ML022800095
| ML022800095 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/2002 |
| From: | Nazar M Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response |
| References | |
| Download: ML022800095 (96) | |
Text
NMC Committed to Nuclear Excellence Mano K. Nazar Site Vice President Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC 1717 Wakonade Dr. East
- Welch MN 55089 September 23, 2002 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DPR-42 Docket Nos. 50-306 License Nos. DPR-60 Prairie Island Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures - F3 Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures Furnished with this letter are the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures F3. This revision includes the following procedures:
INDEXES:
REVISIONS:
F3-2 F3-31 F3-23.1 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC Classification of Emergencies Response to Security Related Threats Emergency Hotcell Procedure DELETIONS:
None TEMPORARY CHANGE DELETIONS:
F3-2 2002-1369 Classification of Emergencies INSTRUCTIONS:
Please post changes in your copy of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. Procedures, which have been superseded or deleted, should be destroyed.
Please sign and return the acknowledgment of this update to Bruce Loesch, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive East, Welch, MN 55089.
Rev 30 Rev 6 Rev 12
If you have any questions, please contact Mel Agen at 651-388-1121 Extension 4240.
Mano K. Nazar Site Vice Presid t Prairie Island clear Generating Plant c: USNRC - Steve Orth, Region 111 (2 copies)
NRC Resident Inspector (w/o attachment)
M Agen (w/o attachment)
Records Management (Doc Control Copy) (w/o attachment)
NL File (w/o attachment)
Mfst Num:
2002 -
0726 Date
- 09/19/02 FROM
- Bruce Loesch/Mary Gadient Loc
- Prairie Island TO
- UNDERWOOD, BETTY J Copy Num: 515 Holder : US NRC DOC CONTROL DESK SUBJECT : Revisions to CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS Procedure #
Rev Title Revisions:
F3-2 30 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES F3-31 6
RESPONSE TO SECURITY RELATED THREATS F3-23.1 12 EMERGENCY HOTCELL PROCEDURE Temporary Change Deletions:
2002 1369 F3-2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES UPDATING INSTRUCTIONS Place this material in your Prairie Island Controlled Manual or File.
Remove revised or cancelled material and recycle it.
Sign and date this letter in the space provided below within ten working days and return to Bruce Loesch or Mary Gadient, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive E.,
- Welch, MN 55089.
Contact Bruce Loesch (ext 4664) or Mary Gadient (ext 4478) if you have any questions.
Received the material stated above and complied with the updating instructions Date
RAhIR'Lf ISLAND NUCLEAR
Title:
l GENERATING PLANT I Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC I
j Effective Date : 09/19/02 I Approved By:
I BPS Supt I
I I
I Document #
Title F3-1
/-ONSITE-EMERGENCY 'ORGANIZATION F3-2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES F3-3
'RESPONSIBILITIES' DURING A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT F3-4 RESPONSIBILITIES DURING AN ALERT, SITE AREA, OR GENERAL EMERGENCY' Rev 19 30 18 28 F3-5' F3-5.1 F3-5.2 F3 -5.3 F3-6 F3-7 F3-8 F3-8.1 F3-9 F3-10 F3-11 F3-12 F3-13 F3-13.3 F3-13.4 F3-13.5 EMERGENCY!NOTIFICATIONS 20 1
SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR DUTIES' 8
RESPONSE TO FALSE SIREN ACTIVATION 9
RESPONSE TO RAILROAD GRADE CROSSING BLOCKAGE 8
ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 16 ACTIVATION &'OPERATION OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 15 CENTER (OSC)
RTF RECOMMENDATIONS -FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 19 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR 12 THE ON SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR /SHIFT MANAGER EMERGENCY EVACUATION 17 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY 19 SEARCH & RESCUE 8
EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CONTROL 14 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION 15 MANUAL DOSE CALCULATIONS 11 MIDAS METEOROLOGICAL DATA DISPLAY 7
ALTERNATE METEOROLOGICAL DATA 4
Page 1 of 3
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR.
Title
- Emergency Plan Implementing GENERATING PLANT Effective Date : 09/19/02 Document #
F3-13.6 F3-14.1 F3-14.2 F3-15 F3-16 F3-17 F3-18 F3-19 F3-20 F3-20.1 F3-20.2 F3-21 F3-22 F3 -23 F3-23.1 F3-24 F3-25 F3-26.1 F3-26.2 F3-26.3 F3-29 F3-30 Procec Title WEATHER FORECASTING INFORMATION ONSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING OPERATIONS EMERGENCY SURVEYS RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION &AJRVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE RESV!1AITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS
'DURING A RADIOACTIVE LIQUID RELEASE CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT THYROID IODINE BLOCKING AGENT (POTASSIUM IODIDE)
PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT MONITORING.& DECONTAMINATION DETERMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASE CONCENTRATIONS DETERMINATION OF STEAM LINE DOSE RATES DETERMINATION OF SHIELD BUILDING VENT STACK
-DOSE RATES ESTABLISHMENT OF A-SECONDARY ACCESS CONTROL POINT PRAIRIE ISLAND RADIATION PROTECTION GROUP RESPONSE TO A MONTICELLO EMERGENCY EMERGENCY SAMPLING EMERGENCY HOTCELL PROCEDURE RECORD KEEPING DURING AN EMERGENCY REENTRY OPERATION OF THE ERCS DISPLAY RADIATION MONITOR DATA ON ERCS ERDS -
NRC DATA LINK EMERGENCY SECURITY PROCEDURES TRANSITION TO RECOVERY lures TOC Rev 7
11 11 C
22 17 10 7
17 9
9 10 16 18 12 7
8 7
7 1
18 6
Page 2 of
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Title,:
Emergency Plan Implementing Effective Date : 09/19/02 Procedures TOC Document #
F3-31 F3-32 Title RESPONSE TO SECURITY RELATED THREATS REVIEW OF EMERGENCY r1 REPAREDNESS DURING OR AFTER NATURAL DISASTER EVEN IS Page 3 of 3
Rev 6
2
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RREEEtC S
Procedure segments may be performed from memory.
- Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.
- Mark off steps within segment before continuing.
- Procedure ]should be available at the work location.
A O.C. REVIEW DATE:
OWNER:
EFFECTIVE DATE 11 of M.3Werner Page 1 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Section Page 1.0 PURPOSE....................................................................................................
3 2.0 APPLICABILITY...............................................................................................
3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS..............................................................................................
3 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES........................................................................................
4 5.0 DISCUSSION.................................................................................................
5 5.1 Definitions..:...............................................
5 5.2 Emergency Action Levels.....................................................................
6 5.3 The Emergency Classification/Declaration/lmplementation Process....... 7 5.4 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs................................ 8 5.5 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events...................................... 9 5.6 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number..................... 9 6.0 PREREQUISITES..........................................................................................
10 7.0 PROCEDURE.................................................................................................
11 LIST OF ATTACHMENTS - Summary of Emergency Action Levels Page 2 of, 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 1.0 PURPOSE-.
The purpose of this procedure is to specify the Emergency Acjion Levels that indicate an emergency condition exists and to properly classify the'emergency into one of the four
> graded levels of emergency classifications, This procedure partially satisfies the requirement of 10CFR50.47 concerning the existence of an emergency classification and action leýel'scheme.,
2.0 APPLICABILITY, This instruction SHALL' aplyto all Shift Managers (SM), Shift Supervisors (SS), Control Room Operators (CRO), Emergency Directors (ED) and Emergency Manager (EM).
3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 Attempt to verify the indications by checking secondary'or coincident indicators.
'3.2 An emergency classification should be made based on current plant conditions described in Attachment 1 of this proceduire.
3.3 These emergency classifications do not apply to offsite transportation incidents that do NOT affect safe operation of thed plant. Currently, the Radiation Protection group is responsible for offsite transportation incident assessment involving plant related shipments.
3.4 Rapidly Escalating Then De-escalating Events 3.4.1 In the case of an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates or begins at a higher emergenicy class'then rapidly'de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.
3.4.2 During initial notifications to tld'NRCb,,te,NRC should be informed of the current emergency classification'and also'the Iibfgest emeirgency classification reached during the course of the event. Emphasize the current emergency classification.
Page 3 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 3.4.3 It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency-class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.
3.5 Continuously monitor the Control Room instrumentation, radiation monitors, or any other developments which would be indicative of further system degradation. Be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification.
4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Duty Shift Manager has the responsibility to authorize the initial emergency classification.
4.2 Shift Supervisor of the unaffected unit has the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager as riecessary including authorization of an emergency classification.
4.3 Shift Supervisor of the affected unit has the responsibility to direct activities related to the operation of the affected 'unit.
4.4 Emergency Director has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification whenever an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency is declared and the EOF is not activated.
4.5 If the EOF is activated and fully functional, the Emergency Manager has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification.
4.6 Control Room Operators and affected unit Shift Supervisor have the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager or unaffected unit Shift Supervisor in the identification and verification of control board indications.
Page 4 of 13 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
5.0 DISCUSSION 5.1 Definitions Notification of Unusual Event - events that are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
Alert - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. It is the lowest level of eme rgency classification when some necessity for emergency planning and offsite response is necessary.
-Any releases expected are limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective
.,Action Guideline exposure levels.
5.1.3 Site Area Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public.
Any releases are not exl5ected to exceed the EPA Pioiective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.
5.1.4 General Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with a potential for loss of containment integrity.
Releases during a General Emergency can be reasonably expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.
5.1.5 Emergency Action Levels (EAL) - specific instrument readings, surface or airborne contamination levels or radiation dose rates that designate a specific emergency class requiring emergency measures for that class.
Page 5 of 13 5.1A1
-5.1.2
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 5.1.6 Safety System(s) - refers to systems that are required to be functional during and following a design basis accident or transient to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition; or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents, which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guidelines of 1 OCFR1 00; or the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. The structures and components of a Safety System are "Safety Related SSC."
5.2 Emergency Action Levels Attached to this procedure is a Summary of Emergency Action Levels,. This summary identifies the four emergency classifications, the initiating condition(s), emergency action levels for each classification, and, where applicable, specific instruments and indications to be used to detect and classify an emergency.
The emergency action levels for each classification and the instrument readings ant indications listed do not reflect a complete list of instrumentation that will show abnormal indications but does list those key parameters useful in classifying the event.
The Summary of Emergency Action Levels lists are based on the initiating conditions as required by Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, accidents analyzed in the Prairie Island USAR, and the NRC Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations From NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
Page 6 of 13 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.3 The Emergency Classification/Declaration/Implementation Process There are three distinct phases to consider: Classification; Declaration and Implementation..
5.3.1, Classification:
The act of assessing'the EALs todetermine the appropriate classification which the ongoing events are categorized.:Assessing and classifying an event should be accomplished within a 15 minute period following the availability of indications that an emergency condition exists. This assessment period is consistent with the NRC Branch Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions, EPPOS No. 2.
5.3.2 Declaration
"The act of formally declaring the classification based on the assessment of EALs. This is the point at which the classification time is set and the 10CFR50, App. E 15-minute offsite notification clock starts.
5.3.3 Implementation
The act of making the notification and/or augmentation of the emergency organizations.
5.3.4 'Ideally, the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) should be
-' 'filled out to near completion while the classification phase is being conducted., Once the declaration is made by the SM/ED/EM, the 15-minute offsite notification time starts. The SM/ED/EM should review the
.contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) to ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator (or Offsite Communicator in EOF) to im~plemen t the E-Plan notifications.
5.3.5 Per 1 OCFR50.72 (a)(3) NRC notification is required immediately after the notification of the state and local agencies (which is completed within about 15 minutes) and not later than one hour after the emergency declaration.
Page 7 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.4 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs 5.4.1 In some cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits (e.g., RCS leakage, reactor coolant activity, etc.) is considered to be precursors to more serious events and warrant declaration of an NUE.
5.4.2 In other cases, exceeding Technical.Specification limits for the period designated in the action statement (Sl.*AOTIiJJS Table)is an analyzed condition of the plant and does not, by itself, represent an emergency.
These events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 as a non-emergencies.
However, if the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable Technical Specifications action statement time limit QTiS4IQTN Tflý Dei. then a declaration of an Unusual Event should be declared.
5.4.3 With regard to Emergency Plan classifications, Operations should handle ak->
TechnicaliSpecification required shutdown in the following manner:
A.
The conditions of the plant should come first. That is, if the condition warrants initiating power reduction immediately, do so. The E-Plan classification can appropriately follow.
B.
Following the initiation of'the reduction in power or temperature, the classification phase of the E-Plan is started. Review of the EALs should be done to assess for proper classification. Once the Shift Manager, has determined the appropriate classification for the event, the Shift Manager should declare the classification and note the time of declaration (this begins the 15-mirute offsite notification clock).
This classification phase should be done within a reasonable time frame determined by the circumstances (within 15 minutes for most instances).
Page 8 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLiAR GENERATING PLAIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
[
[ *NUMBER:
,A IITO O-F EMERGENCIES F3-2 "C.
Once the declaratiori is'made, the'Shift Mdr~ag'er should review the contents of the Emergency Notificati6n Report Fori.(PINGP 577) to
- -~
"6nsure its Completeness, verify the Correct declaration time and then
""--*,'-- sign the form' whidh gives'permission to the'Shift Emergency S..
o.u ct.implement the E-Plan n6tifications*
5.5 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events In the case of an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates or begins at a higher emergency class then rapidly de-escalates, the initial e-mergency, classification should be based on current plant conditions.
It may be discovered that a bohditio'n existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an K>
ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.
The NRC should be informed of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC notification via the ENS phone. The Shift Manager should ensure that this notification be performed by an appropriate individual other than the SEC using PINGP Form 666, Event Notification Worksheet. To avoid possible confusion, other offsite authorities will be informed of the current classification during the initial notification and then given the full description of the highest emergency classification reached during the first update on the follow-up notification.
5.6 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number "Prairie Island"Nuclear Generating Plant has'prepared a written manual (EAL Reference Manual) t6 provide general information about Emergency Action Levels to offsite authorities who are involved in nuclear plant emergency planning. This manual provides a description with text and drawings of the various conditions that might cause the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant to classify an event. By understanding what a particular condition or event means, emergency workers at the various offsite agencies should develop a clear idea of what is occurring at the plant during the emergency.
Page 9 of 13
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Each initiating condition in this procedure is followed by a cross reference number that corresponds to the appropriate classification condition in the EAL Reference Manual. When the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) is completed, the initiating condition statement and the EAL Reference Manual cross reference number should be included on the form by using the label from "Emergency Initiating Conditions Labels - PINGP 1189" or writing this information as it appears in the shaded box on the appropriate page in the Summary of Emergency Action Levels.
6.0 PREREQUISITES An off-normal condition corresponding to one of the initiating events described in of this procedure is occurring or has occurred.
K>
Page 10 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.0 PROCEDURE 7.1 Any significant event that may be classified as an emergency-condition SHALL be
.Ir6ported to the Shift Supervisor, Shift Manager and/or Emergenrcy Director immediately.
- The events may be instrumentation readings or visual
'observations'made by plant personnel.
7.2 Attempttoverify the initial indication by comparing the indication to redundant instrument channels or to other related parameters, visual observations, and field reports as applicable.
7.3 The Shift Manager, unaffected 'Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director SHALL assess the situation and determine the emergency classification, using the guidelines of Attachment 1.
7.4 In those cases-when an evenrt rapidly escalates, then de-escalates 'or begins at a higher classification, then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classificatiop should be based on current plant conditions.
7.4.1 Inform the NRC of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC ENS notification.
7.4.2 It may be discovered that a conditioii existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of "the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.
- 0Page 11 of'i 3 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 7.5 The Shift Supervisor of the affected unit should take immediate actions, using applicable plant operating procedures to return the plant to normal (or Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, if determined to be necessary).
7.6 If the EOF is not activated, the Shift Manager or Emergency Director SHALL declare the appropriate emergency classification and perform actions as specified in the appropriate responsibility procedure applicable to emergency classification:
7.6.1 For a Notification of Unusual Event, proceed to F3-3.
7.6.2 For an Alert, Site or General Emergency, proceed to F3-4.
If the EOF is activated, contact the Emergency Manager for consultation on whether or not to change the emergency classification. The Emergency Director is responsible to formulate the new classification while the Emergency Manager is responsible to authorize the reclassification.
7.7 Continue to assess and watch for changing parameters or visual indication of further system degradation and be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification as indicated by the Emergency Action Levels in.
7.8 As plant conditions stabilize during a Notification of an Unusual Event (NUE) or Alert, consider terminating the event classification.
7.8.1 For the NUE and Alert classifications, the event may be terminated once the following criteria are met:
A.
The plant is in stable condition with at least one fission product barrier intact, and B.
Radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent are being controlled within the following limits:
- 1.
Gaseous effluent release rates (or resulting dose rates) are within plant limits as defined in Section 3.1 of H4, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and Page 12 of 13
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
- 2.
Liquid effluent release rates (or resulting concentrations) are within the plant limits as defined in "Old 10CFR20 Appendix B in Table II, Column 2 (April 1992)" located in H4, ODCM, Table 4.3 and C.
The potential for future degradation of plant conditions is small.
7.8.2 Termination of an NUE classification may be performed by the Shift Manager. Review of 5AWI 1.13.0, Plant Event Investigation and Recovery, should be completed to determine if this procedure needs to be implemented and the Plant Manager informed of the review.
7.8.3 Termination of an Alert classification may be performed by the Emergency Director if the EOF is not activated. Once the EOF is fully functional, the Emergency Manager SHALL terminate the Alert classification when the conditions are met for termination.
7.8.4 Termination of an Alert classification includes the dismissal of the site Emergency Response Organization. Any necessary in-plant or on-site follow-up activities should be coordinated and managed by the normal plant site organization. In some cases, conditions may require the establishment of a Recovery Organization in which case the Emergency Director and Emergency Manager should make this determination based on the extent of damage or other considerations. In this case 5AWI 1.13.0 should be reviewed and implemented as determined appropriate.
7.9 As plant conditions stabilize during a Site Area or General Emergency, consider transition to the Recovery phase.
If the Site Area Emergency event does not require significant repairs or analysis beyond the capabilities of the normal V plant site organization and the conditions of 7.8.1. A, B, & C coordin are met, then the Site Area Emergency may be terminated See F without a transition to Recovery. However review and implementation of 5AWl 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate:
Transition to Recovery should be directed by the Emergency Manager with coordinated recovery planning by the site Emergency Response Organization.
See F3-30, "Recovery", for instruction on transition to Recovery. Review and implementation of 5AWl 1.i3.0 should becbnmpleted as appropriate.
Page 13 of 13
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:
CLASSIFICATION OF'EMERGENCIES F3-2 ATTACHMENT 1
SUMMARY
OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Page 1 of 60
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE INITIATING CONDITION INDEX No.
Condition Description Paqe 1
Safety System Functions 3
2 Abnormal Primary Leak Rate 4
3 Deleted 8
4 Abnormal Primary/Secondary Leak 9
5 Core Fuel Damage 13 6
Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers 15 7
Secondary Coolant Anomaly 21 8
Radiological Effluents 26 9
Major Electrical Failures 31 10 Control Room Evacuations 35 11 Fires 36 12 Plant Shutdown Functions 38 13 Fuel Handling Accidents 44 14 Deleted 46 15 Deleted 46 16 Security Threats 47 17 Hazards to Plant Operations 48 18 ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Events 53 19 Natural Events 54 20 Other 59 Page 2 of 60 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 3 of 60 Condition 1 : Safety System Functions I Failurel.a fto reheftio vappic-lveaessitem d'
loClse' owi~wng reauctiol fi o"applibable pressure::. -.-
Su)
- u.
- b.
L.
(EAL Ref Manual 1 B)
Notification of Unusual Event
-I.'
Visual and/or audible
,indication at discharge of open steam generator safety or relief valve As determined by SS or SM Pressurizer safety > 185 F & NOT valve outlet decreasin temperature, TI-436 Pressurizer safety > 185 F & NO valve outlet decreasin temperature, TI-437 Pressurizer relief > 185 F & NOT valve outlet decreasing temperature, TI-438 Acoustic Monitors indicate flow from either the pressurizer PORV's or safeties PZR Pressure on at < 2335 psig least 2/3 channels I PRT Level increasing PRT Temperature increasing PRT Pressure I increasing I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 4 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak
- Primary system leak rate from, unidentified or incon e
ources-exceeddingrecha6ia I.
Sebfctids naehia :nsi (EAL Ref Manual 2A)
Primary system leak rate, other than controlled leakage sources, exceeds [
Technical Specifications 3.1.C I
( LT.S. 3:4. 1, )
Requires a unit shutdown, as determined I by the SM or SSI Reactor power reduction or cooldown has L been initiatedF Notification of Unusual Event Primary coolant leak rate greater-thanh 50 pmý 7
Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4
- Sum of charging line flow + seal injection flow >50 gpm more than the sum of letdown flow + RCP seal leakoff flow SS, SM, or ED opinion
- Decreasing pressurizer level, as indicated by LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R2 (Containment Area Rad Mon)
R7 (Containment Area Rad Mon)
R-1 1 (Containment Vent Rad Mon)
[Containment Position]
R-12 (Containment Vent Rad Mon)
[Containment Position]
(EAL Ref Manual 2B1)
-p-Alert A rapid temperature decrease in the RCS results in the same indications I
I
"\\j
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1
- Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak (EAL Ref Manual 2C)
,Mode 1,2, 3, or 4
--- _ _=
_ _ *,n l
A~ctuated annunciator illuminated.I "A" SG is not depressurizing in an I uncontrolled manner I "B1 SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure RCS Pressure
< 500 psig NooSI Flow Subcooling
<0 I
Site Area Emergency REV. 30 Page 5 of 60 SI A -- A- * =J--
J J
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 6 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak SSmall LOCA* and 6ially, sucsfulECCS2oK:? *;
systemcsoveeralhorscouldIladtocore melt, Ian-i I-lKeliy aiure of, confammein
.;*3-,*,
(EAL Ref Manual 2D)
Mode 1,2, 3, or 4 LOCA has occurred SS, SM or ED opinion that loss of ECCS is imminent Containment temp has become excessive, and is still rising Containment pressure is high and increasing Operating containment spray pumps Operating containment fan coil unit trains General Emergency I
P3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
'ATTACHMENT 1 Co REV. 30 Page 7 of 60 indition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak Small and large LOCAs with failure of ECCS to "perform leading to severecore degrdaion or melt in'-,,
from-miniitestho hu'r-s-.,Ultlimiatef'fau~re 'of containment" kely~~
~ fo ffet!etine--ý Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 SS, SM or ED opinion that core cooling capability does not exist High Head SI failure Low Head SI failure High dose equivalent 1-131 as determined by sample analysis Valid high radiaiton R-48 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)
Valid high radiaiton R-49 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)
Decreasing RCS pressure Low subcooling margin and decreasing "A" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner
'B" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner Pressurizer Low Pressure Trip RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure (EAL Ref Manual 2E)
General Emergency o o~
I,.j
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 3: Abnormal Coolant Temperature/Pressure REV. 30 Page 8 of 60 DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviations From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 I I REV. 30 Page 9 of 60 "Condition 4: Abnormal Primary I Secondary Leak
.P ria ndr lea-i'eexe`ýdn
ý7'ý'chihzc I
lea n S.
(EAL Ref Manual 4A)
SG primary to secondary
> 150 GPD through any 1 SG leakage exceeds Tech Spec 3.1.0 (C f)i.3:3Ii44 limits Notification of Unusual Event SPrimaryiseconoary leak rate greater than 50 gpm l
!~~4 I-Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Decreasing pressurizer level LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R1 5 (Air Ejector Rad Mon)
Sum of charging line flow plus seal injection greater than 50 gpm more than the sum of Letdown Flow and RCP Seal Leakoff flow SS, SM, ED opinion (EAL Ref Manual 4B)
Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak Fai!re *ftsteam generatortu b6e(s) r'sultin g", nECCS*
C actuati
-'k "SI Actuated" annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, PI-431
<181 PZR level cannot be maintained on at > 5%
least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 I R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor > bkg R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor > bkg R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level (EAL Ref Manual 4C)
Alert REV. 30 Page 10 of 60
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
,ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 4: Abnormail Primary /Secondary Leak Failure of steam generator tube(s) resulting h ECCS' actuation an Ih po tentla tor, ossýotco ia ment.,Y"
- h.
t..
(EAL Ref Manual 4D)
"SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel I Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, P1-431-I < 1815 msa PZR level cannot be maintained on at least I > 5%
2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-4281 R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor
> bkg R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor
. R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor 0=
C)
C.
C.)
LU Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV Failure of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV to close with indications of steam line break downstream of MSIVI Ruptured SG safety or relief valve opens and then fails to reseat indicated by visual and/or audible indication at discharges As determined by SS, SM, or ED,.
REV.:30 Page 11 of 60 Site Area Emergency Unexpected Rise in either SG level II Note ~
If steam break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel a
e m
Gm:SNote:eCdi#6 ae
,I,++
+*+"*+**.+,:+++>++.+failure, this may be a General Emergency. See Condition # 6, Case 2.
I I
I I,+
+1ý
+÷f
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 12 of 60 Condition 4 : Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak
- Failure, m generatortubes resultin ECCSQ-.-1.-
actuatioandossofb ffsite power e;,'.
(EAL Ref Manual 4E)
C.)
C.)
U) 0,.
Site Area Emergency "SI Actuated "annunciator illuminated on I the Aqua panel I Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure ; PI-429,PI-430, PI-431
< 1815 psig PZR level cannot be maintained on at >5%
least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 I R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor > bkg L
R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor 4
R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor 0>2x1 cpm Unexpected Rise in either SG level 4.16 KV Bus 11 [211, 4119304 [4172804]
< 3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]
< 3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 13 123], 4119306 [4172806] < 3500 Volts
< 3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [41728071 D 1 [D5 ]Tach 900 pm 11200 rm]
D1 [D5] Gen Volts 4000 - 4400 volts Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]
D2 [D6 I Tach m90 rpm 1200 D2 [D6 ] Gen Volts 4000 -4400 volts
ý Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 13 of 60 Fuel Damage Indication
- Condition 5: Core Fuel Damage (EAL Ref Manual 5A)
I R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon in alarm
- R-9 R9 confirmed by portable instrumentation High coolant activity sample exceeding Tech Specs 3.1.D ( PC,317-j) for total specific activity in primary coolant High coolant activity sample exceeding Tech Specs 3.1..D ( ý).4,1 I limit on primary coolant iodine activity which requires a unit shutdown.
SSever. oss' o'f' uel cladding' (EAL Ref Manual 5B)
Dose equivalent 1-131 R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon) in alarm R-9 R-9 confirmed by portable instrumentation Notification of Unusual Event Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 14 of 60 Degraded corewith, possible
]I losoK olbegoer SS, SM, or ED opinion Core Delta T increasing No core Delta T Dose Equivalent 1-131 Core exit thermocouples RVLIS full range Condition 5 : Core Fuel Damage (EAL Ref Manual 5C)
Site Area Emergency
%o S
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 15 of 60 Condition 6 : Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier. (EAL Ref Manual 6)
GENERAL EMERGENCY,
- 1. Three permutations exist for loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier; A. Failure of cladding and primary coolant boundary with potential loss of containment.
B. Failure of cladding and containment with potential loss of primary coolant boundary.
C. Failure of containment and primary oo oun with potential loss of cladding.
These 3 permutations are represented in the following 5 cases, each with its own set of EAL's:.
- 2.
All cases are applicable to operations in Modes 1 2, 3,
& 4.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Case~i-Losf clad,, loss* of, primry66coo-laint',*
6oda(LCA)", andr high potentialif0* Ioss of*'ý-
(EAL Ref Manual 6)
C.)
0
-J
'U b
0 0
0 CU I
0 U) 0 CU b
CU
.40 Ce CC 0
-J E
CU 0
C.)
0 Ce
'C 0
0
.4 CU 0
0 Valid high radiation R-48 (Containment High Range Area oR Rad Mon)
Valid high radiation R-49 1
(Containment High Range Area
> lx103 R/hr Rad Mon)
Dose equivalent 1-131
>300uC/cc Pressurizer low pressure trip
< 1900 Ps0 RCS pressure decreasing I uncontrollably High containment pressure High containment humidity High containment sump levels High containment radiation levels "A" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner "B" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner Containment approaching I > 23 psig --
46 psig design pressure and increasing I Control Room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM, or ED opinion Operating containment Zero spray pumps Operating containment fan
< One train coil unit trains REV. 30 Page 16 of 60 General Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
"-ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 17 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2"of 3 Fission Product Barriers Case 2: *Loss of cladSG tube rupture and high potehtialI 4 or lOSS
- ocontnme, (EAL Ref Manual 6) a RI cc toI Dose equivalent 1-131 General Emergency Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured SG MSIV Failure of ruptured SG MSIV to close with indications of steam line break Ruptured SG stuck open safety or relief valve indicated by visual and/or audible steam relief As determined by SS, SM, or ED R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)
R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)
R-15 (Air Ejector)
Unexpected Rise in either SG level SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel Sl flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure PI-429, PI-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 I,
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 18 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Case 3 -1 LoS'sOf clad, containment failiuire, and a6'
'1".
high potential for loss of the RCS boundary.
(EAL Ref Manual 6)
Cold leg temperature decrease in th(
last 60 minutes RCS cold leg temperature Steam line break between containment and the MSIV Steam line break downstream ol MSIV MSIV open-close indicator(s) sho j open or partially openl Control room containment isolation' status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration General Emergency SS, SM,or ED opinioni Uc a4 00 E
0.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
'ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 6-Loss of 2 of'3 Fission Product Barriers Case 4W:[Loss of RCS boundary (LOCA)loss ofi f
c6otaInentwano high potentia -or. 6ss of clalddngh',
(EAL Ref Manual 6)
Control room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM,or ED opinion RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples Pressurizer low pressure trip RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably "A" SG is not depressurizing K in an uncontrolled manner "B" SG is not depressurizing L in an uncontrolled manner High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity H High containment pressure V
- REV. 30 Page 19 of 60 C1.
U 0
-J
?-,,
cc General Emergency 1 -,
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers t(EAL Ref Manual 6) q)
4 0
0 0
-J
=
0 4..
- 0.
C, Cj
Steam line break between containment and the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV Stuck open ruptured SG PORV or Safety valve Steam line break downstream of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV MSIV open-close indicator shows open or partially open RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)
R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)
R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure PI-429, PI-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 REV. 30 Page 20 of 60 General Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 I
REV. 30 Page 21 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly Rapid de.pressurization of secon~da~ryv.ý-,-ý,,
side.'-,A~
SS or SM opinion that a rapid reduction in secondary pressure occurred Steam Generator NB pressure differential Increasing Containment Pressure Indications of a steam line break outside of containment Failed open Steam Dump, SG PORV, or SG Safety Valve Hi Steam Flow Lo-Lo Tavg Indication of steam line break downstream of MSIVs (EAL Ref Manual 7A)
Notification of Unusual Event
. Y
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 22 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly (EAL Ref Manual 7B)
High containment pressure Alert R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading Steam Line Monitor reading above normal background on faulted SG Unexpected rise in faulted SG level Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation Steam generator A/B pressure differential Valid Steamline low pressure safety injection signal Hi steam flow Lo-Lo Tavg SteamIine biea'inside contain ment.*
-it w
significant (greater than 10 gpm) primary to secondary lae
,ratek,-`
_N-
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV.30
-Page 23 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly Unisolable stear'lirin brbk outside' tha;o1tagpment wihsrgsficant geat J tanl10 gpm) primary to sepond~ary l'eak, (EAL Ref Manual 7C)
Indications of unisolable steam line break outside containment R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading Steam Line Monitor reading above normal background on faulted SG Unexpected rise in faulted SG level Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation Steam generator A/B pressure I
differential Valid Steamline low pressure safety injection signal Hi steam flow Lo-Lo Tavg Site Area Emergency 1:: q 1 I
Cu w
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 24 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly containment, with-
- O.rir.aryjto (EAL Ref Manual 7D)
If steam line break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel failure, this may be a General Emergency. See condition # 6, case 2 Primary to Secondary Leakage
> 50 gpm Valid high radiaiton R-48
> 200 R/hr (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)
Valid high radiadton R-49
> 200 R/hr (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)
Steam generator A/B pressure I >100 DSid differential I High containment pressure I >4 psig Valid steamline low pressure I < 500 psig safety injection signal I Hi steam flow
>.745x 106 lb/hr Lo-Lo Tavg
< 540 -F Site Area Emergency Steam Line break in se-condar ieakage4 S 4 4C nd jndif*-atinmAf'fi gal'
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 25 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly (EAL Ref Manual 7E)
Condensate and Main Feedwater cannotI be established to either SG 0
Aux Feedwater flow cannot be established to either SG High Head Safety Injection flow cannot be established to the RCS 30 minutes have elapsed since implementation of step in FR-H.1 requiring
>30 minutes actuation of SI No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow to either SG No Auxiliary Feedwater flow to either SG No High Head Safety Injection flow to the I RCS I
-4_.
General S..
Emergency if
'S "Cannot be established" means that procedural guidance for establishing condition will not be successful based on knowledge of sysiem/cormponent condlition/availability.
-i
- 2
I j
I
-
Transient iniitiaitd by loss of feedwater dcordensate systems (principali heat i removal system) fOllOWed by failure of emergency feedwatersyste for extended period. ICore melting'possible in several hours.*U tmatefailure of *:*---
I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 26 of 60 Condition 8 : Radiological Effluents
- Ai~rbornie Radiiologcal' effluenti I**
=ecmca,*pecmat~nsexceeded *.
I (EAL Ref Manual 8A)
Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected I to exceed Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as determined by Rad Protection Confirmation of total gaseous activity by Rad Chemist that a 300 second marinelli gas grab [
sample analysis from 1[2]R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Valid 1 R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon) [
Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Notification of Unusual Event Liquid' Radioiogical 4effluent Techhicalg;o
- peci iCatlon lmt xedd*3*
(EAL Ref Manual 8B)
Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as determined by Rad Protection Liquid release exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4,ODCM, Sect. 2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)
>High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon)
>High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) >High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)
R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close Notification of Unusual Event U) 0 0
4 Lu
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1
- :REV. 30 Page 27 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents Liquid Radiological effldeht greater~thanW, Iten tImeS;TechniaI Sp6ctficýtion limits:
I Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as determined by Rad Protection Liquid release exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect.
2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)
> 10 times High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon)
> 10 times High Alarm setpoint E
R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) > 10 times L
High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river) lR-1 9 (SG BlovvWdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to dlose Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed 10 times Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as determined by Rad Protection.
Confirmation by RPS that local measured count rate on 1 [2]R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon) gas chamber Valid 1 R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Valid 1 R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon)
Valid 2R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon)
(EAL Ref Manual 8C)
Alert Airbornb'ReidliooiciM lef~lunts-greater than ten tim-es ebhhcl I p*e'c ific"at'io6n I in st a'n't an eobus. limni t s -(a n 1`6i nstantae o us r a tey which,,lf, Scontinuze'd for over-vtwo hours, would result in about 1,mremrnTEDE jat the i§te boundariy u nder average met co6 ditlions. TEDEZTotal r, (EAL Ref Manual 8D)
Alert 4-6 1z
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 8 : Radiological Effluents Radiation survey teams measure gamma dose rates at site boundary Radiation survey teams measure field data at site boundary corresponding to Thyroid CDE Valid 1 R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary TEDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary REV. 30 Page 28 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 8E)
Cu
.2 0
- 0.
0
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 29 of 60 Condition 8 : Radiological Effluents (EAL Ref Manual BF)
Radiation survey teams measure gamma dose rates at or beyond the site boundary Radiation survey teams measure field data at the site boundary, corresponding to Thyroid CDE Valid 1 R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
IC TEDE offsite dose projections at the site 0.
boundary p -Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary Sm q) qu Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 8 : Radiological Effluents Radiation* levels or 'airblorne contaiiinationiwhich,*,.:
Windic~at aesevere degradation in the coptroi~of-*
I,
rooactive materials (e.g,; icreaseoof factor* o-J, 11000 indirctradiation readins within faclhty).i REV. 30 Page 30 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 8G)
SS, SM, or ED opinion Alert Unexpected increase in plant area radiation factor of 1000 monitors Widespread unexpected iodine or
> 1000 DAC particulate airborne concentrations as per 10CFR20 appendix B table 1, Column 3.
Widespread unexpected contamination in > 1,oooooodpm/100cm2 beta-gamma the Auxiliary Building > 50,000 dpm/100cm2 alpha actiwt
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 31 of 60 Condition 9 Major Electrical Failures (EAL Ref Manual 9A) 4.16 KV 'Bus 11 [21],4119304 [4172804]
4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]
4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]
4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]
D1 [D5 ] Tach D1 [D5] Gen Volts Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]
D2 [D6 ] Tach D2 [D6 ] Gen Volts Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]
J Notification of Unusual Event
"(EAL-Ref Manual 9B)
Loss of D1 & D2 [D5 & D6] diesel generators when they are required to be operable by Tech Specs Notification of Unusual Event V
1o q) 0 0
'4 O
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 32 of 60 Condition 9 : Major Electrical Failures Loss ofoffsite ower and loss of all nitE'AgOcfiwrt(SeedoSite Areia'v
,EmergenCy, To rextendedos)~"
If~
(EAL Ref Manual 9C)
Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804] 1 <3500 Volts Bus 12 [221, 4119305 [4172805]
<3500 Volts Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]
<3500 Volts Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]
<3500 Volts Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401]
<4000 Volts Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301] <4000 Volts (EAL Ref Manual 9D)
Blackout duration Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]
Bus 12 [221, 4119305 [4172805]
Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]
Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]
Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401]
Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301]
U) 0 0
U)
U) 0
-J 0
4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 0
Ix
, I SI Alert U) 0
'90 U)
U) 0
-J
'90)
.9-U.
0 I...
0 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Failreof,offsite anado
ý itotal loss-bof 'e-mer makeubpcadpabIity forqo h'dursThi~wouldlead thiran.lke*/
~
l~r:
REV. 30 Page 33 of 60 Conditi6n 9 iMajor Electrical Failures rnsite power alona gency fedwater&
- gre'Pt than 2 (EAL Ref Manual 9E),
- 1to eventual core zi,"
of contannment.'
Mode 1,2, 3, or 4I Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater pump unavailable Motor Driven Aux Feedwater pump from other unit unavailable 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]
4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]
4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]
4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]
4.16 KV 4.16 KV Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [41904011 Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301]
General Emergency t3
'9 0
'9 0
(I
0
-J
'9 0
L.
qj
-r7
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 34 of 60 Condition 9 : Major Electrical Failures (EAL Ref Manual 9F)
SS, SM opinion that DC power is not available for one unit "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DCI FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-05011 "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DCI FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502J Alert (EAL Ref Manual 9G)
"SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DCI FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-05011J "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DCI FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-05021 Loss of DC power has lasted more thanl 15 minutes I Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES "ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 35 of 60 Condition 10 : Control Room Evacuations Ekacuatlon'of the Control -Room
)Wntzcipated or requdl'with control of,-*
'shutd6vown systemhs 'establisheoi from iokot1 Shutdown,Ra'nels and oca sttanstioi-i 7 1-P:
(EAL Ref Manual 10A)
SS,SM, or ED determines evacuation of Control Room is anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations If reason for evacuation is fire in Control Room or Relay Room, see initiating condition 1 1C, "Fire compromising the functions of safety systems" for possible reclassification.
Evacuation the. ontrol Room and
'a"'nirois nsysems. no t establishedfrom Ht Shutdbwn Panels, i and locaý stations *ithin15 minutes&;
(EAL Ref Manual 10B)
Evacuation of Control Room conducted Site Area Emergency Control of shutdown systems not established
> 15 min' from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations within 15 minutes 4,
r 4
4.,'-,
,.1 i Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 11 : Fires (EAL Ref Manual 11A)
FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
Fire within the Reactor Bldg., Auxiliary Bldg., Turbine Bldg., Service Bldg., Rad Waste Bldg., Plant Screen House, D5/D6 Bldg, Cooling Tower Equip. House, Transformers, or on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask in the ISFSI Area Notification of fire or fire detection alarm in the Control Room Fire not extinguished within 10-minutes Notification of Unusual Event The 10-minute time period begins with a report of a FIRE occurring or receipt of a fire detection t te-% Isystem alarm. A fire alarm is assumed to be valid unless disproven within the 10-minute period by I personnel dispatched to the scene.
Fir ptentially affecting safety sys tems.'
(EAL Ref Manual 11 B)
FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
Physical observation of a fire that is I affecting one train of a safety system I SS, SM, or ED opinion F REV. 30 Page 36 of 60 Alert I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
'ATTACHMENT 1 30 Page 37 of 60 Condition 11 :Fires (EAL Ref Manual 11C)
FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
Physical observation of a fire that is affecting both trains of a safety system for the same unit SS, SM, or ED opinion Site Area Emergency I.:
I I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 38 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions srintheontrolI (EAL Ref Manual 12B)
SS or SM opinion that annunciators are nonfunctional Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and loss of plant computer Loss of BOP Annunciator System and loss of plant computer (ERCS)
Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and BOP Annunciator System Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 120)
Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 SS, SM, or ED opinion that annunciators are non-functional Loss of plant computer (ERCS)
Loss of NSSS Annunciator System Loss of BOP Annunciator System 0
b U,
Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 12,:'Plant Shutdown'Functions nnuntia tors) lost,,
" _. °,
i
- 1. 1 t'I n
-+/- -
(EAL Ref Manual 12D)
I..
(U Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Loss of plant computer (ERCS)
SS, SM, or ED opinion that annunciators are non-functional SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient has occurred or is in progress Loss of NSSS Annunciator System Loss of BOP Annunciator System A transient is an UNPLANNED event involving one of more of the following:
(1) automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor povwer, (2) electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection actuation, or (5) thermal power increase or oscillations >10%.
- r REV. 30 Page 39 of 60 Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 40 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions orecooliig ngeded (EAL Ref Manual 12E)
Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Interruption of RHR core cooling Entry into procedure E4, Core Cooling Following Loss of RHR flow Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 12F)
Mitigation actions are unable to prevent RCS temperature
>200 °F exceeding 200 OF tLoIss of wate* level that has uunicveiredF'l
,or~will uncoverte fuel in th'te reactor vessel:while at Mode 5,Cold Shutdown.
4 4
1/2 (EAL Ref Manual 12G)
Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Total loss of RHR system cooling Mitigating actions unable to restore makeup flow greater than inventory loss Alert Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 41 of 60 Condition 12 : Plant Shutdown Functions Corn jIte odsisq Cfjn'P!fUnicti6ri'hedldd foe, plant Mode63, HotShutdrownY, (AlSo seeCondition #'/for poible IL~enral i~fee an b le a
- sitmtitL*.l Mode 1.2% or5i Inadequate hi pressure injection capability (i.e., loss of 2/2 SI pumps
> 15 min.
and loss of all charging pumps for more than 15 minutes) I.
SS, SM, or ED opinion that plant functions required to maintain Mode 3, Hot Shutdown (S1t
' 1 )
not available All steam generator safety valves inoperable I Both steam generator PORVs inoperable All steam generator steam dump to atmosphere valves inoperable Steam generator steam dump to condenser valve inoperable No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow No Auxiliary Feedwater flow Wide range level in both < 25%
Site Area Emergency z:350 °FT
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 42 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions
.. a reactor I',z (EAL Ref Manual 121)
Reactor or turbine trip due to turbine failure Notification of Unusual Event SS or SM opinion (EAL Ref Manual 12J)
As determined by visual inspection SS, SM or ED opinion Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 I
REV. 30 Page 43 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions jFailufeio-theat rea ctdroý'pote-ctiornsyste*m
,to iniate and complete a trip Which <
brings the reactor, subcritidal.
Any valid reactor trip setpoint has I Sbeen exceeded I Intermediate range detector I output not decaying I (EAL Ref Manual 12K)
I*;I
.(EAL Ref Manual 12L)
Failure to bring reactor subcritical with 6ontrol rods inserted No indication of core damage SS, SM, or'ED opinion that a transient is in progress (EAL Ref Manual 12M)
"Failure to bring reactor subcriticial with control rods inserted RCS pressure Rapidly increasing containment pressure and temperature Dose equivalent 1-131 Alert T ransmInt requring operation of shutdown systemsnwith failure to trip (continued power generation but no core damage immediately evident).
Site Area Emergency Transient requiring ope-ration of--;
shutdown systems witifailure to6trip.-,
wvcn results m. core damage or a a ltionfal ia!lure o core'cooling and o akeup systemmss(wich cou1d lead to-Y.
rO General "Emergency I
j
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents REV. 30 Page 44 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 13A)
During refueling operations SS, SM,or ED opinion Valid R2 (containment area)
Valid R7 (containment area)
Containment vent monitor in the Containment Position Valid Ri1 (containment vent)
Valid R1 2 (containment vent)
Alert (EAL Ref Manual 13B)
SS, SM, or ED opinion Valid Spent Fuel Pool Area rad monitor R5 Valid R-22 (shield bldg vent)
Valid R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
Alert
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
'ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 45 of 60 Condition 13 : Fuel Handling Accidents Majordamage to spent fu&l in*,ri continment or fuel handling building J (e.g., large object Idamages fuel or water*, '-,_
I6 osbel6w6fue6l lel (EAL Ref Manual 13C)
SS, SM, or ED opinion SValid R48 (containment area hi range) hi Alarm 8 Valid R49 (containment area hi range) hi Alarm SS, SM, or ED opinion SValid R50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
Valid R5 (SFP area) b a
IL.
b a
IA.
Site Area Emergency It
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 46 of 60 Condition 14: Coolant Pump DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
Condition 15 : Contaminated Injured Person DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES "ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 47 of 60 Condition 16 : Secuirity SCredibIle ste-specifisecuritythreat.'*.
notiffcation or attempted entry or attrnpedsabt e
Threat would have an adverse impact on safe operation or shutdown capability of the plant Security discovers an unauthorized attempted entry by force or stealth (secret) into the plant's protected area The FBI confirms that an act of attempted sabotage did occur to vital plant equipment or security equipment Low Credible Security Threat notification "I
I Ireceived juOngoing security'compro6mise :i*{*i.?`¢*
(EAL Ref Manual 16A)
Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 16B)
Security Safeguards'Contingency event that results in unauthorized personnel commandeering an area within the plant protected area, but not controlling shutdown capability or any vital areas Bomb device discovered within plant protected area and outside of any vital area I High Credible Security Threat notification recmoivedl Alert mmlnentosso cacontrol pofhe
- m-,n*,ot,*
+(EAL Ref Manual 16C)
Physical attack on the plant involving imminent occupancy of the Control Room, auxiliary Site Area shutdown panels or other vital areas Emergency Bomb device discovered within a vital area i LtoS of physical control of the plant4l I
(EAL Ref Manual 16D)
General Emergency Physical attack on the plant has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the Control Room or any other vital areas
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 48 of 60 Condition 17 : Hazards to Plant Operations I~rcraf crash onsite, or unusual aircraft-I I civity ov rfa -It:*
g*
ver~
ac I (EAL Ref Manual 17A)
Reported to the SS or SM Aircraft crash onsite within owner controlled fence "4o Unusual threatening aircraft activity over facility 0
Notification of Unusual Event
- Aircraft crashi the protect (EAL Ref Manual 17B)
Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash Alert in the protected area (EAL Ref Manual 17C)
Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash within protected area and affecting vital structures by impact or fires with either unit in Mode 1,2, 3, or 4
.>200,*
Site Area Emergency
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 173-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1
'Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations Nea or "onsite ex*ploi,on o!0 REV. 30 Page 49 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 17D)
Visually observed evidence of an unplanned or unexplained explosion within the owner Notification of controlled fence but not affecting plant safe Unusual Event operation U
"Reported to the S'S or SM Known exploson damage t6oability W Vsallyti obsrve oevaidenc of. an-unplanned*.-:-
(EAL Ref Manual 17E)
Visually observed evidence of an unplanned_
explosion directly affecting plant safe operation Reported to SS or SM Alert I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations Missile impacts from.whatevei sou6rce ;
Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of missile impacts on facility from whatever source (EAL Ref Manual 17F)
Alert
- evere'aamage to safeslutdown6 equipmentfrom missilbor, explosion; w1th plant not in;Mode*5, Cold Shutdown-(EAL Ref Manual 17G)
Mode 1,2, 3, or 4 Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of missile impacts and/or explosion on facility from whatever source Reactor trip system is inoperable Inadequate high pressure injection flow (no safety injection or charging pumps are available)
All steam generator safety valves inoperable Both steam generator PORVs inoperable All steam generator steam dump to atmosphere valves inoperable Steam generator steam dump to condenser valve inoperable Unable to establish* any Condensate and Main Feedwater flow Unable to establish* any Auxiliary Feedwater flow
"* 'Unable to establish" criteria met if procedural attempt to establish condition has been made, but was unsuccessful or if an attempt cannot be made.
r REV. 30 Page 50 of 60 Site Area Emergency
.4 0u}
0*
0) b.
I
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 "REV.'30 Page 51 of 60 Condition 17': Hazards to Plant Operations Neas'or*o*o ifisietoxic
- i.flammi-able
-gas.
~release,,
(EAL Ref Manual 17H)
Widespread toxic or flammable gaseous hazard being experienced or projected onsite (outside of plant) leading to evacuation or sheltering of personnel outside the plant Receipt of recommendation by Local, County or State Officials to evacuate personnel from site based on an offsite hazardous or flammable gaseous release event Notification of Unusual Event
-C, Entry initothe plant environs ýof toxic 'or.
Explosive gas concentrations being measured within the plant at a distance of greater than 10 feet from the source Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured within a large area of the plant at the breathing zone
- (EA_ Ref Manual 171)
> explosive limits Alert
- 50 ppm hydraine
- 300 ppm ammonia I
- 140o pm mo r 0ho o '
ne
> IDLH foran toxic as see7D14.4 AOP i Note IDLH =imrnediately Dangerous to Ute or Health.
IDLH Reference NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chermical Hazards, June 1994 I ý
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 52 of 60 Condition 17 : Hazards to Plant Operations Entry oftoxic or flammable gases into.zt vital Tareas plant not in Mode 5,'
1 Mnria 1 9 q nr~A I'rYS72Q-I1 I
I, IJ Explosive gas concentrations being measured in a maior portion of a vital area from an "unisolable source such that further access to the vital area is being prevented at a time when it is needed Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured in a majior portion of a vital area at the breathing zone such that further access to the vital area is being restricted at a time when it is needed (EAL Ref Manual 17J)
ISite Area
- Emergency
> explosive limits S> 50 ppm hydrazine
> 50 ppm hyd ohlonc acid I!
> 1400 ppm morpholine
> 30 pm ethanolamine (ETA)
> IDLH for any toxic gas (see D144 AOP1)
Note-IDLH = Immediately Dangerous to Ufe or Health. IDLH Reference. NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, June 1994.
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV.- 30 Page 53 of 60 Condition 18 :ISFSI Events UISFSI cask~tp oyerordrop resulting in.,
caIsk seal leakage
,I (EAL Ref Manual 18A)
Loaded cask tipped over or droppeA Notification of Unusual Event Overpressure monitoring tank o psig pressure decreasing to 0 psi Loss ofISFSI cask/fuel containment t~ ar l~r
+++++..
A'*++,--.+
4-
+++++m++++
- ,;+
S
-,*:++++
+*-++
++,
'++*++*
- _+P.*;m
,-+ +x..-
+ + ++..
(EAL Ref Manual 18B)
While loaded cask is outside the plant[
I..
protected areaI A radiation field near ISFSI caskI increase by a factor of 1000 above theI ambient radiation field (background >
plus the normal radiation field from the cask(s)) I 1,000 X ambient rad. field
> 1,000,000 dpm/100 SI cm2 beta-gamma Widespread contamination outside the ISFSI protected
>50,000 dpnV100 area
'- -- crr* alpha SAlert
+.9 0
0 )3
,U )
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 54 of 60 Condition 19 : Natural Events Ayconrfirmed e th
,e (EAL Ref Manual 19A)
Confirmed by one or more off-site sources Annun "Seismic Event" received on the seismograph As experienced by plant personnel Earthquake greaterthan OperationalF:
Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 19B)
Annun "Operational Basis Earthquake" received on the Alert seismographAer As experienced by plant personnel F
- Earthquake greter thana Design Bas!s'*'.
Earthquale with planAtno in Mode 5X%:
ColI Shutdown**;.*.*
(EAL Ref Manual 19C)
Site Area Emergency Annun "Design Basis Earthquake" received on the seismograph As experienced by plant personnel
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 55 of 60
'Condition 19: Natural Events Any tornado on site (EAL Ref Manual 19D)
Reported to the SS or SM Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security Notification of Unusual Event Anytornado striking the facility' -,
I~~r (EAL Ref Manual 19E)
Reported to the SS or SM, or ED Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security Alert 5
'4
-- I I-
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 56 of 60 Condition 19 : Natural Events t0Yer Flo" (EAL Ref Manual 19F)
River Intake Elevation
>686 ft od levels appro I a c hin gt desigh
- vels,
-n.
- tj'4 -I River Intake Elevation (USAR 2.4.3.5) - requires both units to
> 692 ft be shut down to Mode 2, 3, 4 or 5 t
-J I0d leeS exceeding design levels I h plant not in Mod5 Cld Shutdown:,4 l* *-I*
- +*t
- =-
7*
Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 19G)
Alert (EAL Ref Manual 19H)
Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 River Intake Elevation - Power operation design level (highest level transformers will function)
Site Area Emergency W
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 57 of 60 Condition 19 : Natural Events L.oWwater levels being experienced orý projecte boeyond usual levels.-
River intake elevation (11/21 CoolingI
<6725 t Water Pump - Lo-w Water Level Trip) I I Lowwater lels being experienced ory' Sprojected to be n (EAL Ref Manual,191)
Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 19J)
River intake elevation
< 669.5 ft
-- Alert Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 River intake elevation corresponding to loss of Lock &
Dam # 3 "Major vital equipment failure (EAL Ref Manual 19K)
Site Area Emergency River Intake Elevation
'withplant not ii M6-de5,*Cold ShutdownIl6w water levels being
- experienced or projected toube lss than design ievels, or failure of vital eupe n wt ow Wa~te~r le'vel,
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 58 of 60 Condition 19 : Natural Events SSustained winds being experienced' o'ý.,
projected near design levels.-:$j-*...,
(EAL Ref Manual 19L)
Sustained wind speed indicated by
>90 mph met tower
-o-Alert (EAL Ref Manual 19M)
Modes 1,2, 3, or 4 1m 2
Site Area Emergency Sustained wind speed indicated by I > 100 mph met tower I (EAL Ref Manual 19N)
General Emergency As determined by the SS, SM, or ED I Any ajorinternal6 or external'e'v~ents
,( -i? r s e a r t h u e, s b s n a l y Sb e y n d~ d s ig n sle v e ls ) w m ~ o l r : :
nas caused masse-d*amage to planti "systems resulting orpotentlal fo' r resuiting inlarge'releases to the offsitd en,roinent-Inexcess o'the EPA' ?t0 Pro',tec'tive Actio8n Gud6sf1es.
i
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES SATTACHMENT 1 REV. 30 Page 59 of 60 Condition 20: Other (peration (EAL 20A)
EALRef Manual 2A SM and SS concurrence that plant [ "
conditions warrant increased awareness I Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 20B)
Technical Specification LCO action statement ( TSAC i
=5TABL
) not met requires plant shutdown or cooldown Reactor power reduction or cooldown requirements have been exceeded Cordiltions that involve other than.
rnoiaf c~roiddishiztd6wn.
Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 20C)
Reactor power reduction or cooldown has been initiated Emergency Safeguard Function equipment did NOT perform its function if required Cooldown rate exceeded Tech Spec Limit SS or SM opinion that lack of control of shutdown or cooldown warrants offsite agency notification Notification of Unusual Event
F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 20: Other Conditions that waif*tctivatin o0f TechnicasupportCenteraiid neairsite Emergency Operation IaClllti
- ,*,3*,
REV. 30 Page 60 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 20D)
[ th~el'r plant cond!Un tawrrant*-';-:,]
actitaonfo emerbgency operationri>
I centers and monitoring teams or a",
l precautionary not Iation to the public,ý, o e
lte
- ,J-*r**
(EAL Ref Manual 20E)
Site Area Emergency (EAL Ref Manual 20F)
General Emergency
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE O.C. REVIEW DATE:
UVE4-1 EFFECTIVE DATE M. Werner Page 1 of 7
$ýYýjREF EIENCEVSE1 2
- Procedure segments may be performed from memory.:
- Use the procedure to verify segments are complete..
- .. Mark off steps within segment before continuing.
- Procedure should be available at the work location.
IPRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT r I
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide instructions to the Radiation Protection Group on the use of the Hotcell, to include Hotcell setup, various chemical analysis evolutions and radioactive sample disposal techniques.
2.0 APPLICABILITY This Instruction is applicable to Chemistry Radiation Protection Specialists.
3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 Monitor the general area of the Hotcell for direct radiation to ensure the habitability of the Hotcell.
3.2 The reactor coolant samples taken in an accident condition have the potential to be highly radioactive. This may give rise to dose rates far in excess of what would normally be encountered. All work involving these samples is to be performed in the Hotcell with the fume hood in operation and with remote handling tools, to minimize radiation exposure, until one of the following is determined:
3.2.1 The sample is determined not to have dose rates in excess of normal values.
3.2.2 The sample has been diluted to the point where the diluted portion does not have dose rates in excess of normal values.
3.3 If a sample is determined to be of normal dose rate values, or is diluted to the point NOT to exceed normal dose rate values, the following should apply:
3.3.1 The instructions specified in this procedure may be completed in an area other than the Hotcell Hood.
3.3.2 Monitor the alternate area for direct radiation to ensure habitability.
3.3.3 Analyze the sample in accordance with the appropriate RPIP, as a normal chemistry sample for the analyte of interest.
3.3.4 The instructions for Post Accident Sample Waste Storage and Disposal apply.
Page 2 of 7 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:
F3 EMERGENCY HOTCELL PROCEDURE F3-23.1 REV:
12 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES The Chemistry Radiation Protection Specialists are responsible to implenment this procedure.
5.0 DISCUSSION The Hot Cherm Lab in the Auxiliary Building may not be available due to abnormal radiological conditions. Use of the Hotcell or Alternate Area would be necessary.
6.0 PREREQUISITES 6.1 Hotcell Set-up Procedure or Alternate-Area The following procedure should be completed piIorto NOTE,-
introducing a hot sample into the Hotcell Area.
6.1.1 " Ensure that all instrumentation is turned on, warmed up and calibrated.
6.1.2 'Fill a1 L volumetric-to the mark with derrineralized water.
6.1.3 Fill a 100 ml volumetric to tl~e mark with demineralized water.
6.1.4-Remove 1 ml of demineralized water from each volumetric using a 1 ml pipet.
'6.1.5 Add a: stir bar to'each volumetric.-
- 4 6.1.6 Turn ON the two stir~plates in the fume hood IF corntainment spray has been activated, consider buffering pH meter'with 7 and 10 buffer.
6.1.7 Buffer the pH 6lectrode.,' "
6.1.8 Place a 250 ml beaker of water near the pH probe.
Page 3 of 7
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 7.0 Procedure 7.1 Sample Preparation 7.1.1 Label all samples.
7.1.2 Verify postings and boundaries for expected radiation and contamination levels.
7.1.3 Don a finger ring on each hand.
7.1.4 Ensure TLD and dosimeters are worn.
7.1.5 Place the 60 ml bottle shielded carrier in the fume hood near the pH probe.
,A\\-
AVOID PLACING HANDS OVER TOP OF OPEN SHIELDED U,. i*
- tCARRIER.
7.1.6 IF radiation levels require, THEN use the remote handling tool.
7.1.7 Remove the lid from the 60 ml bottle shielded carrier.
7.1.8 Remove the stopper from the bottle.
7.1.9 Pipet 1 ml of coolant from the 60 ml bottle to the 1 L volumetric.
7.1.10 Cap the volumetric and agitate to mix.
7.1.11 Pipet 1 ml of coolant from the 60 ml bottle to the 100 ml volumetric.
Page 4 of 7 The RPS Sample Team members SHOULD ensure all samples are properly labeled with sample identification, sample size/volume, flowrates, pressures, and sample times, as appropriate to facilitate accurate analysis. As samples are diluted, split, or reduced; the appropriate information needs to be included on new labels attached to the newly created samples. Sample dose rate information should be included on all sample labels, to help ensure personnel awareness of radiological consideration. For ALARA reasons, the sample containers should be prelabeled whenever possible.
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE The 100 ml volumetric is to be saved for the Chloride Analysis, NOTE:
which is to be completed within four days. The undiluted sample must also be saved for 30 days.
7.1.12 Cap the volumetric and agitate to mix.
7.1.13 Label the volumetric with sample, date, time, and the number of mis of sample in the volumetric.
'7.1.14, Mark sample "TO BE SAVED".
7.1.15 Store the 100 ml volumetric in the Hotcell Shielded Area.
7.1.16 IF a pH Analysis is to be determined on the sample, THEN proceed to Step 7.2: IF NOT, THEN replace the'stopper on the 60 ml bottle.
7.1.17
- Replace the lead cover on the shielded carrier, place the shielded carrier "in the Hotcell Shielded Area and proceed to Step 7.3, Gamma Analysis S'Preparation.
7.2 pH Analysis - Using the Combination Methods NOTE:.. >
The pH meter gives a digital readout of sample temperature and will auto-compensate for temperature.
7.2.1 Insert the combination pH probe and temp probe into the 60 ml bottle
-aind read pH ahd temperature of, coolant.,
7.2.2 Remove both probes and place in a beaker of demin water.
7.2.3 Log sample results on PINGP 655, Post Accident Chemical Analysis Report.
7.2.4 IF radiation levels require, THEN use remote handling tools for handling the 60 ml bottle stopper arid shielded carrier Lid.
7.2.5 Replacetlhe stop jer on the'60 ml bottle and the lid on the 60 ml bottle shielded carrier.
7.2.6 Remove the shielded carrier and the beaker of rinse water from the fume hood and store according to Step 7.6, Post Accident Sample Waste Storage and Disposal.
Page 5 of 7 PRAIRIE ISL.AND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 7.3 Gamma Analysis Preparation 7.3.1 Pipet 10 ml of diluted coolant sample from the 1 L volumetric to a 10 ml vial.
Sample should be diluted to give a contact reading of under 1 millirem/hr contact. The diluted sample should NOT Sexceed 25 millirem/hr contact.
7.3.2 Verify that the indicated dose rate on the 10 ml vial is capable of being counted on extended geometry in EOF Countroom.
7.3.3 Label the vial with the sample point, date, time, and dilution factor to the sample prior to sending to EOF Countroom.
7.3.4 Place the 10 ml vial in the shielded carrier for transport to the EOF Countroom.
7.3.5 WHEN radioactive gas, charcoal, or particulate samples are received, THEN ensure all samples are labeled with date and time of sample, sample point, sample volume and/or correction factor, and flow rate.
7.3.6 Store all samples in the Hotcell Shielded Area until transported to the EOF Countroom.
7.4 Boron Analysis 7.4.1 Using the 1 L sample prepared in Step 7.1, Sample Preparation, analyze in accordance with RPIP 3314, Boron by Ion Exclusion Chromatography.
7.4.2 Log the results on PINGP 655, Post Accident Chemical Analysis Report.
7.4.3 Dispose of all radioactive waste according to Step 7.6, Post Accident Sample Waste Storage and Disposal.
Page 6 of 7 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 7.5 Chloride Analysis Chloride analysis SHALL be completed within 4 days of W-T.
..... accident.
THE REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLES TAKEN IN AN
.,ACCIDENT CONDITION HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO BE HIGHLY RADIOACTIVE. THIS MAY GIVE RISE TO DOSE C UT*IOAP RATES FAR IN EXCESS OF WHAT WOULD NORMALLY BE ENCOUNTERED. THE ION EXCHANGE COLUMNS ON THE ION CHROMATOGRAPH COULD HAVE CONTACT READINGS OF UP TO 10 R/HR.
7.5.1 Using the 100 ml sample prepared in Step 7.1, Sample Preparation analyze in accordance with RPIP 3301, Anions by Ion Exchange.
7.5.2 Log the results on PINGP 655, Post Accident Chemical Analysis Report.
7.5.3 Dispose.of all radioactive waste according to Step 7.6, Post Accident Sample Waste Storage and Disposal.,
7.6 Post Accident Sample Waste Storage and Disposal f
Ensure samples are labeled. "TO BE SAVED" or "TO BE DUMPED" before storage In shielded area.
7.6.1 Place all capped or covered radioactive sample waste in the Hotcell Shielded Area.
7.6.2 IF additional waste samples are added-to'the Hotcell Shielded Area, THEN survey the Hotcell general area radiation levels. Add additional shielding, as necessary.
7.6.3 IF making subsequent entries into Auxiliary Building, THEN return the sample waste to the Sample Room for disposal down the affected unit's Sample Hood Drain.
- Page 7 of 7 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:
F3-31 REV:
RESPONSE TO SECURITY RELATED THREATS
- Procedure segments may be performed from memory.
- Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.
Mark off steps within segment before continuing.
- Procedure should be available at the work location.
O.C. REVIEW DATE:
OWNER:
M. Werner EFFECTIVE DATE 7.-I24 Page 1 of 10 I
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 61
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides guidance for responding to a credible security threat by the plant staff resulting in a declared emergency.
2.0 APPLICABILITY This procedure SHALL apply to the duty Shift Manager, Shift Supervisor, Plant Manager, Emergency Director and plant personnel during a credible security threat.
Specific Security Force actions and responses are described in the Safeguards Contingency Plan and procedures.
3.0 PRECAUTIONS If a bomb or sabotage device is found, 3.1 Personnel should remain at a distance of 300 to 500 feet, if possible, from the device.
3.2 The person discovering the device SHALL NOT touch or disturb it.
3.3 Hand-held radios should not be operated within a distance of 50 feet from the explosive device.
Page 2 of 10 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES
,4.1 The Plant Manageror designee has responsibility to assist the Shift Manager during a plant security event.
4.2 The Operations Shift Manager has responsibility for safe operation of the plant and initiation of the Emergency Plan during a plant security event.
4.3 Operations Shift Supervisor has responsibility for plant operations and assessment of operational aspects of the emergency.
4.4 Superintendent Security/designee has responsibility to implement the "Safeguards Contingency Plan during a security event and support the Operations Shift Manager as necessary.
4.5 Shift Chemist has responsibility to assist Shift Manager in performing notification during security threats.
5.0 GENERAL INFORMATION 5.1 Definitions 5.1.1 HIGH Threat Severity - The threat of physical attack to the plant represents a. potential, substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
5.1.2 LOW Threat Severity The threat of physical attack tothe plarnt represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
5.1.3 Non-Credible Threat - Information assessed as offering no reasonable basis to quality as credible.
5.1.4 Security Threat - Any notification from any source which is received at the site or the corporate office which could be considered as a threat to the safety of the site whether considered credible or not.
Page 3of 10 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 5.2 Discussion Once a security threat (i.e., bomb threat, adversary threat, etc.) is determined to be a HIGH credible security threat, the definition of an ALERT is met and an ALERT should be declared per F3-2.
Once a security threat (i.e., bomb threat, adversary threat, etc.) is determined to be a LOW credible security threat, the definition of a NUE is met and a NUE should be declared per F3-2.
The duty operations Shift Manager remains in charge of the overall plant response to the security threat with assistance from Plant Security, Operations, Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEA) and Nuclear Management Company (NMC) staff.
If changing security or plant conditions warrant escalation to a higher emergency classification, the Shift Manager is responsible to authorize the escalation.
Implementation of Emergency Plan procedures during a security event may need to be modified, depending on the event, in order to protect the safety of plant personnel, vital equipment, or protect the health and safety of the public.
6.0 PREREQUISITES 6.1 A credible security threat exists and; 6.2 A Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) or Alert has been declared.
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE INUJMRFR!
RESPONSETO SECURITY RELATED THREATS 7.0 PROCEDURE or designee should go to Ch Contrrol Room to assist with communications.
7.2 The Duty Shift Manageir/Shift Supervisor should ensure the following activities are performed or considered:
7.2.1 IF a bomb device exists, THEN ensure the following message is broadcaisted over the plant P/A system:
During drills, the announcement should begin and end with "THIS IS A DRILL"..
"ATTENTION ALL PLANT PERSONNEL. ATTENTION ALL PLANT
'PERSONNEL.,
"ABOMB MAY EXIST IN THE
"- STAY CLEAR OF,......
(specify area)
(specify area)
Repeat message after about ten (10) second interval.
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II I.....
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 7.2.2 Page 6 of 10 THREATS I*-,j -I REV:
6 IF an Alert has been declared, THEN:
The Alert classification was declared based on a HIGH credible security threat. Site personnel are to be placed out of harms way as soon as possible. The Backup Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) are to be staffed and activated to support offsite communications.
A.
Assume the position of Emergency Director in absence of Plant Manager or other Emergency Director designee.
B.
Ensure the following PA announcement is completed:
"ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A SECURITY THREAT EXISTS.
PLACE ALL ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES IN A SAFE CONDITION.
ALL EOF PERSONNEL ASSEMBLE AT THE BACKUP EOF.
OPERATIONS PERSONNEL, FIRE BRIGADE PERSONNEL, AND DUTY CHEMIST ASSEMBLE IN THE CONTROL ROOM.
ALL OTHER PERSONNEL LEAVE THE SITE AND GO HOME."
Repeat announcement after about ten (10) second interval.
C.
Direct the Shift Emergency Coordinator (SEC) to:
- 1.
Perform offsite government notifications per checklist PINGP 580.
- 2.
Activate EOF personnel to staff Backup EOF and JPIC personnel to staff JPIC per checklist PINGP 580.
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
PDEEMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE D.
Ensure NRC is notified of Alert (PINGP 666).
E.
Follow-up Threat actions:
- 1.
Coordinate with Emergency Manager, to designate appropriate plant representation at the LLEA command "center to provide site facility and plant operations advice to the LLEA.
Ongoing management communication will take place from the Backup EOF.
The hub for security communication will be the NMC Hudson Security Command Post at (715) 377-3353.
- 2.
Determine and execute appropriate procedures to place the plant in a condition that will minimize the potential "consequences of execution of the anticipated or occurring security threat.
"3. 'Cohside'r terminating high-risk or special operations that may be in progress (e.g., refueling, resin sluicing, etc.).
"4.
I lthe case of a'ciedible bomb threat, consider shutting down the plant withi'due consideration for out-plant operator safety.
- 5.
Coordinate with Security and LLEA to determine an appropriate response to the security event.
- 6.
Keeep plant pe-r'nnel 6lear (if possible, 300 to 500 feet) of the affected areas if their personal safety is at risk.
- 7.
After security "all clear" is given,-ensure all appropriate emergency plan actions in PINGP 1125 (SM/SS ED
-,* Checklist) are being completed with due consideration for personal safety and security considerations as appropriate.
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EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
- 8.
IF threat results in plant damage and security threat still exists, THEN continue to assess conditions.
- 9.
IF threat results in plant damage and security risk to personnel no longer exists, THEN:
- a.
Activate remaining ERO per PINGP 1384 AND
- b.
Evaluate EALs per F3-2.
- 10.
IF threat is resolved, THEN terminate event per F3-2.
7.2.3 IF a NUE has been declared, THEN:
The NUE classification was declared based on a LOW credible security threat. Site personnel are to be placed out of harms way as soon as possible. The Backup EOF and JPIC are to be staffed and activated to support offsite communications.
A.
Assume the position of Emergency Director in absence of Plant Manager or another Emergency Director designee.
B.
Ensure the following PA announcement is completed:
"ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A SECURITY THREAT EXISTS.
PLACE ALL ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES IN A SAFE CONDITION.
ALL EOF PERSONNEL ASSEMBLE AT THE BACKUP EOF.
OPERATIONS PERSONNEL, FIRE BRIGADE PERSONNEL, AND DUTY CHEMIST ASSEMBLE IN THE CONTROL ROOM.
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EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE "ALL OTHER PERSONNEL LEAVE THE SITE AND GO HOME."
Repeat announcement after about ten (10) second interval.
C. -
Direct the SEC (Shift Chemist) to:
- 1.
Perform offsite government notifications per checklist PINGP 579..
J,
- 2.
Activate EOF personnel to staff Backup EOF and JPIC
- -personnel to staff JPIC per checklist PING P 579.
D.
Ensure NRC is notified of NUE (PINGP 666).
E.
Follow-up Threat actions:
- 1.
Coordinate with Emergency Manager, to designate appropriate plant representation at the LLEA command
-center to provide site facility and plant'operations advice to the LLEA.
"OngoIng management commuriibation will'-take place from the Backup EOF.
,Jo':,
The hub for security communication will be the NMC Hudson Security Comnmand Post at (7.15) 337-3353.
- '2.
Determine and execute appropriateprocedures to place the
'plant ina conditi6n that will minimize 'the potential consequences of execution of the anticipated or occurring S~~~securi~ty threat.,
- 3.
Consider terminating high-risk or special operations that "may be'in progress (e.g., refueling, resin sluicing, etc.).
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EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
- 4.
In the case of a credible bomb threat, consider shutting down the plant with due consideration for out-plant operator safety.
- 5.
Coordinate with Security and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to determine an appropriate response to the security event.
- 6.
Keep plant personnel clear (if possible, 300 to 500 feet) of the affected areas if their personal safety is at risk.
- 7.
Ensure all appropriate emergency plan actions in PINGP 1125 (SM/SS ED Checklist) are being completed with due consideration for personal safety and security considerations as appropriate.
- 8.
IF event results in plant damage, THEN reclassify per F3-2 and go to Alert section of this procedure.
- 9.
IF threat becomes a HIGH credible threat, THEN reclassify and go to Alert section of this procedure.
- 10.
Coordinate with EOF Manager to assess personnel needed in the EOF and release unnecessary EOF and JPIC personnel.
SPersonnel needed to support essential activities should remain at work or be called back in. All other personnel should go home. Inform such personnel of the determination through management channels.
- 11.
Coordinate with NMC headquarters management personnel and determine what essential activities should proceed.
- 12.
IF threat is resolved, THEN terminate event per F3-2.
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