ML040430155

License Amendment Request: Spent Fuel Pool Crane Upgrade

ML040430155
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	01/29/2004
From:	Domonique Malone Nuclear Management Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML040430155 (40)

Text

. . __ __ ; -_- 1, 11 Committed to Nuclear Excellence Palisades Nuclear Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC January 29, 2004 10 CFR 50.90 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20 License Amendment Request: Palisades' Spent Fuel Pool Crane Upgrade Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) requests Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review and approval to amend Operating License DPR-20 for the Palisades Nuclear Plant. The proposed amendment requests NRC approval to update the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to reflect the fuel pool building crane (L-3 crane) main hoist upgrade to the new rated capacity (110 tons) and to reflect the new single-failure-proof design.

NMC recently modified the L-3 crane to increase the rated capacity to 110 tons and incorporate single-failure-proof technology. NMC also revised the applicable FSAR sections to reflect this upgrade. At that time, NMC understood that the upgrade of the L-3 crane, in accordance with the NRC approved Ederer Incorporated Report, EDR-1, "Generic Licensing Topical Report," and the guidance of NUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," met the criteria of 10 CFR 50.59 and did not require NRC review and approval. Subsequent to this, NMC discussed the crane upgrade with the NRC staff and it was concluded that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, a license amendment per 10 CFR 50.90 was required. provides a detailed description of the proposed change, background and technical analysis, No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Environmental Review Consideration. Enclosure 2 provides summaries of the engineering analyses performed in support of the crane upgrade. Enclosure 3 contains a table that demonstrates compliance of the modified L-3 crane with the requirements of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612, uControl of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." provides Appendix B, "Summary of Plant Specific Crane Data Supplied by Ederer Incorporated," and Appendix C, Summary of Regulatory Positions to be Addressed by the Applicant," of EDR-1. Enclosure 5 provides the revised FSAR pages I 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Michigan 49043-9530 Telephone: 269.764.2000

Document Control Desk Page 2 NMC requests approval of this broposed license amendment by April 30, 2004, to support loading of dry fuel storage casks at Palisades. NMC further requests a 60-day implementation period following amendment approval.

Entergy submitted a similar license amendment to the NRC for Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 1, Docket 50-313, and Unit 2, Docket 50-368, by letter dated February 24, 2003. The ANO request was similar to Palisades in that it also upgraded the spent fuel crane (L-3) to a single-failure-proof design and increased the rated capacity of the crane. The NRC approved this license amendment by letter dated February 28, 2003.

A copy of this request has been provided to the designated representative of the State of Michigan.

Summary of Commitments This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 29, 2004.

Daniel J. Malone Site Vice President, Palisades Nuclear Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC Enclosures (5)

CC Administrator, Region IlIl, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC

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ENCLOSURE I DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGE

1.0 DESCRIPTION

Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) requests to amend Operating License DPR-20 for the Palisades Nuclear Plant. The proposed amendment requests NRC approval to update the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to reflect the fuel pool building crane (L-3 crane) main hoist upgrade to the new rated capacity (110 tons) and to reflect the new single-failure-proof design.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

NMC proposes changing the rated capacity of the L-3 crane from 100 tons to 110 tons and also incorporating single-failure-proof technology that meets the requirements of NUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants." The proposed change incorporates the L-3 crane upgrade into the FSAR, which modifies Palisades' licensing basis.

The former L-3 crane had a main hoist with a 100-ton lifting capacity and an auxiliary hoist with a 15-ton lifting capacity. The main hoist was not designed as single-failure-proof and therefore, the plant had to be capable of withstanding the consequences of a postulated transfer cask drop. In order to meet the acceptance criteria for the postulated transfer cask drop, an impact limiting pad was installed in the spent fuel pool to limit the loads imposed on the spent fuel pool structure associated with a postulated transfer cask drop during dry fuel storage operations.

NMC recently modified the L-3 crane to increase the rated capacity to 110 tons and incorporate single-failure-proof technology. NMC also revised the FSAR to reflect this upgrade. At that time, NMC understood that the upgrade of the L-3 crane, in accordance with the approved Ederer Incorporated single-failure-proof topical report and the guidance of NUREG-0554, met the criteria of 10 CFR 50.59 and did not require NRC review and approval. Subsequent to this, NMC discussed the crane upgrade with the NRC staff and it was concluded that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, a license amendment per 10 CFR 50.90 was required.

The modified L-3 crane is a single-failure-proof crane designed by Ederer Incorporated in accordance with the NRC approved Ederer Incorporated Report, EDR-1, "Generic Licensing Topical Report." The modified L-3 crane meets the NRC requirements for single-failure-proof cranes as described in NUREG-0554.

This upgrade is required in order to support use of a new dry fuel storage cask system. NMC has upgraded the L-3 crane to the requirements of the Ederer system to accommodate a new dry fuel cask design, since the drop of Page 1 of 8

a new, fully loaded cask would exceed the maximum load assumed in the existing load drop analysis. As a result, the modified L-3 crane design reduces the potential for dropped loads. The modified L-3 crane will be used in support of the loading of new dry fuel storage casks, which is scheduled to occur in the second quarter of calendar year 2004.

The following Palisades Nuclear Plant specific FSAR changes are provided in Enclosure 5.

Chapter 1, Figures 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1 These figures reflect the crane upgrade.

Chapter 5, Section 5.7.7.4 - This section clarifies that the fuel pool crane trolley is seismically qualified without the use of "uplifters."

Chapter 9, Section 9.11 - This section reflects the upgrade of the L-3 crane to 110-ton single-failure-proof.

Chapter 9, Table 9 This table reflects the L-3 crane capacity.

Chapter 14, Section 14.11 - This section states that since the new main hoist is single-failure-proof, the cask drop analysis is no longer necessary for load drops from the main hoist, but will remain as the bounding analysis for load drops from the auxiliary hoist.

3.0 BACKGROUND

The L-3 crane is used for a variety of lifts in the spent fuel pool area of the auxiliary building. Due to the change in the dry fuel storage cask system, the load that must be carried by the main hoist is increased above the former capacity of 100 tons. Furthermore, the dimensions of the new transfer cask are such that the fuel handling machine will not be able to load spent fuel into the cask with the impact limiting pad in place without significant modifications. Due to these circumstances, NMC decided to increase the capacity of the main hoist and make the main hoist single-failure-proof.

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

The principal features of the L-3 crane upgrade are as follows:

The trolley, including the main hoist and auxiliary hoist, were replaced.

The main hoist and trolley rated capacity were increased from 100 tons to 110 tons and were designed as single-failure proof in accordance with NUREG-0554. The auxiliary hoist was not increased in capacity, nor was it upgraded to a single-failure-proof design. The bridge capacity was increased to 110 tons and re-evaluated for the new loading associated with the single-failure-proof main hoist.

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• The bridge drive motor was replaced with an electromotive drive and motor similar to that of the trolley.

• The electrical control equipment for the crane, including the radio controls, was replaced.

• The trolley rail welds and the bridge rail clips were removed and replaced by new rail clips.

• The Fuel Handling Building structural steel (angles added to the building's cross members) was modified due to the increased load.

The heavy load paths and interlocks, which were used with the former L-3 crane, remain in place and are unchanged. Rigging and procedures for the single-failure-proof L-3 crane are in compliance with the appropriate regulatory requirements..

The technical analyses for the crane upgrade were performed under numerous engineering analyses (EAs). Summaries of the analyses that were performed in support of the crane upgrade can be found in Enclosure 2. The summaries conclude that the modified L-3 crane is in compliance with the applicable industry codes and standards. Furthermore, impacts of numerous Operating Experiences in relation to the L.3 crane upgrade were reviewed and appropriate actions were taken.

Enclosure 3 contains a table that demonstrates compliance of the modified L-3 crane with the requirements of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The Palisades plant specific information for Appendix B, "Summary of Plant Specific Crane Data Supplied by Ederer Incorporated," and Appendix C,-"Summary of Regulatory Positions to be Addressed by the Applicant," of EDR-1 is provided as Enclosure 4.

5.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) has evaluated whether a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment using the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment." The following supports the conclusion that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident. The potential load carrying capability of the fuel pool building crane main hoist (L-3 crane) has been increased from 100 tons to 110 tons. A fully loaded spent fuel cask is the Page 3 of 8

maximum oad that the L-3 crane normally handles. The heavy load paths and interlocks, which were used with the former L-3 crane, remain in place and are unchanged. Because the modified L-3 crane is single-failure-proof, a postulated cask drop is no longer considered a credible event; therefore, no adverse effects on plant structures or systems are anticipated to occur and the structural integrity of the spent fuel cask and spent fuel pool will not be impaired.

The operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. A single malfunction or failure of the main hoist of the modified L-3 crane will not result in a load drop; therefore, the radiological consequences would not be increased.

While the postulation of a cask drop from the main hoist would no longer be required, the existing analysis of the radiological consequences of a cask drop would be retained as it will envelope a load drop by the auxiliary hoist which is rated for 15 tons and is not single-failure-proof. Heavy loads will continue to be restricted from being moved over spent fuel in the fuel. pool in accordance with plant procedures.

Therefore, the proposed change would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The Palisades Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) previously analyzed the drop of a spent fuel cask weighing 96 tons. The L-3 crane capacity has been increased to 110 tons in order to accommodate a heavier spent fuel transfer cask used in the new dry fuel storage system.

The scope of this change is limited to loads carried by the modified L-3 crane therefore, no other accidents could occur as a result of lifting a heavy load with the modified L-3 crane.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The maximum load carrying capability of the L-3 crane has been increased from 100 tons to 110 tons. A fully loaded spent fuel transfer cask is the maximum load that the L-3 crane would carry.

The process for transporting of a cask is unchanged from that previously performed. The heavy load paths and interlocks, which Page 4 of 8

were used on the former L-3 crane, remain in place and are unchanged. The use of a single-failure-proof hoist, together with rigging and procedures that are in compliance with the appropriate regulatory requirements, assures that the potential for a heavy load drop is extremely small and therefore, not credible. As a result, a cask drop is not required to be postulated. The existing analysis of a cask drop will continue to serve as the bounding analysis for a postulated load from the auxiliary hoist, which is not single failure proof. No other accident analyses are affected by the crane upgrade. No impact on plant operation is expected to occur and the structural integrity of spent fuel casks and spent fuel pool will not be impaired.

The L-3 crane has been upgraded to comply with the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," and Revision 3 of the NRC approved Ederer Topical Report, EDR-1, "Ederer Generic Licensing Topical Report." The safety margins provided by the modified L-3 crane design have not been reduced because the design is in compliance with the regulatory guidance. This ensures adequate safety. margin to prevent failure of the crane or any lifting devices associated with the lifting of a spent fuel cask.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the evaluation above, NMC concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," provided regulatory guidelines in two phases (Phase I and 11) to assure safe handling of heavy loads in areas where a load drop could impact stored spent fuel, fuel in the reactor core, or equipment that may be required to achieve safe shutdown or permit continued decay heat removal. Phase I guidelines address measures for reducing the likelihood of dropping heavy loads and provide criteria for establishing safe load paths, procedures for load handling operations, training of crane operators, design, testing, inspection, and maintenance of cranes and lifting devices. Phase II guidelines address alternatives for mitigating the consequences of heavy load drops, including using either (1) a single-failure-proof crane for increased handling system reliability, or (2) electrical interlocks and mechanical stops for restricting crane travel, or (3) load drops and

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consequence analyses for assessing the impact of dropped loads on plant safety and operations. NUREG-0612, Appendix C, provides alternative means of upgrading the reliability of the crane to satisfy the guidelines of NUREG-0554.

Generic Letter 85-11, "Completion of Phase 11 of Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0612," dated June 28,1985, dismissed the need for licensees to implement the guidelines of NUREG-0612 Phase II, based on the improvements obtained from the implementation of NUREG-0612 Phase I. The generic letter, however, encouraged licensees to implement actions perceived to be appropriate to provide adequate safety.

Regulatory guidance provided in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Bulletin (BL) 96-02, Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," dated April 1, 1996, provides that movement of heavy loads over spent fuel, fuel in the reactor core, or safety related equipment while the reactor is at power should be conducted in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements and within the guidelines of the current licensing basis. In BL 96-02, the NRC staff addressed specific instances of heavy load handling concerns and requested licensees to provide specific information detailing their extent of compliance with the guidelines, their licensing basis guidance, and requested responses from licensees regarding heavy loads handling. The response to BL 96-02 for Palisades Nuclear Plant determined that the heavy load activities were within the current licensing basis (Reference 1).

The proposed revised Palisades Nuclear Plant licensing basis would credit the modified L-3 crane as single-failure-proof for handling heavy loads in accordance with NUREG-0554 and Revision 3 of the Ederer Topical Report.

Therefore, NMC has determined that the proposed changes do not require any exemptions or relief from regulatory requirements and do not affect conformance with any General Design Criteria as described in the FSAR.

The proposed change modifies the former L-3 crane from a non-single-failure-proof crane with a load limit of 100 tons to a single-failure-proof crane with a load limit of 110 tons. Load drop analyses were performed with the former L-3 crane design since the potential existed for dropping such a load. In accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG-0612, NMC no longer considers the drop of a heavy load from the main hoist a credible event since the crane was upgraded to single-failure-proof design per NUREG-0554. Rigging and procedures for the single-failure-proof L-3 crane are in compliance with the appropriate regulatory requirements. The existing analysis of a cask drop will continue to serve as the bounding analysis for a postulated load from the auxiliary hoist, which is not single-failure-proof. Inspection activities and preventative maintenance Page 6 of 8

performed on the modified L-3 crane systems and controls are in accordance with industry requirements and are controlled by plant procedures. The upgrade of the L-3 crane does not present a significant change in the conduct of load movement and control.

The heavy load paths and interlocks, which were used on the former L-3 crane, remain in place and are unchanged. The modified L-3 crane does not, in itself, serve to mitigate a design basis accident.

In conclusion, based on the considerations described above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW CONSIDERATION NMC has determined that the proposed amendment would change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51 .22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 Precedence Entergy submitted a similar license amendment to the NRC for Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 1, Docket 50-313, and Unit 2, Docket 50-368, by letter dated February 24, 2003. The ANO request was similar to Palisades in that it also upgraded the spent fuel crane (L-3) to single-failure-proof design and increased crane rated capacity. The NRC approved this license amendment by letter dated February 28, 2003.

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7.2 References

1) Consumers Power Letter dated May 13, 1996, "Response to NRC Bulletin 96-02"

2) NUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," dated May 1979

3) NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," dated July 1980

4) EDR-1, Generic Licensing Topical Report," Revision 3, dated October 8,1982

5) Generic Letter 85-11, "Completion of Phase II of Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0612," dated June 28,1985

6)Bulletin 96-02, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," dated April 11, 1996 Page 8 of 8'

ENCLOSURE 2 SUMMARIES OF ENGINEERING ANALYSES PERFORMED IN SUPPORT OF THE L-3 CRANE UPGRADE Introduction The following engineering analyses were performed to support the L-3 crane upgrade. They demonstrate that applicable requirements are satisfied.

Crane/Trolley and Building Evaluations EA-FC-976-01, Seismic Input Calculation": This calculation was created to generate the seismic response spectra of the bridge girder with the trolley and lifted loads in various locations and elevations. Three-dimensional analysis models of the structural steel framing and crane were used. The lifted load in the model is supported from the trolley by a beam element, whose element stiffness properties were calculated using pendulum frequency depending on the location of the lifted load (up or down). A confirmatory solution is provided to show that the horizontal component of the amplified lifted load (pendulum) force is smaller than the transferred shear obtained in the small-displacement solution process used.

EA-FC-976-02, uTrolley Weight Calculation": This Ederer calculation was created to calculate and document the trolley weight and frequency. According to this EA, the fundamental frequencies for the trolley are greater than 33 Hz (zero period acceleration), therefore, the trolley is considered a rigid assembly.

EA-FC-976-03, "Bridge Wheel Loads Calculation": This Ederer calculation was created to generate bridge wheel reaction loads for the bridge. This EA used the results of EA-FC-976-01 and EA-FC-976-02 as input into this analysis. This EA provided wheel reaction loads for the bridge based on a weight plus lifted load and seismic reactions. The qualification of the building steel uses this EA as input.

EA-FC-976-04, uMain Hoist & Aux Hoist Assembly": This Ederer calculation qualified the main and auxiliary hoists. This EA confirms the sizes, loadings and gearing for the hoists. It also confirms the main and auxiliary hoist motor power is adequate for the 110-ton and 15-ton hoists. The EA confirms the main drum diameter and the reeving and rope specification for normal and broken rope loadings. The gear ratios, hoist speeds, brake torque and gear case are also confirmed.

EA-FC-976-05, "Trolley Frame, Main Hoist Brake, & Drum Analysis": This Ederer calculation provides the qualification of the trolley structure. Results from EA-FC-976-01, EA-FC-976-02, EA-FC-976-04, and EA-FC-976-1 0 are used as input for this analysis. This EA qualifies the trolley frame and the main hoist

• brake and drum end for both normal load conditions and seismic conditions.

Other trolley components are also analyzed to determine the frame loading.

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EA-FC-976-06, "Trolley Drive Calculation": This Ederer calculation provides qualification for the trolley drive assembly. Results from EA-FC-976-02 are used as input in this EA. This calculation confirms the trolley speed and selects and confirms the gear ratios. This calculation also verifies proper motor sizing for the 25 feet per minute trolley motor speed specification.

EA-FC-976-07, "Assessment of Auxiliary Building Framing Above Elevation 649'-0" for Increased Crane Loads": This EA qualifies the building steel from below the rails and rail clips all the way to the building column anchors. This EA used the results of EA-FC-976-03 as input for the analysis. Some of the vertical bracing in the north-south direction was required to be modified. In addition, the heavy load handling procedure for the modified crane was revised to specify that the crane should not be used when weather warning is in effect for ground level wind speeds in excess of 90 mph.

EA-FC-976-08, "Qualification of Concrete Below Elevation 649'": This EA uses the column base reactions from EA-FC-976-07 as input to qualify the concrete below elevation 649'. This calculation verifies the adequacy of the concrete structure for the increase crane loading in the fuel handling area. Seismic loads are considered in this calculation.

EA-FC-976-09, Evaluation of the L-3 Crane Upgrade and Installation": This EA provides summaries of the engineering analyses that were performed in support of the L-3 crane upgrade. The analysis also demonstrates compliance with the applicable code and standards. Furthermore, this EA evaluated the impacts of numerous Operating Experiences in relation to the L-3 crane upgrade and identified appropriate actions taken.

EA-FC-976-10, "Bridge Girder and Truck Qualification": This Ederer calculation demonstrates the seismic capability of the bridge during all loading conditions and with the trolley in various positions on the bridge. This EA confirms that the bridge components will not be overstressed during the rated or seismic load cases. Therefore no retrofit of any existing components is necessary for the upgrade.

EA-FC-976-1 1, "Spent Fuel Pool Crane L-3 Modification FC-976 Electrical Evaluation": This calculation evaluates the overall changes to the electrical system for the replacement trolley. Included in this calculation are changes to the fuses in the disconnect box on elevation 649'.

EA-FC-976-12, "Crane Cribbing Analysis": This calculation evaluates the external crane outrigger loads on the building subgrade walls and designs cribbing to maintain the- loads within the wall capacities. This calculation also qualifies the trolley laydowvn platform to be temporarily installed over the equipment hatch to land the trolley. This platform may also be used to support a manlift for installation activities.

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EA-FC-976-13, "Bridge Runway Rail Clip Calculation": This Ederer calculation evaluates the existing bridge rail clips and the existing bridge runway bumpers for the new, higher crane loads.

EA-FC-976-14, "Misc. Seismic Attachment Calculation": This Ederer calculation seismically qualifies attachments to the bridge and electrical cabinets not included in other calculations.

EA-FC-976-15, "Trolley Rail Clip Calculation": This Ederer calculation qualifies the new design of the rail clips that replace the existing rail welds. Both rated load and seismic loading are considered. This EA used the results of EA-FC-976-05 as input into the analysis to confirm the adequacy of the rail and clips.

EA-FC-976-16, "Drum Shell Size and Main Hoist Rope Length Calculation for Bridge Crane Trolley Replacement": This Ederer calculation qualifies the drum shell size and main hoist rope length.

EA-FC-976-17, "Main Hoist Reducer and Drum Gear Calculation": This Ederer calculation qualifies the gearing, shafting, and bearings for the main hoist reducer and drum. Results from EA-FC-976-04 are used as input for this analysis.

EA-FC-976-18, Main Hoist Lower Block Calculation": This Ederer calculation qualifies the main hoist lower block. Results from EA-FC-976-04 are used as input for this calculation. The analysis considers the rated load and two blocking loads. This calculation confirms the adequacy of the hook, frame, sheave pin, thrust bearing, and sheave bearing.

EA-FC-976-19, "Trolley Wheel Calculation": This Ederer calculation qualifies the trolley wheels subjected to the maximum lifted load. Results from EA-FC-976-05 and EA-FC-976-06 are used as input for this analysis. Both rated load and seismic loading are considered. This calculation confirms the adequacy of the wheel, shaft, bearings, support cartridge cross shaft, and couplings.

EA-FC-976-20, "Safety System Calculation": This Ederer calculation qualifies the main hoist drum safety support and pillow blocks. Results from EA-FC-976-05, EA-FC-976-21, and EA-FC-976-22 are used as input for this analysis. Both components are confirmed to meet the requirements of the Palisades specification.

EA-FC-976-21, "Brake Drum Calculation for Bridge Crane Trolley": This Ederer calculation verifies the component size and selection for the drum band brake.

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EA-FC-976-22, "Main Hoist Upper Block Calculation": This Ederer calculation qualifies the main hoist upper block. Both rated load and broken rope loading are considered. Results from EA-FC-976-04 are used as input for this calculation. This EA confirms the adequacy of the frame, equalizer sheaves and pins, sheave bearings, equalizer arm and pin, equalizer cylinder and cylinder mount.

EA-FC-976-23, "Bridge Wheel Calculation": This Ederer calculation qualifies the existing bridge wheels subjected to the maximum lifted load. Both rated load and seismic loading are considered. Results from EA-FC-976-03 and EA-FC-976-24 are used as input for this analysis. This calculation confirms the adequacy of the wheel, shaft, bearings and support cartridge bolts.

EA-FC-976-24, "Bridge Drive Calculation": This Ederer calculation qualifies the bridge drive components. Results from EA-FC-976-02 and EA-FC-976-03 are used as input for this analysis. This EA confirms the bridge speed, selects and confirms gear ratios, and confirms the bridge motor horsepower requirements.

EA-FC-976-25, "Rigging Existing Trolley Calculation": This Ederer calculation designed the rigging and pick points for the existing trolley.

EA-FC-976-26, "Crane Upgrade Staging Area-Temporary Shoring Post Design":

This EA qualifies a typical shoring post that will support the enveloped loads from the temporary support frame, trolley beam, and scissor jack. Results from EA-FC-976-12 is used in this analysis. This analysis also specifies the type of screw brace to be used in conjunction with the post.

EA-FC-976-27, "Drive Train Failure Calculation": This Ederer calculation checks the drive train for energy absorption by confirming that the energy absorbing torque limiter will absorb the rotation kinetic energy of the machinery upstream from the clutch plates. Checks confirmed that it would limit the torque to a minimum of 100% rated load during dynamic operation of the device.

EA-FC-976-28, "Trolley Bridge Bumper Calculation": This Ederer calculation confirms that the trolley bumpers will handle collision forces.

EA-FC-976-29, "Rigging for Replacement Trolley Calculation": This Ederer calculation designed the rigging and pick points for the new trolley.

EA-FC-976-30, "Structural Evaluation for Track Alley Slab Trolley Staging Load":

This EA evaluates the concrete slab at elevation 625' in the auxiliary building for the trolley staging loads using' 6x4x2" tube steel which were used as guide rails EA-FC-976-31, "Structural Design of a Stand for Reeving the New Fuel Handling Crane's Block": In order to safely reeve the main hoist, a stand was designed to hold the lower block upright. The EA evaluated the stand.

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EA-FC-976-32, "Structural Evaluation of L-3 Crane Rail Clip Fasteners for Lack of Thread Engagement": Several welded studs for the trolley rails clips were installed such that full thread engagement on the clip nuts could not achieve full thread engagement. This EA determined that sufficient engagement still exists to fully develop the strength of the connection.

EA-FC-976-33, "Jack/Shim Load Check & Bridge Truck Removal Tool Design":

This EA is for the temporary rigging of the bridge end trucks for weld inspections.

EA-SC-93-094-007, Overload Ampacity Analysis of Cable Between Breaker 52-725 and the Fuel Building Crane L-3": This EA updates the existing EA for the new crane electrical data.

Conclusion These EA summaries demonstrate that the L-3 crane upgrade meets all applicable codes and is in compliance with NUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," and NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."

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ENCLOSURE 3 COMPLIANCE TABLE COMPARING L-3 CRANE MAIN HOIST AND TROLLEY DESIGNS WITH THE APPLICABLE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

• _____ .FOR SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF HANDLING SYSTEMS SECTION NUREG NUREG 0612 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

0612 REFERENCES Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of Palisades' heavy load procedure provides the In lieu of marking load paths on the heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if requirements for lifting heavy loads, including safe floor, the load paths are clearly

. dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the .... spent fuel load paths. This procedure has an attached drawing identified in the procedure. In 5.1.1 (1) pool.... The path should follow, to the extent practical, showing the restricted area around the spent fuel pool, addition, Key interlocks are required structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the and gives the minimum requirements for the handling to move the bridge or trolley from a

. load.is dropped the structure is more likely to withstand of heavy loads that could potentially affect the spent less restrictive area (Load Path #3) to

'the impact. These load paths should be defined in fuel pool. areas of higher risk (Load Paths #1, #2 procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and and #4).

clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled. Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee.

Procedures should be developed to cover load handling Palisades' heavy load procedure was developed to operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled cover handing operations for heavy loads. This 5.1.1 (2) over or in proximity to irradiated fuel..... At a minimum, includes identification of required equipment; procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in inspections and acceptance criteria required before the Table 3-1 of this report. These procedures should movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be include:.identification of required equipment; inspections followed in handling the load; defining the load path; and acceptance criteria required before movement of and other precautions and limitations.

load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe load path; and other special precautions.

Crane opertors should be trained, qualified and conduct Palisades heavy load procedure requires that the crane themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ASME operator shall be qualified in overhead crane 5.1.1 (3) B30.2-1976, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes." operations: These training and qualifications meet the ASME B30.2 requirements.

Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of Special lifting devices designed to lift the new casks ANSI N14.6-1978. This standard should apply to all are designed to ANSI N14.6. Design of these lifling 5.1.1 (4) special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as devices is outside of the scope of this modification.

defined above. In addition, the stress design factor stated Requirements of NUREG 0612 for below-the-hook in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the lifting devices are contained in Palisades specific combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could procedures.

be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 .... only the weight (static load)....

Page 1 of 24

SECTION NUREG . NUREG 0612 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

-0612

_______ ______________________________REFERENCES Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be Selection of the proper sling uses the sum of maximum

. installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of static and maximum dynamic load (SSE excluded).

5.1.1 (5) ANSI B30.9-1971, "Slings." However, in selecting the This requirement is included in Palisades' specific

^ proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static procedures, which implement ANSI B30.9.

and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the "static load" which produces the maximum static and dynamic load.

The cane should be inspected, tested and maintained in Palisades' specific electrical and mechanical inspection During the load tests (137.5-ton static, 5.1.1 (6) accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ASME B30.2-1976, procedures comply with the requirements of ASME and 110-ton operational) the test load "Overhead and Gantry Cranes," with ... (exceptions for B30.2. was not transported the full length of cranes not accessible during power operation) the bridge runway (i.e. over the spent fuel pool). The crane was tested sufficiently to demonstrate the full load capacity and the operation capability of the crane.

The crane should be designed to meet the applicable The single-failure-proof crane design meets the 5.1.1 (7) criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2- specifications, or intent, of ASME B30.2-1996 1976, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes" and of CMAA-70, (Chapter 2-1), CMAA-70 and NUREG-0554.

"Specification for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes."

An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied.

Page 2 of 24

.SECTION EXETOSRMRS NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

0554 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~REFERENCES Design criteria for construction phase plus operation The former crane specifications did not specify crane phase. loading or operating characteristics during construction that differ from those during normal operation. This modification to upgrade the crane load rating to 110 tons was performed during the plant operating phase.

Further consideration of construction phase is not

-4.

required .9 Allowable design stress limits of Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 of The allowable stress limits for the crane intended for CMAA Specification #70. plant operation are those indicated in Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 of CMAA Specification #70 and reflecting the appropriate duty cycle in CMAA Specification #70.

2.1 Palisades' specification classifies the main hoist as Construction "Service Level A - Standby or Infrequent Service" as And defined by CMAA Specification #70. Table 3.3.3.1.

Operating 3-1 has since been replaced by table 3.4.7-1 in the Periods latest version of CMAA Specification #70.

EA-FC-976- 10 complies with this recommendation for the normal operation. Since CMAA Specification #70 does not include seismic load combinations or allowable values, the NOG-I load combinations were used and the stresses were evaluated to the AISC design methodology and stress limits.

Design reflects the appropriate duty cycle in CMAA Service Class "A' is specified in Palisades Specification #70. specification and reflected in the vendor calculations listed in Enclosure 2.

Sum total of simultaneously applied loads (static & Structural analyses for various load combinations were dynamic) should not result in stress levels causing performed to maintain allowable design margins.

,permanent deformation ............. handling system. X-SAM trolley is designed to lift and hold 110-ton in all loading combinations. See Engineering Analyses (EAs) listed in Enclosure 2.

Effects of cyclic loading induced by jogging or The hoist control system is designed such that jogging

'plugging .... included in the design specifications. or plugging will not induce excessive cyclical loading.

Per Ederer Topical Report EDR-I, there are no plant operation induced loads.

Page 3 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES Single-failure-proof crane should be designed to Palisades' specification defines the rated load and the handle the maximum critical load (MCL) ........... critical load as 1 10 tons on the main hook. This value was used in the facility change EAs listed in Enclosure 2, to qualify the main hoist, trolley, bridge, and

.______________________._____________________ building steel and foundation loadings.

2.2 Increase of- 15% of the design for component parts Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their Although the 15% margin against Maximum subjected to degradation due to wear & exposure. acceptance of EDR-1. degradation and wear is not attained, Critical detailed design calculations Load demonstrate the adequacy of the component parts.

(USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983, Safety Evaluation Report for EDR-1, Rev. 3.)

The DRL rating marked on the crane separately from Not Applicable. Palisades' specification specifies that the MCL marking. DRL equals the MCL.

2.3 Operating

.... environment specified for the crane Palisades' specification provides the maximum and 23 and lifting fixtures. minimum design operating temperatures.

Operating Closed boxed sections of the crane structure vented to Not Applicable. There are no significant pressure Environment avoid collapse during containment pressurization. loadings because the fuel pool building is a vented structure. No venting of the closed box sections is required.

Drainage should be provided to avoid standing water Not Applicable. The indoor crane is not exposed to in the crane structure. spray or outside weather. Therefore provisions for standing water are not

._____________________________________________ ^required.

Already fabricated crane structural components Existing crane structural components were subjected to 2.4 subjected to a test lift at the lowest .... temperature. a cold proof load test. Minimum operating temperature Material is based on the metal temperature during the cold proof Properties load test of 61.5° F Page 4 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

• NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 0554 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Structural members (exceeding /2 inch) essential to Exception. No test required for 5/8-inch or less structural integrity tested in accordance with (1AW) Charpy V-notch testing of X-SAM was performed on nominal thickness steel per NC-2300.

the following impact test requirements. structural members and crane critical components, with a required NDTT values per applicable ASTM standards A673 and A370 (incl. NC-2300) and for 50 0F, required. EDR-I provides a list of critical

. ______________________________________________ components.

Cold proof test with dummy load = 125% of MCL. Required cold proof load test at 137.5 tons, 125% of 2.4 _MCL (110 tons). Actual load test was at 139.4 tons.

Material If cannot be achieved during test, the minimum Minimum operating temperature is based on the metal Properties - operating temperature should be that of the test. temperature during the cold proof load test of (continued) 61.50 F Cold proof test followed by nondestructive exam of Following the cold proof test in the post modification welds whose failure .... the drop of a critical load. test, all critical welds, whose failure could result in the

.-drop of a critical load, were examined.

Nondestructive exam repeated at < 4-year intervals. Following the cold proof test, a non-destructive examination of welds whose failure could result in the drop of a critical load was performed. This non-destructive examination will be repeated at or less than

.___________________________________________ 4-year intervals.

. Cast iron not used for load-bearing components. Cast iron was not used for load-bearing components.

All new structural steel is ASTM A36, or better Crane designed to retain control of and hold the load. Enclosure 2 summarizes various EAs that were created to generate seismic response spectra and evaluate the trolley, bridge, and structural steel and foundations to 2.5 meet the seismic design criteria. Conclusions from Seismic these EAs demonstrate that the requirements of section Design 2.5 are met for the L-3 design.

Bridge and trolley designed to remain in place EA-FC-976-02 calculates the natural frequency of the with their wheels prevented from leaving the tracks. trolley as rigid. Based on the calculated rigid frequency and a vertical acceleration less than g, there will be no uplift on the trolley. EA-FC-976-03 provides a summary of the wheel loads for the bridge.

Based on this summary there is no uplift and the wheels will not leave the tracks during a seismic event.

Page 5 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES Bridge remains on the runway with brakes applied, EA-FC-976-02 calculates the natural frequency of the and the trolley remains on the crane girders with trolley as rigid. Based on the calculated rigid 2.5 brakes applied. frequency and a vertical acceleration less than 1g, there

• Seismic will be no uplift on the trolley. EA-FC-976-03

-Design provides a summary of the wheel loads for the bridge.

(continued) Based on this summary there is no uplift and the Crane designed wheels will not leave the tracks during a seismic event.

Crane designed and constructed AW regulatory The seismic analyses listed in Enclosure 2 demonstrate position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29. compliance with position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29

._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (i.e. Seismic WII)

The MCL plus operational and . pendulum The seismic spectra generated in EA-FC-976-01 effects . considered in the trolley design and added considered all loads plus pendulum effects.

to the trolley weight for the bridge design.

2.6 Examine the (weld) joint by radiography or ultrasonic According to the Appendix C supplement to the 2.6 inspection ... to ensure the absence of lamellar Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1, the existing

^ Lamellar tearing, and soundness, in the base metal. weld joint geometries used in the bridge structure are Tearing _________________ ____ not susceptible to lamellar tearing.

Weld joints whose failure could result in the drop of a Magnetic particle examinations of new fabrication critical load should be nondestructively examined. critical welds and accessible welds on already fabricated components were performed.

Fatigue analysis .... for the critical load-bearing EA-FC-976- 10 uses the category F (worst case) stress 2.7 structures and components of the crane handling range for crane Service Class A to evaluate the bridge Structural system girder stress range. EA-FC-976-05, which evaluated Fatigue the drum, used reduced weld allowable stresses to

• ___.__^______________________________________ account for fatigue.

Cumulative fatigue usage factors .... cyclic loading Fatigue effects from both construction and operating

-from both construction and operating periods. periods are not a consideration since the main hoist was seldom used for maximum design loads.

Preheat temperatures for all weldments specified in Ederer welding procedures specify preheat

• 2.8 the weld procedures. temperatures, per AWS DI.I. New structural Welding components preheat temperatures specified per Procedures AWS D14. 1.

Page 6 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 0 5 54 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

2.8 Post weld heat treatment for all weldments specified Appendix C supplement to the Generic Licensing Welding in the weld procedures. To include 2.6 welds. Topical Report EDR-1 states that the material thickness Procedures of the existing bridge components are such that post (continued) weld heat treatment is not required.

Auxiliary hoisting systems of the main crane handling EDR-I demonstrates that Ederer X-SAM design for 3.2 system single-failure-proof. hoisting systems are single-failure-proof.

Auxiliary -Auxiliary systems or dual components for the main EDR-1 Section III.E, revision 3 contains the single Systems hoisting mechanism . immobile safe position. failure analysis of the X-SAM design.

Automatic controls & limiting devices designed Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their X-SAM design relies on mechanical disorders due to inadvertent operator action, acceptance of EDR-1. safeguards, rather than electrical, to 3.3. component malfunction ....... will not prevent the provide single-failure-proof features.

Electric handling system from stopping and holding the load. X-SAM's electrical design address the Control effects of phase reversal or loss of Systems phasing in the hoist power supply (USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983, Safety Evaluation Report for EDR- 1, Rev. 3.)

Emergency stop button added to the control station to An emergency stop button was added to the radio stop all motion. control box. In addition there is an existing electrical

_________________________________________________ disconnect switch located on elevation 649'.

EDR-1 states that X-SAM's Emergency Hoist Drum 3.4 Immobilized crane .... hold the load during repairs. brake system permits repairing, adjusting, or replacing Emergency with the load supported and retained in the safe Repairs. position.

Manual operation of the hoisting system and the Manually pneumatic valves provided for pressurizing bridge and trolley transfer mechanisms to a safe the emergency drum brake actuator to lower the load.

laydown area. Design includes means for manual movement of the bridge and trolley to an area away from the spent fuel pool structure. The description of how to manually release the brakes is in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Manual. The description of how to manually move the trolley and bridge is in the Training Manual.

Page 7 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 0554 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Crane design and operating area include provisions The crane would be moved away from the spent fuel 3.4 ...... cause release of radioactivity during corrective pool for any repairs with a suspended load, or Emergency repairs, replacements or adjustments. replacement of parts weighing more than 1300 lbs.

Repairs The Crane is provided with manual operation (continued)

• capability for lowering the main hoist and for the bridge/trolley movement. If required, the crane with the lifted load could be moved to a safe location for repairs, etc.

The pitch diameter of the sheaves should be larger for Sheaves coming off of the drum are 32 inches pitch ropes moving at the highest velocity near the drum. diameter. Other sheaves are 28 inches pitch diameter.

Per CMAA Spec 70, the min. pitch diameter for Class A service is 16 x diameter which equals

.________________________________________________ 2 8 in ches.

Protection against excessive wire rope wear Maintenance manual to include instructions for through scheduled inspection & maintenance. scheduled inspection and maintenance of the wire rope.

4.1 This was added to the Overhead Crane Mechanical Reeving Inspection procedure.

System Design of the rope reeving systems(s) should be dual As described in EDR-1, the dual reeving scheme uses a with each system providing separately the load beam type equalizer for balancing and distributing the balance .. configuration of ropes & rope equalizer(s) load between the two operating reeving systems. This will permit either rope system to hold the critical load and transfer the critical load without excessive shock in the case of failure of the other rope systems.

. Selection of the hoisting rope or running rope .... to As described in EDR-I, the reeving arrangement is maintain efficient working of the individual wire consistent with the recommendations of the wire rope strands .... during the hoisting operation. manufacturer.

The effects of impact loadings, acceleration and Dynamic loading considered by accounting for the emergency stops . selecting rope reeving systems reeving efficiency in sizing the wire ropes and reeving system components.

Page 8 of 24

.SECTIONII EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 0554 _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _

REFERENCES__ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _

Maximum load (....) on each individual wire rope ... Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their Each rope is sized using the Ederer with MCL attached should not exceed 10% of the acceptance of EDR-1. Generic Licensing Topical Report manufactures published breaking strength. EDR-1 according to the reserve strength of the rope and being 0.9 of yield when subjected to the maximum static and inertia forces. While this methodology differs from the 4.1 recommendation within

-Reeving NUREG-0554, the alternate design

. System methodology provides adequate (continued) design margins.

(USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983.

Safety Evaluation Report for EDR-l, Rev. 3.)

Wire rope yield strength . . as well as ultimate Ratio considered consistent between spools of wire strength when specifying . to ensure the desired rope that are made by the same manufacturing process.

margin on rope strength. Ederer's wire rope criteria based upon the yield strength according to EDR-1. EA-FC-976-04 determined required rope breaking strength per EDR-1.

Per EDR-1, App. A, H.3, a rope pull test was required with sample pulled to failure. This test was performed.

Maximum fleet angle from drum to lead sheave in the Maximum fleet angle is 3 Y/2 according to load block or between individual sheeves, 31,2 EDR-1.

Reverse bends for running wire ropes should be According to Appendix B of EDR-1, reverse bend limited, ... use of larger sheaves considered ... occurs only between wire rope drum and the first disproportional reduction in wire rope fatigue life. sheave of the lower block. Bends are not within one sheave diameter of each other (adverse effects limited

.. _____________________________________ _ to...bends in close proxim ity).

Equalizer for stretch and load on the rope reeving ... X-SAM design utilizes a Hydraulic Load Equalization beam or sheave type or combinations thereof. system as described in EDR-1.

______________ I Page 9 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES

. Dual rope reeving system with individual attaching Maximum load motion, kinetic energy and wire rope points & means for balancing or distributing the load. tension per associated with failure of a wire rope were evaluated in EA-FC-976-04. The upper load block for the dual reeving system is qualified in EA-FC-976-22.

4.1 , Pitch diameter of running sheaves and drums 'eh.......

minimum pitch diameter of the drum is 52.5 Reeving IAW recommendations of CMAA Spec. #70. inches. This exceeds the minimum pitch diameter for System CMAA Class A service and is therefore acceptable.

(continued) For CMAA Class A service, and 6x37 size rope, the minimum diameter pitch = 16 x rope diameter = 16 x 1.75 inches = 28 inches. Sheaves coming off of the drum are 32-inch pitch diameter. Other sheaves are

.28-inch _ pitch diameter.

Dual reeving system may be a single rope from each According to EDR-1, the X-SAM has one drum with end of a drum terminating at one of the blocks or two ropes, with a balanced dual reeving system. Each equalizer with provisions ... designed for total load. rope is capable of carrying the total load.

4.2 Load hoisting drum . structural and mechanical EDR- I describes the X-SAM drum safety structure that Drum . safety devices to limit the drop of the drum ... from ensures that a shaft hub or bearing failure will not Supports disengaging from its holding brake system. allow the drum to disengage from its drive gear or

____________________________________ Emergency Drum Brake System.

Head & load blocks should be designed to maintain a EDR-lstates that the balanced dual reeving system

.vertical load balance about the center of lift eliminates tilt of the load block when loaded. If the reeving system of dual design. load ropes are equalized for reeving, the load block will not tilt.

Load-block assembly should be provided with two Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their Equivalent margin of safety by 4.3 load-attaching points, ... each .. ..able to support a acceptance of EDR-I. providing the single load path parts 4.3 load of three times the load (static and dynamic) with a capacity equal to or greater Head and Load without permanent deformation. than the combined capacity specified Blocks for two attaching points. Main hook design MCL is 110 Tons, with a 10:1 factor of safety on ultimate strength as described in EDR-I, Section HI.C.3.a.

(USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983, Safety Evaluation Report for EDR-I, Rev. 3.)

Page 10 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREGNUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 0554 Individual component parts of the vertical hoisting Head and load block designed to support a static load system .... head block, ...... load block designed to of 200% of 110 tons based upon a 5:1 factor of safety ctinnnrt n sati nad nrnol of th. MCT- on ulftmte trenoth and 1 atorof safetv on vield.

Individual component parts of the vertical hoisting Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their Ederer's X-SAM rope reeving system system . ... rope reeving ....... designed to support a acceptance of EDR-1. based on yield strength. Therefore the static load of 200% of the MCL. 200% of the MCL does not apply, as described in Section III.C.3.e of EDR-1, Rev. 3, the yield strength method is more stringent than this requirement.

(USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983, Safety Evaluation Report for EDR- I, Rev. 3.)

Individual component parts of the vertical hoisting Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their Single load attaching device path system . ...dual-load attaching device ....... designed acceptance of EDR- I. capacity used is equal to or greater to sujpport a static load of 200% of the MCL. than combined capacity specified for two attaching points, as described in 4.3 Section II.C.3.a of EDR-I, Rev. 3.

Head and Load (USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983, Blocks Safety Evaluation Report for EDR-1,

'(continued) Rev. 3.)

200% static load test performed for hook. Main hook was pull tested at 200% rated load per ANSI B30.10.

Measurements of the geometric configuration of the Dimensional verification of the main hoist hook was hooks .... before and after the load test. performed after 125% load test of the crane per site work order. Hook was also dimensionally verified after the 200 % or rated load test. ___________________.-

Hook volumetric nondestructive exam, to verify Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their An ultrasonic exam of the hook was soundness & integrity after load test. acceptance of EDR-1. performed before the load test to verify the soundness of fabrication.

A penetrant test and hook dimensional verification were performed before and after the 200% testing, as described in Appendix A, H.2.5 of EDR-1, Rev. 3. (USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983, Safety Evaluation Report for EDR-1, Rev. 3.)

I _______________________________________________ I Page 11 of 24

'SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES Hook surface examination, to verify soundness and Per EDR-I Critical Items List a liquid penetrant exam integrity, before & after load test. of the hook is made before and after the load test.

- Load blocks nondestructively examined by surface Load blocks were inspected per EDR-I Critical Items 4.3 techniques. List.

Head and Load Load blocks nondestructively examined by volumetric Load blocks were ultrasonically inspected per EDR-I Blocks techniques. Critical Items List.

(continued) Results of examinations documented and recorded. In accordance with the specification, the examination and test results were recorded and reviewed by the licensee.

Maximum hoisting speed for the critical load ........ Maximum hoist speed of 3 fpm, as given in CMAA 4.4 limited to "slow" column of CMAA Spec. #70. Spec. #70, Fig. 6.2 for slow speed was verified during Hoisting . shop and site functional tests.

Speed Conservative industry practice limits the rope line The maximum line speed of the wire rope is < 50 fpm

.____________ speed to 50 fpm at the drum. for 30-ton or greater hoists.

The reeving system designed to prevent the cutting or The X-SAM hoist is designed to withstand crushing of the wire rope if a two-blocking incident two-blocking without mechanically damaging the wire were to occur. rope. EDR-1 describes the design features of the hoist drum, and the upper and lower blocks to provide wire rope protection.

The mechanical and structural components of the The X-SAM Hoists' Integrated Protective System complete hoisting system .... required strength to (HIPS) and the Energy Absorbing Torque Limiter 4.5 resist failure ... for two-blocking and load hang-up. (EATL) provide the methods for protection from two-Design blocking, load hang-up and overload incidents.

Against Two-Blocking. Means provided within the reeving system located on The X-SAM Hoists' Energy Absorbing Torque Limiter the head or on the load-block combinations to absorb is incorporated in the hoist gear case and acts as an or control the kinetic energy of rotating machinery energy absorber and a torque limiter.

during the incident of two-blocking.

• As a minimum, two independent travel-limit devices Primary rotary limit switch on the drum shaft senses of different designs, and activated by separate both the upper and lower positions of the load block mechanical means. These devices de-energize the travel. Hoist motion is stopped by de-energizing the hoist drive motor and the main power supply to hoist controls. Secondary lever operated limit switch is prevent the hoist from two-blocking. tripped by the lower block. This switch actuates the Failure Detection System, which sets the Emergency Drum Brake and removes all power from the hoist.

Page 12 of 24

SECTION A EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG . NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES

'The protective control system for load hang-up should A load cell is installed in the hoist reeving. The load

• consist of load cell systems in the drive train or cell senses overloads that result from two-blocking or motor-current-sensing devices or mechanical load- load hang-up. An overload de-energizes the hoist limiting devices. control and sets the conventional holding brakes on the

. * . _________________________________________ high sspeed eesashafting.

ti g _____________hgh Location of the mechanical holding brakes and their Conventional high speed holding braking is provided 4.5 controls should provide positive, reliable & capable on the high speed shafting to hold the load during Design means to stop and hold the hoisting drum. This normal operation. Redundancy in the high speed Against Two- should include capability to withstand the maximum holding braking is not required since the Emergency

. Blocking torque of the driving motor if a malfunction occurs Drum Brake provides single-failure-proof braking for (continued) and power to the driving motor cannot be shutoff. the X-SAM design. The HIPS protects against hoist control system failures, including inability to remove

._ _____________________________________________ powe r.

The auxiliary hoist equipped with two independent Not applicable to this compliance matrix. The travel-limit switches to prevent two blocking. auxiliary hoist is not designed to be "Single-Failure-I Proof".

Lifting devices attached to the load block Not Applicable The transfer cask lifting yoke and

^ 4.6 designed with a dual or auxiliary device or canister vertical lift fixture are Lifting combinations thereof. Each designed or selected to designed in accordance with the Devices support a load of 3Xs the load (static & dynamic) requirements of 5.1.1(4) and 5.1.6 of being handled without permanent deformation. NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6 for critical lifts. This design is not part of the L-3 crane modification.

If side loads cannot be avoided, the reeving system In the event of excessive off center lift, the 4.7 should be equipped with a guard that would keep the X-SAM Wire Rope Spooling Monitor senses the Wire Rope wire rope properly located in the grooves on the drum. improper spooling of the wire rope before damage can Protection occur. The Monitor actuates the Failure Detection System, requiring a controlled key be used to restart the crane. Palisades' specific procedure was revised to prevent side loads.

4.8 The proper functioning of the hoisting machinery Component parts and the welds or bolting were 4.8 during load handling ensured by providing adequate designed in accordance with CMAA Spec. #70. These Machinery support strength of the individual component parts design calculations demonstrating compliance are Alignment and the welds or bolting. summarized in Enclosure 2.

Page 13 of 24

• SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES Where gear trains are interposed between the holding Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their The conventional holding brake 4.8 brakes & the hoisting drum, these gears should be acceptance of EDR-1. system located on the high speed Machinery single-failure-proof & of dual design shafting is fail safe since the failure of Alignment any component between the holding (continued) brake and the hoisting drum would be detected by the failure detection system, which would set the emergency drum brake.

(USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983, Safety Evaluation Report for EDR- 1, Rev. 3.)

Each holding brake a minimum brake capacity of The holding brake has been designed with a minimum 125% of the torque developed .... at the point of brake capacity of 150% of the torque developed during the application, but not excessive capacity that could hoisting operation at the point of brake application.

cause damage through sudden stopping Mechanical holding brakes in the hoisting system X-SAM's Hoist Failure Detection System detects a (raising and lowering) that are automatically activated main hoist drum overspeed condition. Since drum when electric power is off or mechanically tripped by overspeed can occur only if there has been a control

. overspeed or overload devices ... ensure that a critical malfunction or a mechanical failure in the drive train.

4.9

• load will be safely held or controlled incase of failure Holding brake in the hoisting system applied when Hoist Braking ......... hoisting machinery. electric power is off or when a motor overspeed occurs.

System Conventional high speed holding braking is provided on the high speed shafting to hold the load during normal operation. Redundancy in the high speed holding braking isnot required since the Emergency Drum Brake provides single-failure-proof braking for the X-SAM design. The HIPS protects against hoist control system failures, including inability to remove power.

Minimum hoisting braking system should include one The main hoist power control system utilizes dynamic

• power control braking system (not mechanical or drag braking resistors in addition to the holding brake and

,____________ brake type) emergency brakes.

Page 14 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES Minimum hoisting braking system should include Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their Conventional high speed holding

....... .twoholding brakes. acceptance of EDR-1. braking is provided on the high speed shafting. Redundancy is not required since the Emergency Drum Brake provides single-failure-proof braking.

(USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983, Safety Evaluation Report for EDR- 1, Rev. 3.)

Minimum number of braking systems that should be Only the Emergency Drum Brake System, having more operable for emergency lowering after a single brake capability than two holding brakes combined, is failure should be two holding brakes for stopping and operable following a drive train failure. Indication of controlling drum rotation drum lowering speed, which does not require power, is 4.9 provided. This system is capable of continuously Hoist Braking lowering the rated load from the maximum hook height System without exceeding the temperature limits of the brakes.

(continued) Holding brake system should be single-failure-proof; The conventional holding brake system located on the any component or gear train should be dual if high speed shafting is fail safe since the failure of any interposed between the holding brakes & hoist drum component between the holding brake and the hoisting drum would be detected by the failure detection system, which would set the emergency drum brake.

Dynamic and static alignment of all hoisting Component parts and the welds or bolting were machinery components ...... range of lifted loads ... designed in accordance with CMAA Spec. #70, positioned and anchored on the trolley platform. including for seismic design. Calculations listed in Enclosure 2 demonstrate compliance with this requirement.

Provisions for manual operation of the hoisting brakes Manual control station, to safely lower the rated load during an emergency condition. without electrical power, is located on the trolley

.________________________________________________ platform.

Adequate heat dissipation from the brake - preclude Emergency Drum Brake System capable of continuous damage from excessive lowering velocity. lowering of the rated load without exceeding the brake temperature limits.

Portable instruments to indicate the lowering speed Indication of drum lowering speed, which does not during emergency operations. require power, is provided. Manual operation during emergency operation is performed at trolley. Visual indication is provided by observing the drum during lowering.

Page 15 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 0554 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

4.9 Malfunction of a holding brake during emergency The Emergency Drum Brake (EDB) is required to

-Hoist Braking lowering of the load - restore brake to working safely control the load during emergency lowering System condition before any lowering is started. operations. The EDB is independent of the manual (continued) holding brake.

Bridge & trolley drives provided with control and Bridge & Trolley AC drive motors provide control holding braking systems ... applied when power off. braking. Holding brakes are automatically applied

.______________________________________ .when the power is off.

Bridge & trolley drives provided with control and Overspeed switches, which actuate the brakes, are holding braking systems ... applied on overspeed. provided for the trolley and bridge drives.

5.1 Bridge & trolley drives provided with control and Bridge & Trolley drive brakes will set automatically on Braking holding braking systems ... applied on overload. tripping of the overload relay. Drive units will trip on Capacity _____________ __ motor overload, which actuates the brakes.

Maximum torque capability of the driving motor & The bridge and trolley brakes are integral with the gear reducer .... not exceed the capability of the gear motors and located before the gear reducers. The train and brakes to stop the trolley & bridge from the torque ratings of the brakes exceed the torque ratings of maximum speed with DRL attached. the motors.

Incremental or fractional inch movements should be Provided with use of variable frequency speed controls.

provided by .............

Control and holding brakes rated at 100% of Bridge and trolley holding brakes are capable of maximum torque that can be developed at the point of applying a counter torque that is 100% of maximum application. drive torque that can be developed at the point of

. _______________________________________________ _ application.plication.

If two mechanical brakes, one for control and one for Not applicable. Only one mechanical brake is holding .... adjusted with one brake leading .... provided for the Bridge and Trolley drives.

Brakes mechanically tripped to the on or holding Brakes provided with spring set, electrically released position in the event of power supply malfunction. holding brakes that are automatically applied when

.___________________________________________ pow er is interrupted.

Provisions made for manual emergency operation of Bridge and trolley brakes include a manual release the brakes. lever to permit manual emergency operation.

Holding brake should be designed so that it cannot be Not Applicable. This only applies to a cab-controlled used as a foot-operated slowdown brake. crane. The L-3 Crane is radio controlled.

Drag brakes should not be used. Drag brakes are not used for the trolley or bridge drives.

Page 16 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS[REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 0554 __________________________________________ REFERENCES______________

5.1 Opposite driven wheels on bridge or trolley Not Applicable. L-3 crane bridge and trolley do not Braking matched and identical diameters. have opposite drive wheels.

Capacity (continued)

Trolley and bridge slow speed limits of CMAA Spec. Maximum trolley and bridge speed of 25 fpm, as given 70 for handling MCLs. in CMAA Spec. #70, Fig. 6.2 for slow speed 150-ton.

Mechanical limiting devices provided to control or Mechanical end stops installed for bridge runway prevent over travel of the trolley and bridge. (4 total) and trolley runway (4 total).

Electrical limiting devices provided to control or Trolley travel limit switches provided to prevent over prevent over travel of the trolley and bridge. travel. Bridge travel limit switches provided to reduce drive speed when approaching end stops.

5.2 -Buffers for bridge and trolley travel should be Compression bumpers, attached to the trolley and Safety Stops included at the end of the rails. bridge, are included for buffering contact with end of rail stops.

- Safety devices such as limit-type switches ... should Trolley and bridge limit switches are provided as safety

• be in addition to and separate from the limiting means devices, in addition to the end stops and bumpers. The or control devices provided for operation. switches are not intended for control of the bridge and

.____________ __________________________________________ trolley during normal crane operations.

Horsepower rating of the hoist driving motor 'eh......

design of the individual components of the matched with the calculated..... design load and hoisting system is based on the maximum torque acceleration to the design hoisting speed. capability (when hoisting DRL, at maximum 6.1 acceleration & rated speed) of the hoist motor.

Driver EA-FC-976-04 designs the hoist motor horsepower Selection . rating in accordance with CMAA-70.

Over speed conditions considered an operating Bridge and trolley drives have over speed switches, hazard. which actuate the brakes. Holding brake in the hoisting

_____________ ____________________________________________ system is applied when a motor over speed occurs.

. X Page 17 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES Controls capable of stopping the hoisting movement Exception previously accepted by the NRC by their While the controls are capable of maximum hoisting movement of 3 inches an acceptance of EDR-1. stopping the hoisting movement acceptable stopping distance. within a reasonable distance, the EATL (part of the XSAM system) will ultimately limit the maximum load that may be transferred through the individual components.

(USNRC letter dated Aug. 26, 1983, 6.1 Safety Evaluation Report for EDR- I, Driver . Rev. 3.)

Selection (continued) Prudent to include safety devices in the control system The X-SAM is designed to stop and safely hold the

. ..... to ensure the controls will return to or maintain a load for overload, overspeed, wire rope spooling, two-safe holding position in case of malfunction. blocking and drive train discontinuity. Electrical design Electrical circuit design includes the effects of phase reversal or loss of phasing in the hoist power supply, _

For elaborate control systems, radio control . an Not Applicable. An emergency stop button, "emergency stop button" placed at ground level to independent of the emergency stop remove power from the crane independent button on the radio controller, isnot required since an electrical disconnect switch already exists on the 649'

____________________________________________________ elevatio n.

For cranes with a DRL rating much higher than the Not Applicable. The DRL = MCL. The overload MCL rating ... electrical or mechanical resetting of sensing device was shop and field the overload sensing device, away from the operator tested.

cab and included in an administrative program.

Control system(s) provided should include Hoisting (raising and lowering) of all loads, including This was verified by the post consideration of the hoisting (raising and lowering) of the rated load, was considered in the design of the modification testing that the crane 6.2 - all loads, including the rated load. control system for the X-SAM single-failure-proof functioned as designed.

Driver Control hoist and trolley, and the bridge. Enclosure 2 provides Systems . summaries of calculations demonstrating the

____________________________________________ components design.

• Control system(s) provided should include The effects of the inertia of the rotating hoisting consideration of ...... the effects of the inertia of the machinery such as motor armature, shafting and rotating hoisting machinery ............ and drum. coupling, gear reducer, and drum were considered in

.______________________________________________ the design of the crane's control system Page 18 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 6.2 Control system adaptable to include interlocks that Auxiliary hoist, bridge and trolley movements are Driver Control will prevent trolley and bridge movements while spent prevented during operation of the main hoist.

Systems fuel elements are being lifted free of a reactor vessel (continued) or storage rack.

Means provided in the motor control circuits to sense Motor control circuits respond to excessive electric and respond to such items as excessive electric current, over speed, overload and over travel (limit

. current, excessive motor temperature, over speed, switches). Motor thermal trips address excessive overload, and over travel. motor temperature.

6.3 . .-

Malfunction ' Controls provided to absorb the kinetic energy of the From EDR-l, Revision 3: Improper rope spooling and Protection rotating machinery and stop .... if one rope or one of reeving discontinuity, Balanced Dual Reeving System the reeving systems should fail. and wire rope failure discussions are descriptive of the X-SAM's design features for malfunction protection.

Controls provided to absorb the kinetic energy of the X-SAM's Failure Detection System provides hoist over rotating machinery and stop . if over loading or an speed protection as a function of control failure or overspeed condition should occur. mechanical failure of the drive train. A load cell is installed in the hoist reeving to provide overload protection, and will set the conventional holding brake

_____________ on the high speed shafting.

Increment drives for hoisting may be provided by step The main hoist utilizes a three speed controller up to a

.6.4 less controls or inching motor drive. maximum of 3 feet per minute.

Slow Speed Ifjogging or plugging is to be used, the control circuit The X-SAM's control system design includes features Drives should include features to prevent abrupt change in to prevent abrupt change in motion ifjogging or motion. plugging is allowed Drift point in the electric power system for bridge or The X-SAM's control system design provides drift trolley movement should be provided only for the point for the bridge and trolley drive adjacent to the lowest speeds. low end of the controller movement.

. Safety devices such as limit-type switches provided Trolley and bridge limit switches are provided as safety These items were verified during post 6.5 for malfunction, inadvertent operator action, or failure devices, in addition to the end stops & bumpers. The modification testing (PMT) to be Safety Devices should be in addition to and separate from the limiting switches are not intended for control of the bridge and functional and meet design means or control devices provided for operation. trolley during normal crane operations. Hoist limit requirements.

. ^ switches are provided as safety devices and are not

- , intended to be tripped during normal hoisting operations.

Page 19 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 6.6 Manual controls for hoisting and trolley movement Manual controls for the hoist are accessible on the Control provided on the trolley, and for the bridge provided on trolley. Trolley manual movement is performed at the Stations the bridge. trolley motor, which is located on the trolley. Bridge manual movement is performed on the bridge at the

.___________________________________________ .bridge _ m otor overspeed belt.

Remote control for any of these motions should be Not Applicable. There is no bridge cab on the L-3 identical to those on the bridge cab control panel. crane.

Cranes that use more than one control station Not Not Applicable. The L-3 crane is operated by one

.^________________________._________________________ control station (radio transm itter).

In the design of control systems, provision for and The design requirements specified provisions and locations of devices for control during emergency locations of devices (manual, emergency stop) for conditions should be provided. control during emergency conditions.

Installation instructions should be provided by the The installation plan and vendor manual submitted by manufacturer. the vendor was reviewed for completeness in the 7.1 requirements for installation, testing, and preparations General for operation. Ederer provided Palisades installation plan and test procedures which where used to develop

.nclude a crane site specific installation and testing procedures.

Include a full explanation of the crane handling Ederer provided an 0 & M manual for the Palisades system, its controls and limitations for the system. X-SAM trolley and hoist. An explanation of the bridge

• .^_ drive controls and limits was provided to Palisades.

Instructions should cover .... Requirements for The functional test procedures were developed by installation, testing, and preparations for operation. Ederer and used as input to the Palisades test procedure. The O&M manual was used for preparations for operations. Ederer provided Palisades installation plan and test procedures which were used to develop site-specific installation and testing procedures.

Permanent plant crane is to be used for construction Not Applicable. This replacement trolley and hoist will

......... only be used during permanent plant service.

7.2 During and after installation of the crane, the proper This modification was an upgrade to an existing Construction assembly of electrical and structural components nuclear facility crane. The project quality plan and Operating should be verified. required verification of proper assembly of Periods components. PMT was performed to verify the

_______________________________________________ functionality and adequacy of the design Page 20 of 24

. SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES 0 554 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

The integrity of all control, operating and safety This modification was an upgrade to an existing 7.2 systems should be verified as to satisfaction of nuclear facility crane. The project quality plan Construction installation and design requirement. required verification of all control, operating and safety

-and Operating systems. Post Modification Testing (PMT) was

• Periods performed to verify the functionality and adequacy of

- (continued) the design.

- . A complete check .... Crane's mechanical and Proper assembly of the electrical and mechanical electrical systems to verify the proper installation and systems was verified prior to the site functional test.

8.1 to prepare the crane for testing.

General Information concerning proof testing on components Representatives from Palisades reviewed, and and subsystems . performed at the manufacturer's witnessed, the Ederer X-SAM's Shop inspection and plant . available for the checking and testing test.

performed at the place of installation.

The crane system should be static load tested at 125% The 125% MCL static load test was performed in The load (125% of MCL) was 8.2 of MCL, ... including all positions generating accordance with ASME B30.2 and per procedure. All prohibited from being transported over Static and maximum strain in the bridge and trolley structures positions generating maximum strain on the trolley the spent fuel pool.

Dynamic Load' 'and positions recommended by the designer and mfg. structures and bridge structures were included. Ederer

• Tests provided Palisades with test procedures that were used

._______________________________________________.to develop site specific test procedures.

- . After making required adjustments resulting from The crane handling system was given full performance The 100% MCL load was prohibited 125% static load test, 100% MCL performance test tests with 100% of the MCL for all speeds and motions from being transported over the spent for all speeds and motions for which designed. All for which the system was designed. Test included fuel pool.

safety and limiting control devices will be verified. verification of all limiting and safety control devices.

Emergency manual lowering of the load and manual Emergency manual operation of the hoist, trolley and

'movement of the bridge and trolley should be tested bridge was performed with the MCL attached during with the MCL attached. field testing of the crane.

When equipped with an energy-controlling device The X-SAM's Energy Absorbing Torque Limiter between load & head blocks the complete hoisting (EATL) was set and a two-blocking test was machinery allowed to two-block (load block limit and performed.

safety devices bypassed). Test, at slow speed and no load, to provide assurance of design, controls and overload protective devices. Demonstrate that the maximum torque developed by the driving system, including inertia of the rotating parts at the over torque condition, will be absorbed or controlled.

Page 21 of 24

NSECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES The complete hoisting machinery tested for ability to Exception. Per EDR-1, ll.B.L.a, the EATL is a 8.3 sustain a load hang-up condition ... load block The slow speed two-blocking test represents the worse protective device used to protect the Two-Block attaching points are secure to a fixed anchor or an case slow speed load hang-up. hoist from severe loads resulting from Test excessive load. Crane manufacturer ...... ensure two-blocking, load hang-up or other proper functioning of protective overload devices. loads. The EATL limits torque and acts as an energy absorber. The EATL was designed for two-blocking and load hang-up loads in EA-FC-976-27. Since the EATL will function the same in either case, demonstrating proper EATL operation and verifying proper EATL setting is all that is required. For ease of testing, EATL was demonstrated by use of a two-block test.

• Operational tests of crane systems performed to verify A post modification test verified the proper functioning the proper functioning of limit switches and other of all limit switches and safety devices.

. safety devices and the ability to perform as designed.

.8.4 Operational Test Special arrangements may have to be made to test Operation of the portion of the Drive Train Continuity overload and overspeed sensing devices. Detector (DTCD) that monitors the relative rotation of the high speed motor and drum shafts is verified in conjunction with the low speed two-blocking test. The drum overspeed is tested by uncoupling the detector shaft and manually rotating it to verify that the detector actuates the Failure Detection System. The Wire Spooling Monitor is tested manually and verification of actuation of the Failure Detection System.

Page 22 of 24

SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES With good maintenance practice, degradation is not Daily and monthly inspections. The inspections expected to exceed 15% of the design load rating, and incorporated the requirements specified by the periodic inspection coupled with a maintenance manufacturer of the X-SAM hoist and trolley. These program should ensure that the crane is restored to the were incorporated into the mechanical and electrical design condition if such degradation is found. surveillance procedures and/or periodic and predetermined activity control.

8.5 - The MCL rating of the crane should be established as The MCL rating (110-ton) is the maximum load for use Maintenance the rated load capacity, and the design rating for the of the crane. With rope inspection and replacement per degradable portion of the handling system should be ASME B30.2, and maintenance as recommended by identified to obtain the margin available. Ederer, the design MCL (110-ton) will be maintained.

Also, the safety features of the X-SAM provide the desired margin of safety needed to account for degradation of wear susceptible component parts.

The MCL should be plainly marked on each side of The MCL rating (110-ton) is marked on each side of the crane for each hoisting unit. the crane.

Not applicable to this compliance matrix in regards to the auxiliary hoist. The auxiliary hoist is not designed to be "Single-Failure-Proof."

.^ Crane designer and manufacturer should provide a An Operations and Maintenance manual for the crane manual of information and procedures for use in describes the preventive maintenance program based checking, testing and operating the crane. Manual to on the approved test results and information obtained describe a preventive maintenance program based on during the test. The manual includes such items as 9 the approved test results and information obtained servicing, repair and replacement requirements, visual Operating during testing. Include such items as . Operating examinations, inspections, checking, measurements, Manual requirements for all travel movements .... Clearly problem diagnosis, nondestructive examination, crane defined performance testing and special instructions. Operating requirements for travel movements were included.

The description of how to manually move the trolley

___ ___and ___ ___ ___ __ ___ bridge is in the Training M anual Page 23 of 24

-SECTION EXCEPTIONS/REMARKS/

NUREG.^

• NUREG 0554 REQUIREMENT L-3 COMPLIANCE REFERENCES The designer should establish the MCL rating and the The MCL rating (I 10-ton) is the maximum load for use 9 margin for degradation of wear susceptible of the crane. The allowed rope degradation margin is Operating component parts. per ASME B30.2. Ederer provided preventative Manual maintenance requirements, which provides the desired (continued) margin of safety needed to account for degradation of wear susceptible component parts due to the substantive safety features of X-SAM cranes.

A quality assurance program should be established to The licensee developed a project quality plan to include the recommendations of this report for the establish the requirements and responsibilities for design, fabrication, installation, testing and operation control of the design, fabrication, installation and of crane handling systems for safe handling of critical testing of the replacement crane. The license's Part 50, load. Appendix B program addresses these requirements as well as testing and operation at the site.

. 10 Applicable procurement documents should require the The requirements of the project quality plan and Quality crane manufacturer to provide a quality assurance NUREG-0554 were invoked in the procurement Assurance program consistent with the pertinent provisions of documents. The X-SAM manufacture also is required

. - Regulator Guide 1.28, to the extent necessary. to comply with the requirements of IOCFR50, Program to address NUREG-0554. Appendix B. The crane specifications require the contractors to comply with NQA-I and NUREG-0554.

Include qualification requirements for crane operators. Crane operators are qualified to the Palisades heavy loads procedures.

Page 24 of 24

ENCLOSURE 4 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST:

PALISADES' SPENT FUEL POOL CRANE UPGRADE APPENDICES B & C:

SUPPLEMENT TO GENERIC LICENSING TOPICAL REPORT 22 Pages Follow C,