ML031710506
| ML031710506 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/2003 |
| From: | Gumbert R AmerGen Energy Co |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| 50-289/03-301 50-289/03-301 | |
| Download: ML031710506 (58) | |
Text
W SRO Normal Evolution Component Failure RO Reactivity Change Instrumentation Failure Major Malfunction Instrumentation Failure Major Malfunction Component Failure TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario #I Rev 0 Secure FW-P-1A during Power Operations Dropped Rod Manual power reduction from 68-60% power.
Pressurizer Level Control le r Fai I ure Loss of Main Feedwater RPS Auto Trip Failure (AWS)
LOCA, with Loss of SCM.
HPI Pump Automatic Start Failure.
SRO INSTANT Scenario #I Page 1 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 31 212003 Scenario # I Rev 0 Pzr Level Controller Failure FWP Trip SRO INSTANT Simulator Scenario #I Quantitative Attributes LOCA HPI Pump Failure Total Malfunctions Dropped Control Rod I ATWS Malfunctions After EOP Entry LOCA HPI Pump failure Abnormal Events Dropped control rod.
Manual Pressurizer level control.
Major Transients EOPs Entered With Substantive Actions LOSS of Main Feedwater.
LOCA with loss of subcooling margin.
EOP-002, Loss of Subcooling Margin.
EOP Contingencies Requiring Substantive Actions EOP-01 0, Abnormal Transients, Rules, Guides and Graphs Critical Tasks RO Initiate manual reactor trip.
RO Trip RCPs within 1 minute following loss of subcooling margin.
SRO Transition from OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip, to OP-TMI-EOP-002, Loss of 25F Subcooling Margin.
Target 5-8 1 -2 2-4 I
-2 1-2 0-2 2-3 Actual 6
2 2
2 1
I
-2 Ro I
SRO Page 2 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario # I Rev 0 I As RO Reactivity Manual power reduction from 68% to less than 60%.
lnstru ment/Com oonent Fai I u res Simulator Scenario #I L
I 2
SRO INSTANT I - Pzr level controller I - RPS auto trip failure I Reqd C - Dropped control rod C - HPI Pump failure Major Loss of Main Feedwater LOCA, with loss of Subcooling Margin 1
Secure FW-P-1A Instrument/Comr>onent Failure As SRO I Normal Evolution 2
I
I - Pzr level controller I - RPS auto trip failure C - Dropped control rod C - HPI PumD failure I
Major Loss of Main Feedwater 1
I LOCA, with loss of Subcooling Margin Actual 1
4 2
I 4
2 Page 3 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario #I Rev 0 REVISION 0
SCENARIO CHANGE HISTORY PAGE DATE REFERENCE TITLE DESCRIPTION (Include AI # if appropriate) 5/12/03 N/A New scenario Page 4 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario ##1 Rev 0 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO u-This scenario provides the opportunity for the team and individuals to demonstrate ability to utilize normal, emergency, and accident mitigation procedures, and compliance with Technical Specifications requirements.
It exposes the examinees to operational situations that enable examiners to evaluate the ability of the crew to:
Perform normal operations (secure a Main Feedwater pump).
Execute a forced power reduction (due to a dropped control rod) with the Integrated Control System (ICs) in manual control mode, in order to comply with plant technical specifications and plant emergency procedures designed to protect against unacceptable core power distributions that could result in excessive core power densities and core temperatures.
Manually control Pressurizer level to maintain RCS inventory control following failure of an automatic controller.
Implement emergency operating procedures to respond to loss of Main Feedwater and Main Turbine trip concurrent with an ATWS (reactor fails to trip).
Prioritize operator actions to mitigate effects of a loss of reactor coolant accident that produces saturated liquid conditions in the reactor core:
Inject sufficient water into the Reactor Coolant System to prevent gross fuel damage due to overheating the reactor core.
Ensure Containment Building isolation to minimize radioactive releases to the environment.
Estimated scenario time - 60 minutes.
Critical Tasks 1 SRO Critical Task 2 RO Critical Tasks
'J Page 5 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario # I Rev 0 REFERENCES
\\/'
A.
10 CFR 55.45 Operating Tests, (a) Content (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (12), (13)
B.
PROCEDURES OP 11 02-4 OP 11 05-4 OP-1106-3 OP 11 05-9 EP 1202-8 EP 1202-29 OP-TM-EOP-001 0 P-TM-EO P-002 OP-TM-EOP-006 OP-TM-EOP-01 0 Power Operation (marked up copy)
Integrated Control System Feedwater System Control Rod Drive System CRD Equipment Failure Pressurizer System Failures Reactor Trip Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin LOCA Cooldown Abnormal Transients Rules, Guides and Graphs Alarm Responses:
G-2-1 CRD PATTERN ASYMMETRIC G-I -8 TSAT MARGIN A/B LO M-1-1 FW-P-1A TRIP C.
OTHER Page 6 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario # I Rev 0 Malfunction RD28 MU23C RDOI 17 FW156 MU16A b
SI MU LATOR I NIT1 ALlZATlON Description Activation Instructions Automatic Reactor Trip Block IMMEDIATELY MU-P-1C ES Start Failure IMMEDIATELY Dropped Rod (Group 7, Rod 1)
Event 2 FW-P-16 Trip Event 5 Line (A) HPI Leak in RB (downstream of venturi) 25% Severity on Event 7 A.
IC16 100% power, steady state, MOC.
Reduce power to 68% and stabilize the plant.
Transfer ICs to Manual:
Rx-Stm Gen Master FW Loop Masters A and B ICs Reactor Master H/A Station Secure all MOPS Start FWP auxiliary. oil pumps, LO-P8A and LO-P-86.
Reduce to 4 Powdex Vessels.
- 8.
C.
EVENT TRIGGERS None MALFUNCTIONS D.
REMOTE FUNCTIONS
- 1.
FWR34 Powdex Vessel A to Standby immediately (at 68% power).
E.
F.
OVERRl DES I.
02A5A06-ZAIRCILIC Set at 0 and assign to Event #M (fails MU-V-I7 auto controller so valve closes in automatic).
MONITOR Set MSK2609A = 21 5.7 immediately (auxiliary steam pressure).
Page 7 of 17
SHIFT BRIEFING w
NOTE: This sheet is to be provided to the examinees for review.
Reactor power has been reduced to 68% in preparation for removing FW-P-1A from service for maintenance (shaft coupling problem).
ICs is in manual due to OTSG-Reactor Master failure.
Plant is stable.
Xenon reactivity is rising.
Orders for the shift:
- 2. Maintain 68% power during FW-P-1 A maintenance activities.
Page 8 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario # I Rev 0 Event I Malf.
Event I
Event No.
No.
Type*
I Description I
URO I Page 9 of 17 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 ARO N
US Secure feedwater pump (FW-P-1A).
RDOl17 C
URO Dropped Control Rod in controlling group.
ARO c
us R
URO ARO compliance.
us ARO valve (MU-V-17).
Manual power reduction due to dropped rod. Technical Specification AI OVERRIDE I
URO Pressurizer level controller fails to 0% demand, closing makeup control I
us M
ARO M
US RD28 I
URO ARO M I 1 58 M
URO Loss of feedwater due to feedwater pump (FW-P-18) failure.
"ATWS - RPS Auto Trip Failure.
I us M
ARO M
US MU16A M
URO Small Break LOCA, Loss of Subcooling Margin MU23C C
URO High pressure injection pump (MU-P-IC) fails to automatically start.
ARO c
us
TMI Licensing Exam 511 2/2003 Scenario #I Rev 0 US Event No. 1 - Secure Feedwater Pump (FW-P-IA).
I.
1 Direct the ARO to secure feedwater pump FW-P-1A in accordance with OP 1106-3, Feedwater System, Section 3.5.
Examiner Notes and Actions URO ARO SRO Normal Evolution 1.2 Monitor plant parameters (ICs is in manual), and assist as directed.
Secures FW-P-1A using OP 1106-3, Feedwater System, Section 3.5:
1.3 Pos 1 Amlicant ActionslBehaviors ARO 1.3.1 Transfer FW-P-1A ICs control station to Hand.
ARO ARO ARO ARO 1.3.2 Reduce FW-P-1A load and pump speed while verifying FW Valve DP is maintained by FW-P-1 B.
When all load is transferred to FW-P-1 B, reduce FW-P-1 A speed demand to 0%.
Using the Motor Speed Changer, reduce FW-P-1A speed until the LOW SPEED STOP light illuminates, and the HIGH SPEED STOP light de-energizes.
Depress FW-P-1A Manual Trip pushbutton.
1.3.3 1.3.4 1.3.5 ARO 1.3.6 Verify MAP M-1-1 actuates.
I ARO I 1.3.7 I
Verify FW-P-1A TRIP Light illuminates.
ARO ARO I
ARO I 1.3.8 I
Verify HP and LP stop valves closed.
1.3.9 1.3.10 Verify FW-V-1A is closed.
Verify FW-P-1A TRIP light illuminates.
ARO 1.3.1 1 Using the radio, direct an A 0 to open CO-V-374A (CO-V-SA equalizing valve) to keep FW Pump warm and filled.
ARO 1.3.12 Close FW-P-1A suction valve.
Page 10 of 17 ARO ARO ARO 1.3.13 Open FP Turbine A drain valves.
1.3.14 Start FW-P-IATurning Gear motor.
1.3.15 Using the plant radio, direct an A 0 to adjust FW-P-1A cooling as needed, and to monitor lube oil filter DP.
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #1 Rev 0 Events No. 2 and 3 - Dropped Rod and Manual Power Reduction.
~~
Examiner Notes and Actions RO/SRO Component Failure -
Dropped Rod RO Reactivity Change SRO Tech Spec Compliance Pos Team us URO ARO URO us us us us us us us us Applicant ActionslBehaviors 1.0 Recognizes and announces dropped control rod.
2.0 Concurs with plant conditions, and directs team to perform EP 1202-08, CRD Equipment Failure, immediate actions for the dropped rod (Section B of the procedure).
Manually reduces reactor power to less than 60%. Since ICs is in manual, ARO assists with manual reductions in Loop A and Loop B Main FW Flow, FW-P-1B speed, and Main Turbine Load.
3.0 3.1 Assists with the manual Dower reduction in coordination with 3.2 Announces completion of EP 1202-8 Section 6, Dropped Rod, immediate actions.
Concurs with completion of EP 1202-8 Section B, Dropped Rod, immediate actions for dropped rod.
3.3 4.0 5.0 Supervises CRO activities to stabilize the plant.
Announces transition to follow-up actions of EP 1202-8, Section B, and begins directing actions.
5.1 Verifies rod group overlap between groups 6 and 7 is 25%
- 5%.
5.2 Obtains a computer printout of Nuclear Applications Software (NAS) displays 1, 4, 5, 18, and 20.
5.3 Notifies Plant Operations Management, Plant Nuclear Engineers and the dispatcher regarding current plant status.
Ensures compliance with Technical Specifications and Cycle Operating Limits Report (COLR):
5.4 0
Core power distribution limits.
0 Axial imbalance.
0 Quadrant power tilt.
0 Rod index.
5.5 Approximately 15 minutes after the plant is stable, obtains printouts from Nuclear Applications Software (NAS) displays
- 1, 5, 17, and 18.
Page 11 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #I Rev 0 Pos Event No. 4 - Pressurizer Level Controller Failure.
Applicant ActionslBehaviors Examiner Notes and Actions URO 5.1 Transfers MU-V-17 to Manual control.
I URO 1 1.O I
Recognizes and announces lowering Pressurizer level.
URO I
URO 1 2.0 Recognizes and announces 0 gpm Makeup Flow.
5.2 Manually opens MU-V-17, to terminate reduction in Pressurizer level.
I URO I 3.0 Diagnoses MU-V-17 closure.
I URO US 4.0 Announces entrance into EP 1202-29 Section D, Malfunction in Pressurizer Level Indication or Control.
6.0 Announces completion of applicable immediate actions of EP 1202-29 Section D, Malfunction in Pressurizer Level Indication or Control.
Concurs that immediate applicable manual actions of EP 1202-29 Section D, Malfunction in Pressurizer Level Indication or Control, have been completed.
6.1 5.0 Directs URO to perform immediate actions of EP 1202-29 Section D, Malfunction in Pressurizer Level Indication or Control.
US URO US US 7.0 Directs URO to manually adjust valve position as required to return Pressurizer level to normal (220 inches) and then to maintain Pressurizer level at 220 inches.
Adjusts valve position as required to return Pressurizer level to normal (220 inches) and then to maintain Pressurizer level at 220 inches.
Announces transition to follow-up actions of EP 1202-29 Section D, Malfunction in Pressurizer Level Indication or Control.
Directs performance of follow-up actions of EP 1202-29 Section D, Malfunction in Pressurizer Level Indication or Control.
8.0 9.0 9.1 ROs 9.2 Perform follow-up actions of EP 1202-29 Section D, Malfunction in Pressurizer Level Indication or Control, as directed by the US.
Page 12 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario # I Rev 0 Pos Events No. 5 and 6 - Loss of Main Feedwater, Turbine Trip, ATWS.
Applicant ActionslBehaviors Examiner Notes and Actions US RO US US RO Critical Task 1.O Recognizes and announces FW-P-1 B trip, Main Turbine trip, and ATWS.
Concurs with plant conditions, and requirement to manually trip the reactor in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-001.
Directs URO to manually trip the reactor and perform EOP-001 Immediate Actions.
2.0 3.0 Actions include announcement of EFW actuation on plant pagehadio.
URO us 4.0 URO (from memory) performs and verbalizes Immediate Actions of OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip, and the US URO 4.4 Verifies all 4 Main Turbine stop valves are closed.
performs concurrent verification.
I URO US I
I URO 1 4.1 Depresses the Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.
4.6 Announces to the Team that EOP-001 Immediate Actions have been completed, and Global Alarm Silence has been initiated.
Concurs that EOP-001 Immediate Actions have been completed.
4.7 I
URO 1 4.2 Verifies reactor is shutdown (power is less than 7%).
I ARO I
URO I 4.3 Depresses the Main Turbine Trip pushbutton.
I 5.1 Provides Team with Symptom Check Report.
RO I
1 4.5 I
Depresses the Global Alarm Silence pushbutton.
5.2.1 Does NOT announce transition out of EOP-001 due to the (negative results) symptom check.
Implements and reports successful completion of Guide 15, ERN Actuation Response.
6.0 RO I
US 1 5.0 I
Directs ARO to deliver Symptom Check Report to the Team.
7.0 Implements and reports successful completion of Guide 9, US I
US I 5.2 I
Concurs with Symptom Check Report.
RCS Inventory Control.
Opens the EOP book to OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip, to 8.0
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #I US ROs Events No. 5 and 6 - Loss of Main Feedwater, Turbine Trip, ATWS.
continue to direct trip response actions.
Directs ROs to perform remaining VSSV Actions in EOP-001.
8.1 Examiner Notes and Actions US US Reactor trip announcement should include announcement of ERN actuation if not already performed IAW Guide 15.
8.2 US announces transition from EOP-001 VSSV to follow-up actions.
US directs ROs to perform follow-up Actions of EOP-001.
8.3
!?PSI Applicant ActionslBehaviors ROs 1 I
Page 14 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #1 Rev 0 Events No. 7 and 8 - LOCA, MU-P-IC ES Start Failure.
Examiner Notes and Actions Examiner:
Log the exact time when MAP G-1-8 (red window) actuates:
SRO Critical Task RO Critical Task Examiner:
Log the exact time when the 4th RCP is tripped:
MU-P-1C will not automatically start an any ES signal, but will start manually from the control switch.
Pos us RO RO us RO us us us us RO RO RO RO RO RO RO RO ADplicant ActionslBehaviors 1.O Recognize and announce lowering RCS pressure, Pressurizer level, and rising Reactor Building pressure and activity levels.
2.0 Initiate implementation of Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.
3.0 Recognize and announce loss of RCS SCM.
4.0 Concur that loss of RCS subcooled margin has occurred.
4.1 Direct implementation of Rule 1, SCM.
4.2 Makes decision and announces symptom-based mitigation strategy to transition from EOP-001, Reactor Trip, to EOP-002, Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin.
RO performs actions of Rule 1, SCM, which are the Immediate Actions of EOP-002.
5.0 0
The US performs concurrent verification of EOP-002 Immediate Actions.
5.1 Implement Rule 1, SCM.
5.2 5.3 Verify the reactor is shutdown.
Trip all RCPs within one minute of loss of SCM.
5.4 Ensures HPI and LPI have actuated.
5.5 Ensures EFW has actuated.
5.6 5.6.1 5.6.2 5.6.3 Manually Starts MU-P-1C.
5.7 Verifies all HPI and LPI components are in the ES condition.
Recognizes MU-P-IC did not start.
initiates Guide 4 HPI Failure Initiates Guide 15, EFW Actuation.
Page 15 of 17
Examiner Notes and Actions IAW Rule 4, FWC, Section B, minimum required EFW flow is 215 gpm to each OTSG until level reaches 75% or SCM is restored.
poS Applicant Actions/Behaviors 5.8 5.8.1 Transfers EF-V-30AIBICID to manual.
5.8.2 Ensures OTSG levels are being raised to 75-85%.
Increases EFW flows to both OTSGs to begin raising OTSG levels to 75-85%.
RO Step 3.1 5 requires transfer to EOP-006 if HPI is required for RCS Inventory Control and SCM is ~25°F.
5.9 Announces completion EOP-002 immediate actions, with Rule 1, SCM, still in progress to raise OTSG levels.
IAW Guide 11, CDR Limits, there is no maximum cooldown rate limit in effect if ~25°F.
US 5.10 Concurs that immediate actions of EOP-002 have been completed (Rule 1 still in progress to raise OTSG levels).
US 6.0 Announces transition to EOP-002 Follow-up Actions.
US US 6.1 Directs ROs in performance of EOP-002 Follow-up Actions, including initiation of Attachment 1.
Announces transition from EOP-002 to EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown.
7.0 I
I RO I 8.0 With US concurrence, RO throttles EFW IAW Guide 1 1, US Cooldown Rate Limits - if SCM is restored.
I I
7.1 Directs ROs in performance of EOP-006 Follow-Up Actions.
Throttling should not be necessary if RCS remains c25F°F.
~
~
9.0 With US concurrence, RO throttles HPI IAW Rule 2, HPllLPl Throttling, and/or Rule 6, Pressurized Thermal Shock, as abolicable.
Page 16 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #1 Rev 0 c_l TERMINATION CRITERIA When all of the following conditions exist:
- 1.
Reactor is shutdown.
- 2.
HPI is actuated.
- 3.
- 4.
RCS cooldown in progress.
Both OTSG levels are 75-85%.
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION ALERT FA1 Loss of Reactor Coolant System Barrier or ALERT MA4 Auto SCRAM not successful, and manual trip from the Control Room was successful.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.5.2 4.7.1 Control Rod Group and Power Distribution Limits 3.5.2.2 defines allowed operation with inoperable rods.
Defines what constitutes an inoperable rod.
i,
\\---
Page 17 of 17
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 SRO Normal Evolution instrumentation Failure Instrumentation Failure SRO INSTANT Scenario #2 Switch Operating Condensate Pumps.
RCS T-Hot Instrument Failure.
Generator Hydrogen Gas Leak.
Component Failure Major Malfunction I
RO Reactivity Change I Manual Load Reduction to 850 MW.
Auxiliary Transformer Fault.
Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment Building.
L I Component Failure 1 Stuck Open High Pressure Injection Valve.
Page 1 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 ICs Controller Failures.
L HPI Valve Failure.
SRO INSTANT Simulator Scenario #2 Quantitative Attributes RCS T-Hot Instrument Failure.
Total Malfunctions RCS T-Hot Instrument Failure.
I 1A Auxiliary Transformer Fault.
ICs Controller Failures.
I Main Generator Hydrogen Gas Leak. I Steam Line Rupture Inside RB.
Main Generator Hydrogen Leak.
1A Auxiliary Transformer Fault.
Malfunctions After EOP Entry HPI Valve Failure.
Major Transients Steam Line Rupture Inside RB.
EOPs Entered With Substantive Actions EOP003, Excessive Primary-to-Secondary Heat Transfer.
EOP Contingencies Requiring Substantive Actions EOP-010, Abnormal Transients, Rules, Guides and Graphs.
Critical Tasks SRO Direct operator actions following OTSG isolation to prevent RCS heat-up and re-pressurization.
Termination of high pressure injection flow.
RO Target 5-8
~
1 -2 2-4 1-2 1-2 0-2 2-3 Actual 6
I 4
1 1
Page 2 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 As RO I
Simulator Scenario #Z Reactivity 1
Manual Load reduction to 800 MW.
failure.
C -Main Generator Hydrogen SRO INSTANT Transformer fault.
C - HPI Pump ES Auto I Req'd Gas Leak.
I - ICs controller failures.
Start Failure.
C -HPI valve failure.
InstrumentYComponent Failures I - RCS T-Hot instrument I C - 1A Auxiliary
~~
Switch Condensate Pumps I - RCS T-Hot instrument C -Main Generator Hydrogen 2
InstrumentYComponent Failure C - I A Auxiliary C - HPI Pump ES Auto failure.
Transformer fault.
1=2 c = 4 Gas Leak.
I - ICs controller failures.
I Maior Start Failure.
C -HPI valve failure.
Main Steam Line Rupture In Containment.
Major Main Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment.
I 1
1 Actual 1
1=2 c = 4 I
As SRO I Normal Evolution 1
1 1
1 I
1 I
Page 3 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 511 2/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 L
-..e-,
SCENARIO CHANGE HISTORY PAGE REVISION DATE REFERENCE TITLE DESCRIPTION (Include AI # if appropriate) 0 5/12/03 N/A New scenario Page 4 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 511 2/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO
'bi This scenario provides the opportunity for the team and individuals to demonstrate ability to utilize normal, emergency, and accident mitigation procedures, and compliance with Technical Specifications requirements.
It exposes the examinees to operational situations that enable examiners to evaluate the ability of the crew to:
Perform normal operations (switch operating Condensate pumps).
Implement annunciator response and normal operating procedures to stabilize the plant parameters and switch to a valid instrument following failure of a control system input signal.
Determine electrical load limitations due to low gas pressure in the Main Generator due to a Hydrogen leak, and execute a forced load reduction in order to prevent overheating the Main Generator.
Reduce power with the Integrated Control System (ICs) in manual control mode.
Use plant procedures to respond to loss of an Auxiliary Transformer during power operations, and verify compliance with plant electrical technical specifications.
Implement emergency operating procedures to respond to a major steam line rupture inside the Containment Building.
Navigate symptom-based accident mitigation procedures and prioritize rule based operator actions to mitigate effects of excessive RCS heat removal through the ruptured stream line following reactor trip.
0 Isolate sources of water to the affected OTSG in order to limit and terminate the overcooling event.
Inject sufficient water into the Reactor Coolant System to prevent loss of subcooled margin and potential fuel damage.
Prevent RCS reheat and re-pressurization following isolation of the affected OTSG.
Stabilize RCS system pressure and temperature to limit mechanical stresses in the dry OTSG in order to prevent potential tube failures (LOCA into the RB).
0 0
0 Estimated scenario time 60 minutes.
Critical Tasks I
SRO Critical Task.
2 RO Critical Tasks.
Page 5 of 20
REFERENCES A. 10 CFR 55.45 Operating Tests, (a) Content (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (81, (91, (121, (13)
L, TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0
B. PROCEDURE
S:
OP 1102-4 OP 1105-4 OP 11 05-6 OP 1106-1 OP 11 06-2 OP 11 06-8 OP 11 07-2A OP 1107-11 OP-TM-EOP-001 OP-TM-EOP-003 OP-TM-EOP-010 OP-TM-861-902 Power Operation.
Integrated Control System.
Non-Nuclear Instrumentation and Controls.
Turbine Generator.
Condensate System.
Hydrogen Seal Oil and Gas System.
Emergency Electrical - 4KV and 480 Volt.
TMI Grid Operations.
Excessive Primary-to-Secondary Heat Transfer.
Abnormal Transients Rules, Guides and Graphs.
Diesel Generator EG-Y-I B Emergency Operations C. ALARM RESPONSES:
AA-1-8 H-3-2 SASS MISMATCH.
L-1-6 L-2-3 GEN CORE MONITOR TROUBLE.
AUX XFMR 1 B TRIP.
H-2-5 RX OUTLET T-HOT HI.
GEN H2 SEAL OIL TROUBLE.
D. PRINTS 302-301 Generator Gas & Vents Page 6 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 SIMULATOR INITIALIZATION - IC41 Action Commentsllnstructions Description Xenon equilibrium.
Middle of Cycle (MOC).
Scenario support - TSO orders.
~~
~~~~
100% HFP, ICs in full automatic.
Initialization IC-16.
Control Console Main Generator reactive load.
Remote Function FWR(37)
Remote Function EGR14.
Adjust Main Generator automatic voltage regulator for +200 MVAR
- 20.
Places the 6Ih Powdex Vessel into service in preparation for shifting CO-P-INB.
Value: IN.
When: Immediately.
Value: CLOSE.
When: Immediately.
Closes valve G-07 to isolate Main Generator Hydrogen supply.
Severity: 100%.
Ramp: 300 seconds.
Event: 2.
RC4A-TE4 RC Hot Leg Temperature Transmitter Failure.
Malfunction N131 B.
Blocks ability to lower ICs Unit Load Demand from ULD Toggle Switch.
Value: OFF.
Event: 3.
Diaital I/O Override ZDllCSl MCS(4) 02A4A37-Value: OFF.
Event: 3.
Fails Rx Steam Generator Master Lowe Toggle Switch.
Diaital I/O Override ZDllCSl3MCS(4) 02A4A11-Value: OFF.
Event: 3.
Fails Reactor Master Lower Toggle Switch.
Diaital 110 Override ZDllCSl3MCS(4) 02A4A12-Event: 5.
1A Auxiliary Transformer Fault.
Malfunction ED02A.
Severity: 10%.
Ramp: 2 seconds.
Event: 6.
Main Steam Leak in RB.
Malfunction MS02A.
When: Immediately.
HPI Valve Fails As Is (MU-V-I6C).
Malfunction MU08C.
Define as MUVMUVl6C>0.99.
Activates Malfunction MU08C to stick MU-V-16C when the valve is wide open.
Event Triaaer 7
Assign to Monitor.
Main Generator Gas Pressure.
Monitor EGPHZPRESS Monitor Assign to Monitor.
Fractional rate for Main Generator gas leakane.
Page 7 of 20
EGKH2LOSS Monitor MSK2609A.
Assign to Monitor.
Value: 214.7 psia.
When: immediately.
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 Matches Auxiliary Steam header pressure to nominal value for normal operations.
Page 8 of 20
This sheet is to be provided to the examinees for review.
L SHIFT BRIEFING Reactor power is 100% with ICs in full automatic.
Due to current grid conditions, Dispatcher has ordered the station to maintain Main Generator reactive load at +200 MVAR +20.
Preparations are complete for removing CO-P-IA from service for maintenance (excessive shaft vibration).
0 CO-P-1 B will be started before stopping CO-P-1A.
0 All OP 11 06-2 Limits and Precautions are satisfied.
0 CO-P-19 has been fully primed and vented.
0 Seal water is lined up from the seal water head tank.
Six Powdex Vessels are in service.
Orders for the shift:
- 1. Switch Condensate Pumps IAW OP 1106-2, Condensate System, Section 3.3.2 (provide signed off procedure section, pages 30 & 31).
- 2. Return Powdex Vessel A to standby after shifting Condensate pumps.
- 3. Maintain 100% power.
- 4. Maintain +200 MVAR +20.
Page 9 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 Scenario Outline Simulation Facility:
Three Mile Island Scenario No.:
- 2 Op Test No.:
Unit 1 Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 6
Examiners Description Initial Conditions Turnover Malf.
Event Event No.
Type*
Description URO Switch operating Condensate Pumps.
N ARO N
US N127B I
URO RCS Loop A T-hot transmitter failure (high), affecting ICs T-Ave ARO indication.
I us C
URO Main Generator hydrogen gas leak.
C ARO c
us R
URO ARO us Manual load reduction to 800 MW due to ICs controller failures.
ED02A C
URO 1 A Auxiliary Transformer fault (Technical Specifications).
MS02B M
URO Main Steam Line Rupture Inside the RB with ESAS actuation.
C ARO c
us M
ARO M
US C
URO Stuck open high pressure injection valve.
MU08C Operators CRS URO PRO This scenario provides operational situations to evaluate the ability of crew members to implement plant procedures to perform normal operations (switch Condensate Pumps) and to respond abnormal and emergency conditions. While operating at full power, a control system instrumentation failure upsets the balance of plant control. After re-establishing plant stability, a hydrogen gas leak lowers Main Generator gas pressure, requiring a forced load reduction to protect the generator. Because of an Integrated Control System malfunction the load reduction must be performed manually. Following the load reduction, protective relay operation transfers loads off the 1A Auxiliary Transformer to 1 B Auxiliary Transformer and Emergency Generator EG-Y-1 B. A major steam line rupture inside the Containment Building causes the reactor to be tripped. Excessive OTSG heat transfer results in a core overcooling event, and ESAS actuation.
Following isolation of feedwater sources to the affected OTSG, crew members are required take actions to prevent RCS reheat and re-pressurization. RCS pressure and temperature are required to be stabilized to protect OTSG and RCS components from excessive stresses that could lead to material failure and fission product release. Control and termination of HPI flow is complicated by a stuck open injection valve.
Plant is at 100% power, with ICs if full automatic. Dispatcher ordered +200 MVAR e o. Ready to switch Condensate Pumps.
See Attached Shift Turnover Sheet.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)OmpOnent, (M)ajor Page 10 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 Examiner Notes and Actions Event No. 1 poS Applicant ActionsiBehaviors Switch Operating Condensate Pumps.
SRO Normal Evolution US 1.O Direct ROs to start CO-P-1 6, and then stoD CO-P-1 A IAW ARO US OP 1 1 06-2, Condensate System, Section 3.3.2.
Shift Condensate Pumps IAW OP 1106-2, Condensate System, as directed by the US.
Direct ROs to transfer Powdex Vessel A to standby IAW OP 1106-2, Condensate System, Section 3.3.2.
1.1 2.0 Booth Operator uses FWR37 to return A Vessel to Standby.
ARO 2.1 Direct A 0 to transfer Powdex Vessel A to standby IAW OP 1106-2, Condensate System, Section 3.3.2.
Page 11 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 511 2/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 Event No. 2 - RCS T-Hot lnstrument Failure.
Examiner Notes and Actions 1 poS Activate Event 2 to Fail T-Hot Instrument.
RO/SRO lnstrument Failure URO P I Procedural guidance for this is found in OP 1105-4, ICs, Section 3.6 (Level 1) and H-3-2 ARP.
If requested, Booth Operator ARO will use Remote Function ICR15 to clear alarm MAP H-3-2.
(7 minutes)
Amlicant ActionslBehaviors 1.O Announces unexpected alarm H-3-2 SASS Mismatch.
2.0 Recognizes and announces automatic control rod in-motion.
3.0 May recognize and announce elevated RCS T-Hot and Tave indications.
May transfer ICs stations to manual to terminate automatic control system response to failed T-Hot detector. 1 105-4, ICs, Section 3.3.
4.0 4.1 Balance plant parameters to establish stable plant control.
570 Verify validity of the alternate narrow range Loop A T-Hot instrument using Plant Process Computer.
Manually select valid narrow range Loop A T-Hot signal for ind icationkontrol.
If applicable, transfers ICs back to automatic mode of control. 11 05-4, ICs, Section 3.3, Placing and Operation of the ICs in Manual and Return to Auto.
Place an EDT sticker on the selector pushbutton for the failed instrument.
Dispatch personnel to the Relay Room to operate local controls to:
0 Clear H-3-2 annunciator.
0 6.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 Defeat the failed instrument input to MAP H-3-2 (optional).
Page 12 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 Events No. 3 and 4 Respond to Main Generator Hydrogen Leak.
Forced Load Reduction (In Manual)
Examiner Notes and Actions 300th Operator -
Monitor EGPHZPRESS.
Set EGKHZLOSS TO 0.03 Afhen Hydrogen pressure reduces to 40 psig, return EGKHPLOSS to 5.79E-05.
Then, immediately report over the radio:
2 You responded to noise at the Main Generator Hydrogen Control Panel, and isolated a hydrogen gas leak by:
o Closing valve HG-V-GO2 m Turning valve HG-V-GO1 to C02 position (CCW).
H2 gas leakage has been terminated.
Pos us ARO us RO us URO URO us URO URO (15 minutes)
Amlicant Actions/Behaviors 1.O Direct ROs to refer to ARP to resoond to MAP L-1-6 GEN H2 SEAL OIL TROUBLE.
Refer to ARP for MAP L-1-6.
Dispatch an A 0 to determine cause for local alarm.
Using OP 1 106-1 Figure B-2B, Generator Reactive Capability Curve, determine maximum permissible generator load for 40 psig at +200 MVAR.
Direct ROs to reduce generator load to approximately 850 MW at
%/minute, while maintaining +200 MVAR +20.
1.I I
.2 2.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 Attempt to reduce ICs Unit Load Demand to 850 MW.
Recognize and announce ICs controller failure.
~~
3.3 Direct ROs to reduce load with ICs in manual.
3.3.1 3.4 Transfer Steam Generator - Reactor Master to manual.
Recognize and announce Stm Gen-Rx Master controller Page 13 of 20
k Examiner Notes and Actions poS Applicant ActionslBehaviors failure.
Transfer DTC, Loop A and Loop FW Masters, Reactor Master to manual.
URO 3.4.1 URO I 3.5 Recognize and announce Reactor Master controller failure.
I RO Reactivity Evolution I
URO I 3.5.1 Transfer Diamond Control Panel to manual.
I URO 3.3.2 ARO the US.
ARO 3.3.3 Adjust Automatic Voltage Regulator Setpoint as required to Manually reduce plant load to 850 MW at rate specified by maintain +200 MVAR QO.
Page 14 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 9 1 2/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 Pos Applicant ActionslBehaviors Event No. 5 - I A Auxiliary Transformer Fault.
US RO Examiner Notes and Actions Activate Event 5.
1.O Recognize and announce loss of Auxiliary Transformer IA, and loss of #8 230 KV Bus.
US RO 2.0 Perform and verify Immediate Manual Actions for the following Emergency Procedures:
US RO US RO US RO US RO US 2.1 1203-15, Loss of Makeup/RCP Seal Injection.
0 0
Isolate Makeup and SI.
Determine cause for loss of MUISI.
2.1.I Significant Follow-Up Actions:
Start MU-P-1A.
0 Re-establish RCP Seal Injection.
0 Re-establish RCS Makeup.
1202-38, NS River Water Failure.
0 May close NR-V-1A.
0 May match flags.
2.2 2.3 1203-20, NSCC Failure.
0 May match flags.
1203-1 9, RW Systems Failure DWSR.
0 May SR match flags.
May direct efforts to respond to loss of 1A Auxiliary Transformer IAW MAP AA-1-7.
2.2 2.0 ROs 2.0.1 Verify automatic actions:
0 0
230 KV Breakers open to de-energize 1A Auxiliary Transformer.
Fast Transfer to 1 B Auxiliary Transformer 0
IA7KVBus.
0 IA, 1B4KV BUS.
1 E 4KV ES Bus re-energized by emergency diesel 0
generator EG-Y-1 B.
Page 15 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 W
L Events No. 6 and 7 - Main Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment.
High Pressure Injection Valve Sticks Open.
Examiner Notes and Actions Activate Event 6.
Excessive primary to secondary heat transfer may be diagnosed during performance of the reactor trip EP immediate actions. If so. then Steps A - D here will be performed during (in parallel with) EOP-001 immediate actions.
Pos us RO us us URO us URO URO ARO ARO us ARO URO URO URO (16 minutes)
Applicant ActionslBehaviors 1.O Recognize and announce lowering RCS pressure, Pressurizer level, and rising Reactor Building pressure and activity levels.
Concurs with plant conditions, and requirement to manually trip the reactor in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-001.
Directs URO to manually trip the reactor and perform EOP-001 Immediate Actions.
URO (from memory) performs and verbalizes Immediate Actions of OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip, and the US performs concurrent verification.
2.0 3.0 4.0 4.1 Depresses the Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.
4.2 Verifies reactor is shutdown (power is less than 7%).
A.
May recognize and declare excessive primary-to-secondary heat transfer, and announce applicability of Rule 3, XHT.
B.
Manually reduce Main FW Flow to the OTSGs (RN Loop Masters are in Hand at time of reactor trip).
C.
Concurs with excessive primary-to-secondary heat transfer, and applicability of Rule 3, XHT.
D.
initiates Rule 3, XHT.
4.3 4.4 4.5 Actuates Global Silence.
4.5 Depresses the Main Turbine Trip pushbutton.
Verifies all 4 Main Turbine stop valves are closed.
Announces to the Team that EOP-001 Immediate Actions have been completed, and that Global Silence has been initiated.
Page 16 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 Events No. 6 and 7 - Main Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment.
Pos High Pressure Injection Valve Sticks Open.
Applicant ActionslBehaviors Examiner Notes and Actions US US ARO RO will actually need to terminate HPI, since there is no RCS leak.
4.6 Concurs that EOP-001 Immediate Actions have been completed, and acknowledges initiation of Global Silence.
Requests ARO to deliver Symptom Check Report to the Team.
Provides Team with Symptom Check Report, identifying excessive primary-to-secondary heat transfer, and implementation of Rule 3, XHT.
5.0 5.1 The only way to terminate flow through MU-V-16C is to stop MU-P-lC, either at this point or at Step 7.2.4 below.
US 5.2 Concurs with Symptom Check Report. Announces transition from EOP-001, Reactor Trip, to EOP-003, Excessive Primary-to-Secondary Heat Transfer.
US RO RO 6.0 Directs operator actions to perform immediate actions of EOP-003, Excessive Primary-to-Secondary Heat Transfer..
Implement Rule 3, XHT (may already implemented as described earlier).
Initiate Guide 9, RCS Inventory.
6q1 6.2 US US RO US RO 7.0 Direct both ROs to implement Guide 12, Stabilization following OTSG Isolation.
Direct RO to adjust OTSG 16 pressure to prevent RCS heatup following isolation of OTSG 1A Reduce OTSG pressure to prevent RCS reheat and re-pressurization due to coolant expansion, as directed by US.
Direct RO to throttleherminate HPI IAW Rule 2, LPVHPI Throttling.
Bypass and defeat Train A and B ESAS actuation signals to gain control of ES equipment.
7.1 7.1.1 7.2 7.2.1 RO I
7.2.2 Reduce HPI flow to prevent RCS re-pressurization due refill, as directed by the US.
7.2.2.1 Recognize and announce that MU-V-16C is stuck open.
Page 17 of 20
Examiner Notes and Actions poS Awlicant ActionslBehaviors
-~
RO 7.2.3 Open MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 (minimum recirc valves) prior to reducing HPI flow below 115 gpm per operating pump.
RO 7.2.4 Stop MU-P-IC, allowing MU-P-1A to continue to operate to provide RCP seal Injection and RCS makeup flow.
RO 7.2.5 Dispatch and A 0 to manually close MU-V-16C.
US 7.3 May close MU-V-14A and MU-V-14B to isolate MU-P-1B RO suction from the BWST when the Makeup Tank level is >55 inches (IAW Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control).
-..-.a US RO Should not apply to current conditions.
7.4 Review Rule 6, PTS, for applicability.
US RO US Should not apply to current conditions - not being fed.
7.5 Review Guide 13, Dry OTSG, for applicability.
7.6 Review Guide 14, TSDT Limit Guide, for applicability.
Should not apply to current conditions.
RO Required if RB Pressure >2 psig.
7.7 Implement and announce successful completion of Guide 15, EFW Actuation.
Required if RB Pressure >2 psig.
US Scenario can be terminated.
9.0 Direct RO actions to complete EOP-003 Follow-up Actions.
RO 9.2.1 Initiate OP-TM-534-901, Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Operations if RB pressure, as directed by the US.
I US I 8.0 I
Announce transition to EOP-003 Follow-up Actions.
US 9.0 Direct RO actions to complete EOP-001 VSSV actions.
I RO I 9.1 I
Perform EOP-003 Follow-up Actions as directed by the US.
US I
US I 9.2 May direct RO to initiate OP-TM-534-901, Reactor Building 1
9.0 Announce transition EOP-001 Follow-up Actions.
Emergency Cooling Operations if RB pressure >2 psig.
~
I US I 9.3 Announce transition from EOP-003 Follow-up Actions to EOP-001 VSSV (IAW Step 3.15).
I I
RO I 9.0 I
Perform EOP-001 VSSV actions as directed by the US.
I US I 9.0 I
Direct RO actions to complete EOP-001 Follow-up actions.
Page 18 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 Events No. 6 and 7 - Main Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment.
High Pressure Injection Valve Sticks Open.
Examiner Notes and Actions poS RO Applicant ActionslBehaviors 9.0 Perform EOP-001 Follow-up Actions as directed by the US.
Page 19 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #2 Rev 0 ALERT HA4 Non-Bomb Explosion inside the Vital Area.
TERMINATION CRITERIA Exelon Standard E-Plan EALs.
When all of the following conditions exist:
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 6.
- 7.
Reactor is shutdown.
OTSG 1A is isolated and depressurized.
HPI is terminated.
Flow through MU-V-16C has been terminated.
RCS pressure and temperature are stabilized.
EOP-003 actions are complete.
EOP-001 VSSV actions have been completed.
EOP-001 Follow-up Actions are in progress.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.7 Electrical Page 20 of 20
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 Instrumentation Failure SRO Normal Evolution Instrumentation Failure Component Failure Instrumentation Failure RO Reactivity Change Major Malfunction Instrumentation Failure SRO INSTANT Scenario #3 Pressurizer Level I nstru ment Fa i I u re.
Swap Makeup Pumps.
MU-V-32 Failure.
OTSG Tube Leak (Small).
CRD Fails to Respond in Automatic.
Manual Power Reduction.
OTSG Tube Rupture.
ES Train Failure.
Page 1 of 19
TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario #3 MU-V-32 Failure.
~
I SRO INSTANT Simulator Scenario #3 Quantitative Attributes I Target I Actual OTSG Tube Rupture.
I I
Total Malfunctions 1
5-8 I 6
OTSG Tube Leak (Small).
Pressurizer Level Instrument Failure. I CRD Fails to Respond in Auto.
I ES Train Failure.
MU-V-32 Failure.
ES Train Failure.
Malfunctions After EOP Entry CRD System Fails to Respond in Automatic.
I Major Transients EOPs Entered With Substantive Actions OTSG Tube Rupture.
ES Train Failure.
I 1-2 1
1-2 1
2-4 I Abnormal Events Pressurizer Level Instrument Failure. I CRD Fails to Respond in Auto.
bl EOP Contingencies Requiring Substantive 0-2 I
OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage.
Actions EOP-010, Abnormal Transients, Rules, Guides and Graphs.
I I
I Critical Tasks 4
SRO Direct entry into OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage.
RO Implement EOP-010 Guide 2 in response to HPI Train B Failure RO/SRO Maintain <IO00 psig OTSG pressure to limit MSSV operation RO/SRO Minimize RCS Subcooled Margin to reduce tube leak rate.
Page 2 of 19
TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario #3 C -MU-V-32 Failure.
C -0TSG Tube Leak (Small).
Simulator Scenario #3 Fail u re.
I -ES Train Failure.
7 Major OTSG Tube Rupture.
SRO INSTANT I
I I Reqd I Normal Evolution Swap MakeuD Pumps.
As RO 1
As SRO Instrumentlcomponent Failure I - Pzr Level Instrument Fails.
I - CRD Auto Control Failure.
InstrumentlComponent Failures I - Pzr Level Instrument Fails. I I - CRD Auto Control 2
C -MU-V-32 Failure.
C -0TSG Tube Leak (Small).
I -.ES Train Failure.
Major I
OTSG Tube Rupture.
1 1=3 c = 2 1
Page 3 of 19
L REVISION 0
1 2
\\
Page 4 of 19 SCENARIO CHANGE HISTORY PAGE DATE REFERENCE TITLE DESCRIPTION (Include AI # if appropriate) 5/27/01 N/A New Scenario
- 1. Added Pressurizer level instrument failure.
discussion at end of scenario.
7/7/01 N/A
- 2. Added Tech. Spec. information for 5/12/2003 NA Updated for current procedure revisions.
Format and editorial changes. Changed MU-V-32 malfunction to fail the valve open in automatic mode of control. Reduced initial power level at request of NRC.
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO
.d' The scenario will be initiated at 30% power. Makeup Pump 16 (MU-P-16) was removed from service for an oil change, and is now ready to be returned to service. Crew direction is to return MU-P-1 B to service and maintain 30% Power steady state operation.
The selected Pressurizer level instrument slowly fails low. The crew will swap to the alternate Pressurizer level and temperature instruments.
The crew will swap from MU-P-1A to MU-P-1 B IAW 1104-2, Makeup and Purification System.
Once MU-P-16 is in operation, MU-V-32, Seal Water Injection Flow Control valve will fail open, requiring the team to establish manual RCP seal injection flow control.
A small tube leak will occur. Alarm C-1-1, High Radiation, will actuate to cue the crew to the tube leak. The crew will respond IAW Alarm response procedure for MAP C-1-1, and implement OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage procedure.
The crew will commence a normal plant shutdown IAW OP-TM-EOP-005, MAP C-1-1, and Technical Specification require men ts.
During the power reduction, the rod control diamond station will fail to respond in Auto. The crew will be required to continue the shutdown with Manual control of the Diamond CRD station and Feedwater ICs stations.
A large OTSG tube rupture develops. The crew will have to evaluate plant conditions, and should trip the reactor and initiate High Pressure Injection.
The '6 train of Engineered Safeguards Actuation System will not actuate using the Manual Actuation pushbuttons, requiring manual HPIILPI initiation at the component level.
Estimated scenario time - 60 minutes.
Critical Tasks 3 SRO Critical Tasks 3 RO Critical Tasks Page 5 of 19
REFERENCES
~
A. 10 CFR 55.45 Operating Tests, (a) Content (3), (4), (5), (6),
(7), (8), (9),
(12), (13)
B. PROCEDURE
S:
OP 1102-4 OP 1 1 04-2 OP 11 05-4 EP 1202-12 EP 1202-29 0 P-TM-EO P-00 1 OP-TM-EOP-005 OP-TM-EOP-010 Power Operation.
Makeup and Purification System (marked up copy).
Integrated Control System.
Excessive Radiation Levels.
Pressurizer System Failure.
OTSG Tube Leakage.
Abnormal Transient Rules, Guides and Graphs.
C. ALARM RESPONSES:
C-1-1 HIGH RADIATION.
F-1-5 G-2-5 PZR LEVEL HIILO.
G-3-5 PZR LEVEL LO-LO.
RCP SEAL TOT INJECT FLOW HVLO.
D. OTHER Maintenance Risk Document for EF-P-2A.
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 Page 6 of 19
TMI Licensing Exam 511 2/2003 Scenario #3 SIMULATOR INITIALIZATION
~
Action Initialization IC-I 6.
Control Console Reduce power to 30%.
Adjust Mvars to 0.
Trip FW-P-1 B, open drains.
Start FW-P-1 B AC Lube Pp.
Reduce to 4 Powdex Vessels.
Secure all MO-Ps.
Start MU-P-IA, stop P-I B.
Start IC-P-1 B, stop IC-P-1A.
Tag EF-P-2A out of service.
Stop HD-P-1A.
Commentsllnstructions Description 100% HFP, ICs in automatic.
When: Immediately.
Xenon equilibrium, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
Scenario support.
Use FW Remote Functions.
Pressurizer Level instrument failure.
Malfunction RCO4A.
Severity: 100%.
Ramp: 240 seconds.
Event: 1.
Severity: 100%.
Ramp: 30 seconds.
Event: 2.
Severity: 0.08%.
Event: 3.
Event: 4.
MU-V-32, RCP seal injection control valve, fails open in automatic mode.
Malfunction MU07.
Malfunction TH17A.
Malfunction RDIOC Malfunction TH16A OTSG 1A Tube Rupture (Low).
CRD Group 7 Automatic In-Motion Command Block.
OTSG tube rupture (middle).
Severity: 5.0%.
Ramp: 1 second.
Event: 5.
When: Immediately.
B Train ESAS Fail to Actuate at 1600# and 500# Setpoints.
Malfunction ESOI B ES02B Remote Function CCRl2 Remote Function W R I 2 Value: NS.
When: Immediatelv.
Transfer MU-P-1A to NSCC cooling.
Rack out EF-P-2A breaker to the disconnected position, remove fuses.
Value: OUT.
When: Immediately.
Value: OFF.
When: Immediately.
Value: OFF.
When: Immediatelv.
Blocks B Train Manual 4# ES actuation.
Digital 110 Override Digital I/O Override Event TriQQer 4
03A4S02-ZDIPBI RBB 03A4S02-ZDIPBI RCB
~
Blocks B Train Manual 1600# ES actuation.
Define as CRQCRNM 0.27.
Trigger is used to block automatic in-commands from Group 7 rods.
Matches Auxiliary Steam header pressure to nominal value for normal operations.
Monitor MSK2609A.
Assign to Monitor.
Value: 215 psia.
When: Immediately.
Page 7 of 19
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 This sheet is to be provided to the examinees for review.
b I This sheet is to be provided to the examinees for review. I SHIFT BRIEFING Reactor power is 30% with ICs in automatic.
FW-P-1A is in service.
FW-P-IB has been secured.
Emergency Feedwater Pump 2A (EF-P-2A) is tagged out for bearing replacement.
Expected to be returned to service in next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Makeup Pump 1A is running to support an oil change on Makeup Pump 1 B.
Makeup Pump 1A is being cooled by Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water.
MU-P-IA and MU-P-IC are currently selected for ES.
IC-P-I B is operating with IC-P-1A in standby.
0 The oil change has been completed and Makeup Pump 1B is ready to be returned to service.
On-Line Risk Management Sheet # I 32 is attached for reference.
Orders for the shift:
- 1. Swap from Makeup Pump 1A to Makeup Pump 1B.
- 2. Continue 30% power operation.
Page 8 of 19
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
(N)ormal, L.*
ii Examiners Description Malf.
Event Event No.
Type*
Description RCO4A I
URO Pressurizer level instrument failure.
ARO I
us URO Switch operating Makeup Pumps.
N ARO N
US MU07 C
URO MU-V-32, RCP seal injection valve, failure.
TH17A C
URO Small OTSG 1A tube leak.
ARO c
us ARO URO Initiation of plant shutdown.
ARO us RDIOC I/R URO Control Rod Drive System automatic control failure.
ARO I
us TH 16A M
URO OTSG tube rupture.
ARO ESOI B I
URO ES Train failure.
ES02B ARO c
us M
US IO Override I
us (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Outline illation Facility:
Three Mile Island Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
Unit 1 Operators CRS URO PRO This scenario provides operational situations to evaluate the ability of crew members to implement plant procedures to perform normal operations, and to respond to abnormal and emergency conditions. While operating at reduced power, the operators are required to mitigate the effects of a controlling instrument failure by establishing manual control and then selecting alternate (valid) input signals. After re-establishing automatic RCS inventory control, the operators implement normal operating procedures to switch operating Makeup Pumps. An additional control system malfunction requires the operators to establish manual flow control for RCP seal injection. A small OTSG tube leak (greater than Technical Specification limits) forces the operators to implement an emergency operating procedure that includes plant shutdown. The power reduction is performed in manual due to an automatic control problem in the Control Rod Drive System. During the shutdown, a large OTSG Tube rupture develops, requiring the operators to initiate High pressure Injection and trip the reactor. One of the two ES Trains will not actuate automatically or manually at the Train level, requiring the operator is to initiate individual components. Following reactor trip, actions are performed to ensure the reactor is shutdown properly, establish radiological controls and isolate potential secondary release paths, prevent inadvertent operation of the Main Steam Safety Valves, and reduce RCS leakage through the OTSG tubes in order to limit off-site doses.
Page 9 of 19
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 Examiner Notes and Actions poS Expected Operator Actions Diagnosis RO 1.O Recognize and announce Pressurizer level instrument failure us from MAP alarms G-2-5, PZR LEVEL HVLO, G-3-5, PZR LEVEL LO-LO, MU-V-17 response and redundant indications.
Direct Operations US I 2.0 Announce entry into EP 1202-29, Pressurizer System Failure.
URO I 2.3 Select alternate pressurizer temperature transmitter.
URO URO I 2.4 Transfer MU-VI7 back to automatic control mode (optional).
I 2.1 Take MU-V-17 to Hand and adjust makeup flow to equal letdown flow minus seal injection.
URO I URO I 3.1 I
Place EDT on LT-1 Selector Switch, as directed by the US.
2.2 Select alternate pressurizer level transmitter.
US Page I O of 19 3.0 US may request Equipment Deficiency Tag (EDT) be placed on LT-1 Pressurizer Level Transmitter Selector.
TMI Licensing Exam 511 2/2003 Scenario #3 Event No. 2 Swap From Makeup Pump 1A to Makeup Pump 1B ICO: MUM9 to MU-PIB Control Board Operations RO RO ICO: MUR29 to MU-PIC ICO: CCRl2 to DC J
1.6 1.7 Have A 0 ES select MU-P-IC.
Change MU-P-1A cooling water supply back to DCCW.
US 2.0 US may direct operator to start IC-P-IA, stop IC-P-1 B (optional).
I I URO I 2.1 Shift operating IC-Ps as directed by the US.
I i,
Page 11 of 19
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 Event No. 3 MU-V-32, RCP Seal Injection Valve Failure.
u Pos URO us Examiner Notes and Actions System Response Expected Operator Actions 1.O Recognize and announce rising seal injection flow from MAP alarm F-1-5, RCP SEAL TOT INJECT FLOW HVLO, and seal injection flow console indication.
Direct Operations US URO I
2.1 Direct the operator to transfer MU-V-32 to Manual control, restore normal RCP Seal Injection flow, and maintain Manual flow control.
As directed by the US, transfer MU-V-32 to Hand and restore normal seal injection flow by throttling MU-V-32 in the closed direction.
2.2 I
URO I 2.0 Diagnose MU-V-32 failure (valve open too far).
Page 12 of 19
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 Event No. 4 Small Tube Leak Develops in OTSG 1A.
L, I Examiner Notes and Actions Diagnosis Procedures Direct Operations SRO Critical Task Technical Specifications Pos us RO us us us us URO URO Expected Operator Actions 1.0 Diagnose a tube leak in OTSG 1A from MAP alarm C-1-1, HIGH RADIATION, and rising indication/alarms on RM-G-26, RM-A-5 and RM-A-15.
2.0 Direct RO activities to implement ARP for MAP C-I -1, HIGH RADIATION.
Direct RO Actions to implement Immediate Actions of EP 1202-12, Excessive Radiation Levels:
0 Page announcement.
0 Markcharts.
Contact GRCS.
3.0 Maintenance, operations or sampling is NIA.
4.0 Direct STA to start a one-hour leak rate calculation.
5.0 Direct ROlSTA to perform a mass balance calculation for leak 6.0 Perform mass balance and validate OTSG leak rate greater than I gpm.
Determine that criteria is met for entry into OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage (greater than 1 gpm).
7.0
'+-
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TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 Event No. 5 Commence Plant Shutdown as Directed by OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage.
u Pos US US US URO 1 Examiner Notes and Actions Expected Operator Actions 1.O Direct RO activities to implement OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage.
Direct RO to close MU-V-3 as necessary and increase makeup to maintain Pressurizer level.
Direct a plant shutdown to commence at a specified rate, using OP 1 102-4, Power Operation.
Set ULD rate of change to value specified by US, and reduce ULD megawatt demand to commence a plant shutdown.
1.1 1.2 1.3 Procedures Technical Specifications US US Direct Operations 1.5 Emergency classification will be obtained after the scenario since the examinee does not have the support of a Shift Manager for Emergency Plan implementation.
Direct notification of Chemistry and Rad Con and for sampling and surveys.
1.6 m l. 4 Monitor plant response as power reduction begins.
ROs I I
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TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario #3 Examiner Notes and Actions ICO: When Reactor power is less than 27%, verify Event #4 activates to fail the Diamond CRD panel to respond in Auto.
Diagnosis NOTE: Requires the following stations (as a minimum) to be transferred to Hand:
0 Feedwater Demand A & B.
0 ICs Reactor Demand.
0 Diamond CRD Panel.
Event No. 6 Diamond Fails to Respond in Automatic.
Pos us ARO us ROs Expected ODerator Actions
~~~
1.O Recognize and announce Diamond CRD panel failure to respond by ICs alarms and cessation of CRD movement.
2.0 Direct ROs to transfer ICs to Manual to continue the power reduction.
2.1 Place ICs in Hand and recommence power reduction as directed by the US.
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TMI Licensing Exam 511 2/2003 Scenario #3 Events No. 7 and 8 Large OTSG Tube Rupture Develops, B Train ESAS Actuation Fails.
Examiner Notes and Actions Diagnosis Communications System Response Procedures RO Critical Task This task is critical to event mitigation strategy due to the degraded condition of High Pressure Injection.
Pos URO RO ROs URO URO us URO URO URO URO URO us URO URO Exoected Ooerator Actions 1.O Recognize and announce significant leak rate increase from Pressurizer level reduction, MU-V-17 valve position demand, and rising Makeup flow.
2.0 Close MU-V-3 to conserve RCS inventory.
3.0 Continue power reduction in Hand.
4.0 Recognize Pressurizer level lowering below 150 inches while Reactor power is greater than 25%.
Announce requirement to initiate High Pressure Injection, and to trip the reactor IAW step 3.3.1.A.
Concur with requirement to initiate High Pressure Injection, and to trip the reactor IAW step 3.3.1,A, and then to perform EOP-001 Immediate Actions.
Depress Manual 1600 psig ESAS Actuation Buttons for High Pressure Injection.
4.1 5.0 5.1 5.2 Recognize and announce the failure of B Train ESAS manual actuation.
6.0 Implements Guide 2, HPVLPI Initiation.
6.1 Manually initiates two HPI Pumps and two LPI Pumps in ES alignment at the component level as follows:
0 Open MU-V-14B.
0 Open MU-V-16C.
0 Open MU-V-16D.
0 Close MU-V-37.
0 Start DC-P-I B.
0 Close MU-V-3.
0 Open DH-V-5B.
0 Start DH-P-16.
0 Open DH-V-4B.
Start MU-P-IC.
Start DR-P-16.
7.0 URO (from memory) performs and verbalizes Immediate Actions of OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip, and the US performs concurrent verification.
7.0 URO (from memory) performs and verbalizes Immediate Actions of OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip, and the US performs concurrent verification.
7.1 Depresses the Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.
7.2 Verifies reactor is shutdown (power is less than 7%).
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Examiner Notes and Actions poS Expected Operator Actions URO URO URO URO US 7.3 7.4 8.0 Actuates Global Alarm Silence.
9.0 Depresses the Main Turbine Trip pushbutton.
Verifies all 4 Main Turbine stop valves are closed.
Announces to the Team that EOP-001 Immediate Actions have been completed.
Concurs that EOP-001 Immediate Actions have been completed, and acknowledges actuation of Global Alarm Silence.
10.0 I
I US I 13.0 Announces transition out of EOP-001 back to EOP-005 due to US ARO 11.O 11.1 Directs ARO to deliver Symptom Check Report to the Team.
Provides Team with Symptom Check Report.
13.2 Determine affected OTSG.
13.3 Initiate Attachment 2 to establish radiological controls and isolate secondary release paths.
US 13.4 13.5 Perform a Symptom Check.
Transfer Gland Steam System to the Auxiliary Steam supply.
12.0 Concurs with Symptom Check Report.
US Page 17 of 19 the OTSG tube leak.
Direct follow up actions of EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage.
13.0 13.1 SRO/RO Critical Task 13.6 13.7 Announce reactor trip over plant page and radio system.
Dispatch A 0 to verify all Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) are closed.
Direct performance of an alarm review.
Direct Operators to reduce and maintain OTSG pressure to less than 1000 psig to prevent lifting Main Steam Safety Valves.
Direct ROs to implement Guide 8, RCS Pressure Control to 13.7 US 13.8 RO US 13.9 RO minimize Subcooled Margin (SCM).
TMI Licensing Exam 5/12/2003 Scenario #3 Events No. 7 and 8 Large OTSG Tube Rupture Develops, B Train ESAS Actuation Fails.
Examiner Notes and Actions poS t-t-
SRORO Critical Task This task is critical in order to reduce the primary to secondary leak rate to reduce the T dose to the public.
Expected Operator Actions 13.9.1 Implement Guide 8, RCS Pressure Control to minimize Subcooled Margin (SCM), as directed by the US.
13.9.2 Reduce RCS pressure until SCM is between 70" and 30°F.
0 Turn off Pressurizer heaters.
0 Open Pressurizer Spray Valve RC-V-?.
Close RC-V-1 when SCM has been minimized (between 70" and 30°F).
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TMI Licensing Exam 511 212003 Scenario #3
\\ -
TqRMINATION CRITERIA u
When all of the following conditions exist:
- 1. Plant cooldown is in progress.
- 2. OTSG pressures are both less than 1000 psig.
- 3. Subcooled Margin has been reduced to between 30 and 70°F.
- 4. The examinees have had the opportunity to perform all critical tasks.
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION (Based on Exelon Standard Emergency Plan)
FA1 ALERT Potential Loss of RCS Barrier (> 160 gpm Primary to Secondary leak)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.4 Decay Heat Removal Capability 3.4.1.1 a. (2) gives 72-hour time clock for one Emergency Feedwater Pump out of service, or be in Cold Shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
3.1.6 Leakage 3.1.6.3 is LCO for exceeding 1 gpm primary to secondary leakage, however, the Operating License only allows 0.1 gpm above baseline leakage rate.
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FOR TRAINING ONLY TMl ON-LINE STATION RISK EVALUATION DOCUMENT Tag# MU-P-0001 B Rev : 1 ON-LINE RISK # 132 I
Yellow I
Yellow I
Yellow I
- 1. Description of Work and/or Plant Condition Work involves oil change on MU-P-1 B. Scheduled duration of work is approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
MU-P-1A will be placed in service with NSCCW supplying cooling. Normal Makeup Pump suction and discharge valve line up will be maintained.
Originator: FOR TRAINING ONLY Date:
- 2. Risk Concerns Evaluated Reduction in HPI capacity Loss of redundancy of makeup and seal injection HPI line break u
Operating Experience: Yes
- 3. SSCs Which need to be maintained OPERABLE LPI Trains A and B HPI Trains A and B Building Spray Train A and B EFW Train A and B RB Emergency Cooling Train A and B DC Power Train A and B AC ES Power Train A and B EG-Y-1 A and EG-Y-1 B IC-P-1 B and IC-P-1 A ICCW RCP Seal Cooling Function
- 4. Actions to Reduce Risk COMPENSA TORY ACTIONS (Actions Taken)
NSCCW lined up to provide cooling to MU-P-1A.
IC-P-1B will be placed in service to address vulnerability to loss of 1D 4160 Bus.
FOR TRAINING ONLY
FOR TRAINING ONLY CONTINGENCY ACTIONS: (Actions taken if other conditiom change)
W If the MU-P-1 B outage is to be extended beyond the scheduled duration and it is desired to provide backup seal injection capability, obtain Director, Operations approval, open the discharge cross connects, and commence a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TS time clock.
- 5. Additional Briefing notes Error Likely Situations:
- 6. Basis for Station Risk Evaluation Describe basis:
Risk Evaluator :
FOR TRAINING Date:
Oys Director :
FOR TRAINING Date:
Engineering :
FOR TRAINING Date:
Engineering Concurrence is required if Station Risk Condition is lower than ORAM-Sentinel Output Plant Manager:
'FOR TRAINING Date:
FOR TRAINING ONLY