ML022690333
ML022690333 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Harris ![]() |
Issue date: | 03/22/2002 |
From: | Ernstes M Division of Reactor Safety II |
To: | Scarola J Carolina Power & Light Co |
References | |
50-400/02301 50-400/02301 | |
Download: ML022690333 (63) | |
See also: IR 05000400/2002301
Text
Draft Submittal
(Pink Paper)
1. Operating Test Simulator Scenarios
0-1 + D-2- S5k-tkP
SHEARON HARRIS
EXAM 2002-301
50-400
AUGUST 26 - 29, 2002
Appendix D Simulator Scenario Outline FORM ES-D-1
Facility: HARRIS Scenario Number: 1 Op-Test Number: 26o,2 -301
Examiners Operators
Objectives: To evaluate the candidate's ability to operate the plant in a controlled and safe manner
during a power decrease and diagnose and respond to the following events in accordance
with applicable Harris plant procedures:
"* Controlling pressure channel failure on a SG
"* Loss of an Emergency AC 6.9 KV Bus
"* Pressurizer level channel failure
"* Loss of offsite power
. Subsequent loss of all AC power
- Restoration of one Emergency Diesel Generator
Initial Conditions: IC-25; 79% power BOL; Ensure Boric Acid Pump 'B' in AUTO and RMUW Pump 'B'
button is illuminated
Turnover: The unit is at 79% power at BOL during a ramp from 100% power at 5 Mw per minute.
Severe thunderstorms have been reported in the area for the past 30 minutes. AP-301,
"Seasonal Preparations and Monitoring," has been completed.
A 6.7 gpd tube leak exists in SG 'A'.
Boron concentration is 1293 ppm. Bank D rods are at 199 steps.
RHR Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to
contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Technical
Specification 3.5.2 has ben entered. OWP-RH-01 has been completed. Risk is
YELLOW.
Main Feed Pump 'A' has been inspected for potential vibration concerns and Engineering
has requested that plant power be lowered at the current rate to allow removing the pump
from service if required.
Shift orders are to continue the power decrease at 5 Mw per minute to 50% power and
restore RHR Pump 'A' to service when it becomes available. GP-006 is being performed
per Section 5.2.
Page I of 20 SCENARO # 1 NUREG- 1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
EventI Malfunction Event Event Description
Number Number Type*
NA N (SRO) Continued plant power reduction (GP-006)
R (RO)
N (BOP)
2 PT:495 1300 1 (SRO) Controlling Channel of SG C pressure PT-495 high failure (AOP
0 I (BOP) 010, OWP-ESF)
3 LT:459 100 0 I (RO) Pressurizer Level Channel LT-459 fails high (OWP-RP)
I (SRO)
4 EPS05A C (ALL) Loss of IA-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to
ZDSQ94:4A automatically start (AOP-025)
FAILASIS .
5 EPS01 I M (ALL) Lighting strike in switchyard - loss of offsite power. EDG A loads,
DSG1 2 EDG B trips (EOP-PATH-1, EOP-EPP-004)
6 DSG01 3 M (ALL) EDG A trips - loss of all power (EOP-EPP-001)
7 LOA DSG17 C (BOP) EDG A is restarted after S/G depressurization has started (EOP-EPP
C (SRO) 001)
8 NA (SRO) Classifies the Event
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 2 of 20 SCENARIO 41 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 1 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Continued plant power reduction
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: NA
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
Plant management directs continued power reduction to 50%
power.
1) Direct the actions of GP-006, "Normal Plant Shutdown
from Power Operation to Hot Standby" after conducting a
brief
2) Ensure all PRZ Heaters are energized
3) Borate and / or insert Control Rods as necessary to control
RCS temperature and AFD during the load reduction
4) Reduce Turbine Load
- Place Impulse Pressure Feedback Loop in service
- Place Megawatt Feedback Loop in service
- Depress the Load Rate MW / Min pushbutton
- Enter the desired unloading rate (5 MW / Min) in Demand
display
- Depress Enter pushbutton
- Depress Ref pushbutton
"* Enter the desired load (approximately 50% power) in
Demand display
"* Depress the Enter pushbutton and verify the Hold
pushbutton illuminates
"* Depress the Go pushbutton to start the load reduction and
verify the Reference display decreases
5) Verify Generator Load is decreasing
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 3 of 20 SCENARIO #I1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Controlling Channel of SG C pressure PT-495 high failure
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+O (When Lead Examiner determines adequate
power reduction has been observed)
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- LOOP A HI STEAM LINE DP LOW-Pi (ALB-014-1-2)
- LOOP B HI STEAM LINE DP LOW-P3 (ALB-014-2-2)
SSG C STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH (ALB-014-6-1B)
- SG 'C' actual feed flow> steam flow
- SG 'C' feed reg valve opening
- SG 'C level rising
1) Directs the BOP to take manual control of FK-498 and
reduce feed flow per requirements of OMM-001
- Condition / cause communicated to SRO
- SRO provides concurrence to take manual control
- SRO provides control limits
- Appropriate procedure implemented when plant stabilized
- Log entry made when controller in manual
- 2) Take manual control of FK-498 and reduce feed flow to
prevent turbine / reactor trip on high SG level
3) Restore SG C level with feed flow and steam flow matched
4) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-010, "Feedwater
Malfunctions"
5) Determines NO FW Pumps are tripped
6) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain at least I FW Pump
running, flow to all SGs, all SGs > 30%
7) Determines Feed Reg Valve 'C' not operating properly in
auto and verifies in manual
8) Maintain SG levels between 52% and 62%
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 4 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Controlling Channel of SG C pressure PT-495 high failure
(Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
9) Check MCR annunciators available
10) Check all FW Train Pumps and both Heater Drain Pumps
running
11) Goes to Section 3.1 of AOP-010 for All Condensate /
Feedwater Flow Malfunctions (other than pump trips)
12) Checks all Recirc and Dump valves operating properly in
MODU
13) Check Condensate and Feedwater system intact
14) Check all Feedwater Train and Heater Drain Pumps
operating normally
15) Notify Load Dispatcher of any load limitations (NONE)
16) Check reactor thermal power changed by < 15% in any one
hour period
17) Refer to OWP-ESF for SG C pressure failure
18) Selects Channel 495 for control in accordance with OWP
NOTE: Also likely to select Channel496for SGfeedflow
although not required.
19) Refers to TS 3.3.1 (Item 14), TS 3.3.2 (Item 1.e), and TS
3.3.3.6 (Item 6) - 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> requirement to trip bistables most
limiting
20) Initiate a WR
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 5 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Pressurizer Level Channel LT-459 fails high
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+10
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- ALB-009-4-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL ALERT
- ALB-009-2-1, PZR CONT HIGH LEVEL DEVIATION
AND HEATERS ON
- LI-459 indicating 100%
- LI-460 and LI-461 indicating normal
- Charging flow decreasing
1) Enters and directs the actions of ALB-009-4-2
2) Places LK-459F, PRZ Level Controller, in manual and raises
charging flow to restore level to normal
3) Places PRZ Level Controller Selector to 460/461 position
4) Selects LI-460 or LI-461 as input to recorder
5) Places LK-459F in auto and verifies proper operation
6) Refers to OWP-RP
7) Refers to Tech Specs
3.3.3.5.a
3.3.3.6
3.3.1 (Item 11) - most limiting 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to trip bistables
8) Initiate a WR
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 6 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of 1A-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to
automatically start
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+20
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- ALB-024-1-2, 6.9 KV EMER BUS A-SA TROUBLE
- ALB-024-1-3, 480V EMER BUS A-SA TROUBLE
- ALB-024-2-3, DIESEL GENERATOR A TROUBLE
- EDG A-SA starts and loads via the sequencer
- Numerous plant alarms
1) Enter AOP-025,, "Loss Of One Emergency AC Bus
(6.9KV) Or One Emergency Dc Bus (125V),"
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) check NO CSIP running, and
isolate letdown by verifying the following valves shut:
- ICS-7, 45 GPM Letdown Orifice A
IICS-8, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice B
1CS-9, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice C
2) Verify both Emergency AC Buses energized
3) Refer TO PEP- 110, Emergency Classification and Protective
Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry
point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-11i at conclusion of scenario
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 7 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of IA-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to
automatically start (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
4) Refer to the following Tech Specs:
- 3.0.3 (Due to loss of 2/4 containment rad monitors and CVIS
affect on CNMT vacuum reliefs)
- 3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations (Due to
inoperable Control Room Outside Air Intake Monitors)
- 3.4.6.1 RCS Leak Detection (Due to RM-3502A inop)
- 3.6.5 Vacuum Relief System
- 3.8.1.1 AC Sources Operating
- 3.8.2.1 DC Sources Operating
- 3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution - Operating
5) Go to Section 3.1, Loss of IA-SA Emergency AC Bus of
6) Check EDG A is running properly:
, Voltage - normal range
- Frequency - normal range
7) Check Bus lA-SA is energized by EDG A
8) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check ESW A header cooling
water flow:
ESW A Pump is running
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 8 of 20 SCENARIO # 1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of lA-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to
automatically start (Page 3)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
9) Check NO CSIP running
"* Start ANY CSIP (If> 5 min, restore seal injection per AOP
018, Attachment 4)
" Adjust HC-1 86.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow, to establish
seal injection flow as necessary to maintain less than 31 gpm
total flow to all RCPs and between 8 and 13 gpm to all
"* Start CSIP Room Ventilation per OP-172, "Reactor
Auxiliary Building HVAC System"
10) Verify A Train CCW Pump running
11) Verify charging flow, but NO letdown flow, and establish
letdown per OP- 107, "Chemical and Volume Control
System"
"* Verify ICC-337, TK-144 LTDN TEMPERATURE,
controller is in AUTO and set for 110 to 120'F (4.0 to 4.7 on
"* Verify 1CS-38 Controller, PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, in
MAN with output set at 50%
"* Verify open ICS-2, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-459,
1CS-1, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-460, 1CS-1 1,
LETDOWN ISOLATION
"* Adjust controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW,
as required
- OPEN an Orifice Isolation Valve (1CS-7, ICS-8, ICS-9)
- Adjust 1CS-38 position by adjusting PK-145.1 output as
necessary to control LP LTDN Pressure (PI-145.1), then
ADJUST PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE setpoint to 58%, and
PLACE the controller in AUTO
I CS-9) as required
AUTO
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 9 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of IA-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to
automatically start (Page 4)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
12) Control AFW as necessary to maintain reactor power and
S/G levels
- If MDAFW Pump stopped enter 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO
- If TDAFW Pump stopped enter 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO
13) Verify ventilation support equipment for operating CSIP is
in service:
- P-4 Pump
- WC-2 Chiller
- CSIP Room HVAC
14) Check Instrument Air pressure greater than or equal to 90
psig
15) Check RHR operation was NOT in progress and go to Step
46
16) Verify proper load sequencing per OMM-004, "Post
Trip/Safeguards Review," Attachment 12
17) Check A Sequencer Load Block 9 AUTO ACT COMPLETE
MAN LOAD PERMITTED light is LIT
18) Perform Attachment 3 to reset CVIS and restore RM 3502A
operation (Allows exiting T/S 3.0.3)
- Verify operability of rad monitors
- Momentarily place Containment Purge Dampers in shut
- Momentarily place Normal Purge Supply Fans in stop
- Reset CVIS
- Restore RM-3502A by opening RCS Leak Det Sample Isol
Valves (1SP-16, 1SP-939, 1SP-916, and 1SP-918)
- Start RM-3502A sample pump
19) Re-energize 480V Emergency Bus 1AI
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Page 10 of 20
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of 1A-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to
automatically start (Page 5)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
20) Restore Makeup capability:
"* Verify a Reactor Makeup Water Pump is running with
Control switch in START
"* Verify 'B' train Boric Acid Transfer Pump is available and
in AUTO
21) Perform the following:
- Verify Brg Oil & Seal Oil BU from Main Rsvr control
switch in Start
- Stop DC Emergency Bearing Oil Pump and place in auto
- Direct an operator to locally verify Air Side Seal Oil Pump
running
- Direct an operator to locally stop Air Side Seal Oil Backup
Pump
NOTE: Initiate Event 5, "Lightingstrike in switchyard - loss
of offsite power. EDGA loads, EDGB trips" after DC
Emergency Bearing Oil Pump stopped.
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page I11 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Lighting strike in switchyard - loss of offsite power. EDG A loads,
EDG B trips
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+40 (approximate - based on time to perform
AOP-025 actions)
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- Loss of RCPs
- ALB-025-1-2, 6.9 KV EMER BUS B-SB TROUBLE
- ALB-025-1-3, 480V EMER BUS B-SB TROUBLE
- ALB-02B-2-3, DIESEL GENERATOR B TROUBLE
- EDG A-SA continues operating loaded
- Numerous plant alarms
1) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip:
- Trip breakers RTA and BYA - open
- Trip breakers RTB and BYB - open
- Rod bottom lights - not available due to loss of power
- Neutron flux decreasing
2) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip:
- All turbine throttle valves - shut
- All turbine governor valves - shut
3) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Power To AC Emergency
Buses:
- Check AC emergency bus IA-SA - energized ED6
- Check AC emergency bus IB-SB - deenergized
- Check bus voltages
- Check 6.9 KV bus IA-SA breaker 106 (EDG) - closed
- Check 6.9 KV bus lB-SB breakers - open
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 12 of 20 SCENARIO ft1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Lighting strike in switchyard - loss of offsite power. EDG A loads,
EDG B trips (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
4) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO SI Actuation and NOT
required
- Check all of the following dark:
"* SI Actuated bypass permissive light
"* ALB- 11-2-2
"* ALB-1 1-5-1
"* ALB-11-5-3
"* ALB-12-1-4
- PRZ pressure > 1850 PSIG
- Steam pressure > 601 PSIG
5) Go to EOP-EPP-004. "Reactor Trip Response"
6) Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required
7) Evaluate EAL network using entry point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
8) Check RCS temperature and control AFW flow to stabilize
temperature
9) Check RCPs - NONE running and verify SG PORVs
operating to establish natural circulation
10) Check Feed System Status:
- Verify feed reg valves - SHUT
TDAFW Pump as necessary
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 13 of 20 SCENARIO # 1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Lighting strike in switchyard - loss of offsite power. EDG A loads,
EDG B trips (Page 3)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
11) Check Control Rod Status:
- Check DRPI - not available
- When DRPI becomes available, verify all control rods fully
inserted
12) Check PRZ Level > 17%
NOTE: InitiateEvent 6, "EDG A trips - loss of allpower"
after PRZ level verified
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 14 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: EDG A trips - loss of all power
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+50 (approximate - based on time to perform
EOP-EPP-004 actions)
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- ALB-024-1-2, 6.9 KV EMER BUS A-SA TROUBLE
- ALB-024-1-3, 480V EMER BUS A-SA TROUBLE
- ALB-024-2-3, DIESEL GENERATOR A TROUBLE
- ALB-024-3-1, DIESEL GENERATOR A TRIP
- Loss of lighting in Control Room
- Numerous plant alarms
1) Determines loss of all AC power has occurred and
transitions to EOP-EPP-001, "Loss of Power to 1A-SA and
lB-SB Buses"
2) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip
3) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip
4) Check If RCS Isolated:
- Check PRZ PORVs shut
- Check letdown isolation valves shut:
"* Shut ICS-7, 1CS-8, 1CS-9 (Orifice Isolation Valves)
"* Shut ICS-1 (LCV-459) and ICS-2 (LCV-460)
- Verify excess letdown valves shut:
"* ICS-460
"* ICS-461
5) Verify AFW Flow > 210 KPPH from the TDAFW Pump
6) Evaluate EAL network using entry point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
7) Determines NO EDGs are running
8) Determine unable to restore power from offsite sources and
perform Attachment 5
9) Check Status of SI Signal:
- Actuate SI
- Reset SI
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 15 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: EDG A trips - loss of all power (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
10) Direct local operations to align equipment for extended
power loss
11) Continue attempts to restore EDG or offsite power
12) Direct AO to locally isolate RCP seals
- ICS-472
- ICS-340
IICS-381
- ICS-422
- ICC-251
13) Direct AO to locally isolate CST Makeup to Hotwell
- ICE-26
14) Isolate SGs:
- Shut all MSIVs
- Verify all MSIV bypass valves shut
- Verify main FW isolation valves shut
- Shut main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs
15) Determine NO SGs are faulted
16) Determine NO SGs are ruptured
17) Control AFW flow to maintain all SG levels between 25%
and 50%
18) When turbine coastdown complete place the DC bearing
pump in Pull-To-Lock
19) Direct AOs to locally align equipment to conserve DC
power
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 16 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: EDG A trips - loss of all power (Page 3)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
20) Direct AO to locally vent main generator and secure DC air
side seal oil backup pump
21) Monitor CST Level > 10%
22) Check Intact SG Levels at least one > 25%
steam at maximum rate using all intact SG PORVs:
NOTE: Delay locally operatingSG A and SG B PORVs to
allow control to be restoredto MCB when power is restored
later in scenario.
24) Control SG PORVs to maintain SG pressures between 180
PSIG and 140 psig
NOTE: InitiateEvent 7, "EDGA is restartedafter S/G
depressurizationhas started" after SG depressurizationis
commenced
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 17 of 20 SCENARIO ft I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: EDG A is restarted after S/G depressurization has started
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+70 (approximate - based on time to perform
EOP-EPP-001 actions)
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- EDG A-SA starts due to local actions
- Control Room lighting becomes available
- Numerous alarms clear
1) Per foldout page, determine EDG A has been restored and
go to Step 29 for recovery actions
2) Stabilize Intact SG Pressure:
"* Set each SG PORV controller to maintain existing SG
pressure
"* Place each controller in auto AND verify proper operation of
TERMINATE THE SCENARIO (AT THE LEAD
EXAMINER'S DISCRETION) WHEN ALL SG PORVs
ARE BEING CONTROLLED INA UTOMA TIC AT THE
MCB.
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 18 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 8 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Classifies the Event
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: NA
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
None
1) Classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency due to both
IA-SA and lB-SB being deenergized for > 15 minutes
NOTE: Performance Rating for Admin JPM based on
20% for satisfactory classification during simulator
scenario, 20% for satisfactory classification during
JPM, and 60% for satisfactory protective action
recommendation during JPM.
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 19 of 20 SCENARIO # I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 CRITICAL TASKS FACILITY: Harris
Event 2
Take manual control of FK-498 and reduce feed flow to prevent turbine / reactor trip on high
SG level - On transmitter failure, with proper actions, the operators should be able to control S/G
water level in manual without causing a high S/G water level turbine / reactor trip. Per NUREG
1021, App D, Step D.Ia., "prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such
as an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) or ESF actuation)."
Event 6
Depressurize Intact SGs TO 180 PSIG by dumping steam at maximum rate using all intact SG
PORVs - Reduce temp and press of RCS to reduce RCP seal leakage and minimize RCS inventory
loss (no way to makeup). (preventing a challenge to plant safety (App D, Step D. .a))
Page 20 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Simulator Scenario Outline FORM ES-D-1
Facility: HARRIS Scenario Number: 2 Op-Test Number: 200a.-301
Examiners Operators
Objectives: To evaluate the candidate's ability to operate the plant in a controlled and safe manner
during a plant startup and subsequent power decrease and diagnose and respond to the
following events in accordance with applicable Harris plant procedures:
- Loss of a vital instrument bus
- Service Water Pump sheared shaft
I
- SG tube leakage requiring plant shutdown
- Ruptured / Faulted SG due to a seismic event
Initial Conditions: IC-14; 52% power EOL; STOP Condensate Booster Pump 'B' and Condensate Pump
'B'; RHR Pump A-SA OOS (RHR022 RACKOUT)
Turnover: The unit is at 49% power at EOL, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a reactor startup from xenon-free
conditions.
Severe thunderstorms have been reported in the area for the past 30 minutes. AP-301,
"Seasonal Preparations and Monitoring," has been completed.
A 6.7 gpd tube leak exists in SG 'A'.
Boron concentration is 735 ppm. Bank D rods are at 152 steps.
RHR Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to
contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Technical Specification 3.5.2 has been entered. OWP-RH-0l has been completed.
Risk is YELLOW.
Shift orders are to place a second feedwater train in service, continue the power
increase and restore RHR Pump 'A' to service when it becomes available. GP-005 has
been completed through Step 5.0.137.
Event Malfunction Event Event Description
Number Number Type*
1 NA N (BOP) Place a Second Feedwater Train in service (OP-134)
N (SRO)
2 EPS02 3 C (ALL) Loss of Instrument Bus SIII (AOP-024)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page I of 23 SCENARIO 02 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Event Malfunction Event Event Description
Number Number Type*
3 SWS07A C (RO) Normal Service Water Pump A Shaft Shear (AOP-022)
C (SRO)
4 PT:308A I (BOP) S/G A PORV Pressure Transmitter PT-308 fails high (ALB-014)
130090 I (SRO)
5 SGN05B 2 0 C (ALL) SG B tube leak at 2 gpm (AOP-016)
6 NA N (SRO) Commence plant shutdown due to SG tube leak (AOP-038)
N (BOP)
R (RO)
7 XNIOA25 M (ALL) Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults
ALARM-ON S/O B (EOP-PATH-1, EOP-EPP-014, EOP-PATH-2, EOP-EPP
SGN5B 700 020)
600
MSS2B 1E6
600
8 NA (SRO) Classifies the Event
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
<12
<-V
Page 2 of 23 SCENARIO 42 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: I FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Start Up a Second Feedwater Train
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: NA
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
NONE
1) Enter and direct the actions of GP-005, "Power Operation,"
and OP-134, "Condensate System"
2) Direct BOP to place second Condensate Pump and second
Condensate Booster Pump in service per OP-134
3) Verify initial conditions are met to start lB Condensate
Pump
4) Direct operator to open IB Condensate Pump Seal Water
Isolation from Condensate Transfer Pump, ICE- 1109
5) Direct operator to perform prestart checks on Condensate
Pump B per Attachment 5
6) Verify open 1CE-129 Condensate Pump B Discharge valve
7) Start Condensate Pump B
8) Verify initial conditions are met to start lB Condensate
Booster Pump
9) Direct operator to perform prestart cheeks on Condensate
Booster Pump B per Attachment 6
10) Verify Condensate Booster Pump B recire, 1CE-261 in
MODU and shut
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 3 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 1 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Start Up a Second Feedwater Train (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
11) Place the Condensate Booster Pump B Speed Controller to
MAN and zero the demand signal
12) Open, 1CE-268 Condensate Booster Pump B Discharge
valve
13) Place the control switch for the associated recirc valve, ICE
261 in the OPEN position immediately prior to starting
Condensate Booster Pump B
14) Start Condensate Booster Pump B
15) Direct operator to verify differential pressure across the Pall
Replaceable Duplex Filter as indicated between PI-O0LO
2304B1 and PI-O1LO-2304B2 is less than 15 psid
16) Slowly increase the demand signal on the Condensate
Booster Pump B Speed Controller to match the demand
signal on the previously running Condensate Booster Pump
Speed Controller
17) Place the Condensate Booster Pump B Speed Controller to
AUTO when the demand signals are matched
18) Place the control switch for the associated recire valve 1CE
261 in the MODU position
19) Direct operator to verify the VSF coupling oil level is in the
normal operating range after 5 to 10 minutes of running
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 4 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of Instrument Bus SIll
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+0
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
"* ALB-015-4-4, CHANNEL III UPS FAILURE
"* NI Alarms on ALB-013
"* TSLBs I and 3 , 3 rd row of lights lit
"* Numerous plant alarms
1) Enter and direct the actions of AOP-024, "Loss Of
Uninterruptible Power Supply"
2) Refer to PEP- 110, Emergency Classification and Protective
Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry
point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
3) Determine Instrument Bus SIII lost and go to Section 3.1,
"Loss of Instrument Bus," of AOP-024
4) Place Rod Control in MANUAL, and perform the following:
"* Place the N43 NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS at the
Detector Current Comparator Drawer
"* Restore Tavg as necessary
- 5) Perform the following:
"* Place Main FW Regulator Valves in MANUAL
"* Control SG levels between 52% and 62%
6) Take manual control of C SG PORV
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 5 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of Instrument Bus SIII (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
7) Verify PRZ Level Controller Selector switch in CHAN
459/460
8) Refer to Tech Specs
- 3.7.4, Emergency Service Water
- 3.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating
9) Perform OST-1023, "Offsite Power Availability Verification
Weekly Interval Modes 1-6" (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)
10) Check letdown in service
11) Check all PRZ heaters in service.
12) Check any WC-2 Essential Chiller running
13) Contact Maintenance
"* Check the inverter and vital bus for indications of grounds or
other faults
"* Correct any problems found
14) Dispatch an operator to check the affected instrument
inverter (7.5 KVA UPS PANEL Sill for ANY of the
following:
"* Red OVERCURRENT I-1L light lit
"* Obvious signs of damage
NOTE: Operatorreportsovercurrentlight lit, but no obvious
signs of damage.
15) Dispatch an operator to transfer the Instrument Bus to the
alternate power supply per OP-156.02, "AC Electrical
Distribution"
NOTE: TransferBus Sill to alternatepower supply when
directed
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 6 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of Instrument Bus SIII (Page 3)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
16) Refer to the Attachment 3, "SIll Instrument Bus Power
Supplies and Loads," to determine instrumentation affected
17) Refer to Tech Specs
- 3.3.1, Reactor trip System Instrumentation
- 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
- Instrumentation
- 3.3.3.5a, Remote Shutdown System
- 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring System
- 3.7.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater System
- 3.7.4, Emergency Service Water
- 3.8.3.1, Onsite Power Distribution - Operating
18) When power is restored to Sill
"* Reset the Reactor Trip Power Range High Flux Rate alarm
at the NIS panel
"* Return the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to
OPERATE at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer
"* Set AFW flow control valve controllers to 100%
"* Check Steam Dump bypass permissive lights (C7A or C7B)
indicate the Steam Dumps not armed
"* Reset Steam Dumps, if required
19) Place Rod Control in auto if desired
20) Place Main FW Regulator Valves in auto
21) Place C SG PORV in AUTO control at 85% demand
22) Perform a channel check of any RPS and ESF
instrumentation affected by the loss of power
23) Check RVLIS Plasma Displays updating
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 7 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Normal Service Water Pump A sheared shaft
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+15 (approximate - ensure SIII on bypass
supply and plant conditions restored)
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
"* ALB-002-6-5, SERV WTR HEADER B HIGH-LOW
FLOW
"* ALB-002-7-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR B LOW PRESS
"* ALB-002-7-2, SERV WTR PUMPS DISCHARGE LOW
PRESS
"* Loss of flow on ESW Train B
"* Loss of flow on NSW
1) Enter and direct the actions of AOP-022, "Loss Of Service
Water"
2) Check loss of ESW header due to loss of NSW flow and
restore ESW
"* Verify ESW Pump B started
"* Verify open ISW-271, Header B To Auxiliary Reservoir
"* Verify shut 1SW-274, Header B Return To Normal Header
"* Verify shut ISW-40, Normal SW Supply To Header B
3) Start standby NSW pump
"* Start NSW Pump 'B' and verify discharge valve for NSW
Pump A is closing by placing NSW Pump A switch to stop
"* Start NSW Pump B in priming mode by momentarily
placing switch to start
"* When discharge valve for NSW Pump A is fully shut, then
place and hold control for NSW Pump B to start to fully
open discharge valve
4) Go to Section 3.2, "Loss Of Normal Service Water Pump
5) Notify Maintenance to investigate reason for pump trip
6) Initiate WR
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 8 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 4 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: S/G A PORV Pressure Transmitter PT-308 fails high
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+25
ANNI NCIATORS / CUES:
"* ALB-014-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM STEAM
GENERATORS
- RCS temperature lowering
- Steam flow increasing
1) Directs operator to take manual control of SG 'A' PORV
and close per requirements of OMM-001
"* Condition / cause communicated to SRO
"* SRO provides concurrence to take manual control
- SRO provides control limits
"* Appropriate procedure implemented when plant stabilized
"* Log entry made when controller in manual
2) Places SG 'A'PORV controller in manual
4) Initiate a WR
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 9 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: SG B tube leak at 2 gpm
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+30
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- REM-ITV-3534, COND VAC PUMP EFFLUENT HIGH,
on RM- 11
1) Enters and directs the action of AOP-016, "Excessive
Primary Plant Leakage"
2) Refer TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification and Protective
Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry
point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
3) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check RCS Leakage within
VCT makeup capability
4) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check PRZ Pressure > 1960
psig
5) Check that RMS alarm indicates that a SG tube leak exists
6) Sound local evacuation alarm and make plant announcement
7) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check radiation monitors
indicate normal
"* CNMT ventilation isolation monitors (REM-3561A/B/C/D)
"* RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor (RM 3502A)
8) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check PRZ level > 17%
9) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check VCT level > 5%
10) Check ALB-5-1-2A, RCP THER BAR HDR HIGH FLOW,
alarm clear
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 10 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: SG B tube leak at 2 gpm (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
11) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check radiation monitors
indicate normal
- Area rad monitors
- Stack rad monitors
12) Isolate Primary Sampling System
"* Shut ISP-945, RCS Loop B Hot Leg Smpl Isol
"* Verify all other sample valves closed
13) Perform an RCS flow balance calculation
"* Control charging flow using FK-122.1, to stabilize PZR
level
"* Operate letdown orifice valves as necessary to maintain
charging flow on scale
- ICS-8
- Calculate leak rate
14) Perform OST-1026 or OST-1226 (RCS Leakage Evaluation
Calculation)
15) Evaluate RCS leakage per Tech Spec 3.4.6.2
16) Determine leakage to be SG tube leakage
17) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check RCP seals for normal
conditions
18) Notify Health Physics of leak location and radiation levels
19) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) When leakage location has been
determined to be SG tube leakage, then go to Attachment 1
of AOP-016
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page I11 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: SG B tube leak at 2 gpm (Page 3)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
20) Notify Chemistry to implement CRC-804
21) Estimate Primary-to-Secondary Leak Rate to be > 150 gpd
using Condenser Vacuum Pump Rad Monitor (3534) and
plant curves
22) Determine SG 'B' is leaking using individual SGBD
samples and local surveys (Main Steamline Rad Monitors
are not likely to identify - other indications must be obtained
from Chemistry and HP)
23) Check secondary rad monitors not normal and direct HP to
perform surveys and evacuate local areas
24) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check SG tube leakage is
greater than TS limits and start CVPETS per OP-133
25) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check WPB radiation monitors
indicate normal
26) Notify Chemistry to sample Aux Steam system for activity
27) Determine Action Level 3 has been reached due to SG tube
leakage > 75 gpd with a rapid increase in leak rate
28) Enter and direct the actions of Attachment 11
29) Check PZR level stable or trending to reference level
30) Verify Reactor Makeup Control System operating to
maintain VCT level
31) Verify Attachment 9, Increased Monitoring Actions for
Primary-To-Secondary Leakage, is in progress or has been
completed
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 12 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: SG B tube leak at 2 gpm (Page 4)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
32) Check Attachment 10, Escalated Monitoring Actions for
Primary-To-Secondary Leakage Action Level 1, has been
completed or estimate primary-to-secondary leak rate every
15 minutes
33) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Notify Chemistry and Plant
Management of major changes in leak rate
34) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check primary-to-secondary
leakage rate-of-change > 30 gpd in a one hour period and
commence a power reduction to be < 50% within one hour
and in Mode 3 within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per AOP-038
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 13 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Commence plant shutdown due to SG tube leak
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: NA
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- Plant shutdown to < 50% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and Mode 3 within next
2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> total) directed to be performed per AOP
038 due to tube leakage
1) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-038, "Rapid
2) Discuss Reactor Trip Criteria using Attachment I
3) Refer TO PEP- 110, Emergency Classification and Protective
Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry
point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110 at conclusion of scenario
4) Notify Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load
5) Determine required boric acid addition for desired power
reduction by obtaining values from Attachment 2, Gallons of
Boric Acid Required for Power Reduction (1023 gallons
required)
6) Notify Radwaste Control Room to be prepared for the
increased water processing requirements due to boration
7) Notify Chemistry that a reactor power change will exceed
15% in a one hour period
8) Check Rod Control in auto
9) Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters
10) Check the DEH System in auto
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 14 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Commence plant shutdown due to SG tube leak (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
11) PERFORM the following at the DEH panel
"* Check secondary plant stable
"* Place Impulse Pressure Feedback Loop in service
"* Place the Megawatt Feedback Loop in service
"* Depress the Load Rate MW/MIN pushbutton
"* Enter desired rate (Not to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in
DEMAND display.
"* Depress ENTER pushbutton
"* Depress REF pushbutton
"* Enter desired load in DEMAND display
"* Depress ENTER pushbutton
"* Check HOLD pushbutton LIT
"* Depress GO pushbutton
"* Verify the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS
12) Commence RCS boration as required to maintain Control
Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit
13) Verify Generator load and Reactor power lowering
14) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain Generator reactive
load (VARs) within guidelines
15) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check Tavg within 51F of Tref
NOTE: InitiateEvent 7, "Seismic event causes S/G B tube
rupture at 700 gpm andfaults S/G B," after Lead Examiner
determines adequatepower change has occurred.
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 15 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults
S/G B
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: At discretion of Lead Examiner
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
"* ALB-010-4-4, SEISMIC MON SYS OBE EXCEEDED
"* Steam Line Radiation Monitor Alarm on RM- 11
- Steam Tunnel Temperatures increasing
"* Reactor Power increasing
"* Rods stepping out in response to Tavg decreasing
"* Numerous plant alarms
1) Determines SG leakage has escalated, orders a Reactor Trip
and Safety Injection, and enters EOP PATH-1
2) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip
"* Trip breakers RTA and BYA - open
"* Trip breakers RTB and BYB - open
"* Rod bottom lights - lit
"* Neutron flux decreasing
3) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip
"* All turbine throttle valves - shut
"* All turbine governor valves - shut
14) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Power To AC Emergency
Buses
"* Check AC emergency buses IA-SA and IB-SB - energized
by offsite power or EDGs
"* Check bus voltages
"* Check 6.9 KV bus IA-SA breaker breaker 105 (OFFSITE)
closed
"* Check 6.9 KV bus IB-SB breaker breaker 125 (OFFSITE)
closed
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 16 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults
S/G B (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
4) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Actuates SI Actuation and
determines SI has actuated
"* SI Actuated bypass permissive light LIT
"* ALB-1 1-5-3, REACTOR TRIP MANUAL SI
5) Perform The Following:
"* Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees
"* Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
6) Monitor Foldout A
7) Verify all CSIPs and RHR Pump 'B' running
8) Verify SI flow > 200 gpm
9) Verify RCS pressure > 230 psig
10) Verify Main Steam Isolation actuated if SG pressure has
lowered below 601 psig due to faulted SG
11) Verify Containment pressure has remained < 10 psig
12) Verify > 210 KPPH AFW flow
13) Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS
signals using PATH-I Guide, Attachment 6
14) Attempt to control RCS temperature using AFW flow and
steam dumps
15) Energize buses IAI and 1BI B
16) Verify proper PRZ PORV and spray valve response
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 17 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults
S/G B (Page 3)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
17) Determines SG B faulted by pressure decreasing in an
uncontrolled manner (will not completely depressurize due
to concurrent SGTR)
18) Transition to and direct the actions of EOP-EPP-014,
"Faulted Steam Generator Isolation"
19) Checks Critical Safety Function Status Trees
20) Verify all MSIV and MSIV bypass valves shut
21) Determines SGs A and C are NOT faulted
22) Confirms SG B faulted
- 23) Isolate SG B
"* Verify FW isolation valves shut
"* Verify MDAFW and TDAFW pump isolation valves to SG
B shut
"* Shut faulted SG B steam supply valve, IMS-70, to TDAFW
pump (may have been performed earlier for RCS
temperature control)
"* Verify main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs shut
"* Verify SG blowdown isolation valves shut
"* Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves shut
"* Verify hydrazine and ammonia addition valves shut
24) Check CST level > 10%
25) Determines SG B is also ruptured
"* SG blowdown radiation
"* Main Steam Line radiation
"* SG B not completely depressurizing after isolation
"* Previous indications
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 18 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults
S/G B (Page 4)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
26) Transition to and direct the actions of EOP PATH-2, Entry
Point J
27) Monitor Foldout C
28) Evaluate EAL Network using entry point U
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
29) Implement FRPs as required
HAVE BEEN TRIPPED EARLIER DUE TO FOLDOUT
PAGE CONDTIONS BEING MET)
"* SI flow > 200 gpm
"* RCS pressure < 1400 psig
31) Identify SG B as ruptured SG
32) Adjust ruptured SG PORV controller to 88% and place in
AUTO and check shut
33) Verify SG B isolated (performed during EOP-EPP-0 14)
34) Determine ruptured SG should not be fed to restore level due
to also being faulted
35) Determine ruptured SG pressure < 260 psig
36) Transition to and direct the actions of EOP-EPP-020,
"SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery"
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 19 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults
S/G B (Page 5)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
37) Monitor Foldout Page
38) Reset SI
39) Reset Phase A and Phase B
NOTE: Phase B did NOT occur during this scenario
40) Establish IA and Nitrogen to Containment
41) Monitor AC Buses
"* 1A-SA and lB-SB energized from offsite
"* All non-emergency AC buses energized
42) Verify SG B level < 78%
43) Secure PRZ heaters
44) Determine Containment Spray has NOT actuated
45) Verifies SO B is ruptured and faulted and maintains AFW
flow to SG B isolated
46) Stops RHR Pumps
"* RCS pressure > 230 psig, stable or increasing
"* Suction NOT aligned to RWST
47) Coordinate with plant operations staff and chemistry to
obtain primary and secondary samples
48) Initiate evaluation of plant status
49) Control AFW flow to maintain SGs A and C levels between
30% and 50%
50) Block low steam press SI when RCS pressure < 2000 psig
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 20 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-102 1, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults
S/G B (Page 6)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
51) Initiate cooldown to cold shutdown conditions
"* Maintain RCS cooldown rate < 100l / hour
"* Use SG 'A' and 'C' PORVs for cooldown
NOTE: Cooldown due to faulted SG is likely to have exceeded
100IF already,so no additionalcooldown will be
performed at this time.
52) Monitor SDM while performing cooldown
53) Determine EOP-EPP-020 acceptable for performing
cooldown
"* RWST level > 70%
"* SGB level <95%
54) Determine adequate subcooling exists
55) Check SI flow > 200 gpm
56) Depressurize RCS to refill PRZ
"* PRZ level <25%
"* Depressurize using PORVs
"* Stop depressurization when PRZ level > 25%
TERMINATE THE SCENARIO (AT THE LEAD
EXAMINER'S DISCRETION) WHEN
DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE RCS HAS BEEN
OBSERVED.
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 21 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 8 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Classifies the Event
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: NA
ANNIT NCCATORS / CUES:
None
1) Classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency due to two
fission product barriers (RCS and Containment) being
breached
NOTE: Performance Rating for Admin JPM based on
20% for satisfactory classification during simulator
scenario, 20% for satisfactory classification during
JPM, and 60% for satisfactory protective action
recommendation during JPM.
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 22 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 CRITICAL TASKS FACILITY: Harris
Event 2
Place Main FW Regulator Valves in MANUAL - On transmitter failure as a result of loss of
instrument power, with proper actions, the operators should be able to control S/G water level in
manual without causing a high S/G water level turbine / reactor trip or a low water level reactor trip.
Per NUREG 1021, App D, Step DIa., "prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant
safety (such as an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) or ESF actuation)."
Event 7
Determines RCP trip criteria met and trips all RCPs - depending on the conditions of the
accident, for a SBLOCA, the RCPs should be tripped when specified parameters are met. The RCPs
should be tripped to avoid more serious impacts. If the criteria is not satisfied, the pumps should
continue to be operated because they can provide core heat removal without ECCS in operation
(preventing a challenge to plant safety (App D, Step D. 1.a))
Page 23 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Appendix D Simulator Scenario Outline FORM ES-D-I
Facility: HARRIS Scenario Number: 3 (Spare) Op-Test Number: ,2 0 0 2-0a
Examiners Operators
Objectives: To evaluate the candidate's ability to operate the plant in a controlled and safe manner
during a power decrease and diagnose and respond to the following events in..accordance
with applicable Harris plant procedures:
"* VCT Level Channel High Failure
"* T-ref failure resulting in abnormal rod motion
"* Condenser vacuum pump trip
"* Controlling channel of feed flow fails low
"* Rapid downpower
"* RCS leakage inside containment requiring manual reactor trip
"* Failure of reactor to trip automatically or manually
"* RHR pump failure on Safety Injection
Initial Conditions: IC-20; 100% power equilibrium EOL; RHR Pump A-SA OOS (RHR022 RACKOUT)
Turnover: The unit is at 100% equilibrium conditions at EOL.
Severe thunderstorms have been reported in the area for the past 30 minutes. AP-301,
"Seasonal Preparations and Monitoring," has been completed.
A 6.7 gpd tube leak exists in SG 'A'.
Boron concentration is 319 ppm. Bank D rods are at 218 steps.
RHR Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to
contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Technical
Specification 3.5.2 has been entered. OWP-RH-01 has been completed. Risk is
YELLOW.
Main Feed Pump 'A' has been inspected for potential vibration concerns and Engineering
is currently evaluating the data.
Shift orders are to maintain power and restore RHR Pump 'A' to service when it becomes
available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3 weeks.
Page 1 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Event Malfunction Event Event Description
Number Number Type*
I LT:1 12 100 0 1 (SRO) LT-1 12, VCT Level, High Failure (AOP-003)
1 (RO)
2 CRF08 557 0 1 (SRO) T-ref Processor low failure (AOP-001)
I (RO)
3 CND04A C (BOP) Condenser Vacuum Pump A trip (AOP-012)
C (SRO)
4 FT:477 0 0 1 (SRO) Controlling channel of SG A feed flow FT-477 fails low (OWP
5 NA N (SRO) Rapid downpower to remove MFP A from service (AOP-038)
R (RO)
N (BOP)
6 RCS18A 8 M (ALL) RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15
900 minutes (AOP-0 16, EOP-PATH- 1)
7 RPSOIB 3 3 C (ALL) Rx will not trip in manual or automatic (EOP-FRP-S. 1)
8 ZDSQ2:52B C(BOP) Train B RHR Pump fails to autostart on SI (EOP-PATH- 1)
FAIL ASIS
9 NA SRO Classifies the Event
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 2 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 1 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: LT-112, VCT Level, High Failure
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+0
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
"* ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL
SYSTEMS
"* ICS-120 (LCV-1 15A), Letdown VCT/ Holdup Tank, aligns
to HUT
1) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-003, "Malfunction of
Reactor Makeup Control"
2) Check IA available
3) Determines LK- 112 output has failed and goes to Section
3.1, "LT- 112 or LT- 115 Malfunction"
4) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Assesses effects of LT-l112
failure (Attachment 1)
5) Determines failure is NOT due to LT-1 15
6) Determines failure caused by LT-1 12
7) Monitor VCT level using either:
- ERFIS point LCS01 15
- LT-115
8) Determines that LT- 112 is failed high and places 1CS-120
(LCV- 115A), Letdown VCT / Holdup Tank, to VCT
position
9) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain VCT level below 70%
by manually diverting to HUT as needed
10) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain VCT level above 20%
using auto makeup
11) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain VCT level above 5%
auto switchover point to RWST
12) Determines LT-1 12 has failed high and directs Maintenance
to lift leads in SSPS for auto switchover to RWST
13) Maintain LCV-115A in VCT position
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 3 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: T-ref Processor low failure
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+10
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- ALB-010-6-4B, RCS Tref/ Tavg HIGH-LOW
- Rods stepping in at 72 steps per minute
I) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-001, "Malfunction of
Rod Control and Indication System"
2) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines NO control rods have
dropped
3) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Place rod control in manual
4) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check rod motion stopped
5) Go to Section 3.2, "Continuous Spurious Control Bank
Motion," of AOP-00 1
6) Manually operate rods to restore temperature
7) Determine cause of rod movement was a low failure of Tref
instrument
8) Initiate a WR
9) Maintain rods in manual until Tref restored
10) Verify proper operation of boration sources
- CVCS demineralizers
- BTRS
- Reactor Makeup
- CSIP aligned to VCT
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 4 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Condenser Vacuum Pump A trip
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE
TIME: T+20
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- ALB-021-4-1, CONDENSER VACUUM PUMP A TRIP
- ALB-021-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM CIRC WATER
SYSTEMS
- Condenser Vacuum Pump 'A' light indication
- Slowly lowering condenser vacuum
1) If condenser vacuum lowers, refers to and directs the actions
of AOP-012, "Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum"
2) Directs AO to investigate cause of trip of vacuum pump
3) Directs AO to verify suction valve on Condenser Vacuum
Pump A closed
4) Starts Condenser Vacuum Pump B
5) Initiate aWR
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
COMMENTS:
SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Page 5 of 19
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Controlling channel of SG A feed flow FT-477 fails low
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+30
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- FI-477 indicating 0
- SG A feed reg valve opening
- SG A level increasing
- SG A actual feed flow > steam flow
1) Directs the BOP to take manual control of FK-478 and
reduce feed flow per requirements of OMM-001
- Condition / cause communicated to SRO
- SRO provides concurrence to take manual control
- SRO provides control limits
- Appropriate procedure implemented when plant stabilized
- Log entry made when controller in manual
- 2) Take manual control of FK-478 and reduce feed flow to
prevent turbine / reactor trip on high SG level
3) Restore SG A level with feed flow and steam flow matched
4) Enters and directs the actions ofAOP-010, "Feedwater
Malfunctions"
5) Determines NO FW Pumps are tripped
6) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain at least I FW Pump
running, flow to all SGs, all SGs > 30%
7) Determines Feed Reg Valve 'A' not operating properly in
auto and verifies in manual
8) Maintain SG levels between 52% and 62%
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 6 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Controlling channel of SG A feed flow FT-477 fails low (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
9) Check MCR annunciators available
10) Check all FW Train Pumps and both Heater Drain Pumps
running
11) Goes to Section 3.1 of AOP-010 for All Condensate /
Feedwater Flow Malfunctions (other than pump trips)
12) Checks all Recirc and Dump valves operating properly in
MODU
13) Check Condensate and Feedwater system intact
14) Check all Feedwater Train and Heater Drain Pumps
operating normally
15) Notify Load Dispatcher of any load limitations (NONE)
16) Check reactor thermal power changed by < 15% in any one
hour period
17) Refer to OWP-RP for SG A feed flow failure
18) Selects Channel 476 for control in accordance with OWP
NOTE: Also likely to select Channel475for SG steamflow
although not required.
19) Refers to TS 3.3.1 (Item 14) - 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> requirement to trip
bistables
20) Initiate a WR
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 7 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Rapid downpower to remove MFP A from service
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: T+45
ANNI NCIATORS / CUES:
"* Plant management informs the control room that the
evaluation for FWP 'A' requires the pump be removed from
service within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
"* Direct the crew to lower power at a rate to be below 60%
within the next 60 minutes.
1) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-038, "Rapid
2) Discuss Reactor Trip Criteria using Attachment 1
3) Refer TO PEP-I 10, Emergency Classification and Protective
Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry
point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
4) Notify Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load
5) Determine required boric acid addition for desired power
reduction by obtaining values from the latest completed
OPT-1525, "Reactivity Plan Generation Weekly Interval
Mode I at Full Power"
6) Notify Radwaste Control Room to be prepared for the
increased water processing requirements due to boration
7) Notify Chemistry that a reactor power change will exceed
15% in a one hour period
8) Control rods in manual as necessary to maintain Tavg within
2°F of Tref
9) Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters
10) Check the DEH System in auto
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 8 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Rapid downpower to remove MFP A from service (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
11) PERFORM the following at the DEH panel
- Check secondary plant stable
- Place Impulse Pressure Feedback Loop in service
- Place the Megawatt Feedback Loop in service
- Depress the Load Rate MW/MIN pushbutton
- Enter desired rate (Not to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in
DEMAND display.
- Depress ENTER pushbutton
- Depress REF pushbutton
- Enter desired load in DEMAND display
- Depress ENTER pushbutton
- Check HOLD pushbutton LIT
- Depress GO pushbutton
- Verify the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS
12) Commence RCS boration as required to maintain Control
Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit
13) Verify Generator load and Reactor power lowering
14) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain Generator reactive
load (VARs) within guidelines
15) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check Tavg within 5°F of Tref
NOTE: InitiateEvent 6, "RCS Loop A cold leg small break
LOCA, rampedin over 15 minutes," after Lead Examiner
determines adequatepower change has occurred.
COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 9 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15
minutes
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: At discretion of Lead Examiner
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
- RM-lCR-3575, CONT S STAIR EL 261 HIGH, on RM-1 1
- Charging flow increasing
- Pressurizer level decreasing
- ALB-028-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION
SYSTEM
1) Enters and directs the action of AOP-016
2) Refer to PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification and Protective
Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry
point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
3) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check RCS Leakage within
VCT makeup capability
4) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check PRZ Pressure > 1960
psig
NOTE: Reactor Trip and SI will eventually be requiredbased
upon RCS leakage exceeding makeup capabilitiesand/or
RCS pressure.
5) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check radiation monitors
indicate normal
- CNMT ventilation isolation monitors (REM-3561A/B/C/D)
6) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check PRZ level > 17%
7) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check VCT level > 5%
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 10 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6/ 7 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15
minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
8) Orders a reactor trip and safety injection and enters and
directs the actions of EOP PATH- 1
9) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Attempts to manually trip the
reactor and informs SRO that reactor will NOT trip
10) Enters and directs the actions of EOP-FRS-0.1, "Response to
Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS"
- 11) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Manually insert control rods
due to reactor failure to trip
12) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Manually trip Turbine
- All turbine throttle valves - shut
- All turbine governor valves - shut
13) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Start all AFW Pumps
14) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Direct an operator to contact or
report to the main control room (to receive instructions to
locally trip the reactor).
NOTE: Approximately 15 seconds after being directedto
contact the ControlRoom, call the ControlRoom to receive
instructions.After approximately I additionalminute, locally
open the Reactor Trip breakers.
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page I1I ofl19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6/7 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15
minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
15) Perform The Following:
- Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees
- Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
16) Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS from the RWST due to
Boric Acid Pumps being blocked by sequencer operation
- Open at least one CSIP suction from the RWST (1 15B/D)
- Shut at least one VCT outlet valve (1 15C/E)
- Verify CSIP flow to RCS >_90 GPM
- Check PRZ <2335 PSIG
17) Isolate CNMT Ventilation
- Stop Normal Purge Supply and Pre-Entry Purge Exhaust
Fans
- Verify valves and dampers closed
18) Check reactor tripped locally
19) Check turbine tripped
20) Monitor Foldout Page
21) Verify proper operation of safeguards equipment using
PATH-I GUIDE, Attachment 6
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 12 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15
minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR
Pump fails to autostart on SI
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
- 22) Determines neither RHR pump is operating, informs
23) Control feed flow to maintain all intact SG levels between
40% and 50% (adverse containment values)
24) Verify All Dilution Paths Isolated
25) Determines NO positive reactivity addition from RCS
cooldown
26) Determines NO faulted SG exists
27) Determines core exit thermocouples < 12000 F
28) Checks reactor subcritical
- Power range channels < 5%
- Intermediate startup range channels have negative SUR
29) Implement FRPs as required
30) Return to EOP PATH-I, Step 1
31) Verify reactor tripped
32) Verify turbine tripped
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 13 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15
minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR
Pump fails to autostart on SI (Page 2)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
33) Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses
- Check AC emergency buses IA-SA and lB-SB - energized
by offsite power or EDGs
- Check bus voltages
- Check 6.9 KV bus IA-SA breaker breaker 105 (OFFSITE)
closed
- Check 6.9 KV bus lB-SB breaker breaker 125 (OFFSITE)
closed
34) Determines SI has actuated (actuated during performance of
35) Perform The Following:
- Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees
- Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X
NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario
36) Monitor Foldout A
SSl flow>200gpm
- RCS pressure < 1400 psig
38) Verify all CSIPs and RHR Pump B running (RHR Pump A
OOS)
39) Verify SI flow > 200 gpm
40) Verify RCS pressure > 230 psig
41) Verify Main Steam Isolation actuated due to containment
pressure > 3.0 psig
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 14 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15
minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR
Pump fails to autostart on SI (Page 3)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
42) Verify Containment Spray actuation if containment pressure
exceeds 10 psig (not expected to occur)
43) Verify > 210 KPPH AFW flow
44) Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS
signals using PATH-I Guide, Attachment 6 (already
performed during EOP-FRS-0.1)
45) Control RCS temperature using AFW flow and steam dumps
46) Verify buses 1Al and IB I energized
47) Verify proper PRZ PORV and spray valve response
48) Determine no faulted SGs
49) Determine no ruptured SGs
50) Determine Containment pressure NOT normal
51) Implement Functional Restoration Procedures as required
52) Monitor Foldout Pages A and B
53) Maintain seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm
54) Control AFW flow to maintain SG levels between 40% and
50% (adverse containment values)
55) Energize buses IAI and 1B1
56) Verify proper PRZ PORV response
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 15 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15
minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR
Pump fails to autostart on SI (Page 4)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
57) Determine SI Termination criteria NOT met and continues
in PATH- I
- RCS subcooling < 40°F (adverse containment value)
- RCS pressure NOT stable or increasing
- PRZ level < 30% (adverse containment value)
58) Consult plant staff to determine if Containment Spray should
be placed in standby if running
59) Verify SR detectors energized below 5 x 10"-1 amps and
transfer recorder
60) Determines RCS pressure is > 230 psig and stable or
increasing and stops RHR Pump B
61) Determines RCS and SG pressures are both stable or
increasing
62) For each running CCW pump, open the associated CCW
63) Verify 1A-SA and lB-SB energized by offsite power
64) Reset SI
65) Shutdown both EDGs using OP-155
66) Determine RHR Train B is capable of Cold Leg Recirc
67) Determine Aux and Radwaste Bldg rad levels normal
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 16 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15
minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR
Pump fails to autostart on SI (Page 4)
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
68) Determine RCS pressure > 230 psig and RHR Pumps
secured
69) Transition to EOP-EPP-009, "Post LOCA Cooldown and
Depressurization"
TERMINATE THE SCENARIO (AT THE LEAD
EXAMINER'S DISCRETION) WHEN A
DETERMINA TION HAS BEEN MADE T2HAT A
TRANSITION TO EPP-009IS REQUIRED.
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 17 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 9 FACILITY: Harris
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Classifies the Event
EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP
TIME: NA
ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:
None
1) Classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency due to ATWS
while in Mode 1 with a failure of both manual trip switches
in the Control Room
2) Classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency due to two
fission product barriers (RCS and Containment) being
breached
NOTE: Performance Rating for Admin JPM based on
20% for satisfactory classification during simulator
scenario, 20% for satisfactory classification during
JPM, and 60% for satisfactory protective action
recommendation during JPM.
COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK
Page 18 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 CRITICAL TASKS FACILITY: Harris
Event 4
Take manual control of FK-478 and reduce feed flow to prevent turbine / reactor trip on high
SG level - On transmitter failure, with proper actions, the operators should be able to control S/G
water level in manual without causing a high S/G water level turbine / reactor trip. Per NUREG
1021, App D, Step D. Ia., "prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such
as an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) or ESF actuation)."
Event 7
Manually insert control rods due to reactor failure to trip - Correct reactivity control (such as
failure to initiate emergency boration or manually insert control rods) following a failure of the
reactor to trip - Note that Emergency Boration is NOT considered a Critical Task in this scenario due
to automatic actuation of SI providing alignment from RWST (App D, Step D. .a)
Event 8
Starts RHR pump B - Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or
component with neither pump operating during a LOCA (preventing a challenge to plant safety (App
D, Step D.1 .a))
Event 6
Determines RCP trip criteria met and trips all RCPs - depending on the conditions of the
accident, for a SBLOCA, the RCPs should be tripped when specified parameters are met. The RCPs
should be tripped to avoid more serious impacts. If the criteria is not satisfied, the pumps should
continue to be operated because they can provide core heat removal without ECCS in operation
(preventing a challenge to plant safety (App D, Step D.1 .a))
Page 19 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I