ML042750521

Licensee Post Exam Comments & NRC Resolution (Folder 3)

ML042750521
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	08/23/2004
From:	Roush K PPL Generation
To:	D'Antonio J NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-387/04-302, 50-388/04-302, PLA-005802
Download: ML042750521 (64)

Text

Susquehanna Learning Center 707 Salem Boulevard P.O. Box 467 Benvick, PA 18603-0467 570-542-3353 August 23,2004 Mr. Joseph D'Antonio USNRC Chief Examiner USNRC Region 1 475 Allendale, Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Susquehanna Learning Center Post-Examination Materials PLA 005802 File AI 4-1 3D Dear Mr. D'Ant7mk-In accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG 1021, "Operating Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors" (Draft Revision 9) ES-501 "Initial Post-Examination Activities", the following materials are submitted in support of the Susquehanna Initial Licensing Examination that concluded on August 17,2004.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Form ES-403-1 'Written Examination Grading Quality Checklist

The graded, ORIGINAL, Written Examinations Two clean copies of each Applicant's Answer Sheet The MASTER Examination and Answer Key All questions asked by the Applicants during the administration of the examination and the Proctor's responses to those questions The Written Examination Seating Chart Requested modifications to the Written Examination Answer Key After the Written Examination was completed, the Applicants participated in a review session to determine if enhancements to the questions were necessary. Results of this review indicate several questions that should be enhanced (Questions 16,38,40,41,48,66,71,90,93, 97, and 100) prior to reuse. These questions are being tracked by the Corrective Action Program Item #599639.

Post-exam analysis indicates four potential RO generic Training Program weaknesses (Questions missed by 50 percent or more of the Applicants; Questions 2,32, 38, and a),

and two potential SRO generic Training Program weaknesses (Questions 97 and 99). Investigation of the potential generic weaknesses are being tracked by the Corrective Action Program Item #599636.

All individuals signed on to Form ES-201-3,

'I Examination Security Agreement", have not yet completed the post-examination signature. When Form ES-201-3, " Examination Security Agreement", has been completed, it will be forwarded to you, thus completing the necessary documentation for this Susquehanna Initial Licensing Examination.

If you have any questions, or require more information, please contact me at 570-542-3326 or Rich Brooks at 570-542-1 891.

+&-

K. M. Roush Manager - Nuclear Training Response: No

Enclosures:

See 1-7 above cc:

Ops Letter File Nuc Records - NUCPT rb post exam memo 08-18-04 RB/KM Wvah

Question 16 This question should be deleted from the test due to the question having no correct answer.

Choice A includes direction to close the RCIC MIN FLOW VALVE TO THE SUPP POOL (FV-149-F019). This valve should not be open in the test lineup presented in the question stem, and should be opened in accordance with EO-100-103, Step SP/L-4 as a means of adding water to the Suppression Pool. Thus Choice A is incorrect.

Choice B includes the direction to close the RHR LOOP A CROSSTIE VALVE (HV-15 1 -F01 OA). This valve should not be open at this time. If it was open and water was being directly pumped to Rad Waste, it would not match the stem conditions indicating a RHR leak into the reactor building with the sump pumps transferring the water to Rad Waste. Thus Choice B is incorrect.

Choices C and D both include direction to shutdown RCIC. Based on the low Suppression Pool level given in the stem, the candidate should recognize that entry into EO-100-103 is required and that when level cannot be maintained between 22 and 24 (level is currently 22 and lowering), one of the actions directed in step SPL-4 is to start the RCIC System and operate it in Min Flow to add water to the Suppression Pool. Thus Choices C and D are incorrect.

Choice D was the intended correct answer. The indications presented in the stem is a leak in the RHR system in the Reactor Building Pipeway. The leak in the pipeway would not cause a room flooded alarm but would cause the Reactor Building Sump pumps to run with a corresponding increase of inventory in Rad Waste. The correct actions for the indications would be to shutdown the RHR system to prevent inventory loss from the Suppression Pool.

The intended action in Choice D for RCIC would be correct if Suppression Pool water level were greater than 22 feet but indications provided in the stem show Suppression Pool water level at 22 feet and lowering. With water level at or greater than 22 feet the correct actions would be to shutdown RCIC with no Suppression Pool Cooling when RHR is shutdown to stop the leak. With water level at or greater than 22 feet in the Suppression Pool the actions dictated by EO-100-103 require using normal makeup to restore level. Using RCIC minimum flow to restore Suppression Pool Level is required by the EO-100-103 when Suppression Pool water level is below 22 feet. Since water level is at 22 feet and lowering it is necessary to use RCIC as a makeup source to restore Suppression Pool level. Since RCIC is required by the EOP Choice D is not a correct answer. (EOP flow chart and basis attached)

Since there is no correct answer, Question 16 should be deleted from the test.

SSES LOC 20 NRC Exam Flow Suppression Pool to

'Suppression Pool.

RClC is in-service for SO-I 50-002, "QUARTERLY RClC FLOb&VERIFICATION." ! Flnw CST tn CST I

I The Reactor Building Operator sent to investigate a Reactor Building Sump Alarm reports both Reactor Building Sump Pumps running.

In addition, the following alarm is received:

Indiratinn nf leak I

- AR-111-EO2, "SUPPRESSION POOL DIV 1 LO LEVEL."

Rad Waste Control Room Reports high influent to Radwaste Control Room Indications:

- Drywell Pressure 0.5 psig

- Suppression Chamber pressure 0.4 psig

- Suppression Pool Level

- Suppression Pool Temperature 84 O F Rising from 80 OF

- RHR Loop 'A Flow indication

- NO other Control Room Alarms

- All other Control Room indications are constant and consistent with 100% power.

Suppression Pool Level 22 feet

- E l less than 22 10,500 GPM Rising from 9,000 GPM The operator is required to enter EO-I 00-103, "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL", and:

A.

Close RClC MIN FLOW VLV TO SUPP POOL, FV-149-FO19.

Adjust RHR flow to <10,000 GPM.

B.

Close RHR LOOP A CROSSTIE, HV-151 -FO1 OA.

Adjust RHR flow to 4 0,000 GPM.

C.

Shut down RCIC.

Adjust RHR flow to ~10,000 GPM.

D.

Shut down 'C' RHR Pump.

Shut down RCIC.

~

~~

~

~~

Question Data D

Shutdown 'c' RHR pump Shutdown RClC ExplanationlJustification:

A.

This action is for the RClC min flow valve open that would cause SP level to increase as CST water is sent to the SP This would not explain the increase in RHR flow and would not increase flow to radwaste. If the candidate misanatyzes the situation, this answer may be chosen.

If the RHR loop was pumping directly to radwaste, which these adions a intended to stop, there would not be the water flowing rapidly into the sump. If the operator misinterprets the indications and does not realize that RHR k not pumping directly to radwaste or does not recognize the impad of these steps, this answer may be chosen.

B.

LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBank\\MergeDocs\\LOC2ONRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

SSES LOC 20 NRC Exam C.

RClC suction open from the SP would cause SP level to drop but not cause high sump flows. The RHR flow change would not be explained by a changed in RClC parameters and will not be fixed by shutting down RCIC. If the candidate does not recognize an RHR break then this answer may be chosen.

The SP low level and the increase in flow to radwaste indicates a break in pipeway. The RClC system is only discharging steam to the SP. It is running CST to CST.

0.

Sys#

System Category KA Statement 295030 Low Suppression Pool Emergency Procedures and Plan Water Level Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conddions.

KIA#

295030.2.4.48 WA Importance 3.513.8 Exam Level RO (RO/SRO)

References provided to Candidate EOPs Technical

References:

EO-100-1 03 Question Source:

New Susquehanna, 8/4/2004 Level Of Difficulty: (1-5) 3 Question Cognitive Level:

Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43.5 145.12 Objective:

5491 Identify the problems and corrective actions Task:

20.ON.

Implement Flooding In associated with low suppression pool level.

006 Reactor Building LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBank\\MergeDoc\\LOC2ONRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

EO-000-103 Revision 2 Page 1 of 29 SPIL This flowpath contains guidance to control suppression pool water level during emergencies. Low suppression pool water level may result in insufficient NPSH, air entrainment in ECCS pump suction, insufficient heat capacity to absorb all the energy resulting from RPV depressurization, and loss of water seal between primary and secondary containment. High suppression pool water level may result in hydrodynamic loads in excess of those to which the Suppression Pool Water Level Control primary containment and associated equipment are designed.

SPfL-1 USING ANY:

LETDOWN SYSTEMS SUPP POOL CLEANUP 0 RHR SUPP POOL COOLING LETDOWN MAKEUP SYSTEMS SUPP POOL CLEANUP The initial action taken to control suppression pool water level uses the same methods used during normal plant operations: monitoring its status and filling or draining the suppression pool as required to maintain water level within tech spec limits. This is normally accomplished with the Suppression Pool cleanup system or the RHR system with letdown to main condenser or radwaste.

EP-DS-005, Loss of All Decay Heat Removal, gives direction to raise suppression pool level to between 30' and 38'. The intent of raising pool level is to increase the heat capacity of the suppression pool by increasing the mass. Guidance to raise pool level conflicts with guidance in SP/L-1 to maintain level between 22' and 24', however, when a conflict exists between an EO and ai EP-DS, the EP-DS takes precedence.

(

Reference:

SSES-EPG SPL-1)

SPIL-2 WHEN SUPP POOL LVL CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN 22' AND 24' CONTMUE Continued direction for control of suppression pool water level, when level is beyond LCO limits, is provided at step SPL-3.

(

Reference:

SSES-EPG SPL-1)

IS SUPP POOL LVL LOW OR HIGH SPL-3 Actions to reverse a decreasing suppression pool water level trend are provided in steps SPL-4 through SPL-9. Actions to reverse an increasing suppression pool water level trend are provided in steps SP/L-IO through SPL-12.

(

Reference:

SSES-EPG: SPL-1; SP/L-2; and SPL-3) s PIL-4 0

SUPP POOL CLEANUP LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04 HPCI is applicable.

EO-000- 103 Revision 2 Page 2 of 29 0

HPCI ON MIN FLOW EXCEPT AS REQD TO ASSURE ADEQUATE CORE COOLING Decreasing suppression pool water level has several negative effects:

1.

Low level reduces the capacity of the primary containment to absorb all the energy from blowdown of the RPV and still remain below 65 psig.

2.

Low level adversely affects the flow capacity of ECCS pumps taking suction from the suppression pool.

Low level increases the probability of air entrainment and reduces NPSH.

3.

Low level eliminates the water seal between primary and secondary containment. Suppression pool penetrations for HPCI, RCIC and ECCS pumps will not remain water-filled if pool level drops below the penetrations. During a design basis LOCA, loss of water seal permits radoactivity release to the reactor building through these penetrations.

Normal suppression pool water level control methods are contained in OP-159-001(OP-259-001), Suppression Pool Cleanup System. When normal suppression pool water level control methods are inoperable or inadequate, the HPCI and RCIC systems may be operated on minimum flow taking suction from the CST in order to add water to the suppression pool.

The use of HPCI and RCIC for suppression pool level control is not permitted if it conflicts with assuring adequate core cooling.

LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExarnBank\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCFom.doc Printed on 08/18/04

EO-000- 103 Revision 2 Page 3 of 29 insert EO-100-103 Flow Chart LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOCZONRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

I GO TO RPV CONTROL

+

/[IF S W P ~ ~ T E Y P D 140.F I1 BIPASS HFCl SUClWN S W P A S NECESYW U W E S l S Q 4 SWP R X L TEUP AND CAHWT BE W N U R I E D BELOW SWP ma L n FKI 2 mn LEIDOWNSYSTEYS SWPPOOLCLEANLW RHR SUPP POOL COOLIffiLETDOll*

YAMUP SISTEUS 0 Ph.,

I

\\

/

W SUPP POOL C L E A W RClC ON HIN FLOW EXCEPT AS REUO T D

W E

ADEOUATE CORE CoOLIffi I

HpCl ON HIN FLOW EXCEPTASREQDlO-E ADEOUATE CORE C a

m FIG 2 HCTL HEAT CAPACrPl TEMPERANRE LIMIT 2 RAPD DEPRESS IS REUD 3 CONTACTTSCTOENIER EPDSOOZRPVANDPCFLWDlNG 0 -

I 0--

TABLE 18 SUPP POOL EQUALIZATION LEVELS AVG SPOTMOS W Y.CEEDED ABOVE 230 M G F

Question 41 Two answers A and B should be accepted as correct.

The stem of the question presents a loss of feedwater which caused water level to drop below -30 (the RCIC initiation setpoint) but not below -38 ( the HPCI initiation setpoint). At +13, the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP), which was in use at the time of the transient should have automatically withdrawn fiom the core to the in-shield position.

When the detector reached the in-shield position the ball valve in the TIP tube should automatically close. In this question the TIP failed to automatically retract from the core.

In this situation, EO-100-102 will be entered on low RPV water level (+13). Step RC/L-1, directs the operator to ensure all isolations, ECCS initiations, and DGs start. Since the TIP failed to withdraw and isolate, the operator should take manual actions for any automatic operation that should have occurred but did not (see attached EOP bases). The operator actions for the failure of the automatic TIP withdrawal would require manually withdrawing the TIP. If the operator did not refer to a procedure for withdrawal of the TIP, as is allowed by OP-AD-001, the manual actions of withdrawing the TIP would cause the TIP to fully withdraw and the Ball valve to automatically close thus not requiring any additional operator actions, making Choice B correct.

The training material also indicates on page 25 that as soon as the valve is withdrawn to the in-shield position the ball valve will close automatically (no further operator action, Choice B). This response was verified to be accurate using the simulator and further corroborated by the system engineer. Once the TIP is manually reversed, the ball valve is designed to automatically isolate when the in-shield position is reached. Thus, unless there is a second failure, the operator action to ensure isolation will be to observe it occurs.

If the operator were to refer to the procedure, OP-178-00 1, TRAVERSING INCORE PROBE SYSTEM (attached), for manual withdrawal of the TIP, the procedure states in Steps 3.1.3 00 and 3.1.4 ee PLACE Man Valve Control to CLOSE after the detector has been withdrawn to the in-shield position. Step 3.1.4 ff then requires the operator to OBSERVE Ball Valve Closed light ILLUMINATES, which further implies that operator action would be necessary to close the ball valve. Use of the procedure to withdraw the TIP would make Choice A the correct answer.

The training material used by the class (TM-OP-078FY attached) on pages 28 and 29 indicates that the operator would manually withdraw the TIP and then manually close the ball valve to isolate the TIP (Choice A).

The question stem did not state whether only the automatic withdrawal function failed or whether both the automatic withdrawal and subsequent ball valve closure failed.

Depending on the candidates selection of procedure for ensuring the automatic actions, either Choice A using the TIP procedure or Choice B manually withdrawing would be correct.

LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/20/04

Answer A is correct based on training materials and procedure references for actions to manually withdraw the TIP. B is correct based on the TIP logic automatically closing the Ball Valve when the TIP is in the shield, therefore both answers A and B are correct.

LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBank\\MergeDLOC20NRCFom.doc Printed on 08/20/04

SSES LOC 20 NRC Exam

41.

Unit 2 was at 100% power, with Reactor Engineering running TIP traces when a loss of Feedwater occurred, causing an automatic start of RCIC. Water level did not drop to the auto start of HPCI.

The Reactor Engineer reports that a TIP trace was in progress, and when the reactor scrammed, the TIP stopped at mid-core.

What actions are required for the situation reported by the Reactor Engineer?

A.

Manually withdraw the TIP and close the Ball Valve.

B.

Manually withdraw the TIP. No other action required.

C.

Manually withdraw the TIP; ensure when the CHECK IN-SHIELD light ILLUMINATES the Shear Valve auto closes.

D.

Momentarily depress CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton, and verify TIP automatically withdraws.

Question Data A

Manually withdraw the TIP and close the Ball Valve.

Explanation/Justification:

A.

B.

C.

D.

Since RPV level dropped below 13 (RCIC auto initiates at -30, HPCl at -38). the TIP should have withdrawn and isolated. The isolation failed so manual action should be taken to withdraw the TIP and solate it.

Since RPV level dropped below 13 (RCIC auto initiates at -30, HPCl at -38). the TIP should have withdrawn and isolated. The candidate may believe that this is all that is required (no isolation valve dosure) and choose this answer.

Shear valve must be manually fired and would only be fired if the TIP could not be isolated and indications were of leakage from the tube. The candidate may believe that the shear valve will auto close.

This will reset the isolation, not cause the isolation to occur. The candidate may confuse the reset and initiation pushbuttons.

Sys#

System Category KA Statement 223002 Primary Containment Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of Traversing incore probe Isolation SystemlNuclear the PClSlNSSSS will have on following:

system Steam Supply Shut-Off HA#

223002.~3.21 WA Importance 2.612.7 Exam Level RO (ROE RO)

References provided to Candidate None Technical

References:

0~-178-001 Question Source:

New Susquehanna, 8/4/2004 Level Of Difficulty: (1-5) 3 Question Cognitive Level:

Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.7 I 45.4 Objective:

2320 Predict how TIP System key parameters and Task:

78.0P.O components will be affected by a failure of any of 02 the following support systems.

a. AC Distribution

b. Containment Instrument Gas (CIG) System

c. DC Distribution

d. Instrument Air System

e. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS)

LOC 20 As Given H :\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCFm.doc Printed on 0811 8/04

EO-000- 102 Revision 1 Page 2 of 29 RC/L - RPV LEVEL CONTROL RPV water level control (RC/L) section of RPV Control restores and maintains RPV water level to assure adequate core cooling.

Adequate Core Cooling is heat removal from the reactor sufficient to prevent he1 damage.

Three viable mechanisms of adequate core cooling exist; in order of preference they are:

1.

Core submergence

2.

Steam cooling at or above the Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure (81 psid) (Non-ATWS), or Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure (ATWS) (EO-000-1 14, Table 17) injection of makeup water to the RFV with RPV pressure maintained

3.

Steam cooling without injection of makeup water to the RPV with indicated level at or above the Minimum Zero Injection RPV Water Level (-205")

RC/L-1 ENSURE ALL:

ISOLATIONS ECCS INITIATIONS DG'SSTART Intent of this step is to quickly assess plant status and to determine proper automatic operation of plant equipment occurred.

SPDS may be used to determine Containment Isolations.

"Ensure" means take manual action for any automatic operation that should have occurred but did not.

Diesel generator initiation assures that there is redundant source of electrical power available for W V water level control. A loaded diesel generator must be supplied with adequate ESW flow within 4% minutes. This limit is extended to 8 minutes if diesel generator is running unloaded. Adequate ESW flow is described in OP-054-00 1, Emergency Service Water System. Instructions on how to manually shut-down a running diesel generator are located in OP-024-001.

Instructions to bypass interlocks IAW ES procedures always supersede this step's requirements.

(

Reference:

SSES-EPG RCL-I)

LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBank\\MergeDocs\\LOCZONRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

OP-AD-00 1 Revision 29 Page 18 of 52 FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE FEATURES TO PERFORM THEIR FUNCTION 6.4.1 Should a situation occur that requires actuation of an equipment protective feature and the protective feature has not automatically actuated, then the operator shall manually initiate the protective feature.

6.4.2 Should a situation occur that an equipment protective feature is found disabled, then the operator shall take prompt action to either:

a.

Restore the protective feature OR

b.

Remove the equipment from service.

The following functions are provided:

Power Switch On - Power applied to recorder servos.

Off - Turns off power to servos.

Pen Switch Down - Places pen on chart paper.

Up - Pen drops automatically to chart paper when detector reaches core-top limit.

Chart Switch Hold - Electrostatic charge holds paper on recorder.

Release - Charge is dissipated releasing paper.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTION FOR TIP SYSTEM The Primary Containment Isolation system provides isolation signals to the TIP system to isolate nitrogen purge to the Index Mechanism and isolate the individual Guide Tubes with the TIP Ball Valves. This will ensure the release of radioactive materials to the environment is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis for the DBA. Any TIP that is not in the Shield Chamber will be transferred to the Manual energize and close.

The TIP system withdrawal and Ball Valve isolation is initiated on any of the following signals via the PClS Inboard Division 1 Isolation logic:

0 0

Manual (Division 1)

Reactor water level low Level 3 (+13)

High Drywell pressure 1.72 psig Position indication for the TIP Ball Valves is provided on the vertical section of the IC601 Panel. When all five valves are closed, the amber indication will be lit, if any of the five Ball Valves are open the red indication will be lit. Purge valve (SV-12660) solenoid status is indicated on the Valve Control Monitor such that any of the three purge lights on indicates the respective valve is open (energized).

25 078F; Traversing Incore Probe Revision 00 S:\\Training\\Operations Training Directory\\Training Material\\Systems\\TMP-O78F, Traversing In-Core Probe\\SllTM-OP-078F-ST. Traversing In-Core Probe RevO.doc

TM-OP-078F removing it from the containment location and into the shield room chamber.

Manual mode is an alternative to automatic scanning of the Core and provides incremental positioning of the Detector at any selected in-core position.

The manual control mode of operation is very similar to the semi-automatic mode except that manual forward and manual reverse modes are provided. When the subsystem is placed in the manual forward mode, the detector is driven continuously into the core with the same speeds as in semi-automatic operation. The detector will remain at the core top until the subsystem is placed in the manual reverse mode of operation, at which time it will be withdrawn until it reaches the storage position in the chamber shield. When the subsystem is operated in the manual mode of operation, the detector can be stopped at any time, or its direction of travel can be changed by changing from manual forward to manual reverse, or vice versa.

OFF-NORMAL OPERATION (Figure 1)

The third mode of operation, manual drive, requires that the electric motor in the Drive Mechanism be disconnected from the detector drive, and a hand crank be substituted to provide driving power. This method of operation is used primarily for probing the guide tube runs to determine the position indication at the end of the guide tube, so that the core top limits can be programmed. These limits are peculiar to each Drive Mechanism and each detector. Thus, replacement of the detector drive or of a detector cable will normally necessitate reprogramming all of the core top and core bottom limits. The manual drive also can be used to withdraw an inserted probe should the electric motor become inoperable for any reason, and is used for maintenance testing (the determination of drive motor torque required for detector motion).

po&e to a Low RPV level (

In board'i=ontainment Iisolati 1 or High' Drywell retract the detector and cable to the shield position (any detectors that arelnserted in.the Reactor core). Then dose the TIP Ball Valves and is LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

SNOllVl3llll31NI SW31SAS

PROCEDURE COVER SHEET QUALITY CLASS I F I CAT ION :

( X ) QAProgram

( ) Non-QAProgram PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC I NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE APPROVAL CLASS I F I CAT1 0 N :

( X ) Plant

( ) Non-Plant

( )

Instruction TRAVERSING INCORE PROBE SYSTEM 0811 5101 Revision 16 Page 1 of 17 OP-I 78-001 EFFECTIVE DATE:

PERIODIC REVIEW FREQUENCY:

2 Year PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE:

09/30/03 RECOMMENDED REVIEWS:

Procedure Owner:

Shift Technical Advisor-F Shift Responsible Supervisor:

Shift Supervisor-F Shift Responsible FUM:

Manager-Nuclear Operations Responsible Approver:

Manager-Nuclear Operations FORM NDAP-QA-0002-1, Rev. 3, Page 1 of 1

OP-178-001 Revision 16 Page 2 of 17 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECT 10 N PAGE

1.

PURPOSE 3

2.

REFERENCES 3

3.

PROCEDURE 3

3 3.1 OPERATION OF THE TIP SYSTEM MANUAL AND AUTOMATIC MODES ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT A

Table I Table I1 PAGE 16 17

OP-178-001 Revision 16 Page 3 of 17

1.

PURPOSE To provide instructions for operation of Traversing lncore Probe System (TIP).

2.

REFERENCES 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.1 1 2.12

()

2.13 3

Electrical Schematic E-I77 Pre-Operational Test Procedure P278.4 FSAR Section 7.7.1 OP-I 17-002 120V Instrument AC Distribution System OP-I 02-001 125V DC System OP-118-001 Instrument Air System OP-I 25-001 Containment Instrument Gas System OP-I 73-001 Containment Atmosphere Control System GEK 71400 CL-178-0011 Unit 1 Traversing lncore Probe System Electrical CL-178-0012 Unit 1 Traversing lncore Probe System Mechanical CL-178-0013 Unit 1 Traversing lncore Probe System Containment CR-974106 TIP Ball Valve Design PROCEDURE 3.1 OPERATION OF THE TIP SYSTEM MANUAL AND AUTOMATIC MODES 3.1.1 Prerequisites

a.

AC power available in accordance with OP-117-001

( 1 20V).

b.

DC power available in accordance with OP-I 02-001 (125V).

c.

Containment Instrument Gas System operation in accordance with OP-I 25-001.

3.1.2

d.

e.

f.

9-

h.

1.

j.

k.

I.

m.

OP-178-001 Revision 16 Page 4 of 17 Instrument Air System operation in accordance with OP-118-001.

Nitrogen System available in accordance with OP-173-001.

If applicable, Process Computer operable and available.

Detector assembly housed inside shield with ball valve closed.

No containment isolation signals present.

The Unit 1 Reactor Building NPO has been notified to remain clear of the mezzanine area above the TIP room until the TIP'S are returned to the shield position.

Core bottom, Core top, and Shield positions known for desired channel.

CL-178-0011 complete.

CL-178-0012 complete.

CL-178-0013 complete.

Precautions

a.

If Ready indicating light not illuminated, insertion of detector should not be attempted.

b.

Channel Select switch should not be moved once TIP detector past 0001 position.

c.

Upon receipt of containment isolation signal, any TIP detector inserted past shield chamber should automatically retract to shield chamber and ball valve should close to assure Primary Containment integrity. Detector should be monitored to ensure it stops between shield chamber limits and the ball valve closes. (Attachment A, Table II)

d.

Prior to inserting any TIP detector, Core Limit and Detector Position display must have a digit in each window or automatic functions may be altered causing drive control unit to not operate in prescribed manner.

OP-178-001 Revision 16 Page 5 of 17

e.

In order to minimize irradiation of detector and cable, time detector is left in core should be minimized.

f.

Drywell, Containment Instrument Gas mezzanine and TIP Room should be ensured clear of personnel prior to continuing this procedure by notifying Health Physics of intention to operate TIP'S. Any entry into Drywell, Containment Instrument Gas mezzanine and TIP Room must not be allowed until TIP detectors have been placed inside shields.

g.

Detector position display indication in all windows during detector traverse should be ensured.

h.

Displayed Core Top and Core Bottom indications must agree with the known limits. Failure of Core Top or Core Bottom indications may result in damage to the TIP if not immediately retracted in manual.

NOTE:

This procedure describes operation of one drive control unit. The other four drive control units are operated in an identical way.

Each drive control unit is assigned its own LPRM strings with the only common channel among drive control units being channel 10.

This channel is used to cross calibrate the TIP detectors. All controls and indications are at Traveling lncore Probe Control and Monitoring Cabinet 1 C607 unless othetwise indicated.

3.1.3 OPERATE TIP System in Manual Mode as follows:

a.

To control access to the CIG compressor area:

(1)

NOTIFY Health Physics to control access to the CIG compressor area in accordance with HP-HI-073.

(2)

CONFIRM (via Health Physics return notification) that controlled access to the CIG compressor area has been established.

(3)

Insure that no one is in the TIP room and secure against further entry while TIP system in use.

OP-I 78-001 Revision 16 Page 6 of 17 (4)

Insure no one inside the Drywell and secure from further entry while TIP system in use.

b.

Prior to operating the TIP System:

(1)

INITIATE/ENSURE INITIATED TIP System Detector Initiation/Storage Control Form RE-OTP-011-1.

(2)

At 1Y219, CLOSE Brk lY219-25,27,29 (ganged) to energize all.TIP drives.

(3)

ALLOW TIP System approximately 30 minutes to warm up.

C.

PLACE MODE switch to MANUAL.

d.

RESET CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton as follows:

(1)

OBSERVE CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton illuminated.

(2)

MOMENTARILY DEPRESS CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton.

(3)

OBSERVE CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton extinguished.

e.

CHECK CORE LIMIT switch in BOTTOM position.

f.

CHECK all four Core Limits display indicating lights displaying the Bottom Core Limit position.

NOTE:

This number may not be same for all channels. Each channel has been manually set prior to plant startup. Core Bottom and Core Top positions have been previously established.

9.

REFER to Table 1 to determine Drive Control Unit to be used for probing selected LPRM.

h.

SELECT desired channel using CHANNEL SELECT switch.

I.

If desired, READY X-Y Recorder as follows:

OP-I 78-001 Revision 16 Page 7 of 17 PLACE RECORDER POWER switch to ON-ON for X-Y Recorder.

PLACE CHART switch to RELEASE.

PLACE PEN switch to UP PLACE chart on X-Y Recorder.

PLACE CHART switch to HOLD.

j.

PLACE OUTPUT SELECTOR switch on Flux Probe Monitor to Channel to be used.

PLACE METER SELECTOR switch on Flux Probe Monitor to the Channel to be used.

k.

I.

CHECK READY light ILLUMINATED.

m.

PLACE Man Valve Control to OPEN.

n.

OBSERVE Ball Valve Open light ILLUMINATES.

CAUTION NEVER ATTEMPT TO INSERT DETECTOR IF READY LIGHT IS NOT ILLUMINATED.

INDEXER GUIDE TUBE IS NOT ALIGNED UNLESS READY LIGHT IS ILLUMINATED.

0.

To initiate TIP traverse, PLACE MANUAL switch to FWD position.

P.

OBSERVE:

LOW SPEED light ILLUMINATES.

FWD light ILLUMINATES.

Detector Position window indicates detector forward travel at slow speed.

IN-SHIELD light EXTINGUISHES.

TIME DELAY light ILLUMINATES.

At Detector Position 0024, detector SHIFTS to fast speed indicated by LOW SPEED light EXTl NGU ISH I NG.

OP-I 78-001 Revision 16 Page 8 of 17 (7) If desired to insert detector at slow speed, PLACE LOW SPEED switch to ON.

(8)

When detector reaches Bottom Core Limit position:

(a)

CHECK detector SHIFTS to low speed.

(b)

If detector fails to slow down, PLACE LOW SPEED switch to ON.

(c)

CHECK IN-CORE light ILLUMINATES.

(d)

CHECK LOW SPEED light ILLUMINATES.

q.

PLACE CORE LIMIT switch to TOP.

r.

OBSERVE top position numerical value displayed on Core Limits display windows.

S.

If numbers not displayed in all windows:

(1)

PLACE MANUAL switch to OFF (2)

PLACE MANUAL switch to REV position to bring TIP back to shield.

t.

CHECK detector STOPS at Top Core Limit position

u.

CHECK TOP CORE light ILLUMINATES when detector reaches Top Core Limit position.

V.

If X-Y Recorder being used, CHECK X-Y Recorder pen positioned at Core Top position.

NOTE:

Minor adjustment of chart paper may be required. Pen will automatically drop to paper when scan is started if channel being scanned is selected on flux amplifier.

W.

PLACE SCAN switch to ON.

x.

CHECK SCAN light ILLUMINATES.

Y.

PLACE MANUAL switch to REV position for manual trace.

Z.

aa.

bb.

cc.

dd.

ee.

ff.

gg.

OP-178-001 Revision 16 Page 9 of 17 OBSERVE:

(1)

REV light ILLUMINATES.

(2)

CORE TOP light EXTINGUISHES.

(3)

LOW SPEED light ILLUMINATES.

(4)

If in use, X-Y Recorder starts plotting trace.

(5)

Detector Position window indicates detector WITHDRAWAL.

PLACE CORE LIMIT switch to BOTTOM position.

CHECK numerical indication appears in all Core Limits display windows.

When detector reaches Bottom Core Limit, OBSERVE:

(1)

IN-CORE light EXTINGUISHES.

(2)

If in use, X-Y Recorder Pen lifts off chart paper.

(3)

If switch is turned Off, SCAN light EXTINGUISHES.

(4)

LOW SPEED light EXTINGUISHES.

(5)

Fast speed in reverse direction indicated in Detector Position windows.

At Detector Position 0024, CHECK detector shifts to low speed as LOW SPEED light ILLUMINATES.

When Detector Position 0001 reached, PLACE MANUAL switch to OFF.

If additional scans to be run, PERFORM steps 3.1.3.f through 3.1.3.ee.

When Detector Position 0001 reached, ALLOW - 3 hrs for radiation level on detectors to drop before withdrawing defectors into the shield chambers.

hh.

ii.

jj.

kk.

II.

mm.

nn.

00.

PP.

qq-rr.

ss.

tt.

uu.

OP-178-001 Revision 16 Page 10 of 17 Prior to TIP withdrawal to IN-shield position:

(1)

NOTIFY Health Physics to ensure adequate enforcement of HP requirements.

(2)

ENSURE Containment Instrument Gas Mezzanine and TIP Room are clear and remain clear of personnel until all TIP detectors inside shield chambers.

To return detector to shield chamber, PLACE MANUAL switch to REV.

OBSERVE detector withdrawal to HOUSED POSITION at Detector Position window.

CHECK IN-SHIELD light ILLUMINATES.

OBSERVE detector stops at IN-SHIELD positions at Detector Position display. (Attachment A, Table II)

If detector does not stop between IN-SHIELD positions, IMMEDIATELY PLACE MANUAL switch to OFF.

(Attachment A, Table II)

PLACE MANUAL switch to OFF.

PLACE Man Valve Control to CLOSE.

OBSERVE Ball Valve Closed light ILLUMINATES.

PLACE MODE switch to OFF If in use, PLACE RECORDER POWER switch to OFF.

ENSURE ball valve CLOSED.

Upon completion of operating the TIP System:

(1)

COMPLETE Tip System Detector Initiation/Storage Control Form RE-OTP-011-1.

(2)

At 1Y219, OPEN Brk 1Y219 25-27-29 (ganged)

NOTIFY Health Physics to restore normal perSonnel access to the CIG compressor area in accordance with HP-Hl-073.

OP-178-001 Revision 16 Page 11 of 17 3.1.4 OPERATE TIP System in Automatic Mode as follows:

a.

To control access to the CIG compressor area:

(1)

NOTIFY Health Physics to control access to the CIG compressor area in accordance with H P-H 1-073.

(2)

CONFIRM (via Health Physics return notification) that controlled access to the CIG compressor area has been established.

(3)

Insure that no one is in the TIP room and secure against further entry while TIP system in use.

(4)

Insure no one inside the Drywell and secure from further entry while TIP system in use.

b.

Prior to operating the TIP System:

(1)

INITIATE/ENSURE INITIATED Tip System Detector Initiation/Storage Control Form RE-OTP-011-1.

(2)

At 1Y219, CLOSE Brk 1Y219 25-27-29 (ganged) to energize all TIP drives.

(3)

ALLOW TIP System approximately 30 minutes to warm up.

C.

PLACE MODE switch to AUTO.

d.

RESET CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton as follows:

(1)

OBSERVE CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton illuminated.

(2)

MOMENTARILY DEPRESS CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton.

(3)

OBSERVE CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton extinguished.

e.

CHECK CORE LIMIT switch in BOTTOM position.

f.

g.

h.

I.

k.

I.

m.

OP-I 78-001 Revision 16 Page 12 of 17 CHECK all four Core Limits display indicating lights displaying the Bottom Core Limit position.

NOTE:

This number may not be same for all channels. Each channel has been manually set up prior to plant startup. Core Bottom and Core Top positions have been previously established.

REFER to Table 1 to determine Drive Control Unit to be used for probing selected LPRM.

SELECT desired channel using CHANNEL SELECT switch.

If desired, READY X-Y Recorder as follows:

(1)

PLACE RECORDER POWER switch to ON-ON for X-Y Recorder.

(2)

PLACE CHART switch to RELEASE.

(3)

PLACE PEN switch to UP (4)

PLACE CHART on X-Y Recorder.

(5)

PLACE CHART switch to HOLD.

PLACE OUTPUT SELECTOR switch on Flux Probe Monitor to Channel to be used.

PLACE METER SELECTOR switch on Flux Probe Monitor to Channel to be used.

CHECK MANUAL switch is OFF.

CHECK READY light ILLUMINATED.

n.

PLACE Man Valve Control to OPEN.

0.

OBSERVE Ball Valve Open light ILLUMINATES.

OP-178-001 Revision 16 Page 13 of 17 CAUTION NEVER ATTEMPT TO INSERT DETECTOR IF READY LIGHT IS NOT ILLUMINATED.

INDEXER GUIDE TUBE IS NOT ALIGNED UNLESS READY LIGHT IS ILLUMINATED.

P.

To initiate TIP traverse, DEPRESS AUTO START pushbutton.

9-OBSERVE:

(I) LOW SPEED light ILLUMINATES.

(2)

FWD light ILLUMINATES.

(3)

Detector Position window indicates detector forward travel at slow speed.

(4)

IN-SHIELD light EXTINGUISHES.

(5)

TIME DELAY light ILLUMINATES.

(6)

Detector travel STOPS when detector reaches Detector Position 0001.

r.

DEPRESS AUTO START pushbutton to continue traverse.

NOTE:

When Scan lamp illuminates, TIP Auto Start button must be pushed within two minutes or computer will abort run.

s.

If X-Y Recorder being used, CHECK X-Y Recorder pen positioned at Core Top position on chart paper, making adjustments as necessary.

t.

OBSERVE detector starts travel at fast speed indicated in Detector Position window.

u.

If desired to insert detector at slow speed, PLACE LOW SPEED switch to ON.

v.

When detector reaches Bottom Core Limit, OBSERVE detector switches to low speed.

W.

If detector does not slow down, PLACE LOW SPEED switch to ON.

X.

Y-Z.

aa.

bb.

cc.

dd OP-I 78-001 Revision 16 Page 14 of 17 OBSERVE detector enters core until CORE TOP lamp ILLUMINATES.

To return detector to position 0001, DEPRESS AUTO START pushbutton.

If additional TIP traverses to be run, REPEAT steps 3.1.4.f through 3.1.4.y.

When Detector Position 0001 reached, ALLOW - 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for radiation level on detectors to drop off before withdrawing detectors into shield chambers.

Prior to TIP withdrawal to In-shield position:

(1)

NOTIFY Health Physics to ensure adequate enforcement of HP requirements.

(2)

ENSURE Containment Instrument Gas Mezzanine and TIP Room are clear and remain clear until all TIP detectors inside shield chambers.

If no additional TIP traverses to be run, PLACE the detector in shield as follows:

PLACE MODE switch to MAN.

PLACE MANUAL switch to REV.

OBSERVE detector travel to HOUSED POSITION.

CHECK IN-SHIELD light ILLUMINATES.

OBSERVE detector stops between IN-SHIELD positions at Detector Position display.

(Attachment, Table II)

If detector does not stop between IN-SHIELD positions, IMMEDIATELY PLACE MANUAL switch to OFF. (Attachment A, Table II)

PLACE MANUAL switch to OFF ee.

ff.

PLACE Man Valve Control to CLOSE.

OBSERVE Ball Valve Closed light ILLUMINATES.

OP-178-001 Revision 16 Page 15 of 17 gg.

hh.

PLACE MODE switch to OFF.

PLACE RECORDER POWER switch to OFF.

II.

ENSURE ball valve CLOSED.

jj.

Upon completion of operating the TIP System:

(I)

COMPLETE Tip System Detector Initiation Storage Control Form RE-OTP-011-1.

(2)

At 1Y219, OPEN Brk 1Y219 25-27-29 (ganged).

kk.

NOTIFY Health Physics to restore normal personnel access to the CIG compressor area in accordance with H P-H 1-073.

Attachment A Revision 16 Page 16 of 17 OP-178-001 TABLE 1 DRIVE CONTROL UNIT CHANNEL AND INDEXER POSITION VS INCORE ASSEMBLY COORDINATES Index Position lncore Assembly Coordinate Machine No. 1 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

9 10 a

Machine No. 2 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 Machine No. 3 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

9 10 a

Machine No. 4 1

2 16-41 32-57 24-49 24-41 24-33 16-09 16-1 7 16-25 16-33 32-33 16-49 08-4 1

08-33 08-25 08-1 7 08-49 16-57 24-57 NOT USED 32-33 40-57 32-49 32-4 1 32-25 32-1 7 24-09 24-1 7 24-1 5 NOT USED 32-33 48-49 48-4 1

Page 1 of 2

Attachment A Revision 16 Page 17 of 17 OP-I 78-001 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 Machine No. 5 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 40-49 40-4 1 40-33 32-09 40-09 40-1 7 40-25 32-33 48-33 56-4 1 56-33 56-25 56-1 7 48-09 48-1 7 48-25 NOT USED 32-33 TABLE II TIP IN-SHIELD POSITIONS NOTE:

The TIP may stop in between digits, resulting in a blank digit. This is acceptable if it is OBSERVED that the blank digit is between the IN-SHIELD positions.

TIP MACHINE IN-SHIELD POSITION A

9778-9769 B

9766-9757 C

9767-9758 D

9768-9759 E

9772-9763 Page 2 of 2

Question 93 This question should be deleted from the test due to the question being operationally invalid.

The situation presented in the stem of the question postulates that a Barton DP Cell Diaphram has failed. The candidate is then asked how an annunciator will respond and what Technical Specification actions are required for this failure.

The question does not present how the Barton DP cell failed, whether it failed high or low but the correct answer is based on a ruptured diaphragm. No clarification was provided during the exam which allowed the candidate to assume the type of failure that occurred.

There are three potentially correct answers to the question. Discussions with I&C personnel and the investigating the Barton Tech Manual determined that the Barton DP cell diaphram failure could cause the cell to fail either high or low. Applicable portions of the Barton Tech Manual are attached showing that the instrument does use a bellows to sense pressure. The trouble shooting guide from the Tech Manual indicates that the bellows can cause high, low or erratic readings.

The candidate was not told whether the DP cell failed high or low. If the candidate assumed that the DP cell failed low (high sensed level), the alarm would clear, as given in Choices B and C. The candidate had insufficient information to determine what Technical Specification required functions are associated with LIS-B2 1 - 1N024A and thus could not determine which of the incomplete lists of Technical Specification required actions given in Choices B and C is correct. The candidate could choose either Choice B or C.

If the candidate assumed that the DP cell failed high (low sensed level), the alarm would remain in and several (but not all) of the Technical Specification required actions are listed in Choice D. The candidate would choose Choice D.

The candidate was not given all of the references (such as the Surveillance Instruction) necessary to determine all of the fiinctions using LIS-B21-1N024A as an input and is not expected to know from memory all of the functions. There are no objectives in the RCIC or Reactor Vessel Instrumentation Training Material requiring the students to know what level switches activate which equipment. (See attached Objectives)

Based on the lack of references and detailed information in the question stem and the candidate assumptions, B, C, or D could have been chosen. Since there are three possible answers, the question should be deleted.

SSES LOC 20 NRC Exam

93. Unit 1 is operating at 100 O h power with the following alarms acknowledged on 1C651:

- AR 101-H16, "Rx LEVEL XMTR C TURBINE TRIPS BYPASSED

- AR 103-CO1, "RX VESSEL LO LEVEL TRIP" The alarms are caused by I&C performing SI-I 80-305, "QUARTERLY CALIBRATION OF REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL CHANNEL LIS-B21-1 N024A" at the 1C004 Instrument Rack.

I&C reports that LIS-B21-1 N024A, "RX WTR LVL 3 AUTO SCRAM TRIP LOGIC Al" Barton DP Cell Diaphragm has failed while performing the calibration check.

If I&C were to return the DP Cell to service, what would be the status of AR 103-COI, "RX VESSEL LO LEVEL TRIP" alarm?

What Technical Specification actions would be required based on this failure?

A.

Alarm would remain in ALARM.

No actions required.

B.

Alarm would be CLEAR.

Place channel in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Restore the channel to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or declare RClC inoperable.

C.

Alarm would be CLEAR.

Be in MODE 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Restore the channel to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or declare RClC inoperable D.

Alarm would remain in ALARM.

Place channel in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

~~

Question Data B

Alarm would be CLEAR.

Place channel in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Restore the channel to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or declare RClC inoperable.

ExplanationlJustification:

A.

If the candidate believes that 0 dp corresponds to low level then this answer would be chosen. Since the alarm condition will be in and thus the channeled tripped, based on the misconception above, the candidate may believe no further action needed.

LOC 20 As Given H :\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOCZONRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

SSES LOC 20 NRC Exam B.

correct answer, Failure of the diaphragm results in 0 dp which corresponds to a high level. When the DP cell is placed in service, the high level sensed by the failed cell would cause the low level alarm to clear.

Per TS 3.3.1.1 Condition A The channel or trip system must be placed in trip in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Alarm would dear. if the candidate mistakenly uses Table 3.3.1.1-1 and follows the conditions referenced from D.l column then this is the proper action. D.l is only applicable if action A, B, or C is not met If the candidate believes that 0 dp corresponds to low level then this answer would be chosen. This is the proper TS action.

C.

D.

Sys#

System Category KA Statement 21 6000 Nuclear Boiler Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

Detector diaphragm failure or Instrumentation the NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION; and (b) leakage KIA#

216000.~2.04 WA Importance 2.913.0 (RO/S RO)

Exam Level SRO References provided to Candidate TS 3.3.1.1 Technical

References:

SI-180-305, TS 3.3.1.1 Question Source:

New Susquehanna, 8/4/2004 Level Of Difficulty: (1 -5) 3 Question Cognitive Level:

Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.5 I 45.6 I Objective:

5499 Describe the reactor vessel level instrumentation Task:

43.2 system at SSES.

LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

PPCL - NIMS Component D a t a Sheet CPX -

RCPECDAl Parent I D :

1C004 svs :

1 8 0 C nufacturer : BARTON M o d e l N o. :

288A P a r t N o. :

TBD Serial N o. :

2 2 7 7 I n s t a l l D a t e :

13-MAR-1996 U n i t :

1 Fail C o d e :

3B

&ea : 2 9 Maint R u l e :

2 ASME:

?

E l e v :

7 4 9 C r i t i c a l i t y :

3 ASEC :

A c t. E l e v :

753 D u t y C y c l e :

Q:

Q Room : 1-500 E n v i r o n m e n t :

EQ:

Y Bldg : RX c o m p. Type: 1s C o l / L i n e :

D e s i g n Status: ASBLT A z i m u t h :

LOC :

NARROW RANGE D e s cr i p t ion :

C a t e g o r y N/A MAX M I N NOM MAX M I N TOL ( + )

T O L ( - )

NOM NOM Y/A J L ( - l T O L ( + )

Name CONTACT ACTION 1 L 2 OPERATIONS DEVICE RANGE MAX DEVICE RANGE M I N DEVICE SETPOINT PROCESS RANGE MAX PROCESS RANGE M I N PROCESS RANGE TOL(+)

PROCESS RANGE TOL(-)

PROCESS SETPOINT HIGH NOM PROCESS SETPOINT LOW NOM SETPOINT REVISION DATE DEVICE SETPOINT TOLERANCE TOL(-)

DEVICE SETPOINT TOLERANCE T O L ( + )

V a l u e U n i t OICD n/a NULL TBD NULL TBD NULL TBD NULL TBD NULL TBD NULL TBD NULL TBD 5 3. 4 inwc 13.6 inwc 03/19/2002 n/a NULL TBD NULL TBD Lube Location Lube Component C a t a l o g Name C a t a l o g No.

Quantity U/M I D EC-080-1012 EC-INST-1333 EC-INST-1471 EC-INST-1472 EC-INST-1473 EC-INST-1480 EC-INST-22 62 E 1 0 3 4 8 9 E 1 0 6 2 4 7 F F 1 1 4 5 10 Sheet R e v.

~~

N/A 0

N/A 0

N/A 0

N/A 0

N/A 0

N/A 0

N/A 0

5 1 9 1

37 101 6

Latest Rev.

AE No.

AE Sheet AE R e v.

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y N

N Y

-BLANK-

-BLANK -

-BLANK -

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-5 - 2 9 - 5 M-142 M1 -B2 1-1

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-L 1

1

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

-BLANK-

- BLANK -

-BLANK-19 31 6

D e s c r i p t i o n

~

REACTOR WATER LEVEL 3 L LEVEL 8 ALLOWABLE ILC MAINTENANCE CALC SUPERSEDES ICC-LISB2I ILC MAINTENANCE CALC SUPERSEDES ICC-LISB2I I 6 C MAINTENANCE CALC SUPERSEDES ICC-LIS-B; 1 6 C MAINTENANCE CALC SUPERSEDES ICC-LISB21 ILC MAINTENANCE CALC SUPERSEDES ICC-LISB21 I 6 C MAINTENANCE CALC SUPERSEDES ICC-019 PE INSTRUMENT LOCATION DRAWING REACTOR BLDG PLID NUCLEAR BOILER VESSEL INSTRUMENTATIO SAFETY RELlEE VALVE NUCLEAR BOILER SYSTEM Type Name D e s c r i p t i o n ENGR APPENDIX R GROUP ENGR SAFE SHUTDOWN PATH 1 GROUP ADS/CORE SPRAY DIVISION I JSEFEG PROVIDE REACTOR VESSEL LOW Provide reactor vessel low l e v e l (level 3) input s i g n a l f o r RHR Shutdown LEVEL (LEVEL 3 ) INPUT SIGNAL Cooling/Head Spray actuation ( U 1 is system 8 0, U2 i s RPS (System 58) but FOR MR f a i l u r e reported under System 80)

INPUTS TO RPS (System 58) but MR f a i l u r e reported under System 801 NSEFEG PROVIDE REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL Provide reactor vessel l e v e l inputs t o RPS ( U 1 i s System 80, U2 i s RPS Page 1 of 2 Report Date: 18-AUG-2004

PP&L - NIMS Component D a t a Sheet CPX -

RCPECDAl

'38 Name Description NSEFEG PROVIDE REACTOR VESSEL LOW Provide reactor vessel low level (level 1, 2 and 3 ) input signal for LEVEL (LEVEL 1, 2 AND 3) INPUT Primary Containment Isolation (LISB211N024A-D are RPS (System 58) but MR SI failure reported under System 80)

Ins t rumen ta t ion REPORT NPRDS REPORTABLE GROUP NSEFEG Primary Containment Isolation Requirement Source Level 10.1 BARTON PRESS SW INSTALLATION EQ PROGRAM EQAR-0 5 5 10.2 BARTON PRESS SW MAINTENANCE EQ PROGRAM EQAR-0 55 Design Design 10.3 BARTON PRESS SW CONFIGURATION EQ PROGRAM EQAR-0 55 Design 10.7 BARTON PRESS SW PROCUREMENT EQ PROGRAM EQAR-0 5 5 Design CALIBRATION REQ'D - SI-180-305 PLANT EQUIPMENT SURVEILLANCE Design CALIBRATION REQ'D - SO-100-006 PLANT EQUIPMENT SURVEILLANCE Design CALIBRATION CALIBRATION CALIBRATION CALIBRATION Zone Name Status Type Zone Use Comment

~~

1-SA-S FIRE ZONE 1-SA-S FIRE IN Design:

nhysical :

LISE211N024A anufacturer:

Eng. Notes:

rype Comment Text Page 2 of 2 Report D a t e : 18-AUG-2004

Technical Manual Models 288A and 29OA DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INDICATING SWITCHES c

ITT BARTON PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND CONTROLS Box 1882, City of Industry. Calif. 91749 Tetephone (21 3) 961 -2547 TELEX 67-7475

Chapter 1 GENERAL INFORMATION 1-1. INTRODUCTION This manual presents t h e technical information; charts, diagrams illustrations and parts lists necessary to install,operate, maintain, troubleshoot and repair the ITT Barton Models 288A.and 290A Differential Pressure Indicating Switches.

The ITT Barton weatherproof Model 288A and the explosionproof Model 290A Differential Pressure Indicating Switches energize either single or dual alarm circuits when the measured differential pressures ex-minimum or both.

,ceed predetermined limits. These limits may be either maximum, For flow measurement applications,the instrument is connected by tubing to the low and high pressure sides of a primary device located in t h e process run.

Normaliy, primary devices are orifice plates,venturis or flow tubes.

For liquid level measuring applications, the instrument is connected to measure differential pressure caused by variations of level of liquid in the process vessel.These measurements are used to indicate liquid level or to control the I

L liquid height.

The Models 288A and 290A Differential Pressure Switches are actuated by the ITT Barton Model 224 Differential Pressure Unit. (Figure 1-2)

The DPU consists of two interconnected bellows containing a liquid fill and mounted in separate chambers on opposing sides of a center plate. In operation, the difference in pressure betwezn the two chambers causes the bellows to travel toward thz side of the lowest pressur$. The motion of the bellows is trzlnamitted through a rotating shaft to the input mechanism of the instrument. See Appendix 1 for a detailed descrip?:!on of the Model 224 DPU.

1-3.

SPECIFICATIONS The general specifications of the Differential Pressure Indicating Switches are presented in Table 1-1.

The specifications of t h e Model 224 DPU are presented in Appendix 1.

1-1

DRIVE ARM.

HOLE PLUG (DO NOT L O

U S

E A

TOROU E TU BE GLAND NUT ILL (DO NOT LOOSEN) 1-5/8 BELLOWS UNIT ASSEMBLY DRIVE ARM HOC PLUG (w NQT LOOSEN)

TORQUE TUBE C U N D MJT (no NOT Loo9 TORQUE TUBE SHAPT 3/4 BELLOWS UNIT ASSEMBLY

, RUIGE SPRINGS Figure 1-3. Model 224 Differential Pressure Unit - B e l l o w s Unit Assembly 1

c

Chapter 2 THEORY OF OPERATION 2-1 BASIC OPEPATION (Ref:

Figure 2-1)

The Model 224 D i f f e r e n t i a l Pressure Unit (DPU) measures t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l pressure i n the process system relative t o process functions, and produces a mechanical output t o operate process monitoring instruments and process c o n t r o l devices.

The DPU has two bellows.

Each bellows has one sealed end and one open end.

The open end of each bellows is attached and sealed t o t h e s i d e of the center p l a t e (one bellows on each s i d e ).

The bellows and c e n t e r p l a t e are f i l l e d with l i q u i d.

An opening through the center p l a t e provides a passageway f o r the t r a n s f e r of f i l l l i q u i d between t h e two bellows.

The bellows are connected i n t e r n a l l y by t h e drive a r m, and are enclosed by s e p a r a t e pressure housings.

pressure (HP) and t h e o t h e r housing f o r t h e low pressure (LP) connections are connected by p i p e or tubing t o the respective HP and LP s i d e s of a primary device.

One housing f o r the high Any pressure change within the housings causes the bellows being subjected t o increasing pressure t o c o n t r a c t a relative amount

( l a t e r a l l y ), forcing the f i l l l i q u i d through t h e c e n t e r p l a t e i n t o (and expar,ding l a t e r a l l y ) t h e bellows being subjected t o t h e least pressure.

As the bellows move l a t e r a l l y, t h e connecting drive a r m follows the motion o f. the bellows.

The d r i v e arm movement is transmitted through the follower a r m t o twist t h e torque tube.

The twisting of t h e torque tube causes the torque tube s h a f t t o r o t a t e, which provides the mechanical output t o the measuring instrument.

The torque tube s h a f t provides t h e mechanical actuation necessary t o operate instruments such as recorders, indicators, t r a n s m i t t e r s,

c o n t r o l l e r s and switches.

2-2 COMPONENT FUNCTIONS ( X e f :

Figure 1-2)

Pressure Housings - The two p r e s s u r e housings are a v a i l a b l e i n the various s a f e working pressure r a t i n g s defined i n Table 1-1 and i n the o u t l i n e dimension drawing.

2-1

P rob l e m Low o r N o Indication I n d i c a t e s High Possible Sources Primary Element o r D i f f e r e n t i a l Press ure Source

~~

Piping from Primary Element t o DPU Bellows U n i t Mechanism Primary Piping from P r i m a r y Element t o DPU Bellows Unit Table 5-1.

Troubleshooting Chart Probable Cause O r i f i c e i n s t a l l e d backwards, o r oversize.

Flow blocked upstream from run.

Loss of l i q u i d i n reference l e g ( l i q u i d level).

Density changes i n process media o r reference leg.

Pressure t a p holes plugged piping plugged.

Bypass valve open o r leaking.

Liquids o r gasses trapped i n piping.

Block o r shut-off valves closed.

Piping leaks, high pressure s i d e.

Housings f i l l e d up with s o l i d s r e s t r i c t i n g bellows movement.

G a s trapped i n housing i n l i q u i d service o r liquid trapped i n housing i n gas service.

High pressure housing gasket leaks.

DPU tampered with.

Loose l i n k s o r movements.

Out of calibration.

Corrosion o r d i r t i n mechanism.

P o i n t e r loose.

O r i f i c e p a r t i a l l y r e s t r i c t e d,

o r too s m a l l.

Leak i n l o w pressure s i d e piping.

G a s trapped i n low p r e s s u r e housing i n l i q u i d service o r l i q u i d trapped i n high p r e s s u r e housing i n gas service.

L.P. housing gasket leaks.

Range s p r i n g broken, o r DPU tampered with.

Corrective Action Replace o r i f i c e. '

Clean out run o r open valve.

R e f i l l reference leg.

R e f i l l reference l e g with same density l i q u i d as process media.

Clean out piping.

Close bypass v a l v e ( s ).

Vent piping.

Open block o r shut-off valves..

Repair leaks.

~

Clean out housing.

Vent housing.

Replace gasket.

Return BUA f o r repair.

Tighten o r replace.

Recalibrate.

Clean or replace.

Tighten.

Clean out o r replace.

Repair.

Vent housing.

Replace gasket.

Return BUA f o r r e p a i r.

Possible Problem Sources Mechanism Probable Cause Corrective Action Loose l i n k s o r movements.

Repair o r replace.

Out of c a l i b r a t i o n.

Recalibrate.

I n s t a l l dampening device upstream of DPU run.

Erratic I n d i c a t i o n Piping from Primary Element t o DPU Bellows Unit Primary Flow pulsating.

Liquid trapped i n gas piping o r gas bubble i n liquid piping.

Vapor generator incorrectly i n s t a l l e d.

Reference l e g gassy o r l i q u i d vaporizing.

Obstructed bellows travel.

Gas trapped i n DPU W o r LP pressure housing.

Remove (see start-up i n s t r u c t i o n s ).

Repipe.

S e e piping i n s t r u c t i o n s.

Remove (see s t a r t - u p i n s t r u c t i o n s ).

I Mechanism Linkage dragging o r d i r t y.

Pointer dragging on scale p l a t e.

Adjust o r clean.

Adjust.

5-4 I

Reactor Vessel Instrumentation TM-OP-080-PG LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExarnBank\\MergeDoc\\LOC2ONRCForrn.doc Printed on 08/18/04

Licensed Operator Systems Objectives Revision: 00 Effective: 05/30/2001 TM-OP-080-OB, LO Systems, Reactor Vessel Instrumentation 1482 State and explain the purpose of the Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System.

1483 Given a P&ID or simplified diagram of the Reactor Vessel Instrumentation

System, identify the following components and instrumentation, and trace flow paths for normal and alternate system lineups, including ties with other systems:

a.

b.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

C.

Condensing chambers Reference legs and variable legs RPV instrument taps Jet Pump instrument taps Level sensors Pressure sensors Temperature sensors Flow sensors Flow limiting orifices Excess flow check valves 10069 Describe the location, function, and operation of the following Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System components:

a.

b.

c.

RPV water level instruments

d.

RPV pressure instruments

e.

RPV temperature instruments

f.

g.

Condensing chambers Core plate differential pressure instruments Jet Pump flow and total core flow instruments RPV head seal leakage instruments LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

TM-OP-080-OB, LO Systems, Reactor Vessel Instrumentation 1488 Describe the relationships between the Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System and the following:

a.

b.

d.

e.

f.

9.

h.

C.

I.

j.

k.

I.

m.

n.

P-

q.

r.

0.

S.

Reactor Protection System Primary Containment Isolation System Emergency Core Cooling Systems Feedwater System Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System High Pressure Coolant Injection System Residual Heat Removal System Core Spray System Diesel Generators Safety/Relief Valves Reactor Recirculation System Alternate Rod Insertion System Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Reactor Water Cleanup System Uninterruptible AC power distribution Feedwater water level control Reactor Pressure Vessel Main Turbine Remote Shutdown Panel 10538 Locate and describe the function of the following Reactor Vessel System controls and indications:

Instrumentation

a.

RPV water level indication

b.

RPV pressure indication

c.

RPV temperature indication

d.

Jet Pump flow

e.

Coreflow

f.

Core plate differential pressure

g.

Post Accident Monitoring High Speed Reset Pushbutton Page 1 of 4 LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocsVOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

Page 2 of 4 TM-OP-080-OB, LO Systems, Reactor Vessel Instrumentation 10561 Describe the following Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System design interlocks, including initiating signals, setpoints, automatic actions, and control applicable:

features, and logic, as

a.

b.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

k.

I.

m.

C.

Reading parameters outside the Control Room Physical separation of sensors Redundancy of sensors Inputs to RPS Inputs to ECCS and RClC Inputs to PClS Recirculation Pump protection Main Turbine protection from carryover Protection against overfilling RPV from Feedwater Inputs to ARI RPV overpressure protection Overpressure protection for RHR and Core Spray Core flow indication 1480 Evaluate the operational significance of each of the following as it applies to the Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System:

a.

b.

c.

d.

Reference leg flashing Steam flow effect on RPV level indication Indicated RPV level versus actual RPV level during heatup and cooldown Indicated RPV temperature response during rapid heatup and cooldown 1478 Predict the system or overall plant response to manipulation of the following Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System controls:

a.

b.

Remote Shutdown Panel transfer switches Post Accident Monitoring High Speed Reset switch 10562 Given appropriate alarm response procedures, determine the following for any annunciator associated with the Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System:

1.

Probable cause of the alarm

2.

Adverse consequences of continued operation in the alarm state

3.

Appropriate course of action LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20N RCForrn.doc Printed on 08/18/04

TM-OP-080-OB, LO Systems, Reactor Vessel Instrumentation 1479 Predict the effect that the following conditions will have on the Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System:

a.

b.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

k.

I.

m.

C.

Loss of AC electrical power Loss of DC electrical power Leaking detector equalizing valve Instrument line plugging Instrument line leaking Detector diaphragm failure or leakage Surveillance testing Reference leg flashing High drywell temperature Rapid RPV depressurization RPV heatup or cooldown Instrument valve opening or closing Jet pump flow (effect on fuel zone level indication) 10035 Given an industry or SSES event related to the Reactor Nonnuclear System, describe the plant vulnerability and appropriate actions to prevent or the event.

Instrumentation mitigate 1476 Given the Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements associated with the Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System, determine the requirements for operability and the ACTION(s) required when a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met 10070 (SRO only) Explain the Technical Specifications and Technical Requirement Bases for Limiting Conditions for Operation and Technical Requirements for Operation associated with the Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System Page 3 of 4 LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocsUOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

SUSQUEHANNA SYSTEMS TRAINING PRESENTATION GUIDE Licensed Operator n

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling TM-OP-05 O-PC Revision 00 08/02/0 1 LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBank\\MergeDocs\\LOC2ONRCFom.doc Printed on 08/18/04

Licensed Operator Systems Objectives Revision: 00 Effective: 08/02/2001 TM-OP-050-09, LO Systems, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 1998 State and explain the purpose of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.

201 0 Draw the flow paths for each mode of operation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, including the following components and instrumentation, and ties to other systems:

a.

b.

d.

e.

f.

g-

h.

C.

I.

j.

k.

I.

m

n.

P-

q.

0.

r RClC pump RClC turbine RClC flow controller Barometric condenser CST Suction Valve FOIO Suppression Pool Suction Valve F031 Pump Discharge Valve F012 Injection Valve F013 Minimum Flow Valve FO19 Test Line to CST Valve F022 Lube Oil Cooling Water Valve F046 Steam Supply Isolation Valves F007, F008, and F088 Steam to RClC Turbine Valve F045 Turbine trip and throttle valve Turbine governor valve Turbine Exhaust Valve F059 Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valves F062 and F084 I.

Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breakers F063 and F064 LOC 20 As Given H :\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocsVOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

TM-OP-050-OB, LO Systems, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 2008 Describe the location, function and operation of the following Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System components:

a. RCICpump

b. RClC turbine

c.

RClC flow controller

d.

Barometric condenser

e. CST Suction Valve FOIO

f.

g. Pump Discharge Valve F012

h.

Injection Valve F013

i.

Minimum Flow Valve FO19

j.

Test Line to CST Valve F022

k. Lube Oil Cooling Water Valve F046

1.

Steam Supply Isolation Valves F007, F008, and F088

m. Steam to RClC Turbine Valve F045

n. Turbine trip and throttle valve

0. Turbine governor valve

p. Turbine Exhaust Valve F059

q. Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valves F062 and F084

r.

Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breakers F063 and F064

s.

Keep-fill pressure control station Suppression Pool Suction Valve F031 2014 Describe the relationships between the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling following:

System and the

a.

b.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

k.

I.

m.

C.

Condensate Storage and Transfer System Nuclear Boiler System Suppression Pool Main Condenser Instrument Air System Residual Heat Removal System AC electrical distribution DC electrical distribution Emergency Service Water System Main Steam System Remote Shutdown Panel Reactor Building Ventilation Keepfi I I Page 1 of 5 LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBank\\MergeDocs\\LOCZONRCFom.doc Printed on 08/18/04

Page 2 of 5 TM-OP-050-OB, LO Systems, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 10439 State the power supply to the following Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Components:

a.

Motor-operated valves

b.

Initiation logic

c.

Flow controller

d.

Barometric condenser vacuum pump

e.

Isolation logic 2007 Locate and describe the function of each Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and indication.

System control

a.

RClC Manual Initiation pushbutton

b. RClC Turbine Trip

c.

RClC Flow Controller 10406 System 201 8 Describe how the design and operation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling differs between units with respect to initiation.

Describe the following Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System design features interlocks, including initiating signals, setpoints, automatic actions, and control applicable:

and logic, as

a.

b.

d.

e.

f.

9.

h.

i.

k.

I.

m.

n.

C.

1.

Prevention of water hammer Prevention of overfilling the Reactor Vessel Prevention of pump overheating Turbine trips Prevention of radioactivity release to the Reactor Building Automatic initiation System isolations Manual initiation Resetting system initiation Resetting system isolations Resetting turbine trips Alternate supplies of water Operation of the Turbine Lube Oil System Operation of the Pump Room Cooling System LOC 20 As Given H :\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

Page 3 of 5 TM-OP-050-OB, LO Systems, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 10440 Evaluate the operational significance of the following as they apply to the Isolation Cooling System:

Reactor Core

a.

Turbine operation

b.

c.

Flow indication

d.

Differential pressure indication RClC System ability to provide core cooling 201 2 Predict the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System response to manipulation following controls:

of the

a.

Manual initiation pushbutton

b.

Isolation reset switches

c.

RClC flow controller

d.

e. Turbine trip pushbutton High water level reset pushbutton 10441 Given appropriate alarm response procedures, determine the following for any associated with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System:

annunciator

1. Probable cause of the alarm

2.

Adverse consequences of continued operation in the alarm state

3. Appropriate course of action 2016 Given the following Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System procedures, (1) explain the sequence of the procedure evolution, (2) explain the bases for any prerequisites, precautions, cautions, and notes, and (3) apply precautions, cautions, and notes:

a.

OP-I 50(250)-001

b. SO-I 50(250)-001 C.

SO-I 50(250)-002

d.

SO-I 50(250)-004

f.

SO-I 50(250)-015

e.

SO-I 50(250)-005 10442 Given a set of plant conditions, including instrument indications, determine if Core Isolation Cooling System response is correct for each mode of system the Reactor operation.

LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCFom.doc Printed on 08/18/04

TM-OP-050-OB, LO Systems, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 2015 Predict the effect that the following conditions will have on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System:

a.

b.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

j.

C.

1.

k.

1.

m.

n.

0.

Loss of DC power Loss of instrument air Low Suppression Pool level Loss of Condensate Storage and Transfer supply Inadvertent motor-operated valve openings or closings Loss of lubricating oil or lubricating oil cooling Loss of barometric condenser vacuum pump Turbine control system failure Low system flow Loss of RClC Room cooling Turbine rupture disc failure Steam line leak Low CST level High Suppression Pool level High Suppression Pool temperature 10443 Given an industry or SSES event related to the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

System, describe the plant vulnerability and appropriate actions to prevent or mitigate the event.

2024 Given the Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements associated with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, determine the requirements for operability and the ACTION(s) required when a Limiting Condition for Operation or Technical Requirement for Operation is not met.

10444 (SRO only) Explain the Technical Specification and Technical Requirements Bases for the Limiting Conditions for Operation and Technical Requirements for Operability associated with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.

Page 5 of 5 Page 4 of 5 LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBan k\\MergeDocs\\LOC20NRCForm.doc Printed on 08/18/04

S 'ON 31811 I

I

\\

I

\\ I I

Attachment B Page 14 of 29 INSTRUMENT TABLE 1 RANGE Narrow Range Instrumentation Trip Settings LI-C32-1R606A (1C652)

LI-C32-1R606C (1C6523 0" to +60" 0" to +60"

+54"

+13"

+13" HPCI High Water Level Trip Logic Low Water Level Scram RHR Head Spray, Discharge to Radwaste, Sample Valve and Shutdown Cooling Isolation Logic LIS-B2 1 - 1N024B

( 1 C004)

SETPOINT 0" to +60"

+54"

+54"

+39"

+30"

+13" FUNCTION UTILIZATION Auto Depressurization Permissive Logic Main Turbine Trip Logic Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Trip Logic High Level Alarm Low Level Alarm LIS-B21-1N042A

( 1 C004)

+54"

+54" 0" to +60" Main Turbine Trip Logic I Reactor Feed Pump Trip Logic LOC 20 As Given H:\\ExamBank\\MergeDocs\\LOCZONRCFom.doc Printed on 08/18/04

Susquehanna Learning Center 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603-0467 570-542-3353 September 15,2004 Mr. Joseph D'Antonio USNRC Chief Examiner USNRC Region 1 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Susquehanna Learning Center Follow-up Post-Examination Comments PLA 005819 File A14-13D

Dear Mr. D'Antonio:

In our Post-Examination Materials letter to you, dated August 23,2004, (PLA 005802; File A14-13D), we requested a modification to the Written Examination Answer Key for Question Number 41, and supplied documentation for the requested modification.

Based on discussions with you and additional reviews of the question and supporting documentation, we are revising our position on Question 41. The attached pages reflect our revised position for Question 41 and the supporting documentation.

In light of the information provided by these discussions and additional reviews, we request Question Number 41 be deleted from the Written Examination.

If you have any questions or require more information, please contact me at 570-542-3326 or Rich Brooks at 570-542-1 891.

K. M. Roush Manager - Nuclear Training Response: No Attachment cc:

Ops Letter File Nuc Records - NUCPT rb post exam follow-up memo 1 KM WRB/va h

ATTACHMENT Question 41 In our original post-exam submittal we requested Choice B be accepted as an alternate correct answer. Based on discussions with the Chief Examiner and additional reviews of the question and supporting documentation, we are revising our position on Question 41.

Our revised position for Question 41 is:

Delete the question, there are NO correct answers.

The stem of the question presents a loss of feedwater, which caused water level to drop below -30 inches (the RClC initiation setpoint), but not below -38 inches (the HPCl initiation setpoint). At +I3 inches, the Traversing lncore Probe (TIP), which was in use at the time of the transient should have automatically withdrawn from the core to the In-Shield position. When the detector reaches the In-Shield position, the ball valve in the TIP Tube should automatically close. In this question, the TIP failed to automatically retract from the core, and the stem of the question asks What actions are REQUIRED?

In this situation, EO-100-102 will be entered on low RPV water level (+I3 inches). Step RC/L-1 directs the operator to ENSURE all isolations, ECCS initiations, and DGs start.

Since the TIP failed to withdraw and isolate, the operator is REQUIRED to take manual actions for any automatic operation that should have occurred, but did not (see attached EOP Bases). The REQUIRED operator actions for the failure of the automatic TIP withdrawal would be to manually withdraw the TIP to the In-Shield position AND ENSURE the Ball Valve closes.

The correct answer to the question: What actions are REQUIRED is therefore:

Manually withdraw the TIP to the In-Shield position, and ENSURE the Ball Valve is closed.

Choice A, Manually withdraw the TIP and close the Ball Valve is not correct. Manually closing the Ball Valve would ONLY be required if the Ball Valve failed to close as a result of the TIP being withdrawn to the In-Shield position. This second failure is not stated in the stem or the distracter. Furthermore, this choice fails to address the REQUIRED action of ENSURING the Ball Valve is closed.

Choice B, Manually withdraw the TIP. No other action required is not correct. This choice also fails to address the REQUIRED action of ENSURING the Ball Valve is closed.

Choice C, Manually withdraw the TIP; ensure when the CHECK IN-SHIELD light ILLUMINATES the Shear Valve auto closes is not correct. The Shear Valve must be manually fired, and would only be fired if the TIP could not be isolated and indications were of leakage from the tube.

Choice D, Momentarily depress CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton, and verify TIP automatically withdraws is not correct. This will reset the isolation signal, rather than cause the isolation to occur.

In conclusion, none of the choices presented in the question contain the statement Manually withdraw the TIP to the In-Shield position, and ENSURE the Ball Valve is closed. Therefore, there is no correct answer to the question, and it should be deleted from the exam.

Question 41 Revised Justification 09/14/04 RJB 1

SSES LOC 20 NRC Exam

41. Unit 2 was at 100% power, with Reactor Engineering running TIP traces when a loss of Feedwater occurred, causing an automatic start of RCIC. Water level did not drop to the auto start of HPCI.

The Reactor Engineer reports that a TIP trace was in progress, and when the reactor scrammed, the TIP stopped at mid-core.

What actions are required for the situation reported by the Reactor Engineer?

A.

Manually withdraw the TIP and close the Ball Valve.

B.

Manually withdraw the TIP. No other action required.

C.

Manually withdraw the TIP; ensure when the CHECK IN-SHIELD light ILLUMINATES the Shear Valve auto closes.

D.

Momentarily depress CONT ISOLATN PUSH TO RESET pushbutton, and verify TIP automatically withdraws.

Question Data A

Manually withdraw the TIP and close the Ball Valve.

ExplanationNustification:

A.

B.

C.

D.

Since RPV level dropped below 13 (RCIC auto initiates at -30, HPCl at 38), the TIP should have withdrawn and isolated. The isolation failed so manual action should be taken to withdraw the TIP and isolate it.

Since RPV level dropped below 13 (RCIC auto initiates at -30, HPCl at -38),

the TIP should have withdrawn and isolated. The candidate may believe that this is all that is required (no isolation valve closure) and choose this answer.

Shear valve must be manually fired and would only be fired if the TIP could not be isolated and indications were of leakage from the tube. The candidate may believe that the shear valve will auto close.

This will reset the isolation, not cause the isolation to occur. The candidate may confuse the reset and initiation pushbuttons.

Sys #

System Category KA Statement 223002 Primary Containment Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PCISINSSSS will have on following:

Traversing incore probe system Isolation SystemlNuclear Steam Supply Shut-Off wA#

223002.K3.21 2.6/2.7 IRO/SRO)

Exam Level RO References provided to Candidate None Technical

References:

o~-i78-001 Question Source:

New Susquehanna. 8/4/2004 Level Of Difficulty: (1 -5) 3 Question Cognitive Level:

Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.7 145.4 Question 41 Revised Justification 09/14/04 RJB 2

SSES LOC 20 NRC Exam RC/L - RPV LEVEL CONTROL RPV water level control (RC/L) section of RPV Control restores and maintains RPV water level to assure adequate core cooling.

Adequate Core Cooling is heat removal from the reactor sufficient to prevent fuel damage.

Three viable mechanisms of adequate core cooling exist; in order of preference they are:

1.

Core submergence

2.

Steam cooling yitJ injection of makeup water to the RPV with RPV pressure maintained at or above the Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure (81 psid) (Non-ATWS), or Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure (ATWS) (EO-000-1 14, Table 17)

3.

Steam cooling without injection of makeup water to the RPV with indicated level at or above the Minimum Zero Injection RPV Water Level (-205)

RC/L-1 ENSURE ALL:

0 ISOLATIONS ECCS INITIATIONS DGSSTART Intent of this step is to quickly assess plant status and to determine proper automatic operation of plant equipment occurred.

SPDS may be used to determine Containment Isolations.

Diesel generator initiation assures that there is redundant source of electrical power available for RPV water level control. A loaded diesel generator must be supplied with adequate ESW flow within 4-1/2 minutes. This limit is extended to eight minutes if diesel generator is running unloaded. Adequate ESW flow is described in OP-054-001, Emergency Service Water System. Instructions on how to manually shut down a running diesel generator are located in OF-024-001.

Instructions to bypass interlocks IAW ES procedures always supersede this steps requirements.

(

Reference:

SSES-EPG RC/L-1)

Question 41 Revised Justification 09/14/04 RJB 3

NRC Resolution of Facility Comments Question I 6 Facilitv Comment:

The question stem presents a loss of suppression pool cooling with suppression pool level at 22. The original correct answer calls for a shutdown of RCIC. This contradicts EO-I 00-1 03 which calls for running RCIC on recirc to raise level at this point. Delete question, no correct answer.

NRC Resolution:

Question deleted. The examiners reviewed the applicable EOP and determined that the facility is correct.

Question 41 Facilitv Comment:

Accept two correct answers, or delete the question due to no completely correct answer. The stem presents a situation in which the operator is required to manually withdraw TIPS to ensure all isolations... per EO-100-102.

The original correct answer A requires the operator to manually shut the ball valve as well. This is not necessary, since there is a limit switch which shuts the ball valve if the TIPS are fully withdrawn.

Answer B says Withdraw TIPS, no further action necessary. Since this is correct if the ball valve automatically closes, accept it as a second correct answer.

If the NRC does not agree that B should be accepted on the grounds that no further action does not meet the facility definition of ensure, then answer A is not correct because it includes more action than is required. This is the reason the applicant rejected A in favor of B. In this case, neither answer can be considered fully correct, and the question should be deleted.

NRC Resolution:

Question deleted. There was no fully correct answer for this question.

The examiners reviewed the training material and procedures submitted by the facility and agree that fully withdrawing the TIPS actuates a limit switch which closes the ball valve. The NRC does not accept answer B because 01-AD-055 Att A Approved Action Verb List defines Ensure as perform action which determines whether a parameter or piece of equipment is in desired condition and follow up with action to achieve desired condition if it is not. The desired second correct answer does not meet this criteria in that no further action assumes the ball valve goes closed due to the full open limit switch, but does not verify that it did so. If the desired second answer had been

...check ball valve closed, it would be accepted. The NRC agrees that answer A contains more action than is required due to the automatic closure of the ball valve, and agrees that a knowledgeable applicant could reject this answer because of that fact. Accordingly, there is no fully correct answer and the question is deleted.

6 Question 93 Facility Comment:

The question stem presents an instrument failure, but not enough information to determine if the failure was high or low. The question author assumed a bellows failure would mean a low failure, but the metal bellows in the actual instrument could fail due to overstretching as well as puncture. Additionally, the question requires the operator to know what functions the specific level channel provides, which is not expected memory knowledge. Delete the question.

NRC Resolution:

Comment partially accepted, question deleted. The NRC does not agree with the facility statement that it is unreasonable to expect the operator to realize that this channel feeds RClC actuation logic. However, the inspectors reviewed the technical manual troubleshooting guide provided by the utility and concur that there are modes by which the bellows can fail either high or low. The question does not indicate which way the channel failed and provides no information which would allow the operator to deduce the failure. The question therefore provides insufficient information to determine an answer.