thyroid CDE or TEDE and
provide the results to the emergency coordinator. The inspector noted that both
Procedures EPIP-02 and-04 contained tables with the appropriate site boundary dose
rate DDE thresholds for both Site Area Emergency and General Emergency. The
licensee indicated that the emergency coordinator would be able to predicably and
properly classify the event. The inspectors concluded that the emergency coordinator
would likely be given an appropriate recommendation based on Procedures EPIP-02
and -04; however given the actual wording of Emergency Action Levels 3-16 and 3-19, it
was not apparent that the emergency coordinator would develop predicable and
appropriate event classifications as would have been the case with the previous versions
-2- Enclosure
of EALs 3-16 and 3-19. Therefore, the inspectors identified that the changes to
EALs 3-16 and 3-19 represented an apparent decrease in effectiveness of the licensees
Analysis. Implementation of changes to emergency action levels, which decreased the
effectiveness of the emergency plan, was a performance deficiency. The finding had a
credible impact on the emergency preparedness cornerstone objective because a
licensee is less capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and
safety of the public during a radiological emergency if emergency conditions are
removed from licensee emergency action levels. This finding is more than minor
because (1) the removal of a classifiable condition from licensee emergency action
levels has the potential to impact safety; and (2) licensee implementation of a change to
their emergency plan, which decreases the effectiveness of the plan without prior NRC
approval, impacts the regulatory process. The finding also involves an apparent violation
of NRC requirements, subject to enforcement action under the terms of the NRC
Enforcement Policy (see discussion below).
Enforcement. Licensee implementation, without prior NRC approval, of an emergency
action level change, which decreases the effectiveness of the emergency plan, is an
apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q), which states, in part, A licensee authorized to
possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect
emergency plans that meet the standards in §50.47(b) and the requirements in
Appendix E of this part. . . . The nuclear power reactor licensee may make changes to
these plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the
effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of
§50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to this part.
In accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, §2.2(e) and §4.4, the inspector
evaluated the significance of the finding using NUREG-1600, General Statement of
Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy),Section IV,
Significance of Violations. The finding was determined to be an apparent violation
subject to potential escalated enforcement action because the reduction in effectiveness
constituted a failure to implement planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), which is a
planning standard related to assessment (NUREG-1600, Supplement VIII, Emergency
Preparedness).
This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action system as Condition
Report/Disposition Request 2774185 [05000528/2005011-01,05000529/2005011-01,
05000530/2005011-01, Change to radiological emergency action levels, which
decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan].
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
A regional emergency preparedness inspector presented the inspection results at an
onsite exit interview conducted March 4, 2005, to Mr. G. Overbeck, Senior Vice
President, and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the finding. The inspector
-3- Enclosure
confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the
inspection.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
-4- Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
D. Crozier, Governmental Liaison
T. Gray, Department Leader, Radiological Services
D. Marks, Compliance Section Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
D. Mauldin, Vice President, Engineering and Support
E ONeill, Department Leader, Emergency Preparedness
D. Straka, Senior Consultant, Regulatory Affairs
G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President
NRC
R. Lantz, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
ITEM OPENED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000528/2005011-01, APV Change to radiological emergency action levels which
05000529/2005011-01, decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan (1EP4)05000530/2005011-01
A-1 ATTACHMENT