ML023020655
| ML023020655 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/2002 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Forbes J Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-004 IR-02-005 | |
| Download: ML023020655 (42) | |
See also: IR 05000263/2002005
Text
October 25, 2002
Mr. J. Forbes
Site Vice-President
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
2807 West County Road 75
Monticello, MN 55362-9637
SUBJECT:
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
USNRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-263/02-05
Dear Mr. Forbes:
On September 30, 2002, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) completed an
integrated inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report
documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 3, 2002, with Mr. Jack
Purkis and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the USNRC identified one finding of very low safety
significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation. If you contest the subject or
severity of this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of
this inspection report, with a basis for your denial, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4351; the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the
Resident Inspectors' Office at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Station.
A previous inspection report, 50-263/02-04, dated July 24, 2002, contained an administrative
error in the table of "Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed" on page 27. Please be advised
that NCV No. 50-263/02-04-02 was listed in the "Closed" section in error. No such enforcement
item was ever opened.
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the USNRC issued an Order and
several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees' capabilities and
readiness to respond to a potential attack. The USNRC established a deadline of
September 1, 2002, for licensees to complete modifications and process upgrades required by
the order. In order to confirm compliance with this order, the USNRC issued Temporary
Instruction 2515/148, and over the next year the USNRC will inspect each licensee in
accordance with this Temporary Instruction. The USNRC continues to monitor overall security
J. Forbes
-2-
controls and may issue additional temporary instructions or require additional inspections
should conditions warrant.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the USNRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the USNRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of USNRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the USNRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by Geoffrey Wright Acting for/
Bruce L. Burgess, Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-263
License No. DPR-22
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-263/02-05
cc w/encl:
J. Purkis, Plant Manager
R. Anderson, Executive Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Nuclear Asset Manager
Site Licensing Manager
Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Health
J. Silberg, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge
R. Nelson, President
Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens
Association (MECCA)
Commissioner, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
D. Gruber, Auditor/Treasurer
Wright County Government Center
Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Commerce
P. Marker, Office of Attorney General
DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML023020655.wpd
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy
OFFICE
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NAME
GWright/trn
BBurgess
DATE
10/24/02
10/25/02
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
J. Forbes
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ADAMS Distribution:
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket No:
50-263
License No:
Report No:
50-263/02-05
Licensee:
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
Facility:
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Location:
2807 West Highway 75
Monticello, MN 55362
Dates:
July 1 through September 30, 2002
Inspectors:
S. Burton, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Kimble, Resident Inspector
J. Adams, Senior Resident Inspector - Prairie Island
R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
M. Mitchell, Radiation Specialist
G. Wright, Project Engineer
Approved by:
Bruce L. Burgess, Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
2
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000263-02-05; Nuclear Management Company, LLC; on 07/01-09/30/2002, Monticello
Nuclear Generating Plant. Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control.
This report covers a 3 month period of baseline resident inspection and announced baseline
inspections in radiation protection and emergency preparedness. The inspections were
conducted by resident inspectors and Region III inspectors. One Green finding was identified.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings
for which the SDP does not apply may be "Green," or be assigned a severity level after USNRC
management review. The USNRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial
nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3,
dated July 2000.
A.
Inspection Finding
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
Green. A finding and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) for failure to follow
applicable procedural guidance as required by Technical Specifications were identified
by NRC inspectors. The finding and NCV were associated with a loss of spent fuel pool
cooling which resulted from an improper licensee valve tagout/clearance operation.
Because the decay heat load in the spent fuel pool was relatively low, the spent fuel
pool temperature only increased from 90.5 degrees Fahrenheit to approximately
96.5 degrees Fahrenheit and the event involved only the fuel cladding barrier, the
finding was determined through a Phase 1 SDP to be of very low safety significance and
within the licensee response band. (Section 1R13)
B.
Licensee Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.
3
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The plant began the inspection period operating at full power. On August 4, 2002, operators
were forced to reduce power to approximately 90 percent in response to problems with the
"D" demineralizer vessel in the condensate system. Full power operation was resumed later
that same day. On August 10, 2002, power was reduced to approximately 75 percent to
facilitate normal periodic main steam valve testing and control rod pattern adjustments. Full
power operation was resumed again on August 11, 2002. The plant operated at or near full
power for the remainder of the inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and
1R04
Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1
Partial Train/System Alignment Verification
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following equipment trains to verify
operability and proper equipment lineup. These systems were selected based upon risk
significance, plant configuration, system work or testing, or inoperable or degraded
conditions.
Division II Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) with Division I Out-of-Service
for Routine Maintenance (Week Ending 9/14)
Vital Electrical Distribution While Stand-by Liquid Control System Was Out of
Service for Surveillance Testing (Week Ending 7/13)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) During Performance of Emergency Core
Cooling System (ECCS) Initiation Sensor Testing (Week Ending 9/27)
The inspectors verified the position of critical redundant equipment and looked for any
discrepancies between the existing equipment lineup and the required lineup.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4
.2
Semiannual Complete System Alignment Verification
a.
Inspection Scope
Due to the systems risk significance, the inspectors selected the RCIC system for a
complete walkdown. The inspectors walked down the system to verify mechanical and
electrical equipment lineups, component labeling, component lubrication, component
and equipment cooling, hangers and supports, operability of support systems, and to
ensure that ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with equipment operation.
(Week Ending 7/20)
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05
Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1
Quarterly Fire Zone Inspections
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down multiple plant areas important to safety to assess the
material condition of reactor plant active and passive fire protection systems and
features and to look for any fire protection issues. The inspectors selected several
areas containing systems, structures, or components that the licensee identified as
important to reactor safety. (7/15 through 7/27)
Fire Zone A.3-13-A, Lube Oil Storage Tank Room
Fire Zone A.3-13-B, Reactor Feed Pump and Lube Oil Reservoir Room
Fire Zone A.3-13-C, Turbine Building 911' Elevation East Motor Control Center
(MCC) Area
Fire Zone A.3-15-B, No. 11 Diesel Generator Room and Day Tank Rooms
Fire Zone A.3-18-A, Hot Machine Shop
Fire Zone A.3-18-B, Oil Drum Storage Room
Fire Zone A.3-20, Auxiliary Boiler Room
Fire Zone A.3-21, Radwaste Shipping Building
Fire Zone A.3-04-D, Standby Gas Treatment Room
The inspectors reviewed the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire
detection equipment, manual suppression capabilities, passive suppression capabilities,
automatic suppression capabilities, and barriers to fire propagation.
5
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
Annual Fire Drill Observation
a.
Inspection Scope
On September 1, 2002, the inspectors conducted an annual observation of the stations
fire brigade during a drill which simulated a lubricating oil fire on the turbine building
911 elevation in and around the area of MCC 133. The inspectors evaluated the
readiness of the licensees personnel to prevent and fight fires by verifying that:
protective clothing/turnout gear was properly donned; self-contained breathing
apparatus equipment was properly worn and used; fire hose lines were capable of
reaching all necessary fire hazard locations, the lines were laid out without flow
constrictions, the hoses were simulated being charged with water, and the nozzles were
pattern (flow stream) tested prior to entering the fire area; the fire area was entered in a
controlled manner; sufficient fire fighting equipment was brought to the scene by the fire
brigade; the fire brigade leaders directions were thorough, clear, and effective;
communications with plant operators and between fire brigade members were efficient
and effective; the fire brigade checked for fire victims and for fire propagation into other
plant areas; effective smoke removal operations were simulated; fire fighting pre-plan
strategies were utilized; and the drill scenario was followed and the drill objectives met.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06
Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a.
Inspection Scope
Over several weeks in August 2002, the inspectors reviewed the licensees flooding
mitigation plans and equipment to determine consistency with design requirements and
risk analysis assumptions. Specifically, the inspectors conducted a review of the
licensees plans and equipment intended to control internal flooding within the
safety-related intake structure. Applicable walkdowns and reviews were performed that
considered design measures, seals, drain systems, contingency equipment condition,
availability of temporary equipment and barriers, performance and surveillance tests,
procedural adequacy, and planned compensatory measures.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
6
1R11
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
a.
Inspection Scope
On September 4, 2002, the inspectors observed a training crew during an evaluated
simulator scenario and reviewed licensed operator performance in mitigating the
consequences of events. The scenario included an inadvertent initiation of RCIC, a loss
and subsequent recovery of a load center, and an accidental containment isolation
accompanied by a failure of control rods to insert. The transient resulted in the
operating crew implementing multiple emergency operating procedures while
responding to the failure to scram and associated torus heating. Areas observed by the
inspectors included: clarity and formality of communications, timeliness of actions,
prioritization of activities, procedural adequacy and implementation, control board
manipulations, managerial oversight, emergency plan execution, simulator
configuration, and group dynamics.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12
Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees handling of performance issues and the
associated implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) to evaluate
maintenance effectiveness for the selected system. The following system was selected
based on being designated as risk significant under the Maintenance Rule, being in the
increased monitoring (Maintenance Rule category a(1)) group, or due to an inspector
identified issue or problem that potential impacted system work practices, reliability, or
common cause failures:
Instrument Air System Piping Leak and Repair (Weeks Ending 8/3 - 8/17)
The inspectors review included verification of the licensee's categorization of specific
issues, including evaluation of the performance criteria, appropriate work practices,
identification of common cause errors, extent of condition, and trending of key
parameters. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the
maintenance rule requirements, including a review of scoping, goal-setting, performance
monitoring, short-term and long-term corrective actions, functional failure determinations
associated with the condition reports reviewed, and current equipment performance
status.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
7
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed and observed emergent work, preventive maintenance, or
planning for risk significant maintenance activities. The inspectors observed
maintenance or planning for the following activities or risk significant systems
undergoing scheduled or emergent maintenance:
Weekly Scheduling and Planning Meetings (All Weeks)
Outage Planning and Emergent Work Review (All Weeks)
Risk Management During Reactor Protection System Testing Combined With
Rescheduled Standby Liquid Control System Testing (Week Ending 7/13)
Risk Management During Identification and Resolution of Cooling Tower and
Basin Instrument Air System Leak (Weeks Ending 8/3 and 8/10)
Emergent Maintenance and Risk Management for Repair of 11 Control Rod
Drive Hydraulic Pump Leaking Casing (Week Ending 8/17)
Maintenance and Risk Management During Work on Fuel Pool Cooling System
and Subsequent Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling Event (Week Ending 8/24)
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's evaluation of plant risk, risk management,
scheduling, and configuration control for these activities in coordination with other
scheduled risk significant work. The inspectors verified that the licensee's control of
activities considered assessment of baseline and cumulative risk, management of plant
configuration, control of maintenance, and external impacts on risk. In-plant activities
were reviewed to ensure that the risk assessment of maintenance or emergent work
was complete and adequate, and that the assessment included an evaluation of external
factors. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee entered the appropriate
risk category for the evolutions.
b.
Findings
(1)
Introduction
A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV for failure to
follow applicable procedural guidance were identified by inspectors. The finding and
NCV were associated with the loss of spent fuel pool cooling which resulted from an
improper licensee valve tagout/clearance operation.
(2)
Description
On August 23, 2002, the licensee initiated a tagout to isolate the No. 12 fuel pool
filter/demineralizer for planned maintenance. Included in this tagout was valve
AO-2807, the drain valve for the in-service No. 11 fuel pool filter/demineralizer. As
8
indicated on the licensees spent fuel pool cooling system drawing, AO-2807 was a
normally closed, fail closed valve. Thus, the licensees tagout called for AO-2807 to be
tagged in the shut position with operating air removed from the valve.
When plant operators applied the tagout to AO-2807 and removed the valves operating
air, the valve unexpectedly moved to the open position. This immediately established a
drain path between the operating train of spent fuel cooling and the waste sludge tank in
the radwaste system. Approximately 10 minutes elapsed before operators in the field
were informed of the problem by the control room, returned to AO-2807, and reapplied
operating air to shut the valve. During this time, approximately 2000 gallons, or
25 percent of the available surge volume, was drained from the operating train of spent
fuel pool cooling to the radwaste system. Although actual spent fuel pool level was
never affected, the loss of inventory from the surge tank brought in multiple alarms in
the control room, including the spent fuel pool surge tank low-low level alarm, which
caused the operating spent fuel pool cooling pump to trip. Control room operators
immediately entered the abnormal operating procedure for loss of spent fuel pool
cooling. Recognizing that the decay heat load in the spent fuel pool was relatively small,
the operations crew was able to take well planned and deliberate steps to restore flow to
the spent fuel pool cooling system. Although spent fuel pool cooling flow was not
reestablished until almost 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> later because of ongoing maintenance on various
parts of the system, spent fuel pool temperature increased by only 6 degrees Fahrenheit
over that time due to the low amount of decay heat being produced by the irradiated fuel
in the pool.
Upon investigation of this event, the licensee identified that the licensed operators who
had prepared the tagout and the system engineer for the spent fuel pool cooling system
had missed critical information concerning the operation of AO-2807. General
precautions regarding AO-2807 listed in the licensees operating procedures for the
spent fuel cooling system warn personnel against removing air from the valve operator,
as the spring force is insufficient, by design, to maintain the valve in the closed position
against normal system pressure and flow. Additionally, the licensees investigation
revealed that special gagging devices were available specifically for AO-2807 to hold it
closed against system pressure and flow. However, these devices were in the
possession of a previous system engineer and neither the current system engineer nor
any of the operations personnel involved with the tagout had any knowledge of their
existence.
(3)
Analysis
With respect to the tagout for the isolation of No. 12 fuel pool filter/demineralizer, the
inspectors determined that the licensees failure to recognize established procedural
guidance regarding the inability of AO-2807 to remain in the closed position without
control air constituted a performance deficiency in accordance with USNRC Inspection
Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Dispositioning Screening." Further, the
inspectors determined that the loss of spent fuel pool cooling event which resulted from
this performance deficiency was more than minor in that it directly affected the objective
of the Barrier Integrity Reactor Safety Cornerstone.
9
With respect to the irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool, the primary physical design
barrier which provides protection to the public is the fuel cladding. The spent fuel pool
cooling system is designed to remove decay heat and thereby maintain fuel cladding
integrity. Thus, the tagout error(s) by the licensee which resulted in the loss of the
in-service spent fuel pool cooling train had an effect on the fuel cladding temperature of
the spent fuel in the spent fuel pool. Specifically, the loss of the in-service train of spent
fuel pool cooling resulted in a measurable cladding temperature increase.
In order to determine the significance of the event, the inspectors performed a
Phase 1 SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of
Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations." The inspectors concluded that
because the decay heat load in the spent fuel pool was relatively low, the spent fuel pool
temperature only increased from 90.5 degrees Fahrenheit to approximately 96.5 degrees
Fahrenheit, and the event involved only the fuel cladding barrier, the finding was of very
low safety significance (Green) and within the licensee response band.
(4)
Enforcement
Technical Specification 6.5.A.1, via Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A,
requires that the licensee establish and follow appropriately approved procedures for the
operation of the spent fuel pool cooling system. Contrary to this requirement, the
licensee failed to follow approved procedural guidance in Operations Manual Section
B.02.01-05 related to the operation of the AO-2807 valve when the valve was tagged in
the shut position with control air removed to support work on No. 12 fuel pool
filter/demineralizer on August 23, 2002. This violation is being treated as a NCV
consistent with Section VI.A of the USNRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-263/02-05-01).
The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 20027940.
Planned corrective actions include procedural and component database enhancements
regarding the use of this type of air operated valve as an isolation boundary, and
enhancements to the system engineer turnover process.
1R15
Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the following operability evaluations to
determine the impact on Technical Specifications, the significance of the evaluations,
and to ensure that adequate justifications were documented.
12 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Lube Oil Lead Content Increasing to the
Point of Additional Monitoring (Week Ending 8/10)
Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors Not Maintained as Safety-Related (Week
Ending 8/24)
Diesel Fire Pump Discharge Check Valve Inadequate Bolting (Week Ending 8/31)
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Corner Room Calculation Assumptions
Inconsistent with Current Plant Operating Practices (Week Ending 8/31)
10
Operability evaluations were selected based upon the relationship of the safety-related
system, structure, or component to risk.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16
Operator Workarounds (71111.16)
a.
Inspection Scope
During the week ending September 21, 2002, the inspectors reviewed Operations
Challenge No.02-042, "Annunciator 7-B-17 For Vacuum 24 Inch Trip No. 2 Alarmed."
The inspectors reviewed the workarounds potential to impact the operators ability to
respond to a decreasing condenser vacuum situation.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R17
Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)
a.
Inspection Scope
During the week ending August 24, 2002, the inspectors reviewed an alteration to the
control room emergency filtration train (EFT) charcoal filters to verify that the design
basis, licensing basis, and performance capability of the system was not degraded by the
alteration. The inspectors also verified that the alteration did not place the plant in an
unsafe configuration.
The inspectors considered the design adequacy of the alteration by performing a review
of the alterations impact on plant electrical requirements, material requirements and
replacement components, response time, control signals, equipment protection,
operation, failure modes, and other related process requirements.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19
Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the following post-maintenance activities for review. Activities
were selected based upon the structure, system, or components ability to impact risk.
No. 12 EDG Testing Following Speed Changer Motor Replacement (Week
Ending 7/6)
11
Post Maintenance Testing of RCIC Following Repairs to Leaking Components
(Week Ending 7/27)
Post Maintenance Testing Following Failure of HPCI Test Return Line Control Air
Supply (Week Ending 8/17)
Post Maintenance Testing Following Routine Scheduled Work on the Diesel Fire
Pump (Week Ending 8/24)
Post Maintenance Testing Following Routine Preventative Maintenance of
Division I RHR LPCI Inboard Isolation Valve, MO-2014 (Week Ending 9/14)
Post Maintenance Testing Following Routine Preventative Maintenance on No. 13
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pump Motor Cooler (Week
Ending 9/14)
The inspectors verified by witnessing the test or reviewing the test data that
post-maintenance testing activities were adequate for the above maintenance activities.
The inspectors reviews included, but were not limited to, integration of testing activities,
applicability of acceptance criteria, test equipment calibration and control, procedural use
and compliance, control of temporary modifications or jumpers required for test
performance, documentation of test data, Technical Specification applicability, system
restoration, and evaluation of test data. Also, the inspectors verified that maintenance
and post-maintenance testing activities adequately ensured that the equipment met the
licensing basis, Technical Specifications, and Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)
design requirements.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22
Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the following surveillance test activities for review. Activities
were selected based upon risk significance and the potential risk impact from an
unidentified deficiency or performance degradation that a system, structure, or
component could impose on the unit if the condition were left unresolved.
ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] Drywell Pressure Sensor Test (Week
Ending 7/27)
Drywell High Pressure Scram Test and Calibration (Week Ending 7/27)
Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram Test and Calibration (Week
Ending 7/27)
Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Operability Test (Week Ending 7/27)
12
GE 7700 Line Motor Control Center Maintenance Procedure (Week Ending 7/27)
Main Steam Isolation Instrument Test and Calibration (Week Ending 8/24)
Fire Protection Heat Actuated Detector Tests (Week Ending 9/21)
The inspectors observed the performance of surveillance testing activities, including
reviews for preconditioning, integration of testing activities, applicability of acceptance
criteria, test equipment calibration and control, procedural use, control of temporary
modifications or jumpers required for test performance, documentation of test data,
Technical Specification applicability, impact of testing relative to performance indicator
reporting, and evaluation of test data.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23
Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modifications:
Drywell Equipment Drain Pump Bypass of Standby Function (Week Ending 9/28)
Disable of High Temperature Alarm for CRD-24-47 (Week Ending 10/5)
The inspectors reviewed the safety screening, design documents, USAR, and applicable
Technical Specifications to determine that the temporary modification was consistent with
modification documents, drawings and procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the
post-installation test results to confirm that tests were satisfactory and the actual impact
of the temporary modification on the permanent system and interfacing systems were
adequately verified.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP2
Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing (71114.02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors discussed with emergency preparedness (EP) staff the design,
equipment, and periodic testing of the public ANS for the Monticello reactor facility
emergency planning zone to verify that the system was properly tested and maintained.
The inspectors also reviewed procedures and records for a 15 month period ending
June 2002, related to ANS testing, annual preventive maintenance, and non-scheduled
maintenance. The inspectors reviewed the licensees documentation for determining
whether each model of siren installed in the emergency planning zone would perform as
13
expected if fully activated. Records used to document and trend component failures for
each model of installed siren were also reviewed to ensure that corrective actions were
taken for test failures or system anomalies.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP3
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testing (71114.03)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees ERO augmentation testing to verify that the
licensee maintained and tested the ability to staff the ERO during an emergency in a
timely manner. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed quarterly, off-hours staff
augmentation test procedures, dated August 7, 2002, April 30, 2002, February 6, 2002,
November 1, 2001, August 7, 2001, May 8, 2001, February 8, 2001, November 14, 2000,
and August 7, 2000, test records, primary and backup provisions for off-hours notification
of the Monticello reactor facility emergency responders, and the current ERO rosters for
Monticello. The inspectors also reviewed and discussed the facility EP staffs provisions
for maintaining ERO call out lists.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP5
Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (71114.05)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the nuclear oversight staffs 2001 - 2002 audits and field
observations to ensure that these audits complied with the requirements of
10 CFR 50.54(t), and to ensure that the licensee adequately identified and corrected
deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed the EP staffs 2002 self assessment and
critiques to evaluate the EP staffs efforts to identify and correct weaknesses and
deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of EP items, condition
reports, and action requests related to the facilitys EP program to determine whether
corrective actions were acceptably completed.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
14
1EP6
Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a.
Inspection Scope
On September 4, 2002, the inspectors observed a simulator-based training evolution to
evaluate drill conduct and the adequacy of the licensees critique of performance to
identify weaknesses and deficiencies. The inspectors selected simulator scenarios that
the licensee had scheduled as providing input to the Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator.
The inspectors observed the classification of events, notifications to off-site agencies,
protective action recommendation development, and drill critiques. Observations were
compared to the licensees observations and corrective action program entries. The
inspectors verified that there were no discrepancies between observed performance and
performance indicator reported statistics. The simulator scenario observed resulted in an
alert classification.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control
.1
Plant Walkdowns, Radiological Boundary Verifications, and Radiation Work Permit
Reviews (71121.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector conducted walkdowns of the radiologically restricted area to verify the
adequacy of radiological boundaries and postings. Specifically, the inspector walked
down several high and locked high radiation area boundaries in the reactor and turbine
buildings. The inspector observed the pre-job briefing and reviewed the radiation work
permit for main steam low pressure surveillance testing for protective clothing
requirements, dosimetry requirements including electronic dosimeter set points,
boundary controls, and radiation monitoring locations.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
15
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS1
Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems
.1
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) (71122.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the 2001 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report to
verify that the radiological effluent program was implemented as described in the
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
(ODCM). The inspector reviewed the report for significant changes to the ODCM and to
the design and operation of the radioactive waste processing system. The inspector also
reviewed revisions made to the ODCM in calendar year 2001 and the justifications for the
changes, to verify they were completed and reported in accordance with Technical
Specifications and the ODCM.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
Gaseous and Liquid Release Systems Walkdowns (71122.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector performed walkdowns of selected components of the liquid and gaseous
effluent monitoring and control systems, including point of discharge effluent radiation
monitors to verify that the current system configuration was as described in the USAR
and was consistent with the ODCM, and to observe equipment material condition. The
inspector also discussed the gaseous waste processing system, including operations and
components with the cognizant system engineer.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3
Gaseous and Liquid Releases (71122.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed liquid and gaseous radioactive waste (radwaste) release records
to verify that appropriate treatment equipment were used and that the radwaste effluents
were processed and released in accordance with the ODCM. As there were no liquid
batch releases performed during the inspection, the inspector reviewed the release
packages for two small unplanned liquid effluent releases made in 2001 and reported in
the 2001 Radioactive Effluent Release Report. The inspector reviewed the release
calculations to verify that the licensees release procedures and practices, including dose
projections to members of the public and use of station specific scaling factors, were
16
technically sound and conformed to ODCM methodology and Technical Specification
requirements. The inspector also reviewed selected gaseous effluent release data
including results of chemistry sample analyses, to independently verify that the data was
properly used to complete calculations of offsite dose. Additionally, the inspector
reviewed sample collection data to verify that compensatory samples were taken and
properly analyzed as required by the ODCM when the discharge canal water monitor was
out of service.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4
Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Monitor Calibration
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed records of instrument calibrations performed since the last
inspection for selected point of discharge effluent radiation monitors, to determine if they
had been calibrated consistent with industry standards and in accordance with station
procedures and the ODCM. Specifically, the inspector reviewed the calibration records
for:
Reactor Building Vent Wide Range Gas Monitor
Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor
Discharge Canal Monitor
Service Water Monitor
The inspector also reviewed current alarm setpoint values for these monitors to assess
compliance with ODCM requirements. Additionally, the inspector examined the
licensee's calendar year 2000 through 2001 data for tracking the reliability and
maintenance of selected point of discharge effluent radiation monitors, to assess the
adequacy of the licensee's efforts to identify repetitive problems and improve the overall
operating condition of the effluent radiation monitoring system.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5
Dose Calculations (71122.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the 2001 annual dose calculations and a selection of year
2002 monthly dose calculations to ensure that the licensee had properly calculated the
offsite dose to the public from radiological effluent releases, and to determine if any
17
annual Technical Specifications or ODCM (i.e., Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 values)
limits were exceeded.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6
Air Cleaning Systems (71122.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed air cleaning system surveillance test results to ensure that test
results were within the licensees acceptance criteria. The inspector reviewed
surveillance test results for the station vent flow to verify that the flow rates were
consistent with USAR values.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.7
Counting Room Instrument Calibrations and Quality Control (71122.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the quality control records for radiochemistry instrumentation
used to identify and quantify radioisotopes in effluents, to verify that the instrumentation
was calibrated and maintained as required by site procedures. This review included
calibrations of gamma spectroscopy systems.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8
Interlaboratory Comparison Program (71122.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the results of the 2001 Interlaboratory Comparison Program in
order to assess the quality of radioactive effluent sample analyses performed by the
licensee. The inspector reviewed the licensees quality control evaluation of the
interlaboratory comparison program and associated corrective actions for any
deficiencies identified.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
18
.9
Identification and Resolution of Problems (71122.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed audits and self-assessments conducted during 2001 to evaluate
the effectiveness of the licensees self-assessment process in the identification,
characterization, and prioritization of problems. Selected condition reports written during
2000, 2001, and year to date 2002, that addressed radioactive treatment and monitoring
program deficiencies were also reviewed to verify that the licensee had effectively
implemented the corrective action program.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3.
SAFEGUARDS
Cornerstone: Physical Protection (PP)
3PP3
Response to Contingency Events (71130.03)
The Office of Homeland Security (OHS) developed a Homeland Security Advisory
System (HSAS) to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks. The
HSAS implements five color-coded threat conditions with a description of corresponding
actions at each level. USNRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2002-12a, dated
August 19, 2002, NRC Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System, discusses the
HSAS and provides additional information on protective measures to licensees.
a.
Inspection Scope
On September 10, 2002, the USNRC issued a Safeguards Advisory to reactor licensees
to implement the protective measures described in RIS 2002-12a in response to the
Federal government declaration of threat level "Orange." Subsequently, on
September 24, 2002, the OHS downgraded the national security threat condition to
"Yellow" and a corresponding reduction in the risk of a terrorist threat.
The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and security staff, observed the conduct
of security operations, and assessed licensee implementation of the threat level
"Orange" protective measures. Inspection results were communicated to regional and
headquarters security staff for further evaluation.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
19
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
Cornerstones: Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness
.1
Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity Performance Indicator Verification
a.
Inspection Scope
During the week ending July 27, 2002, the inspectors reviewed licensee event reports
(LERs), licensee memoranda, plant logs, and prior USNRC inspection reports to verify
the following performance indicators for the 3rd quarter of 2002:
Safety System Functional Failures
Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicator Verification
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector verified that the licensee had accurately reported the following
performance indicators:
ERO Drill Participation
Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP)
Specifically, the inspector reviewed the licensees PI records, data reported to the
USNRC, and condition reports for the period April 2001 through June 2002 to identify any
occurrences that were not identified by the licensee. Records of relevant control room
simulator training sessions, periodic ANS tests, and excerpts of drill and exercise
scenario and evaluations were also reviewed.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
20
.3
Data Submission Issue
a.
Inspection Scope
During the week ending July 27, 2002, the inspectors reviewed the data submitted by the
licensee for the 3rd quarter 2002 performance indicators for any inconsistencies prior to
its public release in accordance with IMC 0608, "Performance Indicator Program."
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
.1
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-263/2002-004: Unplanned Loss of Both
Trains of Control Room Ventilation During Auto Start Testing Due to Timing Circuit Relay
Failure
On April 1, 2002, both trains of the control room ventilation system (CRV) were found to
be inoperable during routine surveillance testing. During performance of the test, Train B
of CRV is made inoperable to induce a low flow signal and validate the auto start feature
of Train A. Upon performance of the test CRV Train A failed to auto start, thereby
causing both trains of CRV to be simultaneously inoperable. Upon discovery,
appropriate Technical Specifications were entered and all conditions of the license met.
The inspectors reviewed the issue and determined the safety significance to be very low
because, with the exception of the performance of the test, both the Train B auto start
feature and the Train A manual initiation feature were always operable. The licensee has
entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report
(CR) 20023185.
4OA4 Cross-cutting Issues
Human Performance
A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV for failure to
follow applicable procedural guidance were identified by inspectors. The finding and
NCV were associated with a loss of spent fuel pool cooling which resulted from an
improper licensee valve tagout/clearance operation. The cause of the improper valve
tagout/clearance operation was the system engineers and licensed operators lack of
understanding of the system and their failure to adhere to the cautions in the system
operating procedure. A contributing cause was a less than complete turnover from the
previous system engineer. The errors involved were determined to be human
performance related. (Section 1R13)
21
4OA6 Meetings
.1
Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Purkis and other members of
licensee management on October 3, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified.
.2
Interim Exit Meetings
Interim exit meetings were conducted for:
Emergency Preparedness Inspections with Mr. J. Purkis on August 16, 2002
Radiation Protection Inspections with Mr. J. Purkis on August 23, 2002
22
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
R. Baumer, Licensing
G. Bregg, Manager, Quality Services
G. Brevig, Internal Assessment Supervisor
T. Corrigan, Radiation Protection Technician
D. Fadel, Director of Engineering
J. Forbes, Site Vice-President
J. Grubb, General Superintendent, Operations
M. Holmes, Chemistry Supervisor
G. Holthaus, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
D. Horgen, Emergency Preparedness Instructor
K. Jepson, General Superintendent, Chemistry and Radiation Services
B. Linde, Superintendent, Security
D. Neve, Licensing Project Manager
D. Pedersen, Acting Emergency Preparedness Manager
J. Purkis, Plant Manager
B. Sawatzke, General Superintendent, Maintenance
C. Schibonski, General Superintendent, Safety Assessment
E. Sopkin, General Superintendent, Engineering
A. Ward, Business Support Manager
L. Wilkerson, Operations Support
B. Burgess, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
23
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-263/02-05-01
Tagout/Isolation Error Discharges 2000 Gallons From Fuel Pool
Surge Tank To Radwaste and Results in Loss of Spent Fuel Pool
Cooling (Sections 1R13 and 4OA4)
Closed
50-263/02-05-01
Tagout/Isolation Error Discharges 2000 Gallons From Fuel Pool
Surge Tank To Radwaste and Results in Loss of Spent Fuel Pool
Cooling (Sections 1R13 and 4OA4)
50-263/2002-004
LER
Unplanned Loss of Both Trains of Control Room Ventilation
During Auto Start Testing Due to Timing Circuit Relay Failure
(Section 4OA3.1)
Discussed
None.
24
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
Alternating Current
Alert and Notification System
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Anticipated Transient Without Scram
AWI
Administrative Work Instruction
Continuous Air Monitor
CFR
Code of Federal Requirements
CR
Condition Report
Control Rod Drive
Control Room Ventilation
Design Basis Document
Direct Current
Drill and Exercise Performance
Division of Reactor Projects
Drywell
Drywell Equipment Drain Sump
Emergency Filtration Train
Electromotive Division
Electronic Pressure Regulator
FOI
Follow-On Item
High Pressure Core Injection
Homeland Security Advisory System
IMC
Inspection Manual Chapter
Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IR
Inspection Report
LCO
Limiting Condition For Operation
LER
Licensee Event Report
Low Pressure Core Injection
Motor Control Center
Non-Cited Violation
NEI
Nuclear Energy Institute
Nuclear Management Company
Nuclear Management and Resources Council
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Office of Homeland Security
OWI
Operations Work Instruction
Piping and Instrumentation Drawing
PANS
Public Alert Notification System
Performance Indicator
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Refueling Outage
25
Residual Heat Removal Service Water
Regulatory Issue Summary
Radiation Protection
Radiation Protection Specialist
SCTMT
Significance Determination Process
Safety Evaluation Report
Safety Review Item
TS
Technical Specification
Updated Safety Analysis Report
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
26
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1R04
Equipment Alignment
NF-36298-1
Electrical Load Flow One Line Diagram
Revision P
B.9.13
Instrument AC and Uninterruptible AC
Distribution System
NH-36251
P&ID RCIC (Steam Side) Diagram
Revision AN
NH-36252
P&ID RCIC (Water Side) Diagram
Revision AC
B.02.03-01
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Functional and
General Description of System
November 3, 2000
B.02.03-02
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Description of
Equipment
December 15, 2000
B.02.03-03
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Instrumentation
and Controls
November 3, 2000
B.02.03-05
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Operation
June 24, 2002
CR 20011367
Drain Line Configuration for RCIC 50 As-shown
does not match As-Built
March 8, 2001
CR 20011420
Potential to Pressurize HPCI and RCIC Suction
Piping Above Design Not Recognized in Check
Valve Cold S/V Tests
March 9, 2001
CR 20012898
Failed PMT per WO 0107737 Results in RCIC
Inoperability for Additional 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
May 25, 2001
CR 20014637
Basis For RCIC Cooling Water Flow
Requirement Cannot Be Located
September 11, 2001
CR 20016336
Declared RCIC Inoperable and Entered
Unplanned LCO Due to Indicated Turbine Inlet
Drain Pot High Level
October 20, 2001
CR 20021666
Drawing Discrepancies Noted on Three RCIC
Drawings
February 22, 2002
CR 20024414
MO-2076 Failed to Fully Open During RCIC
Steam Line High Area Temperature Test and
Calibration
May 8, 2002
CR 20025729
Final Results of RCIC Design Self Assessment
June 21, 2002
CR 20025730
Declining Trend of RCIC NRC Indicators for
Several Quarters
June 21, 2002
27
CR 20026529
RCIC-65 was Physically Moved During RFO
2001 and Champs was Not Updated
July 16, 2002
M-121
Residual Heat Removal System (Division I)
Revision BM
2120
Plant Prestart Checklist RHR System
Revision 8
2154-12
Residual Heat Removal System Prestart Valve
Checklist
Revision 35
B.3.4
Operations Manual: Residual Heat Removal
System
Revision 4
Section 6.2
USAR:
- Emergency Core Cooling Systems
Revision 19
M-120
Residual Heat Removal System (Division II)
Revision BJ
1R05
Fire Protection
NX-16991
Technical Manual, Monticello Updated Fire
Hazards Analysis
A.3-13A
A.3-13B
A.3-13C
A.3-15B
A.3-18A
A.3-18B
A.3-20
A.3-21
A.3-04D
Pre-Fire Strategies:
- Lube Oil Storage Tank Room
- Reactor Feedpump and Lube Oil Reservoir
Room
- Turbine Building 911 Elevation East MCC Area
- No. 11 Diesel Generator Room and Day Tank
Rooms
- Hot Machine Shop
- Oil Drum Storage Room
- Auxiliary Boiler Room
- Radwaste Shipping Building
- Standby Gas Treatment Room
Revision 3
Revision 5
Revision 2*
Revision 6
Revision 3
Revision 2
Revision 4
Revision 3
Revision 3*
A.2-101
2176
Drill Guide No. 15
5790-103-01
Procedures and Forms:
- Classification of Emergencies
- Fire Drill Procedure
- Fire at MCC 133 and Reactor Feed Pump Area
- Alert Checklist
Revision 28
Revision 12
Revision 11
1R06
Flood Protection Measures
DBD - T.5
Design Basis Document (DBD) T.5, External
Flooding
28
91-0126
91-0125
91-0073
Design Basis Document Follow-On Items (FOI):
- Emergency Procedure A.6, Section B
(Flooding) Concerns
- Unlocated External Flood Study Documents
- Predicted Delivery Time for Sandbags
Individual Plant Examination of External Events
(IPEEE)
Section 12.2.1.7.1
Section 2.4.1
Section 1.3.1.4
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR):
- External Flooding
- Surface Water
- Hydrology
Revision 19
M-801
M-803
M-804
M-805
Intake Structure Drawings
A.6
Operations Manual:
- External Flooding
Revision 0
NH-178639
Flood Barriers for A.6 Acts of Nature Procedure
Revision A
NH-33453
Intake Structure Sections and Detail - Sheet 1
Revision A
NF-36454
Intake Structure Plan at Elevation 919-0"
Revision D
MNTS-83-0438
Flood Protection Requirements for Maximum
Probable Flood, 82-02-SPEC
FOI 96-0116
Qualification of the Intake Structure Pump Room
Slab and Hatches Due to Probable Maximum
Flood Uplift Pressure Loads
3/11/93
1R11
Licensed Operator Requalification Program
RQ-SS-08E
Simulator Exercise Guide - Spurious Group 1
With an ATWS
Revision 6
B.03.05-05.G.1
Standby Liquid Control System
Revision 9
C.4-G
Inadvertent ECCS Initiation
Revision 2
C.5-3101
Alternate Rod Insertion
Revision 3
C.5.3205
Terminate and Prevent Injection
Revision 2
29
1R12
Maintenance Effectiveness
93-01
93-01, Section 11
NUMARC [Nuclear Management and Resources
Council]:
- Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline for
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at
Nuclear Power Plants
- Assessment of Risk Resulting from the
Performance of Maintenance Activities
Revision 2
February 22, 2000
1.160
1.182
Regulatory Guides:
- Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at
Nuclear Power Plants
- Assessing and Managing Risk Before
Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants
Revision 2
May 2000
05.02.01
Engineering Work Instruction, Monticello
Maintenance Rule Program Document
Revision 5
B.8.4.1
Operations Manual:
- Instrument and Service Air
B.8.4.1
Maintenance Rule Program System Basis
Document:
- Instrument and Service Air
Revision 2
10.3.4
USAR:
- Plant Air Systems and Nitrogen Systems
Revision 19
Install Temp Air Compressor To Supply
Discharge Structure
3278
NMC Standard 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Form -
Screening Number SCR-02-0462, Revision 0
Revision 3*
3434
Jumper Bypass Form, Dated 8/2/02, for
Temporary Instrument Air System WO 0203880
Revision 20
Maintenance Rule Performance Data for
Instrument Air System
January 2000 to
August 8, 2002
CR 20017166
13 Air Compressor Tripped on Low Lube Oil
Pressure Due to Cool Ambient Conditions
May Be Air Leaking-Bubbling in Puddle North of
E-100A
CR 20027014
Air Leaking up From Ground by East Side of
M-131
Piping and Instrument Diagram, Instrument Air -
Turbine Building
Revision AA
30
M-800-1
Piping and Instrument Diagram, Circulating
Water System
Revision A
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
4AWI-04.01.01
SWI-14.01
Procedures:
- General Plant Operating Activities
- Risk Management of On-line Maintenance
Revision 33
Revision 0
M-131
M-136
M-135
Drawings and Prints:
- Instrument Air - Turbine Building
- Fuel Pool Filter/Demin
- Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean Up System
Revision AA
Revision T
Revision AB
CR 20027014
Air Leak Bubbling up from Ground by East Side
CRD Pump Casing Bolt to Casing Leak
Reactor and Control Room Log
August 23, 2002
B.2.1-05
Operations Manual:
- Fuel Pool Cooling System Operation
Revision 14
1R15
Operability Evaluations
CR 20026336
12 EDG Lube Oil Lead Content Increasing to
Point of Additional Monitoring
MI 1760
Lubricating Oil for EMD Engines - Marine, Power,
and Drilling Rig
Revision G
MI 1762
Lubricating Oil for Industrial Power Engines
Revision E
MI 1750
Diesel Fuel Recommendations All EMD and
Former COED Engines
Revision H
TRF 90-215
Product Data Sheet - Mobilgard 450
CR 20026579
Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors Not
Maintained with Safety-Related Parts
Section 7.5
USAR:
- Plant Radiation Monitoring System
Revision 19
B.05.11
Operations Manual:
- Process Radiation Monitoring System
License Amendment No. 83
August 18, 1992
CR 20027876
Flanged Connection Bolting for FP-13 (Diesel
Fire Pump Check Valve) Has Insufficient Thread
Engagement
31
EPRI TR-104213s
Electric Power Research Institute Report - Bolted
Joint Maintenance & Application Guide
December 1995
CR 20027020
RHR Corner Room Calculation Assumptions Are
Inconsistent with Current Plant Operating
Practices
CR 20027443
Running Room Coolers for the RHR Rooms
Continuously Could Be a Concern in the Winter
CR 20026989
SRI 86-015 Allowed a 2 Hour Operation with No
RHR Room Cooling Inconsistent with Heatup
Calc CA 97-157 Rev 1 Assumptions
1R16
Operator Workarounds
C.6-007-B-17
C.4-B.6.3.A
Operations Manual:
- Alarm Response For 24" Vacuum Trip No. 2
- Decreasing Condenser Vacuum
Revision 1
Revision 7
OWI-01.07
Operations Work Instruction:
- Operations Department Self Assessment
Revision 17
CR 20025993
Unexpected Alarm C07-B-17, Vacuum 24 Inch
Trip No. 2
1R17
Permanent Plant Modifications
CR 20027798
American Air Filter Replacement Charcoal Trays
Do Not Match Currently Installed Trays
02A047
Alteration Package - Replacement of Charcoal
Filter Trays in the EFT System
August 20, 2002
Guidelines For 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation
Revision 1
4AWI-06.01.05
4AWI-05.06.02
Procedures:
- Alteration Process
- 10 CFR 50.59 Applicability and Screening
Revision 11
Revision 5
32
1R19
Post-Maintenance Testing
0255-08-IA-1
3069
3069
0255-06-IA-1
1158-B
4190-OCD
4058-03
Procedures and Forms:
- RCIC System Pump Flow and Valve Tests
- Post-Maintenance Testing Activities Control
Cover Sheet for WO 0204052
- Post-Maintenance Testing Activities Control
Cover Sheet for WO 0200757
- HPCI Pump Flow and Valve Tests
- Diesel Fire Pump Weekly Check
- Diesel Engine, Fire Protection Pump
- RHRSW Pump No. 11 and No. 13 Motor Cooler
Chemical Cleaning and Pressure Test
Revision 51
Revision 11
Revision 11
Revision 58
Revision 12
Revision 13
Revision 7
No. 12 EDG Testing Following Speed Changing
Motor Replacement/Repair
PI-13-69 Isolation Valve Packing Leak
Small Leak Through Plug on RCIC Trip Valve
MO-2080 on PS-13-72B
Replace Diesel Fire Pump Coolant Hose
Repair of CV-3503 Air Line
CR 20027611
Air Line Failed on HPCI Test Return Valve
CV-3503 Resulting In Aborted Test and Extended
B.08.05
Operations Manual:
- Fire Protection
Section 10.3.1
USAR:
- Fire Protection System
Revision 19
33
1R22
Surveillance Testing
0030
0003
0011-A
0141
4847-PM
0054-B
Procedures and Forms:
- ECCS Drywell Pressure Sensor Test
- Drywell High Pressure Scram and Group 2, 3
and SCTMT Isolation Test and Calibration
- Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure SCRAM
Test and Calibration (>30% of Rated)
- Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker
Operability Test
- GE 7700 Line Motor Control Center
Maintenance Operability Test
- Main Steam Line Low Pressure Group 1
Isolation Instrument Test and Calibration
(Reactor in Run)
Revision 10
Revision 16
Revision 3
Revision 19
Revision 11
Revision 5
3.2/4.2
Technical Specifications:
- Protective Instrumentation
PS-10-101A-D
Instrument Calibration Worksheet
July 15, 2002
Perform Intake Structure Pre-Action Detector
Test
Perform Diesel Pre-Action Detector Test
Chapter 7: Maintenance and Testing
Chapter 8: Maintenance and Testing
1R23
Temporary Plant Modifications
3034
Jumper Bypass 02-39, Prevent Starting of P-20A
When Moving Switch Through Standby Position
Revision 20
3034
Jumper Bypass 02-40, Disable of High
Temperature Alarm for CRD-24-47 From
TR-3-244 by Program Change
Revision 20
Spurious CRD High Temp Alarm TR-3-244
1EP2
Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing
Monticello Area PANS Implementing Procedure
and Supplementary Documents
June 1, 1984
NF-108565-2
Monticello Emer. Plan Sirens and Contours
May 15, 1999
Project 01Q095
Public Alert Notification System Replacement
Revision 0
Surv. Test 1359
PANS Weekly Cancel Signal Test
Revision 6
Surv. Test 1409
PANS Monthly Siren Activation Testing
Revisions 3-7
Contract
Agreement
MNGP Public Alert and Notification System
October 22, 1996
34
General Conditions For Maintenance, Repair,
And Operations Contracts
September 24, 1996
PANS Monthly Test Report, Failure Matrix
February-May 2002
FEMA Letter
MNGP Alert and Notification System Evaluation
April 25, 1985
EPWI-01.05
PANS Maintenance And Testing
Revision 0
1EP3
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testing
Sections 5.0 & 7.0
Revision 21
5790-001-01
MNGP Emergency Response Organization
August 6, 2002
Surv. Test 1317
MNGP Emergency Alert Notification System Test
Revision 12
5790-104-04
Emergency Call List-Alert/Site Area/General
June 5, 2002
Surv. Test 1317
MNGP Emergency Alert Notification System Test
Results: August 2000 - August 2002
1EP5
Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
Nuclear Oversight 1st Quarter 2002 Assessment
Report For Monticello
April 30, 2002
2002-001-5-002
Nuclear Oversight Observation Report
April 3, 2002
2002-001-5-046
Nuclear Oversight Observation Report
April 24, 2002
Self Assessment
Emergency Preparedness Program Assessment
August 9, 2002
AG 2001-S-1
Internal Audit Report, Emergency Preparedness
April 30, 2001
AG 2000-S-1
Internal Audit Report, Emergency Preparedness
April 28, 2000
4AWI-10.01.03
Condition Report Process
Revision 18
Drill Critique Report Conducted April 25, 2001
Exercise Critique Report Conducted June 6,2001
Drill Critique Report Conducted March 27, 2002
Drill Critique Report Conducted June 12, 2002
CA 20003000
Add SER Lessons Learned To EP Training
August 3, 2000
CA 20003370
Provide Ops. Shift Mgt. Guidance On Filling
Unexpected Vacancies
September 6, 2000
CA 20010988
Evaluate Need For Training Shift Em. Comms.
February 20, 2001
CR 20015705
Discrepancies Noted In Em. Equip. Inventory
September 27, 2001
CR 20020316
PASS Procedures Were Wrong Revisions
January 17, 2002
CR 20020362
Em. Plan Proc. Manual Found With Old Revision
January 18, 2002
CR 20020369
Em. Equip. Locker Has Old Revisions EP Maps
January 18, 2002
CR 20020374
Em. Plan Manual Missing Some Procedures
January 18, 2002
CR 20023651
Corrective Actions To Resolve EP Inventory
Problems
April 17, 2002
CR 20024480
NOUE Classification Review (Ft. Calhoun)
May 10, 2002
CR 20023409
Evacuation From The Owner Controlled Area
August 2, 2002
CR 20016978
ERO Augmentation Test Issues
November 7, 2001
CR 20010175
Re-evaluation Of Policy On KI
March 9, 2001
35
CR 20012400
Assessment Of April 25, 2001 Full Scale Drill
July, 23, 2001
CR 20013176
Critique Of June 6, 2001, EP Exercise
August 14, 2001
CR 20014820
Less Than 30% ERO Respond For Pager Test
August 14, 2001
CR 20003136
Inadvertent Activation Of PANS For Weekly Test
August 17, 2000
CR 20026555
EP Inventory Surveillance Finds Missing Items
July 17, 2002
CR 20025894
PANS Electrical Disconnect Notice Received
June 27, 2002
CR 20016589
Abnormal Procedure Issued Without EP 50.54(q)
October 30, 2001
CR 20014819
Failure To Meet Min. Staffing During ERO Test
August 14, 2001
CR 20015043
Failure To Identify Default PAR In Simulator
August 27, 2001
1EP6
Drill Evaluation
A.2-101
5790-103-01
5790-102-02
5790-501-03
5790-104-04
Procedures and Forms:
- Classification of Emergencies
- Alert Checklist
- Emergency Notification Report Form
- Emergency Communicator Checklist
- Emergency Call List - Alert/Site Area/General
Revision 28
Revision 11
Revision 25
Revision 4
Revision 77
RQ-SS-08E
Simulator Exercise Guide - Spurious Group 1
With an ATWS
Revision 6
2PS1
Radiological Effluents
0147
Standby Gas Treatment System Filter Tests
Revision 10
0149
Standby Gas Treatment Charcoal Adsorber
Cartridge Test
Revision 7
0163
Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor Calibration
Revision 25
0171
Discharge Canal Monitor Calibration
Revision 13
0248
Reactor Building Vent Wide Range Gas Monitor
Calibration
Revision 21
0290
Service Water Monitor Calibration
Revision 8
0363-01
RBV Wide Range Gas Monitors Process and
Sample Flow Instrument Calibration Procedure
Revision 5
0372
Stack Wide Range Gas Monitors Process and
Sample Flow Instrument Calibration Procedure
Revision 8
0385-A
Drywell Particulate Monitor Functional Test
Revision 8
1118
Off-Gas Compressors Suction Filters DOP and
Freon Efficiency Test
Revision 5
1119
Stack Filters DOP Efficiency Test
Revision 3
36
1399
Liquid Process Monitor-Grab Sampling
Revision 3
5090
Software Verification-Liquidose
Revision 3
CR 20027821
Improper Routing of Drain Hose Results in
Unplanned Radioactive Liquid Release
December 4, 2001
CR 20020231
2001 Chemistry Self-Assessment
January 16, 2002
CR 20022866
Discharge Canal Monitors Experience a MRFF Due
to Loss of SX Pump During Storm
March 22, 2002
CR 20023425
Received Discharge Canal Hi Radiation Alarm 4-B-22
April 10, 2002
CR 20024422
Discharge Canal Hi Rad, 4-A-22 was Received
Following Heavy Rain
May 8, 2002
CR 20025368
Received Discharge Canal Hi Rad Alarm 4-A-22
During Period of Heavy Rain
June 7, 2002
CR 20026685
Discharge Canal Hi Rad 4-A-22 Received Following
Heavy Rain
July 20, 2002
CR 20026950
Received Discharge Canal High Radiation Alarm 4-B-22
July 29, 2002
CR 20027107
Annunciator 4-A-22 Discharge Canal Hi Radiation
Alarms whenever Heavy Rains Occur. Operational
Challenge 02-048
August 1, 2002
Abnormal-Release Calculations Week #52 of 2001
December 4, 2001
Section 9.3
USAR: Plant Radioactive Waste Control Systems
Revision 19
2001 Radioactive Effluent Release Report
May 15, 2002
Internal Correspondence-Revision to ODCM
November 30, 2000
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Monticello Performance Indicator Data Summary
Report - 2nd Quarter 2002
July 3, 2002
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator
Guideline
Revision 2
3530-09
NRC Performance Indicator Safety System
Functional Failures
Revision 2
3530-08
Performance Indicator RCS Activity Worksheet
Revision 2
1.3.13
Reactor Water and Cleanup Systems Iodine
Revision 11
37
CR 20014093
Unexpected Alarm DW Equipment Drain Leak
Rate During Pump Down of DWEDS
July 12, 2001
CR 20014636
Unexpected Alarm 3-A-17 Auto Blowdown Valve
Bellows Leaking
August 3, 2001
CR 20014975
Tiny Leak in HPCI Main Pump
August 22, 2001
CR 20015261
Unexpected Alarm C04-B-13 Drywell Equipment
Drain Leak Rate High
September 8, 2001
CR 20016595
Unexpected Alarm C04-B-13 Drywell Equipment
Drain Leak Rate High
October 31, 2001
CR 20018193
Leakage Observed from RV-2031 After
Completion of RHR Surveillance
December 20, 2001
CR 20020010
Received Annunciator C-04-B-13 Drywell
Equipment Drain Leak Rate High
January 2, 2002
CR 20020078
Unexpected Alarm C04-B-13 Drywell Equipment
Drain Leak Rate High
January 5, 2002
CR 20022008
Unexpected Alarm C04-B-13 Drywell Equipment
Drain Leak Rate High
March 1, 2002
CR 20022737
Unexpected Alarm C04-B-13 Drywell Equipment
Drain Leak Rate High
March 19, 2002
CR 20023139
Packing Leak on HWC-61-1 Degraded Steam
Leak
March 29, 2002
CR 20024350
Unexpected Alarm C04-B-13 Drywell Equipment
Drain Leak Rate High when P-20 Started
May 6, 2002
CR 20025147
Small Steam Leak from HPCI Instrument Root
Valve R-6
June 2, 2002
CR 20025262
DW CAM Count Rate Increasing with
Corresponding Increase in DW Floor Drain
Leakage
June 4, 2002
CR 20025527
Received Alarm 4-B-32 DWEDS High
Temperature and 4-B-18 DWEDS Leak Rate
Change High Simultaneously
June 14, 2002
CR 20025986
Unexpected Alarm C04-B-13 Drywell Equipment
Drain Leak Rate High
June 30, 2002
CR 20026217
Unexpected Alarm C04-B-13 Drywell Equipment
Drain Leak Rate High
July 5, 2002
EPWI-01-06
Emergency Plan Performance Indicator Program
Revision 0
38
PANS Quarterly Operability Results: April 2001 -
June 2002
ERO Quarterly Participation Results: April 2001 -
June 2002
DEP Quarterly Performance Results: April 2001
- June 2002
4OA3 Event Follow-up
LER 2002-004
Unplanned Loss of Both Trains of Control Room
Ventilation During Auto Start Testing Due to
Timing Circuit Relay Failure
Revision 0
CR 20023185
Entered Unplanned 24 Hour LCO Upon Failure of
V-EAC-14A to Auto Start on Low Flow per
CRV-EFT Test 1429
Investigate/Repair V-EAC-14A Auto Start Relay
Circuitry
CR 20023386
Revise Procedure 1429 to Correct LCO Entries.
Attempt to Develop Test Method Which Will Not
Create 24-hour LCO Entry
1429
CRV-EFT Low Flow Test
Revision 10
CR 20023387
Submit a Request for Estimate on Replacing
Struthers / Dunn Relays With Alt Control System
to the Plant Health Committee