UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
February 4, 2005
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2005-01:
HALON FIRE-EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM PIPING
INCORRECTLY CONNECTED
ADDRESSEES
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear reactors (except those who have permanently
ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor
vessel), research and test reactors, and fuel cycle facilities.
PURPOSE
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform
addressees of the potential generic issue of incorrectly connected piping in the halon
fire-extinguishing systems. It is expected that recipients will review the information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES
On January 12, 2005, the Callaway and Wolf Creek licensees notified the NRC Operations
Center (Event Notification 41326 and 41327) of incorrectly connected piping in the halon
fire-extinguishing systems at both facilities. The piping to the manual-pneumatic actuators in
the halon systems protecting safety-related equipment was found to be reversed. The
licensees implemented compensatory measures until the actuation piping was reconnected in
the proper configuration.
After reviewing the above events and as a result of being questioned by NRC inspectors, the
licensees of other nuclear power reactors checked the condition of the halon systems at their
facilities. Several licensees also found discrepancies in the configuration of the halon systems.
DISCUSSION
The halon fire-extinguishing system is used at many nuclear facilities to protect plant equipment
and rooms from the effects of a fire. Halon extinguishes the fire by interfering with the
combustion chemical reaction. A typical halon system has a bottle or series of bottles to deliver
the appropriate amount of gas to extinguish a fire. During the actuation sequence, the opening
of the manual-pneumatic actuator allows bottle pressure to pressurize the pilot manifold.
Pressurization of the pilot manifold causes the bottle cylinder valve or valves (for multi-bottle
systems) to open and allows the flow of halon into the distribution manifold and into the
protected enclosure.
Typically, each of the manual-pneumatic actuators have ports marked A and B, (see Figure 1).
The ports have specific requirements for connection to the pilot manifold (from port A) and to
the solenoid pilot valve assembly (from port B). In the improper configurations recently
identified, the actuation piping to ports A and B was reversed. Figure 2 is a diagram of a
correctly configured actuator.
Figure 1 - Manual-Pneumatic
Actuator
Figure 2 - Diagram
of Actuator Setup Improper configurations of the halon fire-extinguishing system could have adverse effects on
the system. The Callaway and Wolf Creek licensees contacted the vendor (Chemetron) to
assist in the assessment of the halon system with the piping to the actuator reversed. On
January 26, 2005, an NRC fire protection specialist observed the vendor perform a series of
tests with the actuator piped in both the correct and reversed configuration. With the piping to
the actuator reversed and based on the internal non-symmetric construction of the actuator, there was an approximate 2-second delay in the opening of the cylinder valve. This would
result in a 2-second delay in the delivery of halon gas to the affected equipment.
GENERIC IMPLICATIONS
Based on the above discussion, both carbon dioxide and halon fire-extinguishing systems that
are not properly configured have the potential to impact the extinguishing capability of the
system. Thorough inspection of the systems and adequate postmaintenance testing
procedures can help to ensure that the systems are properly configured.
CONTACT
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any
questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
/RA/
Patrick L Hiland, Chief
Reactor Operations Branch
Division of Inspection Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Daniel Frumkin, NRR
John Kramer, NRR
301-415-2280
301-415-1173 E-mail: dxf1@nrc.gov
E-mail: jgk@nrc.gov
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public website, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
ML050350091 DOCUMENT NAME: E:\\Filenet\\ML050350091.wpd
OFFICE
OES:IROB:DIPM
TECH EDITOR
SPSB:DSSA
BC:SPLB:DSSA
D:DSSA
NAME
JGKramer
PKlein
DMFrumkin
JNHannon
SCBlack
DATE
02/02/2005
02/02/2005
02/02/2005
02/03/2005
02/03/2005 OFFICE
RGN-IV
SC:OES:IROB:DIPM
C:IROB:DIPM
NAME
DDChamberlain
TReis
PLHiland
DATE
02/03/2005
02/04/2005
02/04/2005
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