ML032480800
| ML032480800 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/2003 |
| From: | Ernstes M Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch |
| To: | Rosalyn Jones Duke Energy Corp |
| Shared Package | |
| ML032521014 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269/03-301, 50-270/03-301, 50-287/03-301, ES-D-1, NUREG-1021, Rev 9 50-269/03-301, 50-270/03-301, 50-287/03-301 | |
| Download: ML032480800 (45) | |
See also: IR 05000269/2003301
Text
Final Submittal
OCONEE JUNE 2003 EXAM
50-26912003-301
JUNE 16 - 27,2003
1.
As Given Simulator scenario uperaror Hcrions ES-
D-2 % O U 7 L I d m
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 1
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: De-Lithiation with the deborating Demineralizer (N, BOP)
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Refer to OP/1/~l103/004 (Soluble Poison Control) Enclosure 4.26
(Step 2.6) to begin de-lithiation.
Perform 0P/I/A/1103/004, Soluble Poison Control, Enclosure 4.26
Place Deborating IX in service:
Review Limits and Precautions
Verify closed ICs-32 &37 (SPARE DEBOR IX INLET &
Close ICs-26 (Letdown to RC Bleed)
Open ICs-27 (Debor IX Inlet)
Open IHP-16 (LDST Makeup Isolation)
Verify IHP-15 (LDST Makeup Control) in MANUAL and
Position IHP-14 (LDST Bypass) to "BLEED
Record letdown pressure (contact NEO, Cue: 115 psig)
Wait 5 minutes
OUTLET)
open
qestore system per OP/1/A/1103/004, Soluble Poison Control,
Enclosure 4.26:
Place IHP-14 (LDST Bypass) in "NORMAL"
Close IHP-16 (LDST Makeup Isolation)
Reset IHP-15 Moore Controller for Normal Operation(LDST
Makeup Control)
Close ICs-27 (Debor IX Inlet)
Open 1 CS-26 (Letdown to RC Bleed)
Complete OP/1/A/1103/004, Soluble Poison Control,
Enclosure 4.26
u
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Nhen de-lithiation is complete or when directed by the lead
?valuator this event is completed.
Page 2 of 14
~
-.
Appenoix
..
D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 2
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: PZR Level #I Transmitter Fails HIGH: (I, BOP)
Time -
Position
BO
SROlBOP
SROlBOP
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Statalarms
ISA-2/C-3, RC Pressurizer Level High/Low
ISA-ZC-4, RC Pressurizer Level Emerg. HighlLow
Front board (IUBI) indications:
PZR Level 1 indicates 400
IHP-120 (RC Volume Control) throttles closed
Makeup flow decreases to = 0 gpm.
Crew response:
Refer to ARG:
Check alternate PZR level indications (IUBI and OAC) and
determine that PZR level 1 has failed high.
Check for proper MakeupILetdown flows and adjust to restore
proper level.
SRO should direct the BOP to take actions to restore normal
PZR level.
SRO should refer to PT/600/001 (Periodic Instrument
Surveillance) SASS Manual Operation and have the BOP
select an alternate PZR level channel on 1 UBI.
i/
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
When an alternate PZR level channel has been selected or
when directed by the lead evaluator this event is completed.
Page 3 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 3
Page 1 of 2
Event Description: Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATCISRO) (TS)
When directed by the Lead Examiner Group 2, rod #6 drops into the
core
Position
OATC
Applicants Actions or Behavior
u
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Plant response:
Statalarms
ISA-2/&10, CRD Position Error
Position Indicating Panel
API indication of dropped rod on individual meter
In limit (zero %) green light on respective dropped rod.
Loss of respective dropped rod out limit (100%) red light.
Amber 7 asymmetric lights on the dropped rod and the entire
group.
Diamond Panel indications
9 asymmetric lamp.
g
t
o
stabilize the
plant.
Acknowledge and verbalize to the SRO the most important Statalarm
received for the failure.
Verbalize to the SRO reactor power level and direction of movement.
. .
Recognize that a valid runback should be occurring but is not
because the ICs is in manual.
Refer to ARG for ISA-2/B-10, CRD Position Error
Inform SRO entry into AP/015, Dropped Control Rods is
required.
The SRO should use the OAC to monitor unit status
Enter AP/I/AJI 700/15, Dropped Control Rods
Page 4 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 3
Page 2 of 2
Event Description: Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATCISRO) (TS)
Position
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Direct actions per AP/OI 5, Dropped Control Rods.
1. Verify 5 one dropped control rod or misaligned > 9 (6%) from
group average.
2. Verify Reactor is critical
3. Verify runback to 55% FP in progress.
OATC should determine that a runback is not in progress due
to ICs in manual and initiate a manual runback as directed by
the SRO.
4. Initiate Enclosure 5.1 (Control of Plant Equipment During
Shutdown)
Notify WCC SRO to make notifications
Ensure 1A and 1 B MSRH DRN PUMP stopped
Place IFDW-53 and 1 FDW-65 (MFDWP Recircs) in
MANUAL and closed
Place IHD-37 and IHD-52 in DUMP.
Start the 1A and 1 B MFDW Pump's Seal Injection and Aux oil
pumps.
5. Notify I&E (SPOC) to perform the following:
Investigate cause of dropped rod
Prepare to reduce RPS FluxlFlow-Imbalance and RPS High
Flux setpoints.
6. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> verify > 1% SDM with the allowance for inoperable
control rod(s) by performing PTIIIAII 103/15, Reactivity Balance
Calculations.
7. Refer to TS 3.2.3 Quadrant Power Tilt (QPT) and 3.1.4 Control
Group Alignment Limits.
Verify QPT within COLR limit
8. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, ensure reactor power is less than 60% of the
allowable power per the RCP combination.
Note: The crew may elect to place the Diamond in Auto to let
the unit runback. However going to Auto is blocked by a
When power is being reduced with the ICs in manual this
event is comuleted.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 5 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 4
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: 1A.l RCP High Vibration: (C, BOPISRO)
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Statalarm ISA-9/D-2 (RC PUMP VIBRATION HIGH) will alarm.
1. The BOP should refer to the ARG
2. Verify RCP vibration conditions by using RCP OAC Display
Group RCP
3. Refer to AP/016, Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation.
Determine RCP immediate trip criteria are not met by
referring to Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria).
Since immediate trip criteria is not met then notify the OSM
and request an evaluation of the RCP vibration condition by
the RCP Component Engineer.
Statalarm 1SA-9/E2 (RCP VIBRATION EMERG HIGH) will actuate.
1. The BOP should determine that the immediate trip criteria are
now met based on Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria)
and inform the SRO.
2. The SRO should direct the BOP to:
Verify Reactor power 5 70%
Verify four RCPs operating
Trip the 1Al RCP.
3. TriD the 1Al RCP.
When crew has tripped the RCP this event is completed.
'L/
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 6 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 5
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: ATcfails HIGH: (I, OATC)
Position
OATC
Applicants Actions or Behavior
When the IA, RCP is secured ATcfails HIGH
Statalarm ISA-02/B-5 (RC Cold Leg Diff. Temperature High)
will actuate.
FDW flow will ratio based on the failure
A FDW flow will increase causing A
loop Tc to decrease.
B FDW flow will decrease causing B loop Tc to increase.
This will cause actual ATcto increase
Diagnose the ATcfailure by observing the ATcmeter on IUBI. It
should return to zero but is staying a + 3.5 degrees.
Take the Feedwater Masters to MANUAL and re-ratio feedwater
using the loop Tc meters to return actual ATc to near zero.
When the OATC has re-ratioed FDW and returned Tc to near
zero or when directed by the lead examiner this event is
completed.
--/
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 7 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Dp-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 6
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Second dropped Control Rod (Manual Reactor Trip): (M, OATCISRO)
Time -
-
Position
OATC
Applicants Actions or Behavior
After reactor power has been reduced and when directed by the
lead examiner a second control rod will drop.
Plant response:
Statalarm
API indication of dropped rod on individual meter
In limit (zero %) green light on respective dropped rod.
Amber 7 asymmetric lights on the dropped rod and the entire
group.
ISA-21D-10 (CRD Continuous Boron Dilute Permit) actuates
Crew response:
The OATC should determine that a second control rod has
dropped into the core by observing the CRD PI Panel and
MANUALLY TRIP THE REACTOR. OATC will attempt to trip
the reactor by depressing the reactor trip pushbutton.
Note: The reactor will NOT trip when the button is depressed.
After the reactor pushbutton has been depressed this event is
completed.
i/
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 8 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 7
Page 1 of 4
- vent Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)
Nhen the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
4TWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will be tripped and
CT-I (startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will
De restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground
path ar
Time -
__
-
__
__
CT-4.
Position
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Recognize that the Reactor should have tripped and begin
performing Immediate Manual Actions.
Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton
Veriw reactor power < 5% FP and decreasing
The OATC should recognize that Power Range Nls are not 5%
FP and perform Rule 1. (CT-24)
Verify that at feast one Power Range Nf i s S % FP.
Initiate manual control rod insertion to the IN LIMIT.
Open 1 HP-24 & IHP-25 (IA and 1 B BWST Suction)
Ensure 1A or 1B HPIP is operating.
Start I C HPIP.
Open 1 HP-26 & 1 HP-27 (IA and 1 B HP Injection)
Dispatch operators to the Cable Room and to the 600V Load
Centers 1x9 and 2x1 to de-energize the CRD System.
Notify the Procedure Director to GO TO UNPP tab.
-
L.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 9 of 14
-
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 7
Page 2 of 4
Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)
When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will be tripped and
CT-1 (startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will
be restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground
path and CT-4.
Time
Position
Amlicants Actions or Behavior
Transfer to the UNPP tab from IMAs and direct the following
actions:
Announce plant conditions
Verify Main FDW available.
IAAT all power range Nls are -4%
FP, THEN ensure the
turbine-generator is tripped.
Note: This action will result in a unit loss of power for = 35
seconds due to CT-1 lockout.
Verify -
all wide range Nls 21% FP.
Maximize letdown.
Verify Main FDW available.
Adjust Main FDW flow as necessary to control RCS
temperature.
Verify overcooling NOT in progress.
Ensure makeup to the LDST is secured.
WHEN all Nls are 4%
FP, AND decreasing, THEN continue in
this tab-
Ensure Rule 1 is in progress or complete.
ii
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 10 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 7
Page 3 of 1
Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)
When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and ai
ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will trip and CT-1
[startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be
restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground path
Position
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Perform symptoms check and when asked report no other
symptoms.
When power is regained on the Main Feeder Buses perform APll1
Recovery from Loss of Power.
9
IAAT Pzr level > 80" [180" acc],
THEN ensure Pzr heaters in AUTO
Verify load shed is complete as indicated by LOAD SHED
COMPLETE on an^ ES Module (Channel 1 or 2).
Dispatch an operator to perform End 5.2 (Restoring Loads
Outside the Control Room).
Dispatch an operator to perform Encl 5.4 (Actions to Restore
ESV System to Normal Operation).
9
Verify condenser vacuum maintained.
9
Determine the Main Feedwater Pumps have tripped as a result of
the loss of power and perform RULE 3 (Loss of Main or Emergenc!
FDW).
=
Ensure any EFDWP operating
.
9
Initiate Enclosure 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation)
Throttle Motor Driven EFDW as necessary to prevent
overcooling.
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 11 of 14
b
c
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
~~
~
~
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 7
Page 4 of 4
!vent Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)
Nhen the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
4TWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will trip and CT-1
startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be
- estored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground path
and CT-4.
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
When the turbine is tripped and power is lost:
Two possible paths
1. GO TO the Blackout tab per parallel actions page
In the blackout tab, the crew will: verify power restored,
initiate AP/I 1 (Recovery from Loss of Power) and transfer to
Subsequent Actions.
2.
If power is restored prior to transferring to blackout tab, SRO
will complete UNPP tab.
When power is regained to the 4160-switchgear use a
Parallel Actions transfer from the yellow page to initiate
AP/11 (Recovery from Loss of Power).
Determine that reactor power is 5 1 %.
Direct an RO to throttle HPI per Rule 6 and adjust Letdown
if needed.
3.
Transfer to Subsequent Actions
Verify all control rods are inserted
Verify Main FDW is not operating and ensure SG level are
This event is completed when EOP Encl. 5.9 (Extended EFDW
Operation) is initiated or when directed by the lead examiner.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 12 of 14
..
Aooendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 8
Page 1 of 2
Event Description: Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout, Unit Blackout: (M, ALL)
Note: When directed by the lead examiner Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout will
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout will result in a Unit Blackout.
1. Determine that CC and HPI are lost and initiate AP/25 (SSF
Emergency Operating Procedure)
The SRO will make a Parallel Actions transfer to the
Blackout tab.
Close IHP-31 (RCP Seal Flow Control) and IHP-21 (RCP
Seal Return).
Determine SGs are not being feed and dispatch operators
to the Atmospheric Dump Valves.
Note: Since the TD EFDW Pump is 00s no source of FDW is
available to the SGs until power is restored from CT- 5.
Notify SSF operators that feeding with SSF ASW is
requirea.
~~
Note: If RCS pressure reached 2300 psig the crew will initiate
Rule 4 (Initiation of HPI Forced Cooling). Because no power is
available to the HPI pumps the rule will be exited.
Perform Enclosure 5.38 (Restoration of Power) (CT-8)
1. Verify MFBl and MFB2 de-energized
2. Determine CT-1 has no voltage
3. Verify both Standby Buses de-energized
4. Verify all Keowee Units operating
Note: Keowee 1 emergency locked out, Keowee 2 operating.
5. Notify Keowee operator to give Oconee Control for Keowee 2
6. Close ACB-4 (Unit 2 EMER FDR)
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 13 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Ip-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 8
Page 2 of 2
tvent Description: Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout, Unit Blackout: (M, ALL)
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
IO. Close SKI and SK2
11, Place STBY BUS 1 and 2 SYNCHRONIZING switch in OFF.
12. Verify Standby Bus #I
energized.
13. Notify SRO Standby Bus #I
is energized.
14. Place the following switches in MANUAL:
MFBl AUTOIMAN
MFB2 AUTOIMAN
STANDBY 1 AUTOIMAN
STANDBY 2 AUTOIMAN
15. Ensure the following breakers open:
N1 andN2
E l andE2
16. Close S1 and S2
Note: This will power the Main Feeder Buses.
-~
This event and the exam are complete when plant is in a safe
configuration Le. EFW is restored or when directed by the
Lead Examiner.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 14 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2- Event No.:
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Low A CFT pressure (N2 makeup) (N, BOPISRO)
Time -
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
ISA-O8/A-11. CF TANK A PRESS HIGH/LOW will actuate.
Crew response:
1. The crew should refer to the ARG.
2. Refer to OP/1104/001, Enclosure 4.7 (Pressure Makeup To CFTs
Using Nitrogen) to adjust CFT pressure.
Direct an NE0 to open IN-I37 (CFTs Supply)
9 Cue: Time compression used to open IN-137. This is
used to speed the opening of the valve. It would take
time for the NE0 to travel from work control to the
Auxiliary Building.
When IN-298 (N2 Fill CFT IA) is taken to CLOSE or when
directed by the lead examiner this event is completed.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 2 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: -2-
Event No.:
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: IN-298 (N2 Fill CFT IA) fails OPEN (C, BOPISRO)
Time -
~
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1. Determine 1 N-298 has failed to close:
Red open light lit
CFT pressure continues to increase
2. Inform the SRO.
3. Direct the NE0 to close IN-I37 (CFTs Supply).
Note: If IN-I37 is not closed the CFT pressure will continue to
increase, possibly outside of TS limits.
- p G s k u c p e d
or when directed by the
lead examiner this event is completed.
n n
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 3 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2-
Event No.: 1-
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: 1 HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails closed (C, OATCISRO)
Time -
Position
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
IHP-120 fails closed during CFT pressurization. This will allow
OATC diagnoses of failure.
1. Diagnose 1 HP-120 (RC Volume Control) failed closed:
RCS makeup flow goes to zero
PZR level begins to decrease.
LDST level begins to increase.
Valve position demand for 1 HP-120 begins to increase to
the 100% demand value and valve position indication will
indicate closed (green light).
2. Refer to AP/14 (Loss of Normal Makeup andlor RCP Seal
Injection).
Determine Seal Injection is not lost
Determine loss of suction to HPI pumps has not occurred
and GO TO Step 4.6.
Verify % HPI pump operating.
Verify RCP seal injection flow exists.
Verify RCP seal injection or HPI makeup line leak is not
indicated and GO TO Step 4.10.
Verify all RCPs seal return temperatures are C 240°F.
Verify IHP-120 has failed and GO TO Step 4.183.
Perform the following as necessary to maintain Pzr level >
200": .
9
Throttle IHP-7 (Letdown Control)
9
Throttle IHP-26 (IA HP Injection)
Close IHP-6 (Letdown Orifice Stop)
When PZR level is being controlled manually or when directed
by the lead examiner this event is completed.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 4 of 11
-
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
-
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2- Event No.: 3-
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Controlling Tave fails HIGH (I, OATCISRO)
When directed by the lead examiner controlling Tave will fail high.
-
Time
Position
I
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1. ISA-O2/A-12, ICs Tracking, will actuate due to neutron and
feedwater cross-limits.
2. Controlling Tave will indicate = 596.4 F.
3. Actual loop A & B Tave will decrease until operator stops
4. RCS pressure and temperature will decrease
Crew response:
1. When the ICs TRACKING alarm is received, the candidates
should utilize the Plant Transient Response process to stabilize
the plant and recognize that the controlling Tave has failed. RX
will trip on variable low pressure with no operator action.
2. Verbalize to the SRO reactor power level and direction of
movement.
3. Place the FDW Masters in manual and stabilize the plant. Use
control rods and FDW to stabilize the plant
OATC
4. The SRO should:
Refer to AP/28, ICs Instrument Failures
Contact SPOC to repair controlling Tave.
When the plant is stable or when directed by the lead
examiner this event is completed.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 5 of 11
c
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2- Event No.: A
Page 1 of 1
Event Description:
Seismic event (PW)
1A RBCU rupture (C, BOPISRO) (TS)
c
\\ W'
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 6 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
1. ISA-9/B-9, LPSW RBCU A Cooler Rupture will actuate and RB
normal sump level will increase.
The BOP should refer to ARG for 1SA-9/B-9
Verify alarm is valid by checking RBCU 1A Inlet Flow and
RBCU 1A delta flow.
Verify ILPSW-18 (RBCU 1A Oultlet) open
Verify adequate LPSW flow is available; check LPSW pump
operation
Monitor RBNS Level for any unexplained increase (Notify
Chemistry to sample RBNS for boron to determine if a
cooler rupture has occurred).
Diagnose a Cooler Rupture is indicated and Isolate the 1A
RBCU Cooler.
2. The SRO should determine that isolation of LPSW to a RBCU
places the Unit in Tech Spec 3.6.5 Condition B (7 day
completion Time) and refer to SLC 16.9.12 (Additional LPSW
And SSW System operability Requirements).
Note: The control room will receive a phone call from security
that indicates that a tremor has been felt but no damage has
been noted.
3. The SRO may refer to AP/05, Earthquake.
Dispatch operators to perform plant inspections
Note: No damage will be reported.
- Notify SPOC to develop the Strong Motion Accelerometer
tape.
- Verify NO fuel handling activities in progress.
- These items may not be completed depending on how soon
the next event is started.
Note: Team may decide at this time to begin a unit shutdown.
Refer to event 6.
When the RBCU has been isolated, or at the direction of the
Lead Examiner this event is completed.
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 7 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: --
2
Event No.:
Page 1 of 2
Event Description: 16 SG Tube leak (5 gpm) (C, ALL) (TS)
16 SG tube leak occurs following RBCU isolation or when directed
-
Time
by tl
Position
ALL
-
lead evaluator.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1. The following alarms actuate:
ISA-8/B-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH
1SA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
2. PZR level will decrease.
Crew response:
1. Diagnose and take actions for a Tube leak in the 1 B SG:
2. Refer to the ARG for the following alarms:
ISA-8lB-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH
ISA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
3. Refer to AP/31 (Primary to Secondary Leakage)
Monitor primary parameters; PZR Level and LDST level to
determine that gross leakage exist and transfer to step
4.71.
Path 1 (crew determines that leakage is gross)
Using an RCS inventory balance, determine OTSG tube
leak sue is less than 25 gpm.
Path 2 (crew determines that leakage is NOT gross)
Notify RP and Chemistry
Common path
Determine leak rate using the OAC is 2 100gpd.
Greater than 25 gpm will require entering the EOP.
. loo
rea-ate)
When the SRO has directed a manual Unit shutdown or when
directed by the Lead Examiner the event is completed.
NUREG-1021, Drafl Revision 9
Page 8 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2- Event No.: --
6
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: 16 SG Tube Rupture ( 100 gpm) (C, ALL) (TS)
Time
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
1. Primary inventory should be monitored and when the leak rate is
determined to be > 25 gpm transfer to the SGTR tab of the EOP.
2. EOP SGTR tab will perform the following:
Determine that the Reactor is not tripped.
Maintain PZR level > 220 inches using Enclosure 5.5 (Pzr
and LDST Level Control).
> Open HP-24 and 25 (IA and 1 B BWST Suction)
> Close IHP-5
Monitor RIA-I6 (A MS Header) and 17 (8 MS Header) to
identify all SGs with tube ruptures.
Start the Outside Air Booster Fans on both Units 1 and 3.
Open and white Tag TB Sump pump breakers.
(CT-27)
3. The SRO should direct the OATC to begin a unit shutdown at a
rate between 9.9% per hour and 20% per minute (MAXIMUM
RUNBACK).
When the SRO has entered the EOP SGTR tab or when directed
by the Lead Examiner the event and scenario is completed.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 9 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: _c-
2
Event No.:
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Unit Shutdown (R, OATC)
~
Position
OATC/SRO
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
The OATC will use the FDW Masters and the Diamond to reduce
power while monitoring Reactor Power, Tave, and other plant
parameters.
If the reactor trips automatically the team must return tolMAs.
The BOP will utilize Enclosure 5.19 (Control of Plant Equipment
During Shutdown for SGTR).
1, NotiQ WCC SRO to make notifications
2. Stop 1A and 1B MSRH Drain Pump
3. Place 1 FDW-53 and 1 FDW-65 in manual and closed. (Located
on 1VB3)
4. Place 1 HD-37 and 1 HD-52 in DUMP.
5. Start the both FDWPs Seal Injection and Auxiliary Oil Pumps.
6. When Reactor power is 5 80%, stop 1El and lE2 Heater Drain
Pumps.
7. Transfer electrical auxiliaries
Place ITA AUTO/MAN transfer switch in MAN
Place ITB AUTO/MAN transfer switch in MAN
Close ITA SU 6.9 KV FDR
Close ITB SU 6.9 KV FDR
Place MFBI AUTOlMAN transfer switches in MAN
Place MFB2 AUTOlMAN transfer switches in MAN
Close El, MFBI STARTUP FDR
4. Close E2, MFB2 STARTUP FDR
When a unit shutdown of > 5% has occurred or when directed
by the lead examiner this event is concluded.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Pageloof 11
.-
ADDendiX D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2-
Event No.: 8-
Page 1 of 2
Event Description: 1A Main Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)
1A main steam line break will occur following event 7 as directed by
Time
the
Position
ALL
OATC
OATC
-
ad examiner.
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1. Statalarm ISA-OZA-9, MS Press High/Low, actuates
2. A and B main steam (MS) pressure decreases
3. Reactor trips.
RCS may saturate
B MS line pressure stops decreasing
A MS line pressure continues to decrease
Crew response:
1. The OATC will perform and verify IMAs.
Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton
Verify reactor power 5% FP and decreasing
Depress TURBINE TRIP pushbutton
Verify all turbine stop valves closed
Verify RCP seal injection available
2. The BOP will perform a symptoms check.
3. The Crew should respond to the MSLB in the 1K SG
4. The BOP will perform Rule #5 (Main Steam Line Break) after
receiving concurrence from the SRO. (CT-17)
Stop 1A MDEFDW Pump
Initiate both trains of MSLB isolation
Ensure both Main FDW pumps tripped
Steam 1 B SG to maintain CETCs constant
5. If SCM = 0°F then the OATC will perform Rule #2 (Loss of SCM)
after receiving concurrence from the SRO. (CT-1, CT-2)
Trip ALL RCPs within 2 minutes
Ensure open 1 HP-24 and 1 HP-25
Ensure ALL HPI pumps operating
Fnsiiw
n 1 HP-36 and 1 HP-37
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 11 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: --
2
Event No.: S_
Page 2 of 2
- vent Description: 1A Main Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)
Time -
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Verify TBVs available
Feed all intact SGs
Trip both Main FDWPs
Control EFDW as required to raise level to intact SGs to
proper setpoint per RULE 7 (SG Feed Control)
Place FDW block valve switches (1 FDW-33, 31, 42, 40) in
CLOSE:
Maintain SG pressure c RCS pressure
6. The SRO will "Parallel Action" to transfer to the Excessive Heat
Transfer (EHT) tab and direct the Crew's actions as follows:
7. Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) will be performed.
Diagnose that ES Channels 7 and 8 have not actuated.
Depress the ES Channels 7 and 8 trip pushbutton on 1 UBI.
Note: ES Channel 8 pushbutton will not work. This will require
the operator to manually start the 1B RBS pump from the ES RZ
module.
8. Excessive Heat Transfer (EHT) tab will:
Verify excessive heat transfer stopped
Throttle HPI to stabilize RCS pressure and maintain PZR
level > 8 0 (1 8 0 acc)
Feed and steam all intact SGs to stabilize RCS P/T. PT-11)
Minimize SCM using the following methods as necessary:
k De-energizing all PZR heaters
k Using PZR spray
k Throttling HPI
Initiate Enclose 5.16 (SG Tube-to-Shell A T Control)
(CT-7)
When the SRO has transferred to the SGTR tab or when
directed by the Lead Examiner the event and scenario is
completed.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 12 of 11
Appendix D
Operator Actions
Form ES-D-2
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: --
3
Event No.: -1-
Page 1 of 1
Ivent Description:
Operability test Keowee Unit 1 (N, BOPISRO)
Keowee Unit 1 Gen Field Flashina Breaker fails to OPEN
Position
..
tomatically (C, BOPISRO)
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Direct BOP to perform PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro Operation) to
operability test unit 1 Keowee underground.
Use OP/1106/019 (Keowee Hydro At Oconee) to perform an
Automatic Startup of Keowee Unit 1
Initial Conditions
1. Verify applicable Statalarms and breaker positions
2. Notify Keowee operator to give Oconee control of Keowee ## 1.
3. Review Limits and Precautions
Procedure
1. Place UNIT 1 LOCAL MASTER switch to START AND hold until
Keowee Unit starts.
2. Verify the following:
GEN 1 FIELD BREAKER closes
GEN 1 SUPPLY BREAKER closes
GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER closes
3. Ensure GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER trips.
Candidate should diagnose that the breaker did not open
automatically and should open the breaker manually and
initiate a work request or contact SPOC.
SRO should direct the BOP to continue with the startup.
Note: GEN FIELD FLASHING BREAKER automatically trips
5
45 seconds after receiving close signal. Failure of breaker to
trip automatically does NOT make the KHU inoperable. Startup
procedure may continue.
4. Determines KHU #I
is operable when test complete
Event is complete when operability test is complete or when
directed by the lead examiner.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 2 of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: --
3
Event No.: -2-
Page 1 of 2
!vent Description:
A HPI Pump sheared shaft and the standby HPI pump fails to
auto start: (C, OATC)
Position
OATC
OATC
Aoolicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Statalarms:
1SA-2/B-2 (HP RCP Seal Injection Flow HighlLow)
ISA-2/C-2 (HP Injection Pump Disch. Header Pressure
High/Low)
Board indications:
RC Makeup Flow = 0 gpm
1A HPI Pump = 0 amps
PZR level will begin to decrease and LDST level will begin to
increase.
Crew response:
1. Refer to ARG for above Statalarms
2. SRO should refer to AP1014 (Loss of Normal Makeup andlor
RCP Seal Injection)
Verify no HPI pump operating
Close 1 HP-5 (Letdown Isolation)
Ensure IHP-120 (RC Volume Control) in HAND and closed
Place IHP-31 (RCP Seal Flow Control) in HAND and closed
Start standby HPI pump (1B HPI pump)
Slowly open IHP-31 in small increments until = 8 gpmlRCP is
achieved.
Re-establish normal makeup through 1HP120.
Reduce 1 HP-7 demand to 0%.
Close 1 HP-6
Ensure the following open:
> IHP-1
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 3 of 11
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: --
3
Event No.: A
Page 2 of 2
Event Description:
A HPI Pump sheared shaft and the standby HPI pump fails to
auto start: IC. OATC)
-
Time -
Position
. .
Applicants Actions or Behavior
3. Refer to Tech Spec 3.5.2 High Pressure Injection
Condition A
Completion Time: 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
Required Action: Restore HPI pump to OPERABLE status
Note: Due to sequence of events, SRO may not review the TS
during the scenario. Follow-up questions may be required to
ensure knowledge of this competency.
Event is complete when normal makeup and letdown is
established or when directed by the lead examiner.
NUREG-1021, Drat? Revision 9
Page 4 of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: -3-
Event No.: 3-
Page 1 of 1
- vent C
Time -
-
- criDtion
Controllina NI fails LOW (I. OATC) (TS)
Position
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Statalarm 1SA-2/A-12 (ICs Tracking)
Diamond will transfer to MANUAL, because indicated reactor
power is 1.5%.
Tave will increase and actual reactor power will decrease.
Crew response:
1. Crew should use "Plant Transient Response" to stabilize the plant
by placing both FDW Masters in MANUAL.
2. Adjust CR and FDW as required to stabilize the plant.
3. SRO should refer to AP/028 (ICs Instrument Failures) and
PT/600/001 (Periodic Instrument Surveillance).
4. SRO should refer to TS 3.3.1 (RPS Instrumentation)
Event is complete when plant is stable or when directed by the
lead examiner.
b
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page5of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: -3-
Event No.: A
Page 1 of 1
=vent Description:
-
Loss of Instrument Air (C, BOP)
Time -
-
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Statalarm 1SA-4/C-5 (Aux Bldg Air HDR PR Low) activates
IA pressure decreasing on Aux and Turb Building gauges located
on 1UB2.
Crew response:
1. Refer to ARG for 1 SA-4/C-5.
Start Primary IA Compressor
Send NE0 to start all backup IA compressors
Send operators to check fro IA line ruptures or open valves.
Refer to AP/22 (Loss of Instrument Air)
Using paging system, request that plant personnel stop using
service and IA.
2. AP/22 (Loss of Instrument Air)
Direct Unit 2 to dispatch an operator to start the Diesel Air
Compressor.
IAAT Feedwater flow cannot be controlled, trip Reactor and
all Main FDW pumps.
IAAT two or more CRD temperatures are > 180°F, trip
Reactor.
Using paging system, request that plant personnel stop using
service and IA.
IAAT Aux IA press 5 88 psig dispatch operator to verify Unit 1
Aux IA Compressor is operating.
IAAT IA header pressure is c 80 psig and letdown is desired:
Place IHP-14 (LDST Bypass) to NORMAL
Open IHP-13 (Purification IX Bypass)
Event is complete when AP122 actions are being performed or
when directed by the lead examiner.
Page 6 of 11
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: -3-
Event No.:
Page 1 of 1
fvent Description:
Main FDW Pumr, trim and the turbine Fails to trip (C, OATC)
Time -
-
Position
OATC
L
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
.
.
. . .
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1A Main FDW pump trips resulting in a reactor trip.
The Main Turbine should trip but does not. This will result in a
reduction steam pressure in both SG until actions are taken to
trip the turbine. The will result in RCS overcooling until tripped.
Crew response:
2. OATC will perform Immediate Manual Actions
Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton
Verify reactor power c 5% FP and decreasing
Depress turbine TRIP pushbutton.
Verify all turbine stop valves closed
Note: The OATC should diagnose that the turbine did not trip
and then uerform the RNO steu which will stou both EHC
Event is complete when EHC pumps have been tripped or when
directed by the lead examiner.
Page 7 of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 3- Event No.: 6-
Page 1 of 2
- vent Description:
A TBVs fails open and IMS-17 (A TBV Block) fails to close:
-
Time
Position
OATC)
Aoolicants Actions or Behavior
Note: The A TBVs will fail open at the same time as the turbine
trip.
Plant response:
The A
TBVs will indicate full open. The B TBVs will be
throttled.
The RCS will begin to slowly cool off
A Main Steam line will begin to depressurize
rn
Crew response:
1. The crew may diagnose the TBVs failed open and with SRO
guidance try to control SG pressure by taking the TBVs to
manual. (This will not work)
2. After trying to control pressure with the TBVs in manual, the SRO
may direct them to close IMS-17 (A
TBV Block) but it will not
close.
3. An RO should initiate Rule 5 (Main Steam Line Break). (CT-17)
Close IFDW-315
Close 1 FDW-33 and 1 FDW-31.
Adjust 1B SG to maintain CETCs constant.
Ensure Rule 3 (Loss Of Main or Emergency FDW) in
progress.
Ensure Rule 8 (Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS)) is in
progress or complete.
Select OFF on the A MDEFDWP.
Ensure both Min FDWPTs are tripped
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 8 of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: -3-
Event No.: 6-
Page 2 of 2
=vent Description:
-
A TBVs fails open and IMS-17 (A TBV Block) fails to close:
OATC)
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
4. The SRO should make a Parallel Actions transfer to the
Excessive Heat Transfer tab.
5. Excessive Heat Transfer tab will:
If any SG pressure c 550 psig ensure Rule 5 (Main Steam
Line Break) in progress or complete.
Verify excessive heat transfer stopped.
Verify level in both SGs < 96% O.R.
Throttle HPI to stabilize RCS pressure and maintain Pzr level
> 100.
Verify letdown in service.
Verify B SG has an intact secondary boundary (intact SG).
Ensure open 1 FDW-382 and 1 FDW369.
Event is complete when Rule 5 is complete and Excessive Heat
Transfer tab is in progress or when directed by the lead
examiner.
L
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 9 of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: -3-
Event No.:
Page 1 of 2
=vent Description:
-
A SG Tube Rupture: (M, ALL)
Time -
-
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Statalarms:
1SA-8/A-9 (RM Area Monitor Radiation High)
ISA-8/B-9 (RM Process Monitor Radiation High)
ISA-8/D-10 (RM CSAE Exhuast Radiation High)
Board indications:
PRZ level and RCS pressure will decrease.
Crew response:
SRO should remain in Excessive Heat Transfer Tab and perform the
following:
1. Verify initiating Rule 8 (Pressurized Thermal Shock PTS)) is not
required.
2. Verify aux steam header being supplied from another unit.
3. Open AS-8
4. Close ISSH-1, ISSH-3, and ISSH-9.
5. Notify Chemistry to determine RCS Boron concentration.
6. Notify RP and Secondary Chemistry to check for indications of a
SGTR.
7. IAAT the following conditions exist:
ES Bypass Permit satisfied
All SCMs > 0°F
RCS pressure controllable
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 10 of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 3- Event No.: J-
Page 2 of 2
Position
Event Description:
Time
A SG Tube Rupture: (M, ALL)
-
-
Aoolicants Actions or Behavior
9. Initiate Encl. 5.16 (SG Tube-to-Shell AT Control)
IAAT any SG tube-to-Shell AT approaches either IimitTHEN
take appropriate action.
10. GO TO SGTR tab.
SGTR tab will:
1. Verify Reactor is tripped and Initiate Encl. 5.5 (Pzr and LDST
Level Control)
2. Start A and B Outside Air Booster Fans on Unit 18.2 and Unit 3.
(CT-27)
3. Dispatch operator to open TBS pump breakers.
Event is complete when TBS pump breakers have been opened
or when directed by the lead examiner.
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 11 of 11
~~
ADDendix D
ODerator Actions
Form ES-D-2
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 1
Page 1 of 1
Ivent Description:
That fails HIGH: (I, OATC)
Position
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Thot recorder dl 2°F
Tave recorder and digital meter increases to483"F
Loop A Delta T meter increases to 45°F
Loop A Tave meter increases to 488°F
Statalarm 1SA-2/B-3, RC Hot Leg Temp High, alarms
Loop A Thot Dixson meter reading goes to 6200F
Crew response:
The crew should use Plant Transient Response to stabilize the
unit.
Depending on when ICs is taken to manual, FDW flow may be
greater than 100%. If this is true, taking ICs to hand will allow
NI Power to begin to increase to match FDW flow. When this
occurs, the OATC will be required to decrease FDW flows to
stop the power increase.
SRO should refer to AP/28 (ICs Instrument Failures).
After the instrument is repaired the SRO should direct the
crew from AP/28 (ICs Instrument Failures) to return the ICs
tn ql&,
When the ICs has been returned to auto this event is completed.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page2of 11
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 2
Page 1 of 1
3p-Test No.: -
Zvent Description:
-
Time
=
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1. Statalarms:
ISA-2/C-1, LETDOWN TEMPERATURE HIGH
ISA-S/B-l, CC CRD RETURN FLOW LOW
lSA-S/C-l, CC COMP COOLING RETURN FLOW LOW
2. Control Board indications:
IHP-5 will close due to high letdown temperature
Crew Response:
1. Refer to ARGs
2. Initiate AP/020 (Loss of Component Cooling)
IAAT both of the following are lost:
k CCtoRCPs
> RCP seal injection
THEN perform the following:
k Trip RX
k Stop all RCPs
> Initiate AP/25 (SSF EOP)
IAAT 2 two CRD stator temperatures 2 180"F,
THEN trip RX.
Open ICC-7 and ICC-8
Thi; ev&d-hkdby
CC pump is started or
^.,
when directed by the lead examiner.
i/
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 3 of 11
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 3
Page 1 of 1
Event Description:
IHP-5 Fails closed: (C, BOP)
Time -
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
1. AP/032 (Loss of Letdown)
Verify CC in operation
Close IHP-6
Close IHP-7
Ensure the following open
Ensure IHP-120 in HAND and closed
Notify chemist RCS Born sample needed and normal letdown
line is isolated.
Position the standby HPI pump switch to OFF.
Throttle IHP-31 to establish 12-15 gpm SEAL INLET HDR
FLOW.
> IHP-1
> IHP-2
> IHP-3
> 1HP-4
Verify letdown temperature c 135°F
OpenIHP-13
Ensure 1 HP-8 and 1 HP-9&11 closed
Select LETDOWN HI TEMP INTLK BYP switch to BYPASS.
Ensure 1 HP-5 is open
Note: IHP-5 will not open from the control room or locally.
GO TO step 4.1 1
Verify 1 HP-5 closed
Close IHP-6
P-7
Nhen an operator has been dispatched to open IHP-5 or when
directed by the lead examiner this event is complete.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page4of 11
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 4
Page 1 of 1
Event Description:
Unidentified RCS leak in RB (20 gpm): (C, BOP) (TS)
Time -
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1. Statalarms:
ISA-9/A-6, RB Reactor Bldg Norm Sump Level HighlLow
ISA-8/B-9, Process Radiation Monitor High
2. Control board indications:
RBNS level increases
Pzr level will decrease very slowly due to the leak and IHP-5
being closed.
Crew response:
1. Refer to ARG for ISA-9/A-6, RB Reactor Bldg Norm Sump Level
High/Low
2. Refer to AP1002, Excessive RCS Leakage
Close ICC-I/IHP-I and 1CC-2/1HP-2
Verify leakage has stopped (will not)
Verify re-establishing LD is desired (it is not due to IHP-5
failing shut)
Ensure RB isolation valves are closed.
Verify unit shutdown is desired by Station Management
SRO should determine unit SD is required due to RCS leak
greater than TS limit.
Ensure unit shut down has been initiated in accordance with
one of the following:
Initiate Encl. 5.1 (Leak Rate Determination)
Ensure OSM, STA, RP are notified
Monitor trend of T6 AP02 for increases (OAC)
Verify NO leakage through PORV and close 1 RC-4
Identify leak is in the RB and GO TO Step 4.20
Place standby CC pump switch to OFF.
-88wn
is directed by the SRO
or when directed by the Lead Examiner.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 5 of 11
ii
L
)p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 5
Page 1 of 1
ivent Description:
Inability for CRD insertion in automatic during shutdown:
Position
OATC
OATC
Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior
r 8-
-
Unit shutdown per OP/l/All102/004 (Operation At Power) Encl. 3.2,
Power Reduction
1. Review Limits and Precautions
2. Notify OSM to contact NRC if required.
3. Start IA/IB MFDW pump Seal Injection Pump
4. Select HOLD
5. Select desired shutdown rate
6. Select desired rate of power reduction of RATE SET
7. Select CTPD SET power level
8. Release hold
Note: Control Rods will not insert in auto.
Plant response:
1. Neutron Error goes negative
2. Tave increases
3. When Neutron Error reaches -5, unit will go to track and Statalarm
ISA-2/A-12 (ICs Tracking) will actuate.
Crew response:
1. OATC should determine that control rods are not inserting.
2. SRO should determine that a manual unit shutdown is required
and direct the OATC to place the ICs in manual and continue the
unit shutdown.
3. OATC should Dlace Diamond in Manual.
Event is complete when ICs has been taken to manual or when
directed by the Lead Examiner.
c
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 6 of 11
I
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 6
Page 1 of 1
Event Description:
-
Time -
Position
OATC
Manual CRD power decrease (R, OATC)
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
1, OATC will insert the control rods and reduce FDW flow with the
FDW Masters (if placed in manual) to reduce power.
2. SRO will direct the unit shutdown and continue in Power Reduction
enclosure of the Operation At Power procedure.
Event is complete when reactor power has been reduced 5% or
when directed by the Lead Examiner.
NUREG-1021, Drafl Revision 9
Page 7 of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 7
Page 1 of 4
- vent Description:
Small Break LOCA: (M,
ALL)
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
7ant response:
RCS pressure will decrease resulting in a reactor trip.
ES 1&2 will actuate on low RCS pressure, ES 3-6 will
actuate on high RB pressure.
RCS will saturate.
3ew response:
1. SRO should direct the OATC to perform Immediate Manual
Actions and the BOP to perform a symptoms check.
2. Once the SRO completes the Immediate Manual Actions he
should transfer to Subsequent Actions and ask the BOP to
report any noted symptoms.
3. When the RCS saturates, the BOP should inform the SRO that
the RCS has saturated and obtain SRO concurrence to
perform Rule #2, Loss of SCM.
Verify that reactor power is c 1%.
Trip RCPs within 2 min of LOSCM (CT-1)
Verify that HPI is performing as required. (CT-2)
& Open IHP-410
Note: BOP should determine that IHP-26 has failed to open
and open IHP-410.
Verify that LPI flow in any header is c 1000 gpm.
Verify that TBVs are available.
Disable AFlS in non-actuated channels.
Establish EFDW to the OTSGs to feed to LOSCM SP per
Rule 7 (SG Feed Control).
Verify both MDEFDWPs operating.
Ensure TDEFDWP is in PULL TO LOCK.
Trip both MFDWPs and close the FDW block valves.
Maintain SG pressure c RCS pressure.
Ensure Rules 3 & 8 done or in progress
BLotp- RnP -
that 1rnw-2-
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page8of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 7
Page 2 of 4
- vent Description:
Small Break LOCA: (M, ALL)
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Attempt to control 1 FDW-316 by placing in manual. (will
not control)
Notify SRO that Encl. 5.27 (Alternate Methods for
Controlling EFDW Flow) is being initiated.
Stop B MDEFDW Pump
Place 1FDW-44 controller in HAND and close.
Close 1FDW-42 and 1 FDW-382
Open IFDW-384
Close 1FDW-45
Verify 1FDW-47
Verify 1 FDW-45,l FDW-44, and 1 FDW-42 closed.
Verify 1 FDW-382 closed
Verify 1 FDW-384 open.
Start 1B MBEFDWP
Throttle 1 FDW-44 to obtain desired floe rate and/or SG
level per Rule 7 (SG Feed Control) (CT-IO)
4. The SRO should GO TO the LOSCM Tab per the Parallel
Actions page of the EOP Subsequent Actions section. LOSCM
Tab will:
Ensure that Rule #2 is in progress or complete.
Verify that station ASW is not feeding any SG.
Verify that the LOSCM is not caused by excessive heat
transfer.
Open 1AS-40 while closing 1 MS-47.
Verify all the following conditions exist::
P NO RCPs are operating
P HPI flow exists in both HPI headers
P Adequate Total HPI flow per figure 1 (Total Required
HPI Flow).
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 9 of 11
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 7
Page 3 of 4
Event Description:
Small Break LOCA: (M, ALL)
Time -
Position
OATC
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Control steaming and feed rates on all intact SGs to
maintain cooldown rate within Tech Spec limits:
9 Tc -
> 280°F -
< 50°F/ % hour
> Tc < 280°F
-
< 25OF/ % hour
GO TO Step 70.
Close 1RC-4
Close the following:
9 IHP-1
9 IHP-2
9 IRC-3
9 IGWD-17
5. GO TO LOCA CD tab.
6. When ES Channels 1 and 2 actuate, an operator should inform
the SRO that ES Channels 1 and 2 have actuated. The SRO
should initiate EOP Encl. 5.1, ES Actuation per the parallel
actions page of Subsequent Actions section or of the LOSCM
Tab. When running Encl. 5.1, the operator will:
Determine which ES channels should have actuated and
verify all Blue Lights and White Lightsare lighted for the
appropriate channels.
Place HPI in Manual.
Verify SCMs > 0°F and proceed to the HPI flow check when
he determines that the RCS has saturated.
The operator should determine HPI flow.
Open IBS-1 and IBS-2
Place LPI pumps in manual control.
At SRO direction secure LPI pumps.
Ensure A and B and 3A and 3B Outside Air Booster Fans
are operating. (CT-27)
Dispatch an operator to perform Encl. 5.2 (Placing RB
Hydrogen Analyzers In Service)
Notifv Chemistrv to oreoare for caustic addition.
-
The operator mist get CR SRO approval to exit this
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 10 of 11
lp-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: SPARE
Event No.: 7
Page 4 of 4
- vent Description:
Small Break LOCA: (M, ALL)
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
LOCA CD tab will:
IAAT BWST level -
< 19 feet transfer ECCS suctions to the
RBES.
Verify ES is actuated.
Ensure all RBCUs in low speed and LPSW flow 2 1400
gpm to each RBCU.
Initiate Encl. 5.35, Containment Isolation
Ensure all RB Aux fans are operating
Ensure all RCPs are stopped.
Dispatch operator to isolate both OTSGs.
Close ICF-1 and ICF-2
Initiate Encl. 5.36, Equipment Alignment for Plant
Shutdown.
WHEN CETCs are 5 400°F
THEN continue in this procedure.
Event and exam is complete when the SRO has transferred to
LOCA CD or when directed by the Lead Examiner.
4
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 11 of 11