ML050830185
| ML050830185 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/2005 |
| From: | Popielarski J Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| Download: ML050830185 (36) | |
Text
Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No.
- 1 Op Test No.
Examiners Operators CRS PRO URO Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 4% power during a reactor startup. The E-1 Diesel Generator is 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> into a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> surveillance run. During the turnover, the crew is directed to swap RBCCW pumps for inspection of a noisy bearing on the 'B RBCCW pump. Following the swap of RBCCW, the crew is to continue with the reactor startup pulling control rods in accordance with the approved startup sequence. A trip of the running ESW pump with a failure of the auto-start on the standby pump will require the operators to manually start the standby pump and consult Tech Specs.
After the Tech Spec determination, a high Standby Liquid Control Tank temperature alarm will be received. An investigation will determine that the tank heater had stuck on and the crew should take action to open the breaker for the heater. A review of Tech Specs will result in the SBLC system being considered inoperable due to the loss of NPSH to the pumps.
Once the Tech Spec interpretation is complete, a recirc leak develops in the drywell requiring entry into OT-101, High Drywell Pressure. The crew will take actions for the rising drywell pressure and will manually scram the reactor and enter T-101, RPV Control. During the scram, five rods will fail to insert resulting in an ATWS.
Attempts to spray the drywell will fail due to a drywell spray logic failure and the crew will need to perform a T-112, Emergency Blowdown when drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 281 degrees F. With several rods stuck out, the crew will need to terminate and prevent injection in accordance with T-240 prior to the emergency depressurization. The scenario may be terminated when the RPV depressurization is performed.
Initial Condition lC-121,4% power Turnover:
See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet Event Malfunction Event No.
No.
Type*
1 ATC N
R SRO Override 3
Preinserteci I
ATC CRM02XXXX Preinserted Override BOP SRO Event DescriDtion Swap of RBCCW pumps.
Power Ascension with Control Rods.
ESW Pump Trip and failure of the Standby to Auto-Start (Tech Spec).
Standby Liquid Control Tank High Temperature (Tech Spec).
Recirculation System leak in the drywell.
Five Rods stick full out during the scram.
DW Spray Valve Logic Failure prevents Drywell Sprays.
I
' (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:
e e
e Unit 2 is starting up at 4% rated power.
The Drywell is still deinerted due to required inspections.
The E-1 Diesel Generator is running and is 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> into a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Surveillance run.
INOPERABLE EQUIPMENTILCOs:
None SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
e e
Swap RBCCW Pumps, placing the A RBCCW Pump in service and shutting down the B RBCCW Pump Continue the reactor startup using GP-2 beginning with Step 6.2.50 and Rod Sequence Step 15.
SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
None GENERAL INFORMATION:
Predictive Maintenance reports a noisy bearing on the B RBCCW pump motor and has requested a swap to the A RBCCW pump to permit installing instrumentation on the B pump. When the crew has the shift, perform SO 35.6.A-2, Placing the Standby Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Pump in Service. When the pump swap is complete. notify the Work Control Supervisor, and they will send in the Clearance.
After the pump swap the crew is expected to resume power ascension. GP-2 is complete through Step 6.2.47, begin with Step 6.2.48. A Reactivity Briefing was already completed and you are ready to begin withdrawing rods at the beginning of Sequence Step 15 with Control Rod 18-35.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.:
- 1 EventNo.: 1 Page 1 of10 Event
Description:
Swap of RBCCW pumps.
Cause:
None Automatic Actions:
None Effects:
None Time Position Adcant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct the PRO to perform SO 35.6.A-2 'Placing the Standby Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Pump in Service" to place the 'A RBCCW pump in service and shutdown the 'B' RBCCW pump.
PRO Perform SO 35.6.A-2 "Placing the Standby Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Pump in Service."
- Review SO procedure, including prerequisites and precautions.
- Contact the Equipment Operator (EO) to perform SO 35.6.A-2 Step 4.1 to verify alignment, oil level, and vent the 'A TBCCW pump to verify it ready for start.
- PRO starts the 'A TBCCW pump and informs the EO.
- PRO stops the 'B' TBCCW pump and places it in AUTO (may choose to leave the pump in OFF due to impending maintenance).
- If directed by shift management, the PRO directs the EO to perform the RBCCW routine inspection.
- PRO informs the CRS of the pump swap and contacts the WCS.
URO Monitor plant parameters.
Peer check and assist as requested.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op lest No.: Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.:
2 Event
Description:
Power Ascension with Control Rods Page 2of10 Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Directs the URO to commence rod withdrawal in accordance with the Startup REMA and the Startup Sequence beginning with Rod Sequence step 15, Rod 18-35.
URO Commence rod withdrawal beginning with Sequence Step 15, Rod 18-35.
Coordinate with the 2nd Verifier communicating:
0 Rod Selected 0 Switch Selection and direction of motion 0 Target Rod Position.
Withdraw control rods by selecting the rod on the matrix and then using the Single Notch Withdrawal switch to withdraw control rods.
PRO Monitor balance of plant conditions during rod withdrawal.
NOTE Scenario will continue when the evaluators are satisfied with their observation of the reactivity manipulation.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 1 EventNo.: 3 Page 3of10
.. Event
Description:
Trip of the running ESW Pump and Failure of the Auto-Start on the Standby Pump.
Cause:
Contact Failure in the Pump Control Test Switch Effects:
Position Causes a trip of the running ESW Pump, the Standby Pump will fail to auto start and must be manually started by the operator.
Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize by reporting A EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP (002 8-5) Annunciator is alarming.
Recognize by reporting that the A ESW Pump is tripped.
Recognize by reporting that the B ESW Pump failed to auto start.
Enter and execute the Alarm Response Card (ARC) for 002 8-5.
Attempt a manual start of the B ESW Pump.
CRS Enter and execute the Alarm Response Card (ARC) for 002 6-5.
Direct a manual start of the B ESW Pump (note that the candidate may do this action before it is directed since it is the failure of an automatic action and is directed by the Alarm Response Card).
Direct troubleshooting of the issue.
Review Tech Spec 3.7.2:
Determine that the trip of the A ESW Pump is a condition A for one ESW subsystem inoperable.
Recognize that the failure to auto-start by the 6 ESW Pump is another condition A entry which requires that condition B entry based on both ESW subsystems being inoperable.
Ultimately this requires the plant to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
PRO/URO If directed, contact the Work Week ManagedOutage Control Center (or others) to assist in troubleshooting the ESW Failures.
PRO/URO If directed, coordinate EOs to investigate the loss ESW.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #1 Event No.: 4 Page 4 of 10 Event
Description:
SBLC Tank High Temperature.
Cause:
Heater switch failed leaving heater energized after it should have shutdown.
Effects:
With tank temperature >120°F, SBLC must be considered INOP.
Time Position Adcant's Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize by reporting STANDBY LIQUID OR PIPE HI-LO TEMP (21 1 J-3) annunciator is alarming.
URO Enter and execute ARC 21 1 J-3 0
0 0
Dispatch an operator to check tank temperature locally.
Report tank temperature to CRS.
Direct operator to verify that the heater is NOT on and the control switch is in auto.
PRO Determine the power supply to the SBLC Tank Heater and report it to the CRS.
CRS Direct that the Tank Heater be deenergized.
Reference Tech Spec 3.1.7 and recognize that with 123°F tank temperature, SBLC must be considered INOP.
Tech Spec 3.1.7, Condition C applies requiring temperature to be restored in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
PRO Direct the EO to deenergize the tank heater using switch #52-3604 on E-124-R-C.
URO/PRO Recognize by reporting that the tank heater is off when STANDBY LIQUID TANK HEATER POWER OFF (21 1 5-4) annunciator is received.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No. #1 Event No.:
5 Page 5of10 Event
Description:
Small Recirc Rupture Cause:
Small Recirc Rupture results in Drywell temperature and pressure rising but not fully depressurizing the RPV.
Automatic Actions:
'Drywell Hi-Lo Press" alarms (210 F-2,225 A-4)
High Drywell Pressure Scram Signal, Isolations, Diesel and HPCl auto starts.
Effects:
Rising drywell pressure indicated. Manual scram at 1.2 psig or auto scram at 2 psig with isolations, HPCl and diesel starts.
Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize Drywell High Pressure alarms 0 Recognize that Drywell pressure is going up and announce entry into OT-101 for High Drywell Pressure.
0 Trend the Drywell Pressure Increase CRS Enter/direct actions in accordance with OT-101, High Drywell Pressure:
0 Verify that Drywell lnerting is not in progress 0 Direct placing additional drywell cooling in service.
0 Directs actions to monitor components e.g., RRP seals.
0 Directs crew to isolate and restore systems IAW OT-101 to stop the source of the leak. OT-101 systems include: RWCU, HPCl and RCIC.
URO/PRO Perform OT-101 actions as directed:
0 Monitor drywell pressure and plant parameters.
0 If directed, verify that inerting is not in progress.
If directed, place additional drywell cooling in service.
0 Monitor components for abnormal indications as directed by the CRS.
0 Isolate plant systems to include RWCU, HPCI, RCIC as directed by the CRS IAW OT-101.
CRS Directs a GP-4 Manual Scram when drywell pressure reaches 1.2 psig.
c Op Test No.:
Scenario No. #l Event
Description:
Time Position URO PRO URO PRO CRS Operator Actions ES-D-2 EventNo.: 5 Page 6 of 10 Small Recirc Rupture (Continued)
Amticants Actions Or Behavior Performs GP-4 Manual Scram actions:
0 Places the Mode Switch to Shutdown.
0 Verify Rods inserting 0
Manually control the Reactor Feed Water System to control Reactor Level
+ Pressing Emergency Stop for the C RFP
+ Shut MO-2149C the C RFP discharge valve
+ Open MO-8090 the Startup Level Controller isolation 0
Verify APRMs are downscale and report to the CRS.
0 Verify all control rods inserted and report to the CRS.
Performs scram actions 0
Verify all isolations.
0 Restore Instrument Nitrogen to the DW when directed by the CRS.
Recognize by reporting entry into T-102, Primary Containment Control when Dryell Pressure exceeds 2 psig.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.: 6 Page 7 of 10 Event
Description:
Five Rods stick full out during the scram.
Cause:
Effects:
Time Rods are mechanically stuck in the full out position.
ATWS actions must be completed for the stuck control rods.
This will require injection to be terminated and prevented prior to completing a RPV Blowdown.
Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior CT URO Recognize by reporting that NOT all control rods inserted on the scram.
CRS Direct that the control rods be manually inserted using T-220, Driving Control Rods during a scram. (T-216, Control Rod Insertion by Manual Scram or Individual Scram Test Switches, OR T-246, Maximizing CRD Flow to the Reactor Vessel, OR T-215, Control Rod Insertion by Withdrawal Line Venting are also appropriate but T-220 is typically directed first because it is the most expedient method to insert a few control rods that failed to scram.)
URO Attempt insertion of the control rods by the method specified by the CRS.
For T-220:
0 Place the CRD Flow Control in MANUAL and open the Flow Control Valve Fully OR Direct an Operator to close HV-2-3-56, the Charging Wtr Hdr Blk Vv to Hydraulic Control Units.
Request permission and by pass the Rod Worth Minimizer.
0 Attempt to insert the rods using the Emergency In/Notch Override Switch.
0 Report to the CRS the inability to insert the control rods.
PRO Note that the PRO will be required to perform T-240, Termination and Prevention of Injection into the RPV, later in the scenario as a result of this ATWS condition.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.: 7 Page 8 of 10 Event
Description:
Drywell Spray Logic failure prevents containment spray.
Cause:
Automatic Actions:
Failed Containment Spray Ovemde 2/3 Core Coverage switch (Si 8) prevents spray valve operation.
2 psig isolations, HPCl auto start, emergency diesel starts.
Drywell pressure continues to rise above 2 psig and requires the crew to perform an Emergency Blowdown when drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 281 O F.
Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and respond to 2 psig drywell pressure and announce entry into T-1 01 and T-102:
0 Recognize and verify Group 11/111 isolations.
0 Recognize and verify Diesel Generator starts and has cooling water.
0 Recognize and report the HPCl auto start if it has not been previously 0 Trend and report containment parameters.
identified by the CRS.
CRS Recognize and respond to 2 psig drywell pressure and announce entry into T-101 and T-102:
0 Reenter T-101. RPV Control, and enter T-102, Primary Containment Verify adequate level and may direct either a HPCl shutdown or Performs an isolation or shutdown of HPCl as directed by the CRS.
0 Control.
isolation.
PRO For an isolation, depress the HPCl isolation pushbutton and verify that HPCl shuts down and and the HPCl Steam Line Isolation Valves close.
For a HPCl shutdown, trip HPCI, verify that the HPCl aux oil pump starts as required, and place the HPCl Aux Oil Pump in Pull to Lock when HPCl stops rotating.
0 CRS Directs T-102 actions:
0 Directs Torus sprays IAW T-203 using 'B Loop RHR 0 Directs T-223 actions to restore drywell ventilation.
0 Trends containment parameters specifically drywell pressure and bulk average temperature.
Time Position PRO Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.:
7 (continued)
Page 9of10 Event
Description:
Drywell Spray Logic prevents containment spray (continued)
Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior Perform Torus Sprays IAW T-203, Initiation of Torus Sprays using RHR:
a Open the MO-39BI Torus Hdr. Valve.
a Open the MO-89D HPSW Outlet Valve.
a With CRS permission, place the S18B switch in Manual Override.
Momentarily place the S17B switch in "MAN".
a Start the "D" HPSW Pump 0
Start the 'D" RHR Pump 0
Recognize by reporting to the CRS the failure of the logic that prevents Torus (or Drywell) Sprays from being placed in service.
URO/PRO CRS CRS URO URO/PRO CRS URO/PRO CT CRS URO PRO CT PRO Recognize and report Containment parameters:
a Bulk Drywell temperature at 145°F and entry into T-102.
Re-enters T-102 on Bulk Average temperature 145°F Continues T-101 Actions:
Directs RPV level controlled +5 to +35 inches Maintains RPV level using additional feedwater that is required to keep up with the recirc leak.
Trend and report containment parameters.
Directs URO/PRO to perform T-223, Drywell Cooler Fan Bypass, to Bypass and restore drywell ventilation.
Performs T-223:
0 Directs EO to place drywell fans in slow.
a Verifies T-223 requirements.
When Drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 281 O F, the CRS directs:
0 T-240, Terminate and Prevent Injection into the RPV (due to the 5 rod ATWS).
a T-112, Emergency Blowdown.
When directed, perform T-240 to Terminate and Prevent Injection into the RPV.
a Verify that HPCl is not injecting.
0 Shutdown any running Reactor Feedwater Pumps by depressing the trip pushbuttons.
a Contact the floor operator and direct the isolation of Stayfull from RHR and Core Spray. (This step does not need to be complete prior to the blowdown.)
When directed, performs a Emergency Blowdown by opening all five ADS valves.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.:
7 (continued)
Page 10 of 10 Event
Description:
Drywell Spray Logic prevents containment spray (continued)
Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO Control Reactor level as directed following the blowdown. (Note that level will swell high during the actual blowdown).
TERMINATION CRITERIA Scenario may be terminated when a plant depressurization has been performed.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
Classify this condition as an ALERT (FAl)
Scenario Outline ES-D-1 4
Op Test No.
Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No.
- 2 Examiners operators CRS PRO URO Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 100% power with a RClC surveillance in progress. Following the RClC testing, the crew is to commence a GP-3, Normal Plant Shutdown.
After the RClC turbine is started, a low lube oil pressure alarm is received (similar to a recent Peach Bottom HPCl event). The crew will shutdown RClC and complete a Tech Spec interpretation. The crew will then commence a GP-3, Normal Plant Shutdown. After the reactivity manipulation has been observed, the running Control Rod Drive pump will trip. The crew will pursue the issue using ON-107, Loss of CRD Regulating function. The inability to restore either CRD pump for 20 minutes after CRD Charging Header pressure drops below 940 psig with two accumulator alarms, will result in a required Tech Spec scram.
When the RO attempts to shutdown the plant, an electrical ATWS will occur requiring entry into T-101, RPV Control. Shortly after tripping the recirculation pumps, the 'D' SRV will fail full open requiring entry into OT-114, Stuck Open Safety Relief Valve, and ultimately T-102, Primary Containment Control.
When the RO maximizes torus cooling, the 'A' Loop RHR Torus Cooling Valve (MO-39A) will trip on magnetic overcurrent resulting in no Torus Cooling on the 'A' Loop of RHR causing torus conditions continue to degrade. This will result in an entry into T-102, Primary Containment Control when 95°F is reached. When torus temperature cannot be maintained below 1 10°F, Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) will be attempted and the pumps will fail to start.
After level has been lowered to control power, the ATWS will be terminated by T-214, Venting the Scram Air Header. The scenario may be terminated after all control rods are verified inserted.
Initial Condition Turnover:
Event Malfunction Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description IC-1 22, 100% power with the 'B' loop of Torus Cooling in service.
See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet N
PRO Perform RClC Surveillance Test.
1 CRS Preinserted C
PRO RClC Low Lube Oil Pressure Alarm (Tech Spec).
2 Override on CRS Event Trigger R
URO Commence GP-3, Normal Plant Shutdown with Control Rods.
Overrides CRS CRH03 C
URO Loss of Control Rod Drive System pumps results in a Tech Spec required scram when it cannot be restored promptly (Tech Spec).
4 Preinserted M
PRO ElectricalATWS.
Preinserted C
URO Safety Relief Valve 'D fails open.
6 MSSOSD PRO
I I
Preinserted I C PRO I 'A' RHR Loop Torus Cooling valve fails closed limiting torus cooling.
R I 7 I Override I
Preinserted C
URO Standby Liquid Control Pumps fail to start.
8 SLCOl PRO I
1 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
PLANT CONDITIONS:
Unit 2 at 100% Power ST-0-13-301-2, the RClC Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test has been completed through step 6.3.14.
0 GP-3, Normal Plant Shutdown has been completed through step 6.4.
INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:
0 RClC is currently available, but not operable until post maintenance testing is complete. RClC has been inoperable for over 13 days due to maintenance.
SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
Perform ST-0-13-301-2, the RClC Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test beginning with step 6.3.15.
0 After the RClC surveillance is complete, begin a shutdown using GP-3 Shutdown starting with step 6.5 and the existing Shutdown Sequence. The reactivity briefing has already been completed for this evolution and the Reactor Engineers will return to provide support after power has been lowered to 90% using the provided shutdown rod sequence.
SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
ST-0-13-301-2, the RClC Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
GENERAL INFORMATION:
0 A RClC system outage has just been completed and it is due back in service no later than end of shift. RClC requires the completion of ST-0-13-301-2, the RClC Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test to demonstrate operability. This ST has been completed through step 6.3.14. The B Loop of Torus cooling has been placed in service in support of this test.
A Fourth RO will be completing Torus Temperature Monitoring using Data Sheet 8 of ST-0 301-2.
Station management has determined that Unit 2 will be shutdown following the RClC surveillance.
The reactivity briefing has already been completed for this evolution and the Reactor Engineers will return to provide support after power has been lowered to 90% using the provided shutdown rod sequence.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.:
- 2 Event No.:
1 Page 1 of9 Event
Description:
Perform the RClC Pump, Valve, Flow and Cooling Unit Functional Test.
Cause:
None Automatic Actions:
None Effects:
None Time Position Applicant% Actions Or Behavior CRS 0
Reviews the RClC Surveillance Test and directs the completion of the RClC surveillance test beginning with step 6.3.15.
PRO Start the RCIC pump by:
0 INITIATE AND TIME RClC quick start by opening MO-2-13-131, RClC 0 OPEN MO-2-13-132, the RClC Cooling Water Valve.
0 Adjust FC-2-13-091 between 600 and 61 5 gpm AND Throttle MO 0 Stop the stopwatch when the desired flow and pressure are obtained.
0 Verlfy that MO-2-13-027, the RClC Min. Flow Valve doses 0 Record the initial system parameters on Data Sheet 2 (RCIC may be Supply and starting the stopwatch.13-030 to obtain desired flow rate greater than 600 gpm and discharge pressure of greater than 1090 psig.
automatically.
shutdown before readings are taken).
URO Monitor plant parameterdassist as directed or requested.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.:
- 2 EventNo.:
2 Page 2 o f 9 Event
Description:
Cause:
Automatic Actions:
Effects:
Time Position PRO CRS PRO PRO URO CRS RClC Low Lube Oil Pressure Alarm (Tech Spec)
None None RClC must be shutdown and becomes inoperable.
Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize by reporting RClC TURB BEARING OIL LO PRESS (222 A-
- 3) annunciator.
Enter and execute the Alarm Response Card for 222 A-3.
0 0
0 Direct that the RClC Turbine be shutdown using SO 13.2.A-2, RClC System Shutdown.
Direct monitoring of RClC Bearing Temperatures Direct troubleshooting of the RClC Turbine Shutdown the RClC turbine (Note that the candidate may immediately manually trip RClC and then follow-up with the procedure or may obtain the procedure prior to a shutdown).
0 Trip the RClC turbine by depressing the Trip Pushbutton.
0 Verify closed MO-2-13-021, To Feed Line 0
Close MO-2-13-131, Supply 0
Verify the following:
+ AO-2-13-03, Drain Isolation to Main Condenser OPEN
+ AO-2-13-035, Drain Isolation to Main Condenser OPEN
+ MO-2-13-132, Cooling Water CLOSES Place MO-4487, Trip Throttle Valve to CLOSE, then back to OPEN (may leave tripped due to Lube Oil Failure).
0 Contact Equipment Operators and/or the Work Week Managerloutage Control Center to troubleshoot RCIC.
Monitor Balance of plant and assist as requested.
Recognize that Tech Specs must be evaluated.
Tech Spec 3.5.3 Condition A requires that RClC be restored in 14 days, however, the plant is already 13 days into the RClC spec so time will elapse at the end of shift.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 2 Event No.:
3 Page 3of9 Event
Description:
Commence GP-3, Normal Plant Shutdown with Control Rods Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct initiating a GP-3 Shutdown to 90% power using Control Rods.
URO Commence driving Control Rods in accordance with the Shutdown Sequence.
0 Select the appropriate Control Rod.
0 Perform verification with second verifier including
+ Rod Selected
+ Current Position and Target Position
+ Switch to be moved and direction.
0 Place the Rod Movement switch to IN and hold until the rod is full in.
0 Monitor rod position and release the switch when it is full in.
0 Move to next rod after settle function is complete.
PRO Monitor Plant conditions and assist if required.
NOTE:
Scenario can move forward anytime the evaluators are satisfied with their evaluation of the reactivity manipulation.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 EventNo.: 4 Page 4 o f 9 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #2 Event
Description:
Loss of Control Rod Drive System results in a Tech Spec required scram when it cannot be restored promptly. (Tech Spec)
Cause:
CRD Pumps trip in instantaneous ground overcurrent (Relay 150G)
Automatic Actions:
Alarms 21 1 F-1 Effects:
CRD Pump A trips, CRD Pump B cannot be started, a Tech Spec Shutdown will be required.
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize by reporting A CRD WATER PUMP TRIP (21 1 F-1) and A CRD WATER PUMP OVLD (211 F-2).
CRS PRO Enter and execute Alarm Response Cards (ARC) 21 1 F-1 and 21 1 F-2.
PRO Direct an EO to check the breaker for relay flags.
CRS PRO Regulating Function (ON-107).
URO Recognize by reporting that an entry condition exists for the Loss of CRD CRS Enter and execute ON-107, Loss of CRD Regulating Function.
0 Direct placing the B CRD Pump in service.
0 Direct shutting down the Reactor Water Cleanup System.
PRO URO Start the B CRD Pump using SO-3.1.B-2, CRD Hydraulic System Startup with the System Filled and Vented.
0 Dispatch an operator to perform the pre-startup checks for the B CRD Pump using step 4.1 of the SO procedure 0
Place the CRD Flow Control Valve controller in Manual and close the valve.
0 Verify MO-2-3-20, Drive Water Header Pressure Valve, is open 0
Verify the Reactor Recirc Pump Seal Purge is isolated by shutting MO-2-2A-8029A and B.
0 Attempt to start the B CRD Pump 0
Recognize by reporting the failure of the B CRD Pump to start.
URO PRO Shutdown the RWCU system by tripping the running pump and then shutting the MO-15, MO-18, and MO-68 Isolation Valves.
Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #2 EventNo.: 4 Page 5of9 ES-D-2 Event
Description:
Time Position CRS URO CRS CRS PRO CRS URO CT URO CRS PRO URO Loss of Control Rod Drive System results in a Tech Spec required scram when it cannot be restored promptly. (Tech Spec)
Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Monitor Charging Water Header Pressure and when it drops to 940 psig and accumulator alarms for withdrawn control rods.
Monitor and report Charging Water Header Pressure and Accumulator Alarms as directed by the CRS.
When Charging Water Header Pressure drops to 940 psig AND two or more accumulator alarms exist on withdrawn control rods, THEN start a 20 minute clock until a Reactor Scram is required.
Direct that house loads be transferred (this can be directed in anticipation of the plant shutdown, or completed as a part of the GP-4 Shutdown).
When directed, transfer house loads in accordance with RRC 53.1-2, Unit 2 House Loads Transfer During a Plant Event.
For each 13 KV bus:
0 Install the sync switch key in the normal off-site source and turn it on.
0 Close the selected off-site source breaker 0
Verify that the associated Generator breaker trips.
0 Turn off the synch key.
0 Repeat for the other 13 KY bus.
0 Remove the alternate off-site breakers from Pull To Lock.
When it is determined that CRD cannot be restored before 20 minutes elapses after Charging Water Header Pressure drops to 940 psig concurrent with two or more accumulator alarms on withdrawn control rods, then direct a GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram.
Perform a GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram 0
0 Run Recirculation Pumps to minimum speed.
Immediately place the Mode Selector Switch in Shutdown Recognize by reporting that the reactor did NOT scram.
Recognize by reporting an entry condition into T-1 01, RPV Control.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #2 Event No.:
5 Page 6 o f 9 Event
Description:
Cause:
Automatic Actions:
Effects:
Time Position CRS CT URO CRS PRO Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)
Scram Condition With Power Above 4% or Unknown.
None.
Requires the crew to take actions to terminate the ATWS, as well as enter T-117 LeveVPower Control.
Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Direct T-1 01, RC/Q ATWS actions:
0 Initiation of ARI.
0 Trip Recirc pumps at least 10 seconds apart.
0 T-213, "Deenergize Scram Solenoids".
T-214, Vent Scram Air Header". (This direction is critical because it is 0 T-220, 'Drive Rods".
0 Enter T-117, 'LeveVPower Control".
Performs T-101, RC/Q actions when directed:
the only success path to insert control rods during the ATWS.)
Initiates ARI. Report to the CRS that it was not successful.
Trips Recirc pumps at least 10 seconds apart.
Direct an Equipment Operator to perform T-213. Attempts URO portion of T-213. Reports to the CRS that it was not successful.
Direct an Equipment Operator to perform T-214.
Performs T-220 to insert control rods.
Direct T-117 actions:
0 Inhibit ADS.
0 T-221, '8ypass the MSlV -1 60 inch Isolation".
Lower RPV level to below -60 inches by terminating and Preventing RPV injection using T-240.
Performs T-117 actions when directed:
0 Inhibits ADS.
0 Directs Equipment Operator to perform T-221, Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass, to keep the MSlVs open as level is lowered.
0 Performs T-240. Controls RPV level below -60" and within the specific RPV level band directed by the CRS.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #2 Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
Cause:
Automatic Actions:
Effects:
Time Position URO/PRO CRS URO/PRO PRO PRO URO/PRO CRS Safety Relief Valve 'D' inadvertently fails open.
Page 7 o f 9 Mechanical drift of relief valve setpoint.
Alarms 210 D-2, 'SAFETY RELIEF VALVE OPEN" and 227 84,
'BLOWDOWN RELIEF VALVES HI TEMP".
Loss of Generator Load, steamflow/feedflow mismatch, heat input to the primary containment. SRV will later close when pressure lowers to 800 psig.
Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize, report, and take actions IAW ARC 210 0-2, 'Safety Relief Valve Open", and ARC 227 8-4, 'Blowdown Relief Valves Hi Temp".
Enter/direct actions IAW OT-114:
0 Lead crew in confirming an SRV is open.
0 Direct Torus Cooling to be maximized.
0 Direct attempts to close the 'D' SRV.
Confirm that the 'D' SRV is open IAW OT-114.
Place RHR in Torus Cooling IAW RRC 10.1-2, 'RHR System Torus Cooling During a Plant Event", when directed by the CRS and monitor Torus temperature.
Cycle the 'D' SRV control switch when directed by the CRS.
Coordinate removal of fuses by Equipment Operators and monitor valve status during attempts to close the 'D' SRV. Communicate to the CRS that the 'D' SRV has NOT closed.
Declare the SRV Inoperable AND verify compliance with Tech Spec 3.4.3. (Since adequate SRVs available, this Tech Spec call will likely be delayed due to the transient condition)
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 2 Event No.: 7 Page 8of9 Event
Description:
A Loop RHR Torus Cooling valve MO-39A trips on magnetic overcurrent reducing the effectiveness of Torus Cooling.
Cause:
Automatic Actions:
Effects:
Time Position CRS PRO URO CRS PRO PRO CRS NOTE CRS PRO CT Magnetic Overcurrent of MO-39A Valve trips and cannot be opened.
Torus cooling is unavailable on the A Loop of RHR.
Applicants Actions Or Behavior Recognize by reporting entry into T-102, Primary Containment Control on High Torus Temperature of 95°F.
Enter and execute T-102:
0 Direct that Torus Cooling be maximized.
Establish maximum Torus Cooling:
0 Stroke open MO-39 A and B, RHR Torus Cooling Header Valves.
0 Stroke open MO-89 A and D, RHR Heat Exchanger HPSW Outlet Valves.
Recognize by reporting the failure of the MO-39A valve to open.
Complete lineup of B Torus Cooling by:
0 Starting the D HPSW Pump.
0 Starting the D RHR Pump.
0 Opening MO-34B, Full Flow Test Valve.
0 Starting the B HPSW Pump.
Opening MO-89B, HPSW Outlet Valve.
0 Starting the B RHR Pump.
Direct troubleshooting of the MO-39A valve.
This valve NOT opening will result in a significant loss of Torus Cooling capability causing the torus to heat up more rapidly, complicating the transient for the operators.
When Torus Temperature reaches 1 1 OOF, directs the PRO to perform T-240 again to lower level until it reaches the T-240 Figure 2 conditions.
Performs T-240 again to meet Figure 2 requirements. Specifically, RPV level is lowered and injection restored when any of the following are reached:
- RPV level reaches -1 72 inches or
- Reactor power drops below 4% or
- All SRVs remain closed and Drywell pressure drops below 2 psig.
PRO controls level manually as directed by the CRS to prevent dropping level below -226 inches (a3 Core Coverage).
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 2 Event No.:
8 Page 9 o f 9 Event
Description:
Standby Liquid Control Pumps fail to start.
Cause:
SBLC Pumps fail due to a common mode breaker failure.
Effects:
SBLC Pumps are not available.
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct initiation of SBLC at or before 110°F is reached in the Torus.
URO/PRO Initiate SBLC Place the SBLC switch to either 'System A" or 'System B" Recognize by reporting the Standby Liquid Control Pump failure to start.
Attempt the initiation with the other system.
Recognize by reporting that it is also failed.
CRS Direct alternate methods of SBLC Injection. These could be any of the following:
T-210, CRD System SBLC Injection T-211, CRD System Non-enriched Boric Acid and Borax Injection T-212, RWCU System SBLC Injection PRO URO directed by the CRS.
Direct Equipment Operators to perform alternate SBLC injection as NOTE The failure of SBLC to inject will significantly complicate the transient by ensuring that the operators must lower level to control power.
URO Recognizes 'Scram Valve Pilot Air Header Press Lo" (21 1 D-2) alarm and/or control rods inserting due to T-214 and informs the CRS.
URO Verifies all control rods inserted and informs the CRS.
CRS Determines the ATWS is terminated, exits T-117 Level /Power Control and enters T-101 RC/L:
0 Directs PRO to restore level to +5 to +35 inches.
0 Directs restoration actions.
CRS Exit T-117 Direct that level be restored to a normal level band.
PRO Restore level band as directed by the CRS TERMINATION CRITERIA The Scenario may be terminated when all rods have been inserted and reactor level is being controlled above the top of active fuel.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
Classify as a Site Area Emergency (MS4) (or a General Emergency (MG4) if level drops below -195".)
Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No.
- 3 Op Test No.
Examiners Operators CRS PRO URO Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 95% power. The turnover directs the crew to swap Control Rod Drive (CRD) Flow Control Valves when maintenance is ready to observe operation of the standby valve.
Shortly after assuming the shift, a Drywell Pressure Instrument will fail upscale without inserting the appropriate half reactor scram. The crew will apply tech specs and insert the half scram using GP-25, Installation of Trips/lsolations to satisfy Tech SpedTRM Requirements. After the scram is inserted, maintenance will call requesting that the CRD flow control valve be swapped to the standby valve. When it is swapped, it will be recognized that the standby valve is failed open and CRD will be swapped back to the original flow controller. When the swap is complete, a single control rod will begin to drift. The crew will enter ON-121, Drifting Control Rod and drive the rod in. A fast power reduction to 950 Mwe will be required due to the drifted control rod. Again, the crew will review and apply the tech spec requirements for these conditions.
A leak develops in the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System and the crew will enter T-103, Secondary Containment Control. The RWCU valves cannot be isolated and a T-I 12, Emergency Depressurization will be required when max safe temperatures are exceeded in two areas. If the Bypass Jack is attempted for a normal or a rapid depressurization, it will fail to function. When the manual blowdown is initiated, the 'C' SRV will not open, requiring the crew to open an alternate SRV.
Initial Condition Turnover:
Event Malfunction Event
. Event IC-123, 95% Power, Full Power Rod Pattern See Attached "Shift Turnover Sheet No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
Overrides URO Drywell Pressure Instrument fails upscale without the expected half PRO scram (Tech Spec).
CRS N
URO SwaD Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valves.
2 1
PRO I CRS 3
CRH03B PRO CRS 4
PRO CRS URO 5
PRO CRS 6
PRO CRS 7
Overrides PRO CRS 8
Overrides PRO CRS Preinserted C
URO Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valve Fails Open.
CRH043035 C
URO Single Control Rod Drifts (Tech Spec).
R Fast Power Reduction due to the Drifting Control Rod.
RWCOG M
URO RWCU Leak in the Reactor Building.
Preinserted C
URO RWCU Isolation Valves Fail Open.
Preinserted I
URO Bypass Jack Control Fails.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:
Unit 2 at 95% rated power operation due to a Minimum Generation Emergency.
Power was reduced from full power using only recirculation flow in accordance with Reactor Engineer Guidance.
INOPERABLE EQUIPMENTILCOs:
SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
0 SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
Swap Control Rod Drive (CRD) Flow Control Valves ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
GENERAL INFORMATION:
0 The crew is to swap CRD Flow Control Valves from the AO-19A to the AO-19B using SO 3.6.0-2, "CRDH System Flow Control Valve Swapping", when maintenance reports that they are standing by to observe the function of the AO-19B.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.:
- 3 EventNo.: 1 Page 1 of9 Event
Description:
Drywell Pressure Instrument fails upscale without the expected half scram (Tech Spec).
Cause:
PIS-2-5-12A Fails Upscale Automatic Actions:
DRYWELL HI PRESS TRIP (210 F-1)
RPSIPCIS TRIP UNITS IN CALIBRATION OR GROSS FAILURE (210 D-4)
Drywell pressure instrument fails high in gross failure and half scram fails to occur as expected.
7 Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize by reporting the DRYWELL HI PRESSURE TRIP (210 F-1)
URO PRO Enter and execute the ARC for 21 0 F-1.
CRS Enter and execute the ARC for 21 0 F-1.
Direct an EO to check the instrument racks in the Reactor Building to determine the cause of the trip.
PRO Contact an EO to investigate the trip.
CRS PRO a RPS half scram.
URO Recognize by reporting that the DW Pressure instrument failed to cause CRS Consult Tech Specs for RPS and PCIS:
0 TS 3.3.1.1 0
TS 3.3.6.2 Recognize that trips must be installed in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> NOTE Crew may consult GP-25, but the required trips do not need to be installed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
ES-D-2 Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 3 Event No.:
2 Page 2of9 Event
Description:
Cause:
Automatic Actions:
Effects:
Time Position CRS URO PRO NOTE Swap Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valves None None Manual Operator actions.
Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior Direct the UROlPRO to coordinate with the Equipment Operator (EO) to swap CRD Flow Control Valves in accordance with SO 3.6.0-2, Section 4.1.
Swap CRD Flow Control Valves (FCV) in accordance with SO 3.6.D-2, Section 4.1 0
Direct the EO to perform Steps 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2 0
Place CRD FCV Controller in 'Manual" and adjust to zero.
0 Direct the EO to place the local flow control station selector switch in the valve 'B" position.
The Flow Control Valve Failure can be identified as failed anytime after the 'B" position is selected and the operator attempts to control the FCV with the manual controller.
See Event #2 for details on the failed Flow Control Valve actions.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 3 Event No.:
3 Page 3 o f 9 Event
Description:
Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valve Fails Open Cause:
Automatic Actions:
The standby flow control valve is failed open, which will be noted when it is placed in service.
Flow control valve position indication in the control room will indicate a solid red light with the green light off, indicating the valve is full open with the manual controller set to full closed.
Effects:
Indicated flow will rise to greater than the flow setpoint.
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior URO PRO Recognize by reporting the failed open Flow Control Valve (FCV).
CRS Direct swapping back to the 'A" Flow Control Valve.
URO PRO Swap CRD FCV using S03.6.D-2, Section 4.2:
0 Direct the Equipment Operator (EO) to perform steps 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2.
0 Place the CRD FCV Controller in 'Manual" and adjust to zero.
0 Direct the EO to place the local FCV station selector in the 'A" position.
0 Open the FCV to 55 - 65 gpm.
0 Place the CRD FCV Controller in 'Automatic" and verify flow.
0 Direct the EO to perform steps 4.2.5.1 and 4.2.5.2.
0 Perform Section 4.1 of the CRD routine inspection.
0 Direct the EO to perform Section 4.3 of the CRD routine inspection.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #3 Event No.: 4 Page 4 o f 9 Event
Description:
Cause:
Automatic Actions:
Effects:
Single Control Rod Drifts.
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Fails permitting the rod to drift.
ROD DRIFT (21 1 D-4)
Control Rod 30-35 Begins to Drift.
Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior CT URO Recognize by reporting ROD DRIFT (21 1 0-4) 0 Determine which rod is drifting Enter ON-121. Drifting Control Rod CRS Enter and execute ON-121, Drifting Control Rod.
0 Direct that an EO be sent to investigate.
0 Direct that the control rod be selected and driven full in.
PRO Direct an EO to investigate the HCU.
URO Select Control Rod 30-35 Drive the Control Rod full in and hold for 30 seconds.
CRS Direct a power reduction to 950 W e using GP-9-2, Fast Power Reduction.
URO Reduce power with Recirculation to 950 W e. (See event #5 for details of the power reduction.)
CRS Reference Tech Spec 3.1.3 and declare the Control Rod Inoperable.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No. #3 Event No.:
5 Page 5 o f 9 Event
Description:
Fast Power Reduction due to drifting control rod Cause:
ON-121, Drifting Control Rod, action to place the plant in a safe power configuration.
Automatic Actions:
None Effects:
Power reduction reduces the flux preventing damage from the out of position rod until it can be evaluated by Reactor Engineering.
Time Position Apdicant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Directs the URO to perform a GP-9, Fast Power Reduction, to 950 Mwe.
URO Performs power reduction using Recirc flow to approximately 950 Mwe IAW GP-9 "Fast Power Reduction".
PRO Assists in the power reduction 0
0 Monitor Reactor Feed Pump Flows during the power drop and remove a Reactor Feed Pump from service, if required.
Maintain the Generator Auto-Manual Voltage Regulator
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #3 Event No.:
6 Page 6 o f 9 Event
Description:
Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) leak in the Reactor Building Cause:
Crack in RWCU line in the secondary containment.
u Automatic Actions:
Effects:
"High Area Temp" alarms (210 J-3)
Temperatures rise initially in the Reactor Building 165' Elevation Valve Pit and then spread throughout Reactor Building 165' Elevation.
Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO PRO Recognize by reporting a Potential T-103 Entry on High Temperature.
Verify which temperature point is alarming, confirm T-103 Entry, and inform the CRS.
URO PRO Monitor and trend Reactor Building conditions.
CRS Enter and execute T-103, Secondary Containment Control.
Direct a GP-15 "Local Evacuation" of the Reactor Building CRS Determine that a primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building.
Enter and execute T-101 'RPV Control" from T-103.
Direct a GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram.
Enter T-1 01, RPV Control from T-103.
PRO Conduct a GP-15 evacuation of the Reactor Building.
URO GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram Actions 0 Places the Reactor Mode switch to Shutdown.
0 Verfy control rods are inserting.
0 Verify that APRMs are downscale.
0 Establish and maintain RPV with feedwater.
0 Verify all control rods inserted.
0 Verify RPV pressure, trend and status of EHC.
CRS Direct URO to control level between +5 and +35 inches with Reactor Feedwater.
PRO Perform GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram Actions:
0 Transfer 13 KV House Loads.
0 Trip Main Turbine at 450 Mwe and verify the generator lockout.
0 Verify PClS isolations and SGTS initiation. (See Event #7 for RWCU 0 Verify Scram Discharge Vents and Drains are closed.
0 Verify Hydrogen Water Chemistry is isolated.
0 Verify Recirc pumps have runback to 30%.
0 Monitor Instrument Air header pressure and drywell pressure.
0 Restore Drywell Instrument N2 when directed by the CRS.
isolation failure actions).
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 3 Event No.:
7 Page 7of9 Event
Description:
RWCU Isolation Logic failure Cause:
Relay failures prevent a RWCU isolation Automatic Actions:
Effects:
Isolation is failed for RWCU MO-15, MO-18, and MO-68.
Operators attempt a manual isolation and the valves will not close.
Reactor Building conditions degrade requiring a RPV depressurization.
Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO 0 Recognize excessively high temperatures in the 165' Reactor Building Valve Pit.
0 Recognize by reporting that RWCU has not automatically isolated.
0 Attempt to manually dose the RWCU isolation valves by taking their control switches in the counter-clockwise direction to CLOSE.
CRS 0 Recognize excessively high temperatures in the 165' Reactor Building Valve Pit.
0 Directs the PRO to manually close the RWCU isolation valves (if it has not already been attempted).
URO PRO temperatures.
0 Monitor and trend degrading Reactor Building conditions and 0 Monitor for additional areas exceeding the Action levels.
0 Investigate the failed isolation valves.
0 Direct plant support personnel to troubleshoot and repair isolation valve failure.
CRS Recognizes temperatures in additional T-103 areas continue to rise.
Continue T-101 actions and directs the URO/PRO to begin a RPV depressurization <lOO°F (See Event M).
CRS If the crew has not yet identified the Bypass Jack Failure (Event 8), the CRS may direct a Rapid RPV depressurization with Bypass Valves in accordance with T-101, RPV Control Step RC/P-12 when he determines that the plant is approaching an Emergency Blowdown from T-103.
Note that this step is optional based on the CRS perception of the rate of rise in temperatures.
CT CRS Recognize two or more areas above the Action level and a primary system breach is in progress.
0 Directs T-112 Emergency Blowdown actions.
0 Directs the URO/PRO to open all ADS valves (See Event ##9).
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #3 EventNo.: 8 Page 8 o f 9 I
Event
Description:
Cause:
Automatic Actions:
Effects:
Time Position PRO URO PRO URO CRS URO PRO The Bypass Valve Jack Control fails to function Bypass Jack Control Failure None When the Bypass Jack use is attempted, for either cooldown or rapid depressurization, it will fail to operate.
Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior Attempt to open the Bypass Valve Jack as directed by the CRS for either a normal or a rapid depressurization.
Recognize by reporting the failure of the Bypass Jack.
0 Acknowledge the failure of the Bypass Valve Jack.
Direct that the normal depressurization be performed using Safety Relief Valves (SRVs).
Use SRVs to initiate a normal depressurization as directed by the CRS.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #3 Event No.: 9 Page 9of9 Event
Description:
ADS SRV fails to open on Emergency Blowdown Cause:
ADS solenoid failure.
Automatic Actions:
None Effects:
Only 4 ADS valves will initially open and operator action is required to open an additional SRV to accomplish the Blowdown as designed.
Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO 0
Opens all ADS valves by placing their hand switches to open as directed by the CRS.
0 Recognize by reporting that the 'C' ADS Safety Relief Valve failed to open.
CT CRS Reviews T-112 steps and directs an additional SRV opened to achieve 5 open SRVs.
PRO 0
Opens an additional non-ADS SRV 0
Verify 5 open SRVs and informs the CRS.
URO PRO Emergency Blowdown.
Control reactor level (which will initially swell very high) during the TERMINATION CRITERIA The scenario may be terminated after the Emergency Blowdown is initiated to depressurize the RPV.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
Classify the event as a Site Area Emergency (FS1)