ML042800230

Issuance of Amendment

ML042800230
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	12/21/2004
From:	Hopkins J NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD3
To:	Bezilla M First Energy Services
Hopkins J , NRR/DLPM, 301-415-3027
References
TAC MC0366
Download: ML042800230 (12)

Text

December 21, 2004 Mr. Mark B. Bezilla Vice President-Nuclear, Davis-Besse FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. MC0366)

Dear Mr. Bezilla:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 263 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated August 11, 2003, as supplemented January 9, May 3, and July 19, 2004.

This amendment relocates the TS requirement to leak rate test the enclosure for decay heat removal system valves DH-11 and DH-12 to the Technical Requirements Manual.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jon B. Hopkins, Senior Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate III Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-346

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 263 to License No. NPF-3

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page

ML042800230 (Letter) ML043640549 (Package)

ML04364 (Tech Specs)

OFFICE PM:PD3-2 LA:PD3-2 IROB OGC SC:PD3-2 NAME JHopkins PCoates TBoyce RHoefling GSuh DATE 12/06/04 12/03/04 12/06/04 12/16/04 12/17/04

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 cc:

Mary E. O'Reilly FirstEnergy Corporation 76 South Main St.

Akron, OH 44308 Manager - Regulatory Affairs First Energy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 Director Ohio Department of Commerce Division of Industrial Compliance Bureau of Operations & Maintenance 6606 Tussing Road P.O.Box 4009 Reynoldsburg, OH 43068-9009 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60523-4351 Michael A. Schoppman Framatome ANP 1911 N. Ft. Myer Drive Rosslyn, VA 22209 Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5503 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 Barry Allen, Plant Manager FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 5501 North State - Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 Dennis Clum Radiological Assistance Section Supervisor Bureau of Radiation Protection Ohio Department of Health P.O. Box 118 Columbus, OH 43266-0118 Carol OClaire, Chief, Radiological Branch Ohio Emergency Management Agency 2855 West Dublin Granville Road Columbus, OH 43235-2206 Zack A. Clayton DERR Ohio Environmental Protection Agency P.O. Box 1049 Columbus, OH 43266-0149 State of Ohio Public Utilities Commission 180 East Broad Street Columbus, OH 43266-0573 Attorney General Office of of Attorney General 30 East Broad Street Columbus, OH 43216 President, Board of County Commissioners of Ottawa County Port Clinton, OH 43252 President, Board of County Commissioners of Lucas County One Government Center, Suite 800 Toledo, Ohio 43604-6506 David Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Engineer Union of Concerned Scientists 1707 H Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20006 The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich, Member United States House of Representatives 14400 Detroit Avenue Lakewood, OH 44107 Mr. James P. Riccio Nuclear Policy Analyst Greenpeace 702 H. Street, NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20001 Paul Gunter Director Nuclear Watchdog Project Nuclear Information & Resource Service 1424 16th Street NW Suite 401 Washington, DC 20009 Mr. Lew W. Myers Chief Operating Officer First Energy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-346 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 263 License No. NPF-3 1.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (the licensee) dated August 11, 2003, as supplemented January 9, May 3, and July 19, 2004, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 263, are hereby incorporated in the license. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of the date of issuance. The implementation of this amendment shall include the relocation of certain technical specification requirements to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Technical Requirements Manual as described in the licensees application dated August 11, 2003, as supplemented January 9, May 3, and July 19, 2004, and evaluated in the staffs Safety Evaluation attached to this amendment.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Gene Y. Suh, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate III Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 21, 2004

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 263 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 DOCKET NO. 50-346 Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 263 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 11, 2003, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or the licensee) requested a change to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The proposed license amendment would relocate the requirement to leak rate test the watertight enclosure for decay heat removal system valves DH-11 and DH-12 from the TS to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).

The licensee submitted supplemental information by letters dated January 9, May 3, and July 19, 2004. The supplemental letters contained clarifying information and did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration determination and did not expand the scope of the original Federal Register notice.

2.0 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS The Commissions regulatory requirements related to the content of TS are set forth in Section 50.36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). This regulation requires that the TS include items in five specific categories. These categories include: 1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings; 2) limiting conditions for operation;

3) surveillance requirements; 4) design features; and 5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular TS to be included in a plants license.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) states:

Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.

The four criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) are used by the staff in reviewing whether a SR should be included in the TS to assure that limiting conditions for operation (LCO) are met.

The criteria are:

1.

Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

2.

A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis accident or transient analysis that assumes either the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

3.

A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design-basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

4.

A structure, system or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

3.0 EVALUATION The licensee modified the valve enclosure to improve its sealing capability during the last outage. Stainless steel plates (1/4 inch thick) were anchor-bolted to the walls and floor, expansion joints were installed, and welded construction was used for joints and seams of the new stainless steel liner. The new enclosure is an improvement over the previous enclosure.

The licensee requests to relocate to the TRM, TS Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.f. which states:

4.5.2 Each Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

f. By performing a vacuum leakage rate test of the watertight enclosure for valves DH-11 and DH-12 that assures the motor operators on valves DH-11 and DH-12 will not be flooded for at least 7 days following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA):

1.

At least once per 18 months.

2.

After each opening of the watertight enclosure.

3.

After any maintenance on or modification to the watertight enclosure which could affect its integrity.

The inspection port on the watertight enclosure may be opened without requiring performance of the vacuum leakage rate test, to perform inspections. After use, the inspection port must be verified as closed in its correct position. Provisions of TS 3.0.3 are not applicable during these inspections.

The only ECCS subsystem affected by valves DH-11 and DH-12 is the primary flow path for an active means of boron precipitation control (BPC), if required, post-LOCA. The valves do not affect the high pressure ECCS or the low pressure ECCS, which are the systems of concern for TS 3/4.5.2. Therefore, the SR for the watertight enclosure for DH-11 and DH-12 is not needed in TS for assuring...that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained... for the high pressure and low pressure ECCS.

An active means of BPC is either not needed or is a long-term cooling issue for many post-accident scenarios. Also, Davis-Besse has two credited flow paths for active means of BPC, only one of which uses valves DH-11 and DH-12. Finally, leakage of the enclosure does not result in a direct challenge to safety limits. Consequently, the staff concludes that the SR to leak rate test the valve enclosure is not necessary to be in TS to meet the requirement...that facility operation will be within safety limits....

With regard as to whether the SR is needed to be in TS to assure...that the limiting conditions for operation will be met, by letter dated May 3, 2004, the licensee provided information as to why the SR does not affect TS LCO 3.5.2.d. which states:

3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

d.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the borated water storage tank (BWST) on a safety injection signal and manually transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

The TS Bases associated with TS 3.5.2.d states that each ECCS subsystem consists of one high pressure injection train, one low pressure injection train (including the associated decay heat cooler), and the necessary piping, valves, instrumentation and controls to provide the required flow paths from the BWST or the containment emergency sump to the reactor vessel.

However, the ECCS suction flow path from either the BWST or the containment emergency sump does not go through valves DH-11 and DH-12.

From the above, the NRC staff has determined that TS 3.5.2.d will not be affected by the transfer of the surveillance to leak rate test the enclosure for valves DH-11 and DH-12.

Therefore, the staff concludes that Criteria 3, A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design-basis accident...

does not require the SR to remain in TS.

If this requested change is approved, the licensee intends to reduce the valve watertight enclosure leak rate test frequency from approximately every 18 months to approximately every 24 months by following the process established in 10 CFR 50.59. In order to fully evaluate the possible applicability of Criteria 4, which states that A structure, system or component which...

probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety, to this request for TS relocation, the NRC staff requested that the licensee address the impact the new BPC alignments, approved by amended exemption dated November 29, 2004 (ADAMS ML042590641), would have on the core damage frequency (CDF) and the large early release frequency (LERF) values in light of the anticipated reduction in the frequency of the surveillance interval for the watertight enclosure protecting valves DH-11 and DH-12.

By letter dated July 19, 2004 (Adams ML042040230), the licensee stated that it had performed an analysis to determine the impact of the surveillance interval being extended by 33 percent.

The analysis indicated that the effect of the change in surveillance frequency was less than 1x10-8 per reactor year on the CDF. The effect on LERF was not quantified, but the licensee stated that it was expected to be very small...because the reactor coolant system is depressurized and, at a minimum, the borated water storage tank would be injected. The licensee also stated that a previous calculation had shown that the LERF contribution for any BPC sequence was very small.

By letter dated July 23, 2004 (Adams ML042100246), the licensee provided information concerning the impact on risk due to the new BPC alignment path and revised procedure for BPC. As part of the response, the licensee provided justification for the timeliness of the existing auxiliary pressurizer spray path as the revised procedures back-up method by discussing the time frames for accident milestones, alarms and indications, primary method postulated failure, and initiation time for the back-up path. The licensee stated that the change in BPC alignment paths outweighs the change of reducing the surveillance frequency interval for the watertight valve enclosure such that CDF and LERF estimates are maintained or reduced.

Although the licensee did not quantify the benefit of the new BPC alignment path and revised procedure in terms of CDF and LERF, the NRC staff conservatively estimates that the impact is an improvement by a factor of at least 10, considering the new primary BPC alignment path versus the previous back-up path. Therefore, the NRC staff has determined that the new BPC alignment path and revised BPC procedure outweighs a reduction in surveillance frequency of 33 percent for the valve watertight enclosure such that CDF and LERF estimates are maintained or reduced. Additionally, the replaced back-up path, though no longer credited as part of the licensing basis, is still available as a third means of BPC, if necessary.

From the above, the staff has determined, based on Criteria 4, that the valve enclosure leak rate test requirements do not need to remain in TS. This determination is based, in part, on the current BPC alignment paths. If the alignment paths were to be changed, then risk would need to be reassessed to determine if the leak rate test requirements needed to be added back into TS based on Criteria 4. Although it is likely that any future change would decrease risk, since both credited BPC alignment paths have exemptions issued to approve them, then any future change would require either an exemption amendment or withdrawal and risk can be reviewed as part of any such action.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees request to relocate TS 4.5.2.f to the TRM and, based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed change is acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (68 FR 54750). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),

no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: F. Orr Date: December 21, 2004