ML031180673
| ML031180673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/2003 |
| From: | Graves D NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Muench R Wolf Creek |
| References | |
| IR-03-003 | |
| Download: ML031180673 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000482/2003003
Text
April 28, 2003
Rick A. Muench, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839
SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 50-482/03-03
Dear Mr. Muench:
On April 5, 2003, the NRC completed an integrated inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating
Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on
April 4, 2003, with Ms. D. Jacobs and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and
representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified an issue that was evaluated
under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance
(Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with this issue. This
violation is being treated as a noncited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A of the
Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the
violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date
of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the
Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza
Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the
Wolf Creek Generating Station facility.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -2-
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them
with you.
Sincerely,
/RA/
David N. Graves
Project Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket: 50-482
License: NPF-42
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
50-482/03-03
cc w/enclosure:
Site Vice President
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839
Jay Silberg, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Supervisor Licensing
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839
Chief Engineer
Utilities Division
Kansas Corporation Commission
1500 SW Arrowhead Rd.
Topeka, Kansas 66604-4027
Office of the Governor
State of Kansas
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Office of the Attorney General
120 SW 10th Avenue, Floor 2
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -3-
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1597
County Clerk
Coffey County Courthouse
110 South 6th Street
Burlington, Kansas 66839-1798
Vick L. Cooper, Chief
Radiation Control Program, RCP
Kansas Department of Health
and Environment
Bureau of Air and Radiation
1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1366
Frank Moussa, Technological
Hazards Administrator
Department of the Adjutant General
2800 SW Topeka Blvd.
Topeka, Kansas 66611-1287
Technical Services Branch Chief
FEMA Region VII
2323 Grand Blvd., Suite 900
Kansas City, Missouri 64108-2670
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -4-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (EWM)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
Senior Resident Inspector (FLB2)
Resident Inspector (JXC2)
SRI, Callaway (MSP)
Branch Chief, DRP/B (DNG)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (RAK1)
Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
Dale Thatcher (DFT)
W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)
Scott Morris (SAM1)
WC Site Secretary (SLA2)
ADAMS: * Yes * No Initials: ______
- Publicly Available * Non-Publicly Available * Sensitive * Non-Sensitive
R:WC\2003\WC2003-03RP-FLB.wpd
RIV:SRI/DRP/B RI/DRP/B C:DRS/EMB C:DRS/PSB C:DRP/B
FLBrush JCruz CSMarschall TWPruett DNGraves
E - DNGraves E - DNGraves /RA/ MPShannon for /RA/
4/7/03 4/7/03 4/28/03 4/28/03 4/28/03
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos: 50-482
License Nos: NPF-42
Report No: 50-482/03-03
Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location: 1550 Oxen Lane NE
Burlington, Kansas
Dates: December 29, 2002, through April 5, 2003
Inspectors: F. L. Brush, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Cruz, Resident Inspector
P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. F. Melfi, Reactor Inspector
G. A. Pick, Senior Physical Security Inspector
Approved By: D. N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B
ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Wolf Creek Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-482/03-03
IR 500482/03-03; Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; 12/29/2002 - 4/5/2003; Wolf
Creek Generating Station. Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions.
The report covers a 14-week period of resident inspection and announced inspections by three
Region IV inspectors. The inspections identified one Green noncited violation. The
significance of issues is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) and was
determined by the Significance Determination Process in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.
Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply are indicated by the
severity level of the applicable violation. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation
of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight
Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
Component Manipulation Control. Step 6.1.2 of Procedure AP 21D-005 requires shift
manager or designee authorization to operate all systems or components. While
restoring a rod-drive motor generator to service, an operator did not receive
authorization prior to operating the motor-generator output breaker handle. The
manipulation of the handle was an action not directed by procedure and resulted in a
reactor trip. The failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005 was identified as a violation of
Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This
violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensees corrective action program as
Performance Improvement Request 2003-0010.
This issue was considered more than minor because the failure to follow procedure
resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and the inherent challenges to plant safety systems
and equipment associated with a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very
low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of: (1) a
primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, (2) mitigation equipment or
function unavailability; and (3) a plant fire or internal/external flooding affecting plant
response (Section 1R14).
Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power for the report period, with one exception.
On January 3, 2003, the plant tripped due to the failure of an operator to follow procedure while
restoring a rod-drive motor generator to service. The licensee restarted the plant and placed
the main generator online on January 4. The plant returned to 100 percent power on
January 6.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
Preparedness
1R01 Adverse Weather (71111.01)
a. Inspection Scope
On March 27, 2003, the inspectors performed walkdowns of various plant areas. These
areas included the power block buildings, switchyard, main and auxiliary transformer
area, and the vital bus power supply transformer area. The inspectors reviewed the
following documents:
C AI 14-006, Severe Weather, Revision 4
C OFN SG-003, Natural Events, Revision 9
C Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Revision 5, EAL-11, natural
phenomena
Additionally, the inspectors discussed adverse weather preparations with various
licensee personnel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
a. Inspection Scope
Partial walkdowns
The inspectors performed the following partial walkdowns:
C Component cooling water Pumps B and D during component cooling water
Pumps A and C outages, March 5-7
C Emergency diesel Generator A during an emergency diesel Generator B outage,
March 28
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C Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A during a motor-driven auxiliary
feedwater Pump B outage, February 27
C Safety injection Pump B during a safety injection Pump A outage, February 5
The inspectors performed the walkdowns to verify equipment alignment and identify
discrepancies that could impact redundant system operability. The inspectors used the
Updated Safety Analysis Report, system drawings, system lineup checklists, and other
documents to perform the walkdowns. The inspectors also discussed the walkdowns
with various licensee personnel.
Full Walkdown
The inspectors performed a full walkdown of the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system
on February 13-15, 2003.
The inspectors performed the walkdown to verify equipment alignment and identify
discrepancies that could impact redundant system operability. The inspectors used the
Updated Safety Analysis Report, system drawings, and system lineup checklists to
perform the walkdowns. The inspectors also reviewed the outstanding work order list,
corrective action program documents, operator workarounds, and plant temporary
modifications. The inspectors also discussed the walkdowns with various licensee
personnel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Quarterly Fire Area Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors toured the following areas to assess the licensees control of transient
combustible materials, the material condition and lineup of fire detection and
suppression systems, and the material condition of manual fire equipment and passive
fire barriers. The licensees fire preplans and fire hazards analysis report were used to
identify important plant equipment, fire loading, detection and suppression equipment
locations, and planned actions to respond to a fire in each of the plant areas selected.
Compensatory measures for degraded equipment were evaluated for effectiveness.
C Control building 2000 foot level, NB01 vital switchgear room, February 12
C Control building 2016 foot level, air conditioning Unit SGK05B room, March 15
C Control building 2016 foot level, vital battery and nonvital switchgear rooms,
February 28
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C Reactor building 2026 foot level, reactor coolant Pump B oil leak inspection,
February 15
C Turbine building 2065 foot level, general floor area north, January 10
C Turbine building 2065 foot level, general floor area south, January 23
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope
On January 31, 2003, the inspectors verified that the licensees flooding mitigation plans
and equipment were consistent with the licensees design requirements and the risk
assumptions in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The areas inspected were the
emergency core cooling system pump rooms. The inspectors reviewed the following:
C ALR 00-095A, RHR RM Sump A/B LEV HI, Revision 6
C ALR 00-096A, RHR RM Sump C/D LEV HI, Revision 5
C Calculation FL-02, Flooding of Auxiliary Building Rooms 1107-1114, Revision 0
C Calculation AN-96-126, Wolf Creek Generating Station Plant Specific Analysis,
Internal Flooding Notebook, Revision 0
C Manual M-093-00116-04, Instruction Manual for Installation, Operation, &
Maintenance of Miscellaneous Sump Pumps for SNUPPS
C OFN SG-003, Natural Events, Revision 9
C Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.4, water level (flood) design
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)
a. Inspection Scope
On March 5, 2003, the inspectors observed control room operator simulator training to
verify that the licensed operator requalification program ensured safe operation of the
plant. The inspectors observed crew performance during simulator sessions to evaluate
the clarity and formality of communications, the correct use of procedures, high risk
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operator actions, and the oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor. The
inspectors used Simulator Guide LR 50 020 16, Control Room Not Habitable Lab,
Revision 0. The scenario included the donning of self-contained breathing apparatus
and implementation of Off-normal Procedure OFN RP-013, Control Room Not
Habitable, Revision 9.
The inspectors also reviewed the scenario sequences and objectives, observed the
licensees critique, and discussed crew performance with licensee monitors for the
training.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)
.1 Periodic Evaluation Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's reports documenting the performance of the last
maintenance rule periodic effectiveness assessments. This periodic evaluation covered
the period from November 7, 2000, through April 27, 2002. This periodic evaluation was
prepared as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3). The inspectors also reviewed
maintenance panel meeting minutes and other program documents through the end of
2002.
The inspectors reviewed whether the licensee's program had identified and monitored
risk-significant functions associated with structures, systems, and components using
reliability and unavailability. Additionally, the performance of nonrisk-significant
functions were monitored using plant level criteria. The inspectors reviewed the
conclusions reached by the licensee with regard to the balance of reliability and
unavailability for specific maintenance rule functions. This review was conducted by
examining the licensee's evaluation of all risk-significant functions that had exceeded
performance criteria during the evaluation periods. The inspectors also examined the
licensee's evaluation of program activities associated with placement of maintenance
rule program risk-significant functions in Categories (a)(1) and/or (a)(2).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Effectiveness of Maintenance Rule Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for those
meetings listed in the Attachment with an emphasis on issues associated with functions
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of the containment isolation, component cooling water, and plant service water systems.
For the identified functions, the inspectors followed up by obtaining the needed
documentation (listed in the Attachment) and assessing the maintenance rule program
performance related to:
C Program adjustments made in response to unbalanced reliability and availability
C Cause determination of degraded performance or failure to meet performance
criteria
C Functional failure evaluation and determination of maintenance preventable
functional failures
C Adequacy of corrective action and goal setting
C Monitoring of established goals for functions placed in Category (a)(1)
C Program revisions to scoping and risk significance
C Creation of new risk-significant functions to improve performance monitoring
C Assessment of plant level performance
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the use of the corrective action system within the maintenance
rule program. This evaluation was accomplished by reviewing the performance
improvement requests (PIRs). The purpose of this review was to establish that the
corrective action program was entered at the appropriate threshold for the purposes of:
C Starting the evaluation and determination of the corrective action process when
performance criteria were exceeded
C Correction of performance-related issues or conditions identified during the
periodic evaluation
C Correction of generic issues or conditions identified during programmatic audits
or assessments
The inspectors verified that the identification and implementation of corrective action
were acceptable.
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b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Maintenance Effectiveness for Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees maintenance rule implementation for the plant
service water and containment isolation to assess the effectiveness of maintenance
efforts that apply to scoped structures, systems, and components. The inspectors
reviewed various maintenance rule information.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees maintenance rule implementation for the
following structures, systems, or components to assess the effectiveness of
maintenance efforts in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65:
C Emergency lighting dc system, January 24
C Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup, February 15
The inspectors reviewed work practices, scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b),
performance, 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification goals, and
identification of common cause failures. The inspectors reviewed various
documentation and discussed maintenance rule items with licensee personnel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees risk assessment for equipment outages as a
result of planned and emergent maintenance in accordance with the requirements of
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee Procedure AP 22C-003, Operational Risk
Assessment Program, Revision 8. The inspectors also discussed the planned and
emergent work activities with planning and maintenance personnel. The inspectors
reviewed the following:
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C Operational risk assessments for planned maintenance for the weeks of
January 6 and 27, February 3, 17, and 24, and March 24, 2003
C Actual, planned, and emergent work schedules for the same weeks
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions (71111.14)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees performance in accordance with alarm response
and off-normal procedures following a reactor trip.
b. Findings
Introduction. A Green noncited violation was identified for failure to follow a Regulatory
Guide 1.33 referenced procedure in accordance with Technical Specification 5.4.1.
Specifically, Licensee Procedure AP 21D-005, Component Manipulation Control, was
not followed while restoring plant equipment. This Human Performance related issue, a
failure to follow procedure, resulted in a reactor trip.
Description. On January 3, 2003, an operator was restoring a rod-drive motor generator
to service following planned preventive maintenance. The operator used Procedure
SYS SF-120, Rod Control System Operation, to restore the motor generator. The
operator was also providing on-the-job training to another operator during this evolution.
When asked a question concerning the operation of the motor generator output breaker
charging motor, the operator performing the restoration manipulated the handle on the
breaker. The breaker closed and, since the motor generator was not running, the other
rod-drive motor generator output breaker opened. The operator did not receive
authorization prior to operating the motor-generator output breaker handle as required
by Procedure AP 21D-005. The reactor tripped when the breaker opened.
Analysis. This issue was considered more than minor because the failure to follow
procedure affected the objective of the Reactor Safety Initiating Events Cornerstone by
resulting in an unplanned reactor trip and the inherent challenges to plant safety
systems and equipment associated with a reactor trip. The inspectors performed a
Phase 1 screening using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A. The finding is of very low
safety significance (Green) because, although it caused a reactor trip, it did not increase
the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, did not
contribute to a combination of a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment functions,
and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood affecting plant
response.
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Enforcement. Technical Specification 5.4.1 states, in part, written procedures shall be
established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures
recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, 1978. Item 1.b of
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, 1978, lists Authorities and
Responsibilities for Safe Operation and Shutdown as a typical safety-related activity
that should be covered by written procedures. Licensee Procedure AP 21D-005,
Component Manipulation Control, step 6.1.2, required shift manager or designee
authorization to operate all systems or components. Contrary to the above, an operator
did not receive authorization prior to operating the motor-generator output breaker
handle. The manipulation of the handle was an action outside of the requirements of
Procedure SYS SF-120.
The failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005 was identified as a violation of Technical
Specification 5.4.1 for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is
being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy and is in the licensees corrective action program as PIR 2003-0010
(50-482/03-01).
Cornerstone: Reactor Safety Initiating Events
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected operability evaluations conducted by the licensee during the
report period involving risk-significant systems or components to review. The inspectors
evaluated the technical adequacy of the licensees operability determinations, verified
that appropriate compensatory measures were implemented, and verified that the
licensee considered all other pre-existing conditions, as applicable. Additionally, the
inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees problem identification and
resolution program as it applied to operability evaluations. Specific operability
evaluations reviewed are listed below.
The components or systems were:
C Accumulator Tank A PT-960 Drain Valve EPV0097, January 8
C Auxiliary feedwater pump turbine-steam inlet system snubber configuration,
January 21
C Emergency fuel oil transfer Pump PJE01B, January 27
C Motor-operated Valve ALHV0030, essential service water to motor-driven
auxiliary feedwater Pump B, March 4
C Reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water isolation
Valve BBHV14, January 23
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C Spent fuel cooling Pump A discharge check Valve ECV004, January 22
The inspectors also reviewed applicable portions of the Updated Safety Analysis Report,
Technical Specifications, and system drawings and discussed the operability evaluations
with licensee personnel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)
a. Inspection Scope
On January 31, 2003, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of operator
workarounds to determine the following:
C Effect of the workarounds on system reliability, availability, and potential for
misoperation
C Whether the cumulative effects of the workarounds could affect multiple
C The cumulative effects of the workarounds on operator response to plant
transients and accidents
The inspectors reviewed licensee Administrative Procedure AI 22A-001, Operator
WorkArounds, Revision 1, and the licensees operator workaround/burdens list.
The inspectors discussed with licensee operations personnel long-term equipment
problems that were not included in the workaround list. The inspectors reviewed five
deficiencies that were not on the list and did not meet the licensees definition of a
workaround or operator burden. The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the
operator workarounds, burdens, and long-term equipment problems to determine
whether they could affect mitigating system response during normal and emergency
plant operations.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed or observed the postmaintenance testing on the following
equipment to determine whether procedures and test activities were adequate to verify
system operability:
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C Containment spray Pump A, February 12
C Emergency diesel Generator B, February 26
C Essential service water Pump B, February 25
C Normal charging pump, February 19
C Safety injection Pump B, January 2
C Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, March 19
In each case, the associated work orders and test procedures were reviewed to
determine the scope of the maintenance activity and determine if the test adequately
tested components affected by the maintenance. The Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report, design basis documents, and selected calculations were also reviewed to
determine the adequacy of the acceptance criteria listed in the test procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed or observed all or part of the following surveillance activities in
accordance with inspection Attachment 71111.22 to determine whether risk significant
structures, systems, and components were capable of performing their intended safety
functions and assessing their operational readiness:
C STS EG-100A, Component Cooling Water Pumps A/C Inservice Pump Test,
Revision 19, March 6
C STS EJ-100A, RHR System Inservice Pump A Test, Revision 24, January 9
C STS IC-208A, NB01 4KV Loss of Voltage and Loss of Off-site Power TADOT,
Revision 0, February 4
C STS IC-209A, 4KV Degraded Voltage TADOT NB01 Bus - Separation Group 1,
Revision 6, February 4
C STS KJ-005B, Manual/Auto Start, Synchronization and Loading of Emergency
D/G NE02, Revision 40, January 23
C STS KJ-015A, Manual/Auto Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE01, Revision 16,
March 12
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
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1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)
1. Camera Installation in the Bioshield
a. Inspection Scope
On February 21, 2003, the inspectors reviewed the long-term installation of a camera
within the containment bioshield to verify that the modification had not affected the
safety functions of systems important to safety. The modification installed the camera to
allow monitoring of the oil level site glass for the reactor coolant Pump B motor upper
reservoir following the receipt of an RCP Oil Leak alarm in the control room on
February 13, 2003. The level indicator transmitter for the reactor coolant Pump B motor
upper reservoir had previously failed on December 13, 2002. Containment entries by
licensee personnel verified that the oil level in the site glass was within the acceptable
range and that there was no evidence of oil leakage outside of the reactor coolant pump
leakage detection system.
The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification Order 03-001-BB and its associated
10 CFR 50.59 screening against the systems design basis documentation in the
Updated Safety Analysis Report and verified that the installation of the temporary
modification was consistent with the modification documents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2. Reactor Coolant Pump B Oil Level Alarm
On March 27, 2003, the inspectors reviewed the temporary modification that eliminated
the reactor coolant Pump B upper oil reservoir low-level alarm. The transmitter for the
oil level, BBLT0495B, provided a false low-level indication, thereby generating an alarm
on the main control board. The temporary modification disabled this low-level alarm but
did not affect the other inputs to the annunciator. The licensee installed a jumper across
the low-alarm contact. The licensee planned to perform corrective maintenance on the
level transmitter during the fall 2003 refueling outage.
The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification Order 02-023-BB and its associated
10 CFR 50.59 screening against the systems design basis documentation in the
Updated Safety Analysis Report and verified that the installation of the temporary
modification was consistent with the modification documents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
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1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector performed an in-office review of Revision 5 to the Wolf Creek Generating
Station Emergency Plan, submitted December 13, 2002. Revision 5 of the plan made
changes to the public information function, clarified the stations policy on protective
action recommendations, updated evacuation time estimate tables, implemented
approved changes to facilities, and corrected editorial errors. The inspector compared
Revision 5 to its previous revision and to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) to
determine if the revision decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a. Inspection Scope
On February 5, 2003, the inspectors observed and reviewed emergency drill activities in
the simulator control room, the technical support center, and the emergency offsite
facility in accordance with inspection Attachment 71114.06. The inspectors also
attended a drill critique in the technical support center. The inspectors reviewed
associated documents and logs associated with the drill and discussed the drill activities
with various licensee personnel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3. SAFEGUARDS
Cornerstone: Physical Protection
3PP4 Security Plan Changes (71130.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following physical security plan, security contingency plan,
and training and qualification plan changes to determine if they decreased the
effectiveness of the physical security plan, security contingency plan, and training and
qualification plan, respectively, and to determine if requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (p)
were met:
C Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, dated August 24, 2000
C Physical Security Plan, Revision 33, dated January 18, 2002
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The inspectors determined that these plan changes were administrative.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of performance indicator data. The inspectors
reviewed the licensees data submittal using NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2. The inspectors reviewed various licensee
indicator input information to determine the accuracy and completeness of the
performance indicator:
C Reactor coolant system specific activity - October 2001 through
September 2002, February 15
C Scrams with loss of normal heat removal - January 2000 through
December 2002, February 10
C Unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours, January 2001 through
December 2002, March 14
The inspectors discussed system status with various licensee personnel. The
inspectors also reviewed licensee information, including control room logs, and the
applicable Technical Specifications.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
1. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Valve Out of Position
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to spent fuel pool cooling system
Valve EC-V091, Refueling Pool to Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 1A Isolation, out of
position. The licensee initiated PIR 2002-2195 to document the evaluation and
corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed additional PIRs that documented
out-of-position valves.
-14-
The licensee could not determine when the valve was mispositioned. The licensee
reviewed Procedure SYS EC-120, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Startup. As
a corrective action, the licensee was implementing a change to Procedure SYS EC-120
to ensure refueling pool cleanup is secured prior to swapping cooling pumps. The
inspectors did not identify any trends after reviewing the additional PIRs.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup (71153)
1. (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-482/2003-001-00: Manipulation of
Component Outside of Procedural Guidance Causes Reactor Trip
The inspectors observed and reviewed the licensees response to the January 3, 2003,
reactor trip due to an operator error while returning a control rod drive motor generator
to service following planned preventive maintenance. The inspectors observed plant
parameters and status and determined the conditions preceding the event. The
inspectors also examined the posttrip review package, discussed the trip with control
room personnel, and attended outage meetings. The licensee properly classified the
event and the inspectors communicated details of the event and classification to
Region IV management.
Refer to paragraph 1R14 in this report for a discussion of the findings associated with
this event.
2. (Closed) LER 50-482/2002-001-00: Voluntary Report of Emergency Diesel Generator
Heat Exchanger Tube Degradation
The issues associated with this LER were discussed and four unresolved items were
opened in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-06. The unresolved items were closed
and a noncited violation was issued in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-04.
4OA6 Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the resident inspection results to Ms. D. Jacobs, Plant
Manager, and other members of licensee management after the conclusion of the
inspection on April 4, 2003.
The inspectors presented the Maintenance Rule inspection results to Mr. R. A. Muench,
President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of licensee management on
February 7, 2003. The licensee acknowledged the information presented.
-15-
The inspectors presented the Physical Security Plan inspection results to Mr. D. Elbe,
Security Manager, verbally on February 21, 2003. The licensee acknowledged the
information presented.
The inspectors presented the Emergency Plan inspection results to Mr. T. East,
Superintendent, Emergency Planning, and other members of licensee management
during a telephonic exit interview conducted on March 18, 2003. The licensee
acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT
Supplemental Information
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
K. A. Harris, Manager, Licensing and Corrective Action
R. Munch, President and Chief Executive Officer
B. T. McKinney, Vice President Operations
D. Jacobs, Plant Manager
W. B. Norton, Director Engineering
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-482/03-03-01 NCV Manipulation of component outside of procedural guidance
causes reactor trip (Section 1R14)
Closed
50-482/03-03-01 NCV Manipulation of component outside of procedural guidance
causes reactor trip (Section 1R14)
50-482/2003-001-00 LER Manipulation of component outside of procedural guidance
causes reactor trip (Section 4OA3)
50-482/2002-001-00 LER Voluntary report of emergency diesel generator heat
exchanger tube degradation (Section 4OA3)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Drill Evaluation
C 03-SA-01, 2003 Semi-Annual Drill, Revision 0
C Technical Support center logs
Equipment Alignment
C CKL AL-120, Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup, Revision 32
C CKL EC-120, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Normal Valve Lineup/Breaker
Checklist, Revision 11
-2-
C CKL EG-120, Component Cooling Water System Valve, Switch and Breaker Lineup,
Revision 34
C CKL EM-120, Safety Injection System Lineup Checklists, Revision 21
C CKL KJ-121, Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Valve Checklist, Revision 24
C M-12EC01, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup
System, Revision 16
C Open fuel pool cooling and cleanup system work orders as of February 12, 2002
C PIRs 2002-0407, -0971, -1237, -1239, -1660, -1981, -2015, -2195, and -2391
Fire Protection
C AP 10-100, Fire Protection Program," Revision 6
C AP 10-106, Fire Preplans," Revision 2
C FPP T-12, Turbine Building General Floor Area 2065' South," Revision 5
C FPP T-13, Turbine Building General Floor Area 2065' North," Revision 6
C Updated Safety Analysis Report fire hazards analysis
Identification and Resolution of Problems
C PIRs 2002-2195, -2391, and -3076
Licensee Event Report Closure
C Design Change Package 09206, Revisions 0 and 1
C OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Revision 18
C PIR 98-3012, 99-1100
Maintenance Rule Documents
C Functional failure evaluations for EC, spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system
C Functional failure evaluations for QD, emergency lighting dc system
C Maintenance rule bases information for QD, emergency lighting dc system
C Maintenance rule bases information for EC, spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system
C Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for QD, emergency lighting dc system
-3-
C Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for EC, spent fuel pool cooling and
cleanup system
C Maintenance rule performance evaluation for EC, spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system
C Maintenance rule performance evaluation for QD, emergency lighting dc system
C MPE BA-010, Preventive Maintenance on Teledyne Emergency Lighting, Revision 10
C PIRs 2002-0194, -0217, -0407, -0439, -0971, -1237, -1239, -1250, -1595, -1660, -1781,
-1783, -1816, -1981, -2015, -2195, and -2391
C Work Orders 02-233306-000, 02-233343-000, 02-233348-000, 02-234251-000,
02-234470-000, 02-235391-000, 02-237383-000, 02-237371-000, 02-243412-005,
02-243688-000, 02-245619-000, 02-246735-000, 02-247021-000, and 02-247022-000
- Functional failure determination checklist for AAPL-01, plant level performance criteria,
initiated by PIR 2002-1180
C Functional failure determination checklist for INS-03, postaccident instrumentation,
initiated by PIR 2002-0173
C Maintenance Rule Paragraph (a)(3) Periodic Assessment Report , SEL 02-005,
(November 7, 2000, through April 27, 2002)
C Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for KE1-1,
provide safe means for handling and transporting new and spent fuel, June 12, 2002
C Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for WS-01,
provide continuous supply of strained water to the power block and nonsafety-related
essential service water system, May 3, 2002
C Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for BM-08,
provide the means to identify a steam generator tube leak, March 19, 2002
C Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for CI-01,
containment isolation, November 23, 1999, and December 7, 2000
C Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for UU-01,
provide remote indication, indicating lights, plan annunciation/BOP computer alarms,
and the ability to select and manually operate remote auxiliaries from the main control
room, February 7, 2001
C SEL 02-005, Maintenance Rule Paragraph (a)(3) periodic assessment report,
November 7, 2000, through April 27, 2002
-4-
Operability Evaluations
C Calculation P-060, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine-Steam Inlet System,
Revision 10
C Calculation M-JE-321, Emergency Diesel Storage Tank and Day Tank Volumes and
Level Limits, Revision 2
C Control room operations logs
C Drawing M-13EP04, Small Piping Isometric Accumulator Safety Injection System
Loop 1 - Reactor Building, Revision 2
C Engineering Disposition CCP 10421, Evaluation of Snubber FC-01R020/135,
Revision 1
C Engineering Disposition CCP 11035, ALVH0030 Over Torque, Revision 0
C PIR 02-3039, 2003-0078, -0096, and -0516
C Piping and Instrumentation Diagram M-12EC01, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup
System, Revision 16
C Work Order 02-246887-000, Evaluation of nonconforming conditions of installed plant
equipment for BBHV14
C Work Order 03-248123-003, Evaluation for active leak on packing or body-bonnet for
EPV0097
C Work Order 03-249601-000, Evaluation of nonconforming conditions of installed plant
equipment for PJE01B
C STS EC-100A, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump A Inservice Pump Test, Revision 15,
conducted on January 15, 2003
C STS KJ-005B, Manual/Auto Start, Synchronization and Loading of Emergency D/G
NE02, Revision 40, conducted on January 23, 2003
Performance Indicator Verification
C Licensee performance indicator worksheets
C Performance indicator summary reports
C Selected NRC Inspection Reports
C Selected control room operator logs
-5-
Postmaintenance Testing
C CKL KJ-121, Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Valve Checklist, Revision 24
C STN AL-201, Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Test, Revision 0
C STS AL-210C, TDAFW Pump Inservice Valve Test, Revision 3
C STS EF-100B, ESW System Inservice Pump B & ESW B Discharge Check Valve Test,
Revision 22
C STS EM-100B, Safety Injection Pump B Inservice Pump Test, Revision 18
C STS EN-100A, Containment Spray Pump A Inservice Pump Test, Revision 15
C STS IC-641A, Slave Relay Test K641 Train A TDAFP Start, Revision 8
C STS KJ-015B, Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02, Revision 16
C SYS KJ-124, Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator B, Revision 16
C Work Orders 94-101437-031, 00-219451-420, 00-219451-466, 00-219451-472,
02-234011-003, 02-237319-000, 02-237319-001, 02-238037-001, 02-240689-001,
02-243342-002, 02-243342-004, 02-243344-002, 02-243344-004, 02-243346-001,
02-243698-001, 02-245272-000, 02-245278-000, 02-245282-000, 02-245510-001,
02-245510-002, 02-245511-001, 02-245783-000, 02-245783-001, 02-245783-002,
02-245864-001, 02-245865-001, 02-245870-001, 02-245940-001, 02-246303-001,
02-246472-000, 02-246472-001, and 02-246516-000
C AP 12-004, Containment Entry and Material Control, Revision 2
C AP 14A-003, Scaffold Construction and Use, Revision 10
C AP 21B-003, Control of Temporary Equipment, Revision 2
C AP 25A-700, Use of Temporary Lead Shielding, Revision 6
C Calculation GS-M-005, Aluminum in Containment, Revision 3
C CKL ZL-001, Auxiliary Building Reading Sheets, Revision 49
C Temporary shielding Request 03134
C Seismic qualification of Scaffolding 03-S0038
C WCGS scaffolding Request 03-S0038
-6-
Procedures
- AI 23M-003, Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Duties and Responsibilities, Revision 3
- AP 23M-001, WCGS Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 4
- AI 23M-007, Engineering Structural Monitoring Walkdowns, Revision 1
- EDI 23M-010, Determination of Structures, Systems, and Components Within the
Scope of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 2
- EDI 23M-020, Determining the Safety Significance of Structures, Systems, and
Components Within the Scope of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 2
- EDI 23M-030, Establishing Performance Criteria for Structures, Systems and
Components Within the Scope of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 2
- EDI 23M-050, Monitoring Performance to Criteria and Goals, Revision 3
- Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes
- February 12 and 23, and March 12, 2001, January 14 and 28, February 11, March 7, 11,
and 22, May 7 and 9, June 17, November 3, July 11 and 15, August 12, September 9,
and December 16 and 17, 2002
Performance Improvement Requests
- 2000-3719, 2001-0195, -0198, -0267, -0268, -0989, -1279, -1758, -2783, -2797,
2002-0439, -2352, -2226, -2699, and -2483