ML041130292

EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart, Revision 22

ML041130292
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	04/19/2004
From:	Pace P Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
EPIP-1, Rev 22, EPIP-13, Rev 11
Download: ML041130292 (82)

Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 APR 1 9 200o 10 CFR 50, App E.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority

)

Docket No. 50-390 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN)

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISIONS In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the EPIPs as listed below.

EPIP Rev Title Effective Date EPIP-1 22 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies 4-16-2 004 3-25-2004 EPIP-13 11 There are no regulatory commitments in this letter.

If you should have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.

Sincerely, P. L. Pace Manager, Site Licensing and Industry Affairs Enclosure cc:

See Page 2

-A D)4S-Pwted on recyced aer

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 APR 19 2004 PLP:JES Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure)

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2 copies)

Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART Revision 22 Unit 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:

James F. Haciv (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

Em APPROVED BY:

Frank L. Pavlechko eraencv Planning EFFECTIVE DATE:0411 6/2004 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-I CLASSIFICATION Revision 22 FLOWCHART Page 2 of 49 REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Description of Revision Number Date 0

04/13/90 New WBN-EPIP. Supersedes IP-1.

1 02104/91 Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers.

2 11/28/91 Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment 1 Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown.

3 03/04/92 Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new 'Merit Tech Specs and ODCM references.

4 02110/93 Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARCINESP-007, Rev. 3, 1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92.

5 09/15/93 Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC.

6 01/01/94 Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes.

7 05/27/94 Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) and establish site perimeter monitoring points.

8 01/10/95 FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to provide Operators additional information.

9 4/28/98 Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AO1-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following:

System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements.

Revision Implementation Date Pages Description of Revision Number Affected CN-1 09/28/95 10, 14, 26 The following non-intent enhancements were made:

(CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA),

to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tomado) revised to new number.

CN-2 11/10/95 3, 6, 34 The following non-intent enhancements were made:

Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-I CLASSIFICATION Revision 22 FLOWCHART Page 3 of 49 REVISION LOG(Continued)

Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected CN-3 05/24/96 8, 11,16, The following non-intent enhancements were made: Due 19, 23, 24, to revisions made to AO1-27, it was added back to the 26, 29, 32, EALs in event 4.5 'Control Room Evacuation'; The 34 Assessment Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPIP-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash', to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification.

10 3/15/99 All The following non-intent enhancement were made:

Software revised to Microsoft Word which re-formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised - one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS.

11 4/15/99 2, 34 Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to >0.1.

11A 7/1/99 3,26 Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 only page 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed.

12 9/30/99 All Non intent change. Minor editorial\\format changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695.

(LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000.

13 12/08/99 All Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step I of the Alert classification.

14 04/10/00 All Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN 50484, (Pg.4 & 45) stage 1 which moved 0-RE-90-101B, & -132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE-90-421B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120 & -121 from ICS Screen 4RM1 to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen.

15 08/17/00 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (Pg. 4, 11A & (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to correspond B) with the new TI-RPS-162, *Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors' readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 11 b. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000.

This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 22 FLOWCHART Page 4 of 49 REVISION LOG (Continued)

Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 16 3130101 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do (Pg 11 &1 4) not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors readings In the Barrier Matrix (1.3) to support new dose assessment methodology.

Non Intent change. Revised reference from annunciator alarm printer to annunciator monitor per DCN D-50301.

17 09/258/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Page 6. 1 1 B Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NOAP a pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Barrier Matrix.

18 02115/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews Indicate the following revisions do 2, 11 B, 44 not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-Intent change. Changes to the EALs in this revision consist of changing pa-to gamma in Section 7.0 to ensure consistency with NUMARCINESP-007, Reg Guide 1.101, and NEI 99-01 rev 4. Clarification to EAL 1.3.3 (containment Isolation status also made per this reference.)

This standardizes these issues with the other TVAN sites. These changes were approved by the State of Tennessee.

19 06/05102 All Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) Indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

4.7 &30 Intent change(s): A revision to the Security Event (4.6) was made to J>

Incorporate change(s) resulting from the NEI to NRC (Mr. Bruce Boger) letter dated 12)18/01 requesting conformation for an EAL basis change to include response to a Credible Site Specific Threat. Table 4-3 was revised to Incorporate this additional EAL. This meets the compliance of the NRC's 10/6/01 Safeguards Advisory on this matter. This represents an additional EAL and does not change existing criteria in the Security Event Basis.

Revised 5.1 Interfacing documents by noting the termination of EPIP 9 with reference to EPIP 16.

20 07/09/02

ALL, Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) pg. 2, 10, indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of 13,15, 20, effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

24, 30, 32, Intent change(s): Reference to T/S 3.4.16 in Event 2.4 EA 39, 43 1 (a) revised to correspond to levels in AO1-28. Credible Site-Specific was added to the definition pages. Removed reference to the definition in Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS to standardize with other TVAN sites.

21 03/03/2003 2, 15 Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Non-intent change: Deleted reference to table which was deleted from AO1-28, Ref. WBPER 03-004004-000.

22 04/16/2004 4, 7, 45 Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Intent change: Revised Table 7.1 in Section 7,

'Radiological," to standardize the calculational methodology with SQN. This revision updates the site meteorology, removes allocation factors, and removes the joint frequency distribution factors which were in the previous table. Updated references.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 22 FLOWCHART Page 5 of 49 1.0 PURPOSE 4 This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2' 4 The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4 3.1 The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.

3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.

3.3 Classification Determination 3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced.

3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.

3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 22 FLOWCHART Page 6 of 49 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.

3.3.5 IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.

3.3.6 IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition CAN NOT be reasonably discounted (i.e.,

spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered MET and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.3.7 IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to. declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time.

3.3.8 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 Non-QA Records None

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 22 FLOWCHART Page 7 of 49

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 Interfacing References BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis SPP 3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3, Alert WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5, General Emergency WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of Meteorological Data (Canceled see EPIP-16)

WBN-EPIP-1 3, Initial Dose Assessment For Radiological Emergencies WBN-EPIP-14, Radiological Control Response WBN-EPIP-16, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures 1-SI-68-34, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance 5.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection From Radiation REG GUIDE-1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For NuclearPower Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.

Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs),

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

ICS Operator's Manual EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Pane 8 of 49 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART 1' 3'4'5

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Pape9of49

. I....

• FISSION'PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Mod 1:4) 1~ 1 Pu1 CiadK

^KJ<

K> j:::::;Ž 1.3

-. C.ntam.nt 1..

~.:.:.

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Dowvn 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2

2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Tecimlical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidenified Leakage

2. 10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Powver Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4 7 SED Judgment 4

Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthlquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 AircrafllProjectile 5.6 Watcrcrafl Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems/

6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdow n) 6, RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels M

7.2 Liquid Emfuent 7.4 Fuel Handling/

Table 7-1 Table 7-2 7

Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page IOof49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT. ALERT. SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC-The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of infonnation found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release orcore radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling. Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.. steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLANMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

JIO.STAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH! condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATHI. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) andlor Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

\\.J ODCNI: OffQite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or oftsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the aftected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe following: (I) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing. or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition arc unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates. and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing. or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking. and'or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping. scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment. systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Revision 22 a

S

1. Critical Safety Function Status

f'
'--

.1. Critical Safety-Function Status

_ iPotential LOSS Core Cooling Red Core Cooling Orange OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)

-OR-,

2.- PrimaryCoolant Activity Level Potential LOSS RCS sample activity is Greater Than 300 pCi/gm Not applicable dose equivalent iodine-131

-OR-

4. RecrTCs Hi Quad Average' -.

Potential LOSS Greater Than 1200VF Greater Than 7273F

OR-4.'. Reactor Vessel Water Level; Potential LOSS Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level <33%

(No RCP running)

-OR-

5. Containment Radiation Monitors Potential LOSS VALID reading increase Not Applicable of Greater Than:

74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 OR 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274

-OR-

6. Site Emergency Director Judgment Potential LOSS Not Applicable Pressurized Thermal Shock Red OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)

-OR-:

2. RCS Leakage/LOCA 6_

t Potential LOSS RCS Leak results in Non Isolatable RCS Leak Loss of subcooling Exceeding The Capacity of

(<650F Indicated),

One Charging Pump (CCP)

[850F ADV]

In the Normal Charging Alignment.

OR RCS Leakage Results In Entry Into E-1

-OR-

3. Steam Generator ube Rupture Potential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable safety injection actuation OR Entry into E-3

-OR-

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level Potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level Not Applicable

<33%

(No RCP Running)

-OR-

5..Site Emergency Director Judgment I

Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

EPIP-IRevisio 22l F

Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4 n Status -

1. Critical baTet Functic)I Potential LOSS INSTRUCTIONS Not Applicable Containment (FR-Z.1) Red OR Actions of FR-C 1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE NOTE: A condition is considered to be MET1i in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director. the condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, in the absence of a viable success oath).

The classification shall be made a soon as this determination is made.

-OR-

2. Containment Pressure/Hydrogen Potential LOSS Rapid unexplained decrease Containment Hydrogen following initial increase Increases to >4% by volume OR OR Containment pressure or Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase Sump level Not increasing B) with < One full train of (with LOCA in progress)

Containment spray

-OR-3: Containment Isiolation Status Potential LOSS Containment Isolation is Not Applicable Incomplete (when required)

AND a Release Path to the ronment Exists

-OR-

4. Containment Bypass Potential LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID increase FAULTED outside CNTMT in area or ventilation RAD OR monitors in areas adjacent to Prolonged (>4 Hours)

CNTMT (with LOCA in Secondary Side release progress) outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits

-OR-

5. Significant Radioactivity in Containment Potential LOSS Not Applicable VALID Reading increase of Greater Than:

108 Rlhr on 1-RE-90-271 and 1-RE-90-272 OR 86 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and I-RE-90-274

1. In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which, if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET.

Circle these CONDITIONS.

2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.

3. If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING CONDITION; the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the EVENT classification for the Modes listed on the classification flowchart.

4. Compare the barrier losses and potential losses to the EVENTS below and make the appropriate declaration.

EVENTS F

I S

S I

0 N

P R

0 D

U C

T B

A R

R I

E R

M A

T R

l X

U I

UNUSUAL EVENT Loss or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier ALERT Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier

-OR-Site Emergency Director Judgment

)~

condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier

EPIP-I Revision 22 Page 12 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

S x n

n t

~~~~~.

n................,

.SYSTEM :DEGR-ADATION:.....

2.1 Loss-of Instrumentation: ::::

.::2.6'::::::RCS ldentified Leakagc

'g ::::::::

C

e,.d,n

2.

c i-a.....

.2:.5 ::.RCS Unidentified Le ukage ti :.:::.2;

Safey 'Lii t;

~.

LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdowvn) 3.3 Loss of DC 3

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment 4

Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Efuent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Etlluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 7

Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page 13 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMIB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling. Heat Sink. Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safl operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.. steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOW'ER EXPLOSIVE LINIIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or DXecreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classificatiom INTRUSIONAINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

t<

ODCNIt: OMsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATHI: Monitoringofone or more CSFsby FR-0 wbich indicates that the CS F(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or oflsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATII: Monitoringofoneormorc CSFsbythe FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) An automatic turbine runback > 153%; thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that isnot the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (Witl specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a )ischarge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP. e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow. minimum release times, maximum release rates. and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or rponrt or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conClisively verified by (l) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment. i.e.. within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DANIAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing. or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability orallected safety structure. system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact. denting. penetration, rupture, cracking. and'or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment. systems. devices, or material, the failure.

destruction. or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

IRcvision 22 Pae 4 of 49, I

I Moe I Iitiating/Condition Referto 'Fission Product BarrierMatrix and

'RadlologicalEffiuents'(Section 7) 1,2 3,4 Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)

1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS

4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

Sub-criticality Core Cooling Heat Sink PTS Containment Inventory

- 4.__...........__

1,2 3,4 UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for>15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes.

2. SWSED Judgment that increased surveillance Is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)

3. (a orb)

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress

b. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix Complete loss of function needed to achieve 2! maintain Hot Shutdown (I or 2) 1,2

1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red 3,4

2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (RHR not in service)

Note: Also Refer to 'Faulure of Rx Protection' (2.3) and Fission Product Barrier Matfix' Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs (1 and 2 and 3) 4

1. Shutdown is required

2. Loss of RHR capability

3. Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser A. Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Communication capability (I and 2 and 3)

ALL

1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones

3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios or B. UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)

1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies

3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system

4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines

5. UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system 1,2 3,4 UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System annunciators or indications in the Control Room for >15 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (a Annunciator Monitor)2 indications for >15 minutes.

2. SMISED Judgment that Increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)

3. ICS Computeror SPDS is in service and capable of displaying data requested.

EPIP-io Revision 22

I.

AKO III d'!K
1

J mral f:1
4 d1al i

~i~

A

• g9 M3g~n Fre Mode Initiating/Condition Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals 1,2 did not result In a reduction of Rx power to <5% and decreasing (l and 2)

1. (aorb)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red

2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result In a Rx Power of <5% and decreasing 1,2 Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3)

1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was kgo successful.

3. FR-S.1 has been entered.

Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal 1,2 and manual trip from MCR was successful (1 and 2)

1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing.

Not Applicable Mode Initiatina/Condition II Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx'

-4 Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix' S

Y S

T E

M D

E G

R A

D A

T l

0 N

U I

-4 Refer to 'Fisson Product Barrier Matnx

-4 1,2, 3,4, 5

Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3A.16)

1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a orb)

a. Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131) >0.265 pCi/gm for >48 Hours or

>21 pCilgm.

b. Specific activity >100/E ECi/gm

!EPIP'-I Rcvision. 22 1~o D-4 -A.

_r_

I I

InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer MatNx' Refer to XFission Product Barrier Matrx' Unidentifiedgir pressure boundary RCS leakage

>10 GPM 1,2

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as l A 4, defined by Tech. Spec.) >10 GPM as Indicated l 5 below (a orb)

a. 1-SI-68-32 results

b. With RCS Temperature and PZR Level Stable.

VCT Level Dropping at a Rate >10 GPM

'_ Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized I Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix' Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Referto 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM 1,2,

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)

3,4,

>25 GPM (a orb)

• 5

a. 1 -SI-68-32 results

b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank

'Note: Appries to Mode 5 ff RCS Pressurized

IReviion 22 pae 7o149in Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety 1,2,3 Injection Initiation (1 and 2)

1.

Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System

(<675 psig)

2. Safety Injection has initiated o is required Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing Safety Related equipment

1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in VISIBLE 1,2,3 DAMAGE in any of the following areas:

Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg.

Auxiliary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station CST Turbine Failure results In Casing penetration 1,2,3

1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing or Damage to Main Generator Seals S

Y S

T E

M D

E G

R A

D A

T l

0 N

U I

Pa~jc of49, 0

0 I

I Mode Initiating/Condition NotAppricable Not Appricable

-I 2

Not Applcable Moue InitiatinglCondition Not Applicable NotApplicable Not Applicable Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or2) 1,2,

1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and 34 RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech.

Spec. Figure 2.1.1-1 'Reactor Core Safety Limitse

2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig) 1,2 3,4 Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech.

Spec. limits (I and 2)

1. Any Tech. Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a Mode reduction, has been entered

2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode within the time prescribed by the LCO Action Statement

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Paee 19 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment I

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2

2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWE 3~~~~.

...........1. - so~

3 :-:::osof AC (Shutdown).;::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::

.3..

os o........-.

3 HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment 4_

Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low

~

5.3 AircraftlProjectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown n Systems>

6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) a 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdow n) 6 RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels T

7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling/

Table 7-1 Table 7-2 7

Figure 7-A

IRcision 22l Pan20of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT. ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BONIB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality. Core Cooling. Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Cornbustion characterized by heat and light. Sourc of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed FLANIMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATTI condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, c.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) andlor Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSIONIINTRUI)ER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Oftsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATII: Mtonitoringofone or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the afltected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATII: Mionitoringofone or more CSFs bythc FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine).

UNPlANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result or normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions King taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures arc UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED): (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release orradioactivity is INI'I.NNi l) irthe release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (I)P.

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases. unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specilied on tl D11'.

e.g.. alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow. minimum release limes, maximum release rates, and/or discharge or incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively serilied by (I) an instrument channel cheek, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment i c. %ithin 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measuretl.tits. testing. or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability ol'allZ.wd saldty stnieture, system, or component. Example damage includes: deflormation due to heat or impact, denting. penetration. rupture. cracking. and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g. paint chipping. scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area withiii the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment. systems. de% ices. or material, the failure, destruction. or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Pare21 of 49 Mode Initiating/Condition Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power (I and 2) 1,2,

1. I A and I B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 3,4 for >15 minutes

2. (a orb)

a. Core Cooling Red or Orange

b. Restoration of Either 1 A or 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss.

Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 15 minutes

1. 1A and 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 1,2, for >15 minutes 3,4 Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (I and 2) 1,2,

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 3,4

2. 1 A or 1 B Diesel Generator not available Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) 1,2

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 3,4

2. Each Diesel Generator Is supplying power to Its respective Shutdown Board

-m Mode InitiatinglCondition Not Applicable Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 minutes 5,6,

1. 1 A and 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized or for >15 minutes De-fuel Also Refer to Loss of Shutdown Systems (6.1)

UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (I and 2) 5,6,

1. Cand DCSSTs not available for>15 minutes or De-

2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power fuel to its respective Shutdown Board

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page 22 of 49 Inntiatingllondition Mode Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' and

'Loss of Function' (2.2) 1,2 Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes 3,4

1. Voltage <1 05V DC on 1 25V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-l and 1-ti and 1-l1l and 1-IV for >15 minutes Also Refer to 'Fission Product Barier Matrix',

'Loss of Function' (2.2),

and 'Loss of Instrumentation' (2.1)

Also Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix,

'Loss of Function' (2.2),

and 'Loss of Instrumentation' (2. 1)

L 0

S S

0 F

P 0

W E

R U

l 5,6, or De-fuel UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-land 1-ll or>15 minutes

2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vita Battery Buses 1-Il and 1-tV for >15 minutes

IRc~ision 22I Pae2 f4 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumcntation 2.6 RCS Identified Lcakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DCJ HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1...Fir.

4.3.Fl.a l

.Ga 4.5 C nr

.:4.2, Explosio'n:::4,4:To.ic' as:'-'

4':6: vSec'rity'::: :'

.::,::'Table 4 :'.:'::::

Tabl

.4;2

-.::: 4:

SED

.dgm.ent F".':igure 4-A Fgu're' 4-B' j

'.Tae 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 5

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling 6

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Efuent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 7

Figure 7-A

Revision 22 Page 24 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXTLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more pcrsons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -Thc determination is macL by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release orcorc radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WUBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and'or Decreasing Trend on Core Thennocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSIONVINTRUD)ER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCNI: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATII: MIonitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-O which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition arc unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, egg, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and'or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements. testing. or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping. scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL ARFA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page 25 of 37 I

I Mode InitiatinglCondition

-4 Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matrix' Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx' Refer to 'Control Room Evacuation. '(4.5) or Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' All FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-4 that Is affecting Safety Related equipment (I and 2)

1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

2. (a orb)

a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or Safety Related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE

b. Control Room Indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the FIRE All EXPLOSION In any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that Is affecting Safety Related equipment (l and 2)

1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

2. (a orb)

a. An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to Safety Related equipment

b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the EXPLOSION Refer to 'Secunty' (4.6) 4 FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that Is Not extinguished within 15 minutes from the Time of Control Room notification or verification of Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)

UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure or equipment (Figure 4-A)

All All Refer to 'Security (4.6)

IRevisio 22I Pa~

6of 49 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building CST Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1 &2)

RWST Figure 4-A PROTECTED AREAISITE PERIMETER H

A z

A R

D S

I S

E D

J U

D G

M E

N T

U 1

EPIP-I Revision 22 Pae 27 of 49_

-I V^411L

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I Mode InitiatinglCondition Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Refer to Fission Product Bamier Matnx' All UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within a facility structure containing Safety Related equipment or associated with Power production

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1 Oft triangular Area is

>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Refer to X Fission Product Barer MaIx" Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to establish or maintain Cold SID (1 and 2 and 3)

All

1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building listed in Table 4-2

2. (aorb)

a. Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (i.e., burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness)

b. Sampling indications > (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit

3. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.

A. Normal Operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2 All OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations >than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an Evacuation (Figure 4-B)

-4.

All A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1 Oft Triangular Area Is

>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 4-B)

OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite Flammable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >25% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page 28 of 49 TABLE 4-2 Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1&2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building Figure 4-B ONE MILE RADIUSISITE PERIMETER H

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U D

G M

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T U

1

IRevision 22l

• Pa~2of49 K.

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I

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I 5

I I Mode Initiatinci/Condition Mode I Initiatinq/Condition Refer to `Fission Product Barrier Matnx'

-I All Evacuation of the Control Room has been initiated and Control of all necessary equipment Has Not been established within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room (1 and 2 and 3)

1. (a or b)

a. AOI-30.2 'Fire Safety Shutdown' entered

b. A01-27 'Main Control Room Inaccessibility' entered

2. SMISED Orders Control Room evacuation

3. Control has Bto been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels Li 1 A and LI 18 Evacuation of the Control Room Is Required (1 and 2)

1. (a orb)

a. AO1-30.2 'Fire Safe Shutdown' entered

b. AOI-27 'Main Control Room Inaccessibility' entered

2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation Security Event resulting in loss of Control of the Plant

1. Hostile Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant, All Control Room, or Remote shutdown capability Security Event has or is occurring which results in Actual or Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed to Protect the Public All

1. VITAL AREA, other than the Control Room, has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2 or 3)

All

1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA

2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA

3. PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawing of Protected Area and Site Perimeter Confirmned Security Event which indicates a Potential Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2)

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA All

2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-3 All Not Applcable

EPIP-I Revision 22 Page 30 of 49 MAII

AW:] 119kya ml I t:444 (01 iIIII II Wo II 11:4 II M I

IMode Initiating/Condition Events are In progress or have occurred All which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 74-Events are in progress or have occurred All which Involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result In Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.

Events are in progress or have occurred All which Involve Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels.

Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS

a. SABOTAGEIINTRUSION has occurred or is occurring within the PROTECTED AREA

b. HOSTAGEIEXTORTION Situation that Threatens to interrupt Plant Operations

c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA

d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence received)

e. A CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC security threat notification.

if A

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I All Unusual Events are in Progress or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page 31of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containmcnt I

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identificd Leak-age 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2

2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT I

Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4

Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIV PHENOMENON

5

.Ear hqua e:

5.4: Rivr Level Hi.. ::.: :.:.::::::

5.2.. Tornado

.5.5: River L.vel Low:.:.:

5.3 Aircrafrojetile 5.6 Water...:

.C ra

.Table 5 2 :.::.::.: :.

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling 6

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 7

Figure 7-A

IRcvision 22 Pa~e 2 of 49.

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EM ERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent sigrificant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by K J threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of name is prefrred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat arc observed.

FLAMNINIABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that dernands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g.. Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) andlor Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

K ODCMI: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATII: NMonitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offisite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-A which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) An automatic turbine runback > I 5% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason or inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, andlor discharge of incorrect tank.

VALII): An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check. or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMIAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily obscrvable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concem regarding the continued operability or reliability of aflected safety structure. system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting. penetration, rupture, cracking. and'or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices. or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Pa de 33 of 49 Moe niiaig/onito "Oini 0v

.06 Mode InitiatinqlCondition Refer to Fission Product Banier Matrix' Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix' All Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. (aandb)

a. Ann.166 D indicates 'OBE Spectra Exceeded'

b. Ann.166 E indicates Seismic Recording Initiated"

2. (a orb)

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matix' Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

All

1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one minute) strikes any structure listed In Table 5-1

2. (a orb)

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE

b. Control Room Indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to event Note: Site Met Data Instrumentation fads to 0 at >100 mph.

Natonal Weather Service Morristown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide additional information if needed.

Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report a Tomado has been sighted within All the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

Earthquake detected by site seismic

-4.

All Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. Ann. 166 E indicator'Seismic Recording Initiated"

2. (a orb)

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page 34of 49 A

Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to Fission Product Bamer Matrix' Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx' Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any All Plant structure listed in Table S-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1

2. (a orb)

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE

b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to the event within the specified areas Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within All the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure S-A)

D E

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I Table 5-1 Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Units I & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building RWST CST

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page 35 of 49 Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to 'Fission Product BamerMatNx' Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrx' River Reservoir level is at Stage It Flood Warning (1 or 2)

All

1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft

2. Stage If Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning (I or2or3)

1. River Reservoir level >726.5 Ft from April 16 thru All September 30

2. River Reservoir level >714.5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15

3. Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been Issued by River Systems Operations 0

I Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to

_Fission Product Barer Matri Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx' River Reservoir level Is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations All River Reservoir level is S673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations All

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Pape 36 of 49 initiatinglCondition Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix' D

E S

T R

U C

T I

V E

P H

E N

0 M

E N

0 N

U 1

-I I

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix"

-4.

All Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW)

(1 and 2)

1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station

2. (aorborc)

a. ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train A O-PI-67-18A is <15 psig

b. ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train B O-PI-67-17A is <15 psig

c. RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is

'15 psig

Revision 22 7 of49 Figure 5-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER

EPIP-1 Revision 22 e 38 of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2

2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment 4

Figure 4-A Figure 4-13 Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUT:DOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

6.1 Loss of Shutdow.n.Sstems.:I.:I::::::

6.2 -Loss of AC.(Shutdow n) 63 Loss of DC (Shutdo-' n) 6 6.4

FuelHandling :: ::

i:::::::

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 7

Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Reision 22 Page 39 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA ElitERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (sec SED Judgnent 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling. Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Pat 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

K g

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.. steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLANINIABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWT.R EXPLOSIVE LIMN IT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in thie applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

K )

ODCMI: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATII: Monitoring ofone or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the CSF(s) is tnder severe challenge.

PROJECTILE1 An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safty equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing. or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting. penetration, rupture. cracking, and'or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (eg.. paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material. the failure, destruction, or release orwbich could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Pape 40 of 49 Mode Initiating/Condition 5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs Refer to Gaseous Effluents" (7. 1)

Loss of water level In the Rx vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT closure established (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5) 5,6

1. Loss of RHR capability

2. Rx vessel water level < el. 718'

3. Incore TCs (if available) Indicate RCS temp. >200° F

4. RCS Is ventedlopen to CNTMT

5. CNTMT closure is established Note: If CNTMT open. refer to Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

Inability to maintain Unit In Cold Shutdown (I and 2 and 3) 5,6

1. RHR capability Is n available for RCS Cooling

2. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp. >200° F

3. CNTMT closure is established 5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs g

• A O,

Mode Initiating/Condition Not Appocable Not Appricable

-4 UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power for >15 minutes

1. 1A and 1 B 6.9 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes 5,6 or De-Fuel UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes (I and 2)

1. C and D CSSTS not available For >15 minutes.

2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board 5,6 or De-Fuel

IRevision 22 I4*

I I Moae Inniatingicontlition Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 5,6 UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of or DC Power for >15 minutes (1 or2)

De-

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital fuel Battery Buses 1-l and 1-Ill for >15 minutes

2. Voltage <1 05V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-li and 1-IV for >15 minutes.

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents (7.1)

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)

1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-1 01 or All O-RE-90-102.or O-RE-9D-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 or 1 -RE-90-400 or 2-RE-901400

2. (a orb)

a. Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capability such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or All Transfer Canal

2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-9o-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1 -RE-90-60

3. Fuel remains covered with water S

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EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page 42 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2

2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment 4

Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 (Gaseous Effluent 7.3 RadiationfL6Vdls> -

7.2 - Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-l Table 7.2 F. gu 7 -A Figure 7-A'

IRevision 22I Pam43 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BONIB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITF-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling. Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (FAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

t EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.. steam or fied line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source or smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities orsmoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) hld as Ieverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) andlor Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters. radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCMI: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE-An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPT URED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage. misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power- (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERl*IFMTER (SP): Encompasscs all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnonnal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNI'LANNE): (With specific regard to radioactivityreleases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases. unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and'or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VAL.ID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment. i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE(: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing. or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting. penetration, rupture, cracking. and'or paint blistering. Surtace blemishes (e.g., paint chipping. scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL, AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Paee 44 of 49 iI Mode I Initiatinci/Condition Mode I Initiating/Condition

-I All EAB dose resulting from an actual or Imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General In Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded.

2. Field survey results indicate >1000 mremlhr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 p CVcc at SP

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fioure 7-A)

Not Applicable All EAB dose resulting from an actual or Imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual &r projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Site In Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results Indicate >100 mrem/hr gamma p an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-7 p Cicc at SP

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>100 mrem TEDE pr >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual o projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Not Applicable

-4 All Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or2 or3)

1. A VAUD rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >1 0 mrem/hr gamma at SP >15 minutes

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

All Any UNPLANNED release of Uquid Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion Is Not exceeded.

2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration

-4 All Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes. unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma at SP for >60 minutes

3. EP dose assessment results Indicate EAB dose

>0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Any UNPLANNED release of Uquid Radioactivity to the Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for

>60 minutes (I or 2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded.

2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity

>60 minutes In duration All

-I

EPIP-1 Revision 22 Nee 45 of 49 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading. As used here, the radiation monitor indications as displayed on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local indication as necessary.

Monitor ICS Screen Units UE Alert Site General Total Site (GAS)

EFFI TCi/s (2) 2.59E+05 2.59E+07 3.32E+07 3.32E+08 Ul Shield Building 1-RE-90400 EFFI ACils 2.59E+05 2.59E+07 3.32E+07 3.32E+08 U2 Shield Building 2-RE-90400 EFF1 u+/-Ci/s 2.59E+05 2.59E+07 3.32E+07 3.32E+08 Auxiliary Building O-RE-90-101B 4RMI cpm 6.22E+04 6.22E+06 7.99E+06

,*ij-Service Building 0-RE-90-132B 4RMI cpm 1.42E+06 ;*****(I)

-7 V 4 :: --

Ul Condenser Vacuum Exhaust 1-RE-90404A 3PAM p~Ci/cc(3" I.22E+01 1.22E+03 1.56E+03 1.56E+04 1-RE-90404B 3PAM KY=

1.22E+O1 1.22E+03 1.56E+03 1.56E+04 S/G Discharge Mtonitors I-RE-90-421 thru 4RM2 mR/hr(4' NA 7.48E+02 9.59E+02 9.59E+03

-424 Total Site (LIQUID)

N/A KCi/mnI" 1.01E3-02 1.0I E+00 N/A N/A O-RE-90-122 4RM2 cpm 1.OOE+06

• • • • • (I)

N/A N/A 1-RE-90-120,121 4RM2 cpm 5.68E+05 N'**.()

N/A N/A O-RE-90-225 4RM2 cpm 9.92E+05 I

N/A N/A 0-RE-90-212 4RM2 cpm 7.64E+03 7.64E+05 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes 60 15 15 15 R

A D

I 0

L 0

G I

C A

L F

U E

L H

A N

D L

I N

G U

I ASSESSMENT METHOD: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as neccssary Notes:

(I) Table values are calculated values. The -

indicates the monitor is ofl scale. and olher confirmatory data is required for event classification.

(2) In all cases, the total site EAL is the limiting value. Therefore, in the case where there are multiple release paths from the plant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS or other analysis) that will determine whether an emergency classification is warranted.

(3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the MCR. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondanr leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates pCi/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 12.2 pCi/cc. This channel was included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path for possible escalation.

(4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig. 600°F.

Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g. PORV).

EPIPI Revision 22 Page 46 of 49 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or -. ith other definitions of "Site Boundary."

Note: Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.

EPIP-I Revision 22 Pave 47 of 49 W

4K I I

1. f U

I I Moue Inntiating/Concdition Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix' or

'Gaseous Effluents' (7. 1)

Refer to 'Fission Product Barier Matrix' or

'Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown (Ior2)

1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings or survey All results exceed 15 mremlhr in the Control Room or CAS

2. (a and b)

a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2

b.

Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for Safe Operation or the ability to establish Cold Shutdown See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within the Facility All

1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings Increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels Note: In Either the UE orALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels and Review Other INITIATING/CONDITIONS for Applicability (e.g.. a dose rate of 15 mremlhrin the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).

Refer to Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Referto "Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

All Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (I and 2)

1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-101 or G-RE-90-102 Pr 0-RE-90-103 or 1 -RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90400

2. (a orb)

a. Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered All UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool, r Reactor Cavity, o Transfer Canal

2. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-102 or O-RE.90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60

3. Fuel remains covered with water.

jRevision 22 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS Location Monitor Monitor No.

Building and Elevation Reading

• 1&2 RE-90-1 1-RE-90-2 O-RE-90-3 O-RE-90-4 O-RE-90-5 1 &2-RE-90-6 1 &2-RE-90-7 1 &2-RE-90-8 O-RE-90-9 1 &2-RE-90-10 O-RE-90-1 1 1-RE-90-61 O-RE-90-230 O-RE-90-231 Auxiliary El. 757.0 (spent fuel pool)

Auxiliary El. 757.0 (personnel air lock)

Auxiliary El. 729.0 (wastc pac. area)

Auxiliary El. 713.0 (decon room)

Auxiliary El. 737.0 (spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.)

Auxiliary El. 737.0 (comp. cl. *lr. lit. ex. ar.)

Auxiliary El. 713.0 (sample room)

Auxiliary El. 713.0 (aux. feed pump area)

Auxiliary El. 692.0 (wst. cond. evap. tk. ar.)

Auxiliary El. 692.0 (cvcs arai)

Auxiliary El. 676.0 (ctmt. spry. & rhr pmp ar.)

Auxiliary El. 736.0 (RB low. cmpt. inst. rm.)

Turbine El. 685.0 (conden. dcmin.)

Turbine El. 685.0 (conden. demin.)

2.5 x IO3 mR/hr 2.5x 1 0°R/hr 2.5 x I03 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x I03 mR/hr 2 x I03 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 2.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr R

A D

I 0

L 0

G I

C A

L H

F U

E L

I A

N D

L I

N G

U 1

Note: *These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrcmlhr.

j WBN EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART EPIP-1 Revision 22 Page 49 of 49 SOURCE NOTES Page I of I

1. NIR-0551, DV-847100 F00012, and MC-850321 809004, MSC-00956, NCO 920030366.

2. MC-84 0827 005 035A, MCS-2400

3. MC-8407 1900 3003, MSC-00701, NCO-920030222 CNTMT

4. ANSI Standard N.18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01 POI

5. MSC-02401, NCO-920030998

6. EPPOS #2 Monitor readings and challenges to barriers are provided in EPIP-1, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad 1.1.5 and 1.3 CNTMT Barrier 1.3.5), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and Table 7-2). Barriers are covered in Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix. Monitor readings are also provided in EPIP-5, App. B, Note 3.

SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 Responsibility.

Rad Monitors used in conjunction with a plant parameter to determine emergency classifications.

Monitor readings are included with plant parameters for the purposes of emergency classifications. Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix (1.1 Fuel Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment),

Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Effluent and 7.3 Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel Handling).

EPIPs will contain the following elements.

Chemistry detection of failed fuel.

Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on timeliness of classification of emergency conditions.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENGY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-13 INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES Revision 1 1 Unit 0 PREPARED BY:

James F. Hagy SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

Emergency Planning APPROVED BY:

Frank L Pavlechko Effective Date:

03/25/2004 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE NON-QUALITY RELATED

I i

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP-1 3' FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date '

Affected 8

12/16/2002 All Plan effectiveness determination reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non Intent change. Renumbered instruction for inter-site consistency, formerly EPIP-16. For historical data, source notes, etc., see EPIP-16, Revision 14. Editorial revisions. Deleted source notes, renumbered sections, corrected Appendix references.

9 06/02/2003 2, 4, 6, 12, Plan effectiveness determination reviews 24 indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non Intent change. Standardized record retention. Editorial corrections. Revised SQN Control Room access phone number.

10 02/20/2004 All Intent change. Added steps in Appendix B to support Tritium (TPBAR's) in calculations.

Modified TEDE/CDE factors to support infinite cloud methodology to be consistent with CECC EPIP-8. General editorial changes, remove extraneous formatting.

11 03/25/2004 2, 9 Plan effectiveness determination reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non Intent change. Deleted superfluous verbiage for WBN PER 33477.

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PAGE 2 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP-13 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES TABLE of CONTENTS Section Description Page 1.0 PURPOSE 4

2.0 REFERENCES

4 2.1 Interfacing Documents 4

2.2 Other Documents 4

2.3 Definitions/Acronyms 5

3.0 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 6

4.0 RECORDS 6

APPENDIX A - "ICS" DOSE ASSESSMENT _

7 FIGURE A - SITE MAP 8

APPENDIX B - MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF MONITORED GASEOUS RELEASES 9

APPENDIX C - UNMONITORED RELEASES BASED ON ACCIDENT-TYPES 17 APPENDIX D - NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE EVALUATION_

18 APPENDIX E - STEAM LINE RELEASE EVALUATION 20 APPENDIX F - USE OF GRAB SAMPLES FOR GASEOUS EFFLUENT EVALUATION 22 APPENDIX G - TOTAL SITE NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE 24 APPENDIX H - FLOW ESTIMATES 25 APPENDIX I - CECC LONG TERM DOSE ASSESSMENT 26 APPENDIX J - LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL DATA 27 PAGE 3 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

I -

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP 3 K FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES 1.0 PURPOSE This Procedure provides initial guidance to support site activities concerning dose assessment for airborne release situation(s).

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Interfacing Documents

1.

CECC EPIP-8, "Dose Assessment Staff Activities During Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergencies"

2.

WBN FSAR

3.

ICS User's Manual

4.

EPIP-1, "Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart" 2.2 Other Documents

1.

TVA NP Radiological Emergency Plan

2.

NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants"

3.

NUREG 1465, Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants

4.

NUREG 1228, Source Terms Estimated During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents

5.

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix E

6.

DCN 37910-A

7.

EPA-400

8.

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20

9.

Letter, Eberline Instrument Co., to TVA (EEB820919007), 9/19/83 on (High Range Monitor Efficiencies)

10.

EPIP-6, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC)

11.

ODCM

12.

NE Calculation Package, WBN TSR-008, WBNTSR-009, TI-RPS-162, WBN NAL 3-003R1, WBN APS 3-084

13.

SPP-2.6, Computer Software Control

14.

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Environmental Data Station Manual.

15.

Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs."

16.

American Nuclear Society Standard ANSI/ANS-3.11-2000, "Determining Meteorological Information at Nuclear Facilities."

17.

Meteorological Data Print Program Users Manual.

18.

Radiological Emergency Notification Directory (REND).

V

19.

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Nowcast Manual, October 1991.

20.

ANSI N18.7-1976 PAGE 4 OF 30 REVISION 11

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP-13 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES 2.3 Definitions/Acronyms AIRBORNE RELEASE: Release of airborne radioactive material from the site into the environment.

CECC: Central Emergency Control Center.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY: The demarcation of the area (0.62 mile) surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 1 OCFR Part 100. (See Figure A of this procedure).

ICS: Integrated Computer System.

PAG: Protective Action Guide. Specific levels of radiation dose control established by the Environment Protection Agency, (i.e., 1 REM TEDE, 5 REM Thyroid CDE).

REIRM ICS references radiological elements (RE). The control room also has radiological monitors (RM) connected to these elements. For the purposes of this procedure these acronyms can be used interchangeably.

SITE BOUNDARY: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. (See Figure A of this procedure). The appropriate boundary between £onsite" and Uoffsite".

SITE PERIMETER (SP): An area'encompassing owner controlled areas in the immediate site environment. Measurements are taken at the 16 identified radiological monitoring points along the Site Perimeter. (See Figure A of this procedure).

STABILITY CLASS: An index (A-G) to represent the degree of mixing in the atmosphere.

TEDE: Total Effective Dose Equivalent. The TEDE dose is equivalent to the sum of the plume EDE, the inhalation EDE, and the ground EDE.

THYROID CDE: Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent.

X/Q: The release dilution ratio between concentrations (X) at reception point (e.g., SP) to the source strength (Q) at a given release point. This dilution ratio is incorporated into the tables for Appendix B.

PAGE 5 OF 30 RREVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP-1 3K1 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES 3.0 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 The onshift Radiological Control Group (RADCON) is responsible for completing this procedure should the CECC/TSC not be activated. This procedure will be performed as directed by the SED/SM when a dose assessment is necessary.

3.2 For initial dose assessment activities, COMPLETE the instructions found in Appendix A, "ICS, Dose Assessment."

3.3 Should ICS dose assessment be unavailable use the backup calculation method in Appendix B for the Site Boundary and five mile zones.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies The materials generated in support of key actions during an actual emergency are considered Lifetime retention Non-QA records. Materials shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall submit any records deemed necessary to demonstrate performance to the Corporate EP Manager for storage.

4.2 Drill and Exercise Records The materials deemed necessary to demonstrate performance of key actions during drills are considered Non-QA records. These records shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall retain records deemed necessary to demonstrate six-year plan performance for six years. The EP Manager shall retain other records in this category for three years.

PAGE 6 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN l INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT l

FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

3 APPENDIX A - "ICS" DOSE ASSESSMENT (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE 1: METDATA, wind direction, and EFF1 information are also available from the Dose Assessment screen. See example of ICS Dose Assessment screen below.

1]

-ACCESS the main WBN menu screen from an ICS terminal.

[2]

ACCESS the TSC menu from the main WBN menu screen.

[3]

ACCESS the Dose Assessment screen (DOSE) from the TSC menu.

[4]

SELECT the appropriate appendix on the EPIP-13 Dose Assessment Calculator program.

[5]

CALCULATE the Dose Assessment and print the Appendix.

[6]

IF ICS Dose Assessment is unavailable or the incident involves TPBAR's, THEN REFER to the Appendix B of this procedure.

EPIP-13 Dose Assessment Calculator - Screen Example S6e6dctonEPI-1 3 Apoeicfix fAppen&c Applen& EG Append H PAGE 7 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT l

FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES EPIP-1 3 FIGURE A - SITE MAP (Page 1 of 1)

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PAGE 8 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

i WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

3 APPENDIX B - MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF MONITORED GASEOUS RELEASES (Page 1 of 8)

[1]

IF the incident does not involve TPBAR, THEN GO TO step [11].

(2]

REQUEST Chemistry to obtain a sample of the appropriate gaseous release for

' tritium.

lNOTE Appendix F may be referred to during periods when ICS is unavailable to obtain release flow' rate.

l

[3]

DETERMINE the flow rate for the release path.

[4]

DETERMINE the tritium release rate by completing the following table.

A B

C D=AxBxC Tritium Release Conversion factor to Tritium Release Cbncentration Flowrate

, -convert scfm to cc/s.

Rate pCi/cc scfm Ci/s

,472 cc/s/scfm NOTE Appendix J may be referred to during periods when the Meteorological data'is unavailable.

[5]

OBTAIN Stability Class from the MET DATA screen on ICS or from SQN control room (843-7860) and CIRCLE the Stability Class in both tables below.

[6]

IF the Stability Class cannot be obtained, THEN -

DETERMINE the stability class by subtracting the 10 meter from the 46 meter temperatures and CIRCLE the stability class in both tables below.

A < -1.24 13-1.11to-1.23 C I-.98to-i.'10

'D-
33to-.'97 E.97 to -.32 F 2.59 to.98 G Ž2.6

[7]

OBTAIN the wind speed in mph from the'46 meter height and CIRCLE the appropriate range for the vwind speed in both tables below.

PAGE 9 OF 30 REVISION 11

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP-13 I FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

P APPENDIX B - MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF MONITORED GASEOUS RELEASES (Page 2 of 8)

[8]

CIRCLE the appropriate Tritium TEDE factors for each distance in the tables below based on the wind speed and stability class obtained in the above steps.

0.62 Mile Tritium TEDE Factors Stability

<2.2

>2.2

>4.4

>6.6

>8.8

>11

>13.2

>15.4

>17.6

>19.8 Class mph

<=4.4

<=6.6

<=8.8

<=11

<=13.2

<=15.4

<=17.6

<=19.8 mph ph mph mmph mph mph mph mph A

2.52-10 1.32-10 8.3E-11 6.3E-11 5.0E-11 4.22-11 3.62 3.1E-11 2.8E-11 2.5E-11 B

1.2E-09 6.0E-10 4.0E-10 3.OE-10 2.4E-10 2.0E-10 1.7E-10 1.5E-10 1.3E-10 1.2E-10 C

3.5E-09 1.8E-09 1.2E-09 8.8E-10 7.0E-10 5.82-10 5.0E-10 4.4E-10 3.9E-10 3.5E-10 D

1.OE-08 5.0E-09 3.3E-09 2.5E-09 2.OE-09 1.7E-09 1.4E-09 1.3E-09 1.1E-09 1.OE-09 E

1.7E-08 8.5E-09 5.7E-09 4.3E-09 3.4E-09 2.8E-09 2.4E-09 2.1E-09 1.9E-09 1.72-09 F

3.3E-08 1.7E-08 1.1E-08 8.3E-09 6.6E-09 5.5E-09 4.7E-09 4.1 E-09 3.7E-09 3.3E-09 G

7.0E-08 3.5E-08 2.3E-08 1.8E-08 1.4E-08 1.2E-08 1.OE-08 8.8E-09 7.8E-09 7.0E-09 5 Mile Tritium TEDE Factors Stability

<2.2

>2.2

>4.4

>6.6

>8.8

>11

>13.2

>15.4

>17.6

>19.8 Class mph

<=4.4

<=6.6

<=8.8

<=11

<=13.2

<=15.4

<=17.6

<=19.8 mph mphmph mph m

ph mph mph mph mph A

4.0E-11 2.0E-11 1.3E-11 1.0E-11 8.0E-12 6.7E-12. 5.7E-12 5.0E-12 4.4E-12 4.0E-12 B

5.0E-11 2.5E-11 1.7E-11

-1.3E-11 1.0E-11 8.3E-12 7.1E-12 6.3E-12 5.6E-12 5.0E-12 C

1.1E-10 5.5E-11 3.7E-11 2.8E-11 2.2E-11 1.8E-11 1.64-11 1.E-11 1.2E-11 1.1E-11 D

4.4E-10 2.2E-10 1.5E-10 1.1E-10 8.8E-11 7.3E-11 6.3E-11 5.5E-11 4.9E-11 4.4E-11 E

9.5E-10 4.8E-10 3.2E-10 2.4E-10 1.9E-10 1.6E-10 1.4E-10 1.2E-10 1.1 E-10 9.5E-11 F

2.4E-09 1.22-09 8.02-10 6.0E-10 4.8E-10 4.0E-10 3.4E-10 3.OE-10 2.7E-10 2.4E-10 G

5.5E-09 2.8E-09 1.8E-09 1.4E-09 1.1E-09 9.2E-10 7.92-10 6.9E-10 6.1E-10 5.5E-10 INOTE A duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> should be used when the release duration is unknown.

I

[9]

OBTAIN and RECORD the estimated duration of the release in hours from the SM.

[10]

CALCULATE the Tritium TEDE dose at.62 and 5 by multiplying the Tritium release rate x TEDE factor x Release duration = Tritium TEDE Dose.

Tritium TEDE DOSES Distance Tritium Tritium Release Tritium TEDE Release Rate TEDE Factor Duration Dose gCi/s hour(s)

(REM) 0.62 5.0 III Prepared by:

Date/Time:

PAGE 10 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES EPIP-13 APPENDIX B - MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF MONITORED GASEOUS RELEASES (Page 3 of 8)

NOTE Appendix J may be referred to during periods when the Meteorological data is unavailable.

[I1]

OBTAIN Stability Class from the MET DATA screen on ICS or from the SQN control room (843-7860) and CIRCLE the Stability Class in both tables below.

[12]

IF the Stability Class cannot be obtained, THEN DETERMINE the stability class by subtracting the 10 meter from the 46 meter temperatures and CIRCLE the stability class in both tables below.

A s -1.24 B -1.1 1 to -1.23 C-.98to-1.10 D-.33to-.97 E.97 to -.32 F 2.59 to.98 G 2 2.6

[13]

OBTAIN the wind speed in mph from the 46 meter height and CIRCLE the appropriate range for the wind speed in both tables below.

[14]

CIRCLE the appropriate Noble Gas TEDE factors for each distance in the tables below based on the wind speed and stability class obtained in the above steps.

0.62 Miles Noble Gas TEDE Factors Stability

<2.2

>2.2

>4.4

>6.6

>8.8

>11

>13.2

>15.4

->17.6

>19.8 Class mph

<=4.4

<=6.6

<=8.8

<=11

<=13.2

<=15.4

<=17.6

<=19.8 mph mph mph mph mph mph mph mph A

6.OE-10 3.0E-10 2.0E-10 1.5E-10 1.2E-10 1.0E-10 8.6E-11 7.5E-11 6.7E-11 6.0E-11 B

2.1 E-09 1.1E-09 7.0E-10 5.3E-10 4.2E-10 3.5E-10 3.0E-10 2.6E-10 2.3E-10 2.1 E-10 C

4.6E-09 2.3E-09 1.5E-09 1.2E-09 9.2E-10 7.7E-10 6.6E-10 5.8E-10 5.1 E-10 4.6E-10 D

9.5E-09 4.8E-09 3.2E-09 2.4E-09 1.9E-09 1.6E-09 1.42-09 1.2E-09 1.1E-09 9.5E-10 E

1.4E-08 7.0E-09 4.7E-09 3.5E-09 2.8E-09 2.3E-09 2.0E-09 1.8E-09 1.6E-09 1.4E-09 F

2.1E-08 1.1E-08 7.0E-09 5.3E-09

.4.2E-09 3.5E-09 3.0E-09 2.6E-09 2.3E-09 2.1E-09 G

3.5E-08 1.8E-08 1.2E-08 8.8E-09

.7.OE-09 5.8E-09 15.0E-09 4.4E-09 3.9E-09 3.52-09 5 Miles Noble Gas TEDE Factors Stability

<2.2

>2.2

>4.4

>6.6

>8.8

>11

>13.2

>15.4

>17.6

>19.8 Class mph

<=4.4

<=6.6

<=8.8

<=11.

<=13.2

<=15.4

<=17.6

-<=19.8 mph mph mph m

mLhmph mph mph A --

9.5E-11 4.8E-11' 3.22-11 2.4E-11 1.9E-11

-1.6E-11 1.4E-11 1.2E-11 1.1E-11 9.5E-12 B

1.5E-10 7.5E-11

-5.0E-11 3.8E-11

-3.0E-11' 2.5E-11 2.1 E-11 -1.9E-11

-1.7E-11..1.5E-11 C

2.8E-10 1.4E-10 9-.3E-11 7.0E-1I-5.6E-11' -4.7E-11 4.0E-11.

3.5E11 3.1E-11 2.8E-11 D

9.5E-10 4.8E-10 3.2E-10 2.4E-10 1.9E-10 1.6E-10 1.4E-10 12E-10 1.12-10 9.5E-11 E

1.8E-09 9.0E-10 6.0E-10 4.5E-10 3.6E-10 3.0E-10 2.6E-10 2.3E-10 2.0E-10 1.8E-10 F

3.5E-09 1.8E-09 1.2E-09 8.8E-10 7.0E-10 5.8E-10 5.0E-10 4.4E-10 3.9E-10 3.5E-10 6.5E-09 3.3E-09 2.2E-09 1.6E-09 1.3E-09 1.1E-09 9.3E-10 8.1E-10 7.2E-10 6.5E-10 PAGE 1 1 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT' EPIP 13 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES l 3

APPENDIX B - MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF MONITORED GASEOUS RELEASES (Page 4 of 8)

[NOTE RCS fuel damage should be used when the fuel damage is unknown.

l

[15]

DETERMINE and CIRCLE the TEDE ratio based on the release path and type of fuel damage for both 0.62 and 5 mile distances using the table below.

I NOTE The SM may be able to assist in determining the release paths and type of fuel damage.

Release Paths Containment leak filtered Containment leak unfiltered or SGTR below the water Turbine, Reactor, or Auxiliary Building SGTR above the water Type of Fuel Damage Normal reactor coolant system Fuel clad gap Core damage (fuel over temp)

Fuel melt 0.62 Mile TEDE Ratios RCS Gap Core Fuel Damage Melt CNTMT (filtered) 3.7 1.0 0.9 1.0 CNTMT (unfiltered) or SGTR (below) 7.4 9.0 5.3 11 Turbine, Reactor, or Auxiliary Building 17 32 16 37 SGTR (above) 95 221 111 263 5 Miles TEDE Ratios RCS Gap Core Fuel Damage Melt CNTMT (filtered) 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 CNTMT (unfiltered) or SGTR (below) 3.5 4.9 2.9 5.8 Turbine, Reactor, or Auxiliary Building 7.4 15 7.9 17 SGTR (above) 43 100 51 116 116]

IF ICS is unavailable, THEN NOTIFY the SM that Appendix D must be performed by RADCON/Chemistry personnel in TSC.

[17]

IF Radiation Monitor data is unavailable or the release is not monitored, THEN use Appendix C to determine the noble gas release rate.

PAGE 12 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT FOR RADIOLOGICALEMERGENCIES E

3 APPENDIX B MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF MONITORED GASEOUS RELEASES (Page 5 of 8)

[18]

COMPLETE the following NG TEDE Dose table for both 0.62 and 5 mile as follows:

[a]

' OBTAIN and RECORD the Noble Gas release rate from ICS EFF1 or appropriate appendix.

[b]

RECORD the NG TEDE Factors determined in step [14].

[c]

RECORD the TEDE Ratios determined in step [15].

NOTE A duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> should be used when the release duration is unknown.

[d]

OBTAIN and RECORD the estimated duration of the release in hours'from the SM or if the release is unmonitored use release duration associated with accident type from Appendix C.

[e]

CALCULATE the TEDE dose at.62 and 5 by multiplying the NG release rate x TEDE Factor x TEDE Ratio x Release Duration'= NG TEDE Dose.

Noble Gas TEDE DOSES-Distance Noble Gas Noble Gas TEDE Ratio Release Noble Gas Release Rate TEDE Factor -

Duration TEDE Dose jCi/s hour(s)

(REM)

.0.62

.5.0...

[19]

COMPLETE the following Total TEDE Dose table for both 0.62 and 5 mile as follows:

[a]

OBTAIN and RECORD the tritium TEDE Dose (REM).

.[b]

OBTAIN and RECORD the'noble 'gas TEDE Dose (REM).

[C]

ADD the Tritium and Noble Gaseous TEDE Doses.

TOTAL TEDE DOSES Distance- -

Tritium TEDE

- Noble Gas Total Dose TEDE Dose TEDE.

((REM)

-REM)

(REM) 0.62

-5.0'

.> Prepared by:

Date/Time:

PAGE 13 OF 30 R

REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP 13 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

APPENDIX B - MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF MONITORED GASEOUS RELEASES (Page 6 of 8)

NOTE Appendix J may be referred to during periods when the Meteorological data is unavailable.

[20]

OBTAIN Stability Class from the MET DATA screen on ICS or from the SQN control room (843-7860) and CIRCLE the Stability Class in both tables below.

[21]

IF the Stability Class cannot be obtained, THEN DETERMINE the stability class by subtracting the 10 meter from the 46 meter temperatures and CIRCLE the stability class in both tables below.

A* -1.24 B -1.11 to -1.23 C -.98 to -1.10 D -.33 to -.97 E.97 to -.32 F 2.59 to.98 G Ž 2.6

[22]

OBTAIN the wind speed in mph from the 46 meter height and CIRCLE the appropriate range for the wind speed in both tables below.

[23]

CIRCLE the appropriate CDE Factors for each distance in the tables below based on the wind speed and stability class obtained in the above steps.

0.62 Miles CDE Factors Stability

<2.2

>2.2

>4.4

>6.6

>8.8

>11

>13.2

>15.4

>17.6

>19.8 Class mph

<=4.4

<=6.6

<=8.8

<=11

<=13.2

<=15.4

<=17.6

<=19.8 mph mph mph m

mph mp mph mph mph A

1.2E-05 6.0E-06 4.OE-06 3.0E-06 2.4E-06 2.OE-06 1.7E-06 1.5E-06 1.3E-06 1.2E-06 B

5.8E-05 2.9E-05 1.9E-05 1.5E-05 1.2E-05 9.7E-06 8.3E-06 7.3E-06 6.4E-06 5.8E-06 C

1.7E-04 8.5E-05 5.7E-05 4.3E-05 3.4E-05 2.8E-05 2.4E-05 2.1 E-05 1.9E-05 1.7E-05 D

4.8E-04 2.4E-04 1.6E-04 1.2E-04 9.6E-05 8.OE-05 6.9E-05 6.OE-05 5.3E-05 4.8E-05 E

8.3E-04 4.2E-04 2.8E-04 2.1 E-04 1.7E-04 1.4E-04 1.2E-04 1.OE-04 9.2E-05 8.3E-05 F

1.6E-03 8.0E-04 5.3E-04 4.0E-04 3.2E-04 2.7E-04 2.3E-04 2.0E-04 1.8E-04 1.6E-04 G

3.5E-03 1.8E-03 1.2E-03 8.8E-04

7. OE-04 5.8E-04 5.OE-04 4.4E-04 3.9E-04 3.52-04 5 Miles CDE Factors Stability

<2.2

>2.2

>4.4

>6.6

>8.8

>11

>13.2

>15.4

>17.6

>19.8 Class mph

<=4.4

<=6.6

<=8.8

<=11

<=13.2

<=15.4

<=17.6

<=19.8 mph mphmph mph mph mph mph mph mph A

2.OE-06 1.0E-06 6.7E-07 5.OE-07 4.OE-07 3.3E-07 2.9E-07 2.5E-07 2.2E-07 2.OE-07 B

2.5E-06 1.3E-06 8.3E-07 6.3E-07 5.OE-07 4.2E-07 3.6E-07 3.1 E-07 2.8E-07 2.5E-07 C

5.0E-06 2.5E-06 1.7E-06 1.3E-06 1.OE-06 8.3E-07 7.1 E-07 6.3E-07 5.6E-07 5.0E-07 D

2.2E-05 1.1E-05 7.3E-06 5.5E-06 4.4E-06 3.7E-06 3.1 E-06 2.8E-06 2.4E-06 2.2E-06 E

4.7E-05 2.4E-05 1.6E-05 1.2E-05 9.4E-06 7.8E-06 6.7E-06 5.9E-06 5.2E-06 4.7E-06 F

1.2E-04 6.0E-05 4.0E-05 3.0E-05 2.4E-05 2.0E-05 1.7E-05 1.5E-05 1.3E-05 1.2E-05 G

2.7E-04 1.4E-04 9.0E-05 6.8E-05 5.4E-05 4.5E-05 3.9E-05 3.4E-05 3.0E-05 2.7E-05 PAGE 14 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT lEPIP1 31 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES l APPENDIX B - - MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF MONITORED GASEOUS RELEASES (Page 7 of 8)

NOTE 1 RCS fuel damage should be used when the fuel damage is unknown.

NOTE 2 The SM may be able to assist in determining the release paths and type of fuel damage.

[24]

DETERMINE and CIRCLE the Iodine to Noble Gas ratio based on the release path and type of fuel damage using the table below.

Release Paths Containment leak filtered Containment leak unfiltered or SGTR below the water Turbine, Reactor, or Auxiliary Building SGTR above the water Type of Fuel Damaae Normal reactor coolant system Fuel clad gap Core damage (fuel over temp)

Fuel melt Iodine to NG Ratios RCS Gap Core Fuel Damage Melt CNTMT (filtered)

I.7E-06 3.OE-05 1.2E-05 2.2E-05 CNTMT (unfiltered) or SGTR (below) 1.7E-04 3.OE-03 1.2E-03 2.2E-03 Turbine, Reactor, or Auxiliary Building 5.8E-04 1.0E-02 4.1 E-03 7.7E-03 SGTR (above)I 4.2E-03 8.OE-02 3.OE-02 5.5E-02

[25]

IF ICS is unavailable, THEN NOTIFY the SM that Appendix D must be performed by RADCON/Chemistry personnel in TSC.

[26]

IF Radiation monitor data is unavailable or the release is not monitored, THEN Use Appendix C to determine the noble gas release rate.

PAGE 15 OF 30 R

REVISION 11

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP 3 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

3 APPENDIX B - MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF MONITORED GASEOUS RELEASES (Page 8 of 8)

[24]

COMPLETE the following CDE Dose table for both 0.62 and 5 mile as follows:

[a]

OBTAIN and RECORD the Noble Gas release rate from ICS EFF1 or appropriate appendix.

[b]

RECORD the CDE Factors determined in step [23].

[C]

RECORD the Iodine to NG Ratios determined in step [24].

NOTE A duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> should be used when the release duration is unknown.

[d]

OBTAIN and RECORD the estimated duration of the release in hours from the SM or if the release is unmonitored use release duration associated with accident type from Appendix C.

[e]

CALCULATE the CDE dose at.62 and 5 by multiplying the NG Factor x Iodine to NG Ratio x Release Duration = CDE Dose.

Release Rate x CDE CDE DOSES Distance Noble Gas CDE Factor Iodine to NG Release CDE Dose Release Rate Ratio Duration (REM) 0.62 1Ci/s hour(s) 0.62 5.0 1

Prepared by:

Date/Time:

PAGE 16 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT.

FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES EPIP-1 3 APPENDIX C - UNMONITORED RELEASES BASED ON ACCIDENT TYPES (Page 1 of 1)

Summary of Accident Types Duration of the Noble Gas I

Release Release (Consult with SM to determine the Accident type to use.)

Rates' (Hours) pCils LOCA - 100% Fuel Melt(>1200F) RCS_

Containment Tech Spec allowed leakage (0.25%/24 hours) 24 1.16E+07 Containment Failure(1 00%/4 hours) 4 2.79E+1 0 LOCA - 100% Gap Activity RCS l

l IContainment Tech Spec allowed leakace(O.25%/24 hours) I 24 I

6.34E+03 I

lContainment Failure(100%/4 hours)

I 4

1.52E+07 LOCA - Normal RCS Containment Tech Spec allowed leakage(b.25%124 hours) 24 3.40E+01 Containment Failure(100%/4 hours) 4 8.15E+04 SG Tube Rupture 0-2 hours after the beginning of the release 2

3.87E+06 l

2-8 hours after the beginning of the release 6

2.14E+Q0 l

Fuel Handling - One Bundle Damaged l

l Accident inside Containment with Purge fans on l

2 1.89E+05 Accident outside Containment with ABGTS on 0.25 1.51 E+06 Waste Gas Decay Tank Rupture l

Reg. guide 1.24 analysis 7

1 2.09E+07 l

PAGE 17 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP 3 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

3 APPENDIX D - NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE EVALUATION (Page 1 of 2) lNOTE 1:

If ICS is not functional and time is not available due to the ongoing emergency event, NOTE wait for the TSC to activate prior to proceeding in this appendix.

l NOTE 2:

In columns A and B of this Appendix, the radiation monitor and panel number, along with the ICS or Eberline computerpoints necessary to obtain the data, are listed.

Monitors indicating uoffscale' (>10 cpm for monitors on panels 1 or 2-M-30) should be indicated as such.

[1]

OBTAIN and RECORD the noble gas monitor readings on page 2 of this Appendix.

NOTE:

Flow rates that are less than the minimum value indicated should be reported as the minimum value.

[2]

RECORD the effluent flow rate(s) on page 2 of this Appendix.

[3]

IF flow instrumentation is inoperable, THEN OBTAIN flow estimates using Appendix H.

[4]

CALCULATE the noble gas release rates on page 2 of this Appendix.

[5]

SUM the noble gas release rates, AND RECORD the gaseous noble gas release rate total on page 2 of this Appendix.

[6]

TRANSFER the gaseous noble gas release rate to Appendix G.

PAGE 18 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP 13 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

APPENDIX D - NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE EVALUATION (Page 2 of 2)

Monitor Noble Gas Release Point Effluent Noble Gas Effluent Flow Conversion Release Rate Monitor Read Monitor Reading Rate Factor (ACils)

Date/Time (cfm)

A B

C D =AxBxC cpm 1.82E-05' Aux. Bldg. Vent 0-RM-9D-101B 0-PNL-90-L3973 I

(0-M-12)

R0020A F2704A (Min.141,000 cfm cpm 1.82E-05' Service Building Vent O-RM-90-132B O-PNL-90-L3993

/

(0-M-12)

R0011A F2702A (Min.3,000 cfm) 4722 U1 Shield Building Vent

_iCi/cc 1-FI-90A400 Ci/s (1-M-30) 1-RI-90-400 (1-M-9) 1-RI-90400 I_

(EFF) 1-PNL-90-L398 (Low, Mid, High)

Y2203A R9101A (Min.3300 cfm) 4722 uiCi/s U2 Shield Building Vent IyCi/cc 2-FI-90W00 (2-M-2-RI-90400 I

(2-M-30) 2-RI-90A4D0

9)

(Low, Mid, High)

(EFF) 2-PNL-90-L398 R9102A F9015A (Min.3300 cfm)

U1 Condenser Vacuum cpm 1.82E0.051 Exhaust (CVE) 1-RM-9D-119 1-FE-2-256

/

(0-M-12)

R0001A (low rng)

F2700A (Min.21 cfm)

NOTE: If 1-RM-90-119 is onscale, stop here. If monitor is offscale, proceed to next row.

U1 Condenser Vacuum cpm From table Exhaust (CVE) 1-RM-90450 T-FE-2-256 below I

(1-M-31)

(Data) Channel 13-01 F2700A R9061A (Min.21 cfm)

NOTE: If Channel 13-01 is onscale, stop here. If monitor is offscale, proceed to next row UL1 Condenser cpm From table Vacuum Exhaust (CVE) 1-RM-90450 j

-FE-2-256 I

below I

(1-M-31)

(Data) Channel 13-03 F2700A R9062A (Min.21 cfm)

Total CVE Accident Monitor Calibration Factors x 472 cclslcfm for Various Times (T) Post-Accident T = Hours T=O T=1 T=8 T=16 T=24 T=48 T=168

,1-RM-90-450 (Channel 13-01) 5.48E-04 1.04E-031 2.75E-03 4.77E-03 1.60E-02 1.23E-02 T 1.81E-02 1-RM-90-450 (Channel 13-03) 9.44E-01 2.02 5.33 9.16 1.23E+01 2.23E+01 3.14E+01 I The monitor Xe-133 efficiency multiplied by a conversion factor (472 ccs/scfm).

2 Conversion factor of 472 cc/s/scfm.

3 No MCR indication (local indication only)

PAGE 19 OF 30 REVISION 11

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP 13 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

3 APPENDIX E - STEAM LINE RELEASE EVALUATION (Page 1 of 2)

[1]

OBTAIN and RECORD the steam line radiation monitor readings on page 2 of this Appendix.

[2]

DETERMINE and CIRCLE the appropriate calibration factor listed on page 2 of this Appendix AND RECORD the value on page 2 of this Appendix.

lNOTE Engineering may be consulted to determine the best estimate of steam flow during NOTE periods when ICS steam flow is unavailable.

[3]

OBTAIN and RECORD the steam mass flow rates on page 2 of this Appendix.

[4]

CALCULATE the steam line release rates on page 2 of this Appendix.

[5]

SUM the release rates for the steam lines, and RECORD the total steam line noble gas release rate on page 2 of this Appendix.

[6]

TRANSFER the steam line noble gas release rate to Appendix G.

PAGE 20 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

I WBN

- I INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT, EPIP-1 3 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

APPENDIX E - STEAM LINE RELEASE EVALUATION (Page 2-of 2)-

Steam Line Radiation Calibration Factor Steam Mass Conversion Release Monitor Reading (from table below)

Flow Rate' Factor 2 Rate (mR/hr)

(&Ci/cc per mR/hr)

(Ibm/hr)

I_(_Cils)

A

- B D

AxBxCxD Steam Generator RM-90-421B (1-M-30) 4.45 1

RR-90-268 Pt.01 (1-M-31)

R9055A Steam Generator RM-90-422B (1-M-30) 4.45 2

RR-90-268 Pt.02 (1-M-31)

R9056A Steam Generator 3

RM-90-423B (1-M-30) 4.45 RR-90-268 Pt.03 (1-M-31)

R9057A Steam Generator 4

RM-90-424B (1-M-30)

RR-90-268 Pt.04 (1-M-31)

-R9058A-4.45 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 4.45 Turbine RM-90-421B (1-M-30) or RM-90-424B (1-M-30)

Total 1 This data is an internal ICS calculation.

2 4.45 = Icc(steam)/0.0283 g] x g/2.205E-3 Ibm x hr/3600 sec Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor Calibration Factors (CF)

Time After Shutdown Normal Spectrum Monitor DBA Spectrum Monitor Reading (hrs)

Reading < 1000 mR/hr

> 1000 mR/hr or Suspected Fuel (tCi/cc per mR/hr)

Damage (,XCi/cc per mRthr) 0 3.00E-3 9.88E-5 1

5.13E-3 7.79E-4 2

6.11E-3 5.41 E-3 4

7.76E-3 6.86E-3 8

1.09E-2 9.63E-3 PAGE 21 OF 30 REVISION 11

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP-13 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES APPENDIX F - USE OF GRAB SAMPLES FOR GASEOUS EFFLUENT EVALUATION (Page 1 of 2)

[1]

IF sampling analysis is required to determine the site release rates, THEN REQUEST noble gas samples be obtained from applicable release points that have flow.

[2]

RECORD sample date(s) and time(s) for applicable release point(s) on page 2 of this Appendix.

NOTE 1:

Flow rates that are less than the minimum value indicated should be reported as the minimum value.

NOTE 2:

Operations may be required to obtain flowrate for 1-FE-2-256, Condenser Vacuum Exhaust.

[3]

RECORD the effluent flow rate(s) on page 2 of this Appendix.

[4]

IF flow instrumentation is inoperable, THEN OBTAIN flow estimates using Appendix H.

[5]

RECORD the total noble gas concentration for applicable release point(s) on page 2 of this Appendix.

[6]

CALCULATE the total noble gas release rate as indicated on page 2 of this Appendix

[7]

SUM the noble gas release rates, AND RECORD the total gaseous noble gas release rate on page 2 of this Appendix.

[8]

TRANSFER the gaseous noble gas release rate to Appendix G.

PAGE 22 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

[

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT l EPI P-1 3 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES -

1 APPENDIX F - USE OF GRAB SAMPLES FOR GASEOUS EFFLUENT EVALUATION

-(Page 2 of 2)

Noble Gas Total Noble Gas Total Noble Gas Release Point Sample Date/Time Flow Rates Concentration Release Rate

_cfm "Ci/cc)

Ci/s)

_'A B

C' D=AxBxC Auxiliary Building

/

472 0-PNL-90-L397 EL 786, A8-V (Min.141,000 cfm)

Service Building I

472 0-PNL-90-L399 SN EL 751, S-5 (Min. 3000 cfm)

V1 Shield Building

/

472 1-FI-90-400 PNL-90-L398 EL 729, AE-5 (Min. 3,300 cfm)

U2 Shield Building

/

472 2-FI-90-400 2-PNL-90-L398

-EL-727, AE-1 I (Min. 3,300 cfm)

Condenser Vacuum I

472 Exhaust I

(Min.21 cfm)

I Total 1 Conversion factor: 472 cc/s/scfm.

Performed by:

Date:

PAGE 23 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP 13 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

3

[1]

[2]

APPENDIX G - TOTAL SITE NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE (Page 1 of 1)

SUM the values listed below to obtain the total site noble gas release rate.

IF the CECC needs long term dose assessment THEN COMPLETE and TRANSMIT Appendix 1.

Total Site Noble Gas Release Rate Gaseous Noble Gas Release Rate l Ci/s Steam Line and/or Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Noble Gas

__Ci/s Release Rate Total Site Noble Gas Release Rate aci/s Performed by Date PAGE 24 OF 30 REVIS ION 1 1

l; WBN I

INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES EPIP-1 3 APPENDIX H - FLOW ESTIMATES (Page 1 of 1)

I NOTE: These values will be conservative.

I

[1]

IF ventilation flow data is not readily obtainable, THEN the maximum values in cfm from Appendix C of the REP or from DBA analysis (shown in parentheses below) may be used in the Total Flow Rate Column below.

Shield Building - Unit I (If 1-FI-90-400 11-M-9] and 1-PNL-90-L398 are inoperable)

Containment Purge air flow.

(Record 14,000 per operating fan) cfm EGTS air flow (Record 8,000 if operating) cfm ABGTS Fan A-A in operation.

(Record 9,900 if operating) cfm PASF Ventilation (Record 2200 if operating) cfm Total cfmr (Max. 48,100)

I 81,0 I

,l Shield Building - Unit 2 (If 2-FI-90-400 12-M-9] and 2-PNL-90-L398 are inoperable)

I ABGTS Fan B-B in operation (Record 9,900 if operati ngj)l cfm (Max. 9,900)

Auxiliary Building (If O-PNL-90-L397 [no MCR indication] is inoperable)

Number of Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fans Operating x 84,000 [1-M-9]

cfm Number of Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fans Operating x 60,000 [1-M-9]

cfm Total cfm (Max. 228,000)

I Condenser Vacuum Exhaust - Unit I (If 1-FE-2-256 -[no MCR indication] is inoperable)

Obtain an estimate from Operations personnel (rotometer on pump) cfm (Max. 100)

I Service Building Exhaust (If O-PNL-L399 [no MCR indication] is inoperable)

Enter 10,500 SCFM for Service Building Exhaust cfm (Max. 10,500)

PAGE 25 OF 30 R

REVISION 11

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP 3 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES 3

APPENDIX I - CECC LONG TERM DOSE ASSESSMENT (Page 1 of 1)

Iodine and Particulate Release Concentrations

[1]

IF site iodine and particulate concentrations are required, THEN REQUEST Chem Lab to obtain samples from applicable release points.

[2]

RECORD the applicable information in the table below.

[3]

COMPLETE and TRANSMIT Appendix I to the CECC.

1-131 Particulate Release Flow Rate (cfm)

Concentration Concentration Point

(.Ci/cc)

(ttci/cc)

_A B

C Auxiliary Building Service Building_

U1 Shield Building U2 Shield Building Condenser Vacuum Exhaust Total Iodine and Particulate Release Fractions Noble Gas 1-131 Release 1-131 Fraction Particulate Particulate Release Rate Rate Release Rate Fraction (tpCi/s) (1)

(tpCi/s)

(lCi/s)

D E=A*B*472 E/D F=A*C*472 F/D (1) From App. B or App. G Performed by:

Date:

PAGE 26 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES EPIP 3

APPENDIX J - LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL DATA (Page 1 of 4) 1.0 PURPOSE This Appendix provides instructions to ensure appropriate'-actions are taken -

by the Shift Manager (SM) for'Main Control Room outages of onsite meteorological data.

2.0 RESPONSIBIUTY Daily meteorological channel checks are performed by the SM to verify operability.

If an outage is detected, the SM shall take necessary actions to check backup'displays, track the outage, and to initiate repair request.

Emergency Planning (EP) Field Support is responsible for operating the meteorological data system and for making the data signal available to the plant.

3.0 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS A.

The Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) requires that two of three wind speed channels, two'of three wind direction channels,and one of three air temperature differences be operable at all times to support estimation of routine and accident doses. A special report to the NRC is to be prepared for outages of more than seven (7) days.

B.

Emergency action level event (5.2 tornado) and protective action decision making of the Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) require use 'of meteorological'data.

C.

R.G. 1.23 "O'nsite'MeteoFological'Pro'gra'ms"andANSI/ANS Standard 3.11-2000 "Determining Meteorological'Inform'ation at Nuclear Facilities" require a 90 percent annual joint data recovery rate of valid wind speed, (ind direction and temperature difference.

PAGE 27 OF 30 R

REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP-1 3 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

3 I

APPENDIX J (Page 2 of 4)

LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL DATA NOTE l&C should be contacted to fix any problem associated with the ICS display.

[1]

IF Met data is unavailable in the Main Control Room or from the ICS Terminals in the TSC and OSC (METDATA), THEN OBTAIN Met Data from the MET Tower using the CECC computer terminal in the TSC per Appendix J (page 3 of 4) of this Procedure.

[2]

IF the minimum required data listed in Section 3.0 is not available from these methods, THEN DECLARE the system inoperable and begin appropriate tracking, AND NOTIFY EP Field Support (normal business hours or next working day, whichever is applicable) at x8450.

[3]

IF specific Met data is still needed (i.e., EPIP-1, emergency action levels), THEN the remaining steps for obtaining data should be used in the following order:

[a]

CALL the SQN Control Room (843-7860) and request the needed meteorological information.

[b]

REQUEST the Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) to page the duty CECC Meteorologist. The CECC Meteorologist has backup procedures to estimate missing data using established relationships between onsite data and other sources of data.

lNOTE This information obtained in step [c] will be from the 10 meter NOTE elevation but is still usable.

m

[c]

CALL the Morristown National Weather Service at 9-1-(423)-586-8400 and REQUEST the wind speed and wind direction.

[4]

DOCUMENT the closure of any tracking initiated, AFTER notification that the Met Tower outage is completed.

PAGE 28 OF 30 REVISION 1 1

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES E

3 APPENDIX J (Page 3 of 4)

TSC CECC COMPUTER AND PRINTER USE

[1]

ENSURE computer terminal is energized (switch is located in front).

Cl

[2]

PRESS the "Return" key twice (repeat step if necessary).

0

[3]

TYPE "WBMET' at the "Username" prompt AND PRESS "Return".

0 NOTE The printer will print the MET data and log off the computer.

[4]

TYPE 'TSC" at the "Password" prompt AND PRESS "Return".

0

[5]

REPEAT step 2 through 4 for additional MET data as needed.

PAGE 29 OF 30 REVISION I11

WBN INITIAL DOSE ASSESSMENT EPIP-1 3 FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES APPENDIX J (Page 4 of 4)

EXAMPLE REPORT WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT METEORLOGICAL DATA DATE: 4-OCT-01 TIME: 11:30:48 (Central)

REF: 49 LOCATION: CECC COMPUTER DESCRIPTION INSTRUMENT TS LIMIT DATA (Last 15 min) 1Oim Elevation Operable and 3.5 mph WIND SPEED 46m Elevation Channel Check 5.4 mph 91m Elevation 6.3 mph 1 Om Elevation 233.7 deg WIND 46m Elevation 222.4 deg DIRECTION 91m Elevation 219.3 deg AIR 10to46m 1.1 F*

Delta T 10 to 91m 1.9 F*

46 to 91m 0.9 F*

'-V To calculate Delta T, subtract the Lower elevation temperature value from the higher elevation temperature value (ex: (91m value) - (1Om value)).

Performers Initials SROs Initials PAGE 30 OF 30 REVISION 1 1