ML022690333

August 2002 Exam 50-400/2002-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios & D-1 & D-2

ML022690333
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	03/22/2002
From:	Ernstes M Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Scarola J Carolina Power & Light Co
References
50-400/02301 50-400/02301
Download: ML022690333 (63)

See also: IR 05000400/2002301

Text

Draft Submittal

(Pink Paper)

1. Operating Test Simulator Scenarios

0-1 + D-2- S5k-tkP

SHEARON HARRIS

EXAM 2002-301

50-400

AUGUST 26 - 29, 2002

Appendix D Simulator Scenario Outline FORM ES-D-1

Facility: HARRIS Scenario Number: 1 Op-Test Number: 26o,2 -301

Examiners Operators

Objectives: To evaluate the candidate's ability to operate the plant in a controlled and safe manner

during a power decrease and diagnose and respond to the following events in accordance

with applicable Harris plant procedures:

"* Controlling pressure channel failure on a SG

"* Loss of an Emergency AC 6.9 KV Bus

"* Pressurizer level channel failure

"* Loss of offsite power

. Subsequent loss of all AC power

• Restoration of one Emergency Diesel Generator

Initial Conditions: IC-25; 79% power BOL; Ensure Boric Acid Pump 'B' in AUTO and RMUW Pump 'B'

• in START; RHR Pump A-SA OOS (RHR022 RACK OUT); Ensure DEH HOLD

button is illuminated

Turnover: The unit is at 79% power at BOL during a ramp from 100% power at 5 Mw per minute.

Severe thunderstorms have been reported in the area for the past 30 minutes. AP-301,

"Seasonal Preparations and Monitoring," has been completed.

A 6.7 gpd tube leak exists in SG 'A'.

Boron concentration is 1293 ppm. Bank D rods are at 199 steps.

RHR Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to

contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Technical

Specification 3.5.2 has ben entered. OWP-RH-01 has been completed. Risk is

YELLOW.

Main Feed Pump 'A' has been inspected for potential vibration concerns and Engineering

has requested that plant power be lowered at the current rate to allow removing the pump

from service if required.

Shift orders are to continue the power decrease at 5 Mw per minute to 50% power and

restore RHR Pump 'A' to service when it becomes available. GP-006 is being performed

per Section 5.2.

Page I of 20 SCENARO # 1 NUREG- 1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

EventI Malfunction Event Event Description

Number Number Type*

NA N (SRO) Continued plant power reduction (GP-006)

R (RO)

N (BOP)

2 PT:495 1300 1 (SRO) Controlling Channel of SG C pressure PT-495 high failure (AOP

0 I (BOP) 010, OWP-ESF)

3 LT:459 100 0 I (RO) Pressurizer Level Channel LT-459 fails high (OWP-RP)

I (SRO)

4 EPS05A C (ALL) Loss of IA-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to

ZDSQ94:4A automatically start (AOP-025)

FAILASIS .

5 EPS01 I M (ALL) Lighting strike in switchyard - loss of offsite power. EDG A loads,

DSG1 2 EDG B trips (EOP-PATH-1, EOP-EPP-004)

6 DSG01 3 M (ALL) EDG A trips - loss of all power (EOP-EPP-001)

7 LOA DSG17 C (BOP) EDG A is restarted after S/G depressurization has started (EOP-EPP

C (SRO) 001)

8 NA (SRO) Classifies the Event

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Page 2 of 20 SCENARIO 41 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 1 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Continued plant power reduction

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: NA

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

Plant management directs continued power reduction to 50%

power.

1) Direct the actions of GP-006, "Normal Plant Shutdown

from Power Operation to Hot Standby" after conducting a

brief

2) Ensure all PRZ Heaters are energized

3) Borate and / or insert Control Rods as necessary to control

RCS temperature and AFD during the load reduction

4) Reduce Turbine Load

• Place Impulse Pressure Feedback Loop in service

• Place Megawatt Feedback Loop in service

• Depress the Load Rate MW / Min pushbutton

• Enter the desired unloading rate (5 MW / Min) in Demand

display

• Depress Enter pushbutton

• Depress Ref pushbutton

"* Enter the desired load (approximately 50% power) in

Demand display

"* Depress the Enter pushbutton and verify the Hold

pushbutton illuminates

"* Depress the Go pushbutton to start the load reduction and

verify the Reference display decreases

5) Verify Generator Load is decreasing

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 3 of 20 SCENARIO #I1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Controlling Channel of SG C pressure PT-495 high failure

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+O (When Lead Examiner determines adequate

power reduction has been observed)

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• LOOP A HI STEAM LINE DP LOW-Pi (ALB-014-1-2)

• LOOP B HI STEAM LINE DP LOW-P3 (ALB-014-2-2)

SSG C STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH (ALB-014-6-1B)

• SG 'C' actual feed flow> steam flow

• SG 'C' feed reg valve opening

• SG 'C level rising

1) Directs the BOP to take manual control of FK-498 and

reduce feed flow per requirements of OMM-001

• Condition / cause communicated to SRO

• SRO provides concurrence to take manual control

• SRO provides control limits

• Appropriate procedure implemented when plant stabilized

• Log entry made when controller in manual

• 2) Take manual control of FK-498 and reduce feed flow to

prevent turbine / reactor trip on high SG level

3) Restore SG C level with feed flow and steam flow matched

4) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-010, "Feedwater

Malfunctions"

5) Determines NO FW Pumps are tripped

6) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain at least I FW Pump

running, flow to all SGs, all SGs > 30%

7) Determines Feed Reg Valve 'C' not operating properly in

auto and verifies in manual

8) Maintain SG levels between 52% and 62%

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 4 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Controlling Channel of SG C pressure PT-495 high failure

(Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

9) Check MCR annunciators available

10) Check all FW Train Pumps and both Heater Drain Pumps

running

11) Goes to Section 3.1 of AOP-010 for All Condensate /

Feedwater Flow Malfunctions (other than pump trips)

12) Checks all Recirc and Dump valves operating properly in

MODU

13) Check Condensate and Feedwater system intact

14) Check all Feedwater Train and Heater Drain Pumps

operating normally

15) Notify Load Dispatcher of any load limitations (NONE)

16) Check reactor thermal power changed by < 15% in any one

hour period

17) Refer to OWP-ESF for SG C pressure failure

18) Selects Channel 495 for control in accordance with OWP

ESF

NOTE: Also likely to select Channel496for SGfeedflow

although not required.

19) Refers to TS 3.3.1 (Item 14), TS 3.3.2 (Item 1.e), and TS

3.3.3.6 (Item 6) - 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> requirement to trip bistables most

limiting

20) Initiate a WR

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 5 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Pressurizer Level Channel LT-459 fails high

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+10

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• ALB-009-4-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL ALERT

• ALB-009-2-1, PZR CONT HIGH LEVEL DEVIATION

AND HEATERS ON

• LI-459 indicating 100%

• LI-460 and LI-461 indicating normal

• Charging flow decreasing

1) Enters and directs the actions of ALB-009-4-2

2) Places LK-459F, PRZ Level Controller, in manual and raises

charging flow to restore level to normal

3) Places PRZ Level Controller Selector to 460/461 position

4) Selects LI-460 or LI-461 as input to recorder

5) Places LK-459F in auto and verifies proper operation

6) Refers to OWP-RP

7) Refers to Tech Specs

3.3.3.5.a

3.3.3.6

3.3.1 (Item 11) - most limiting 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to trip bistables

8) Initiate a WR

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 6 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of 1A-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to

automatically start

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+20

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• ALB-024-1-2, 6.9 KV EMER BUS A-SA TROUBLE

• ALB-024-1-3, 480V EMER BUS A-SA TROUBLE

• ALB-024-2-3, DIESEL GENERATOR A TROUBLE

• EDG A-SA starts and loads via the sequencer

• Numerous plant alarms

1) Enter AOP-025,, "Loss Of One Emergency AC Bus

(6.9KV) Or One Emergency Dc Bus (125V),"

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) check NO CSIP running, and

isolate letdown by verifying the following valves shut:

• ICS-7, 45 GPM Letdown Orifice A

IICS-8, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice B

1CS-9, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice C

2) Verify both Emergency AC Buses energized

3) Refer TO PEP- 110, Emergency Classification and Protective

Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry

point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-11i at conclusion of scenario

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 7 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of IA-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to

automatically start (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

4) Refer to the following Tech Specs:

• 3.0.3 (Due to loss of 2/4 containment rad monitors and CVIS

affect on CNMT vacuum reliefs)

• 3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations (Due to

inoperable Control Room Outside Air Intake Monitors)

• 3.4.6.1 RCS Leak Detection (Due to RM-3502A inop)

• 3.6.5 Vacuum Relief System

• 3.8.1.1 AC Sources Operating

• 3.8.2.1 DC Sources Operating

• 3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution - Operating

5) Go to Section 3.1, Loss of IA-SA Emergency AC Bus of

AOP-025

6) Check EDG A is running properly:

, Voltage - normal range

• Frequency - normal range

7) Check Bus lA-SA is energized by EDG A

8) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check ESW A header cooling

water flow:

ESW A Pump is running

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 8 of 20 SCENARIO # 1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of lA-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to

automatically start (Page 3)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

9) Check NO CSIP running

"* Start ANY CSIP (If> 5 min, restore seal injection per AOP

018, Attachment 4)

" Adjust HC-1 86.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow, to establish

seal injection flow as necessary to maintain less than 31 gpm

total flow to all RCPs and between 8 and 13 gpm to all

RCPs

"* Start CSIP Room Ventilation per OP-172, "Reactor

Auxiliary Building HVAC System"

10) Verify A Train CCW Pump running

11) Verify charging flow, but NO letdown flow, and establish

letdown per OP- 107, "Chemical and Volume Control

System"

"* Verify ICC-337, TK-144 LTDN TEMPERATURE,

controller is in AUTO and set for 110 to 120'F (4.0 to 4.7 on

potentiometer)

"* Verify 1CS-38 Controller, PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, in

MAN with output set at 50%

"* Verify open ICS-2, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-459,

1CS-1, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-460, 1CS-1 1,

LETDOWN ISOLATION

"* Adjust controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW,

as required

• OPEN an Orifice Isolation Valve (1CS-7, ICS-8, ICS-9)

• Adjust 1CS-38 position by adjusting PK-145.1 output as

necessary to control LP LTDN Pressure (PI-145.1), then

ADJUST PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE setpoint to 58%, and

PLACE the controller in AUTO

• Open additional orifice isolation valves (1CS-7, 1CS-8,

I CS-9) as required

• Place controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, in

AUTO

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 9 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of IA-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to

automatically start (Page 4)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

12) Control AFW as necessary to maintain reactor power and

S/G levels

• Close AFW FCVs from MDAFW Pump, if desired

• If MDAFW Pump stopped enter 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO

• If TDAFW Pump stopped enter 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO

13) Verify ventilation support equipment for operating CSIP is

in service:

• P-4 Pump

• WC-2 Chiller

• CSIP Room HVAC

14) Check Instrument Air pressure greater than or equal to 90

psig

15) Check RHR operation was NOT in progress and go to Step

46

16) Verify proper load sequencing per OMM-004, "Post

Trip/Safeguards Review," Attachment 12

17) Check A Sequencer Load Block 9 AUTO ACT COMPLETE

MAN LOAD PERMITTED light is LIT

18) Perform Attachment 3 to reset CVIS and restore RM 3502A

operation (Allows exiting T/S 3.0.3)

• Verify operability of rad monitors

• Momentarily place Containment Purge Dampers in shut

• Momentarily place Normal Purge Supply Fans in stop

• Reset CVIS

• Restore RM-3502A by opening RCS Leak Det Sample Isol

Valves (1SP-16, 1SP-939, 1SP-916, and 1SP-918)

• Start RM-3502A sample pump

19) Re-energize 480V Emergency Bus 1AI

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

Page 10 of 20

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of 1A-SA Emergency AC Bus with failure of CSIP A to

automatically start (Page 5)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

20) Restore Makeup capability:

"* Verify a Reactor Makeup Water Pump is running with

Control switch in START

"* Verify 'B' train Boric Acid Transfer Pump is available and

in AUTO

21) Perform the following:

• Verify Brg Oil & Seal Oil BU from Main Rsvr control

switch in Start

• Stop DC Emergency Bearing Oil Pump and place in auto

• Direct an operator to locally verify Air Side Seal Oil Pump

running

• Direct an operator to locally stop Air Side Seal Oil Backup

Pump

NOTE: Initiate Event 5, "Lightingstrike in switchyard - loss

of offsite power. EDGA loads, EDGB trips" after DC

Emergency Bearing Oil Pump stopped.

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page I11 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Lighting strike in switchyard - loss of offsite power. EDG A loads,

EDG B trips

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+40 (approximate - based on time to perform

AOP-025 actions)

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• Reactor Trip

• Loss of RCPs

• ALB-025-1-2, 6.9 KV EMER BUS B-SB TROUBLE

• ALB-025-1-3, 480V EMER BUS B-SB TROUBLE

• ALB-02B-2-3, DIESEL GENERATOR B TROUBLE

• EDG A-SA continues operating loaded

• Numerous plant alarms

1) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip:

• Trip breakers RTA and BYA - open

• Trip breakers RTB and BYB - open

• Rod bottom lights - not available due to loss of power

• Neutron flux decreasing

2) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip:

• All turbine throttle valves - shut

• All turbine governor valves - shut

3) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Power To AC Emergency

Buses:

• Check AC emergency bus IA-SA - energized ED6

• Check AC emergency bus IB-SB - deenergized

• Check bus voltages

• Check 6.9 KV bus IA-SA breaker 106 (EDG) - closed

• Check 6.9 KV bus lB-SB breakers - open

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 12 of 20 SCENARIO ft1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Lighting strike in switchyard - loss of offsite power. EDG A loads,

EDG B trips (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

4) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO SI Actuation and NOT

required

• Check all of the following dark:

"* SI Actuated bypass permissive light

"* ALB- 11-2-2

"* ALB-1 1-5-1

"* ALB-11-5-3

"* ALB-12-1-4

• CNMT pressure < 3.0 PSIG

• PRZ pressure > 1850 PSIG

• Steam pressure > 601 PSIG

5) Go to EOP-EPP-004. "Reactor Trip Response"

6) Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required

7) Evaluate EAL network using entry point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

8) Check RCS temperature and control AFW flow to stabilize

temperature

9) Check RCPs - NONE running and verify SG PORVs

operating to establish natural circulation

10) Check Feed System Status:

• Verify feed reg valves - SHUT

• Establish AFW flow to SGs using MDAFW Pump A and

TDAFW Pump as necessary

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 13 of 20 SCENARIO # 1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Lighting strike in switchyard - loss of offsite power. EDG A loads,

EDG B trips (Page 3)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

11) Check Control Rod Status:

• Check DRPI - not available

• When DRPI becomes available, verify all control rods fully

inserted

12) Check PRZ Level > 17%

NOTE: InitiateEvent 6, "EDG A trips - loss of allpower"

after PRZ level verified

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 14 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: EDG A trips - loss of all power

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+50 (approximate - based on time to perform

EOP-EPP-004 actions)

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• ALB-024-1-2, 6.9 KV EMER BUS A-SA TROUBLE

• ALB-024-1-3, 480V EMER BUS A-SA TROUBLE

• ALB-024-2-3, DIESEL GENERATOR A TROUBLE

• ALB-024-3-1, DIESEL GENERATOR A TRIP

• Loss of lighting in Control Room

• Numerous plant alarms

1) Determines loss of all AC power has occurred and

transitions to EOP-EPP-001, "Loss of Power to 1A-SA and

lB-SB Buses"

2) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip

3) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip

4) Check If RCS Isolated:

• Check PRZ PORVs shut

• Check letdown isolation valves shut:

"* Shut ICS-7, 1CS-8, 1CS-9 (Orifice Isolation Valves)

"* Shut ICS-1 (LCV-459) and ICS-2 (LCV-460)

• Verify excess letdown valves shut:

"* ICS-460

"* ICS-461

5) Verify AFW Flow > 210 KPPH from the TDAFW Pump

6) Evaluate EAL network using entry point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

7) Determines NO EDGs are running

8) Determine unable to restore power from offsite sources and

perform Attachment 5

9) Check Status of SI Signal:

• Actuate SI

• Reset SI

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 15 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: EDG A trips - loss of all power (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

10) Direct local operations to align equipment for extended

power loss

11) Continue attempts to restore EDG or offsite power

12) Direct AO to locally isolate RCP seals

• ICS-472

• ICS-340

IICS-381

• ICS-422

• ICC-251

13) Direct AO to locally isolate CST Makeup to Hotwell

• ICE-26

I1CE-27

14) Isolate SGs:

• Shut all MSIVs

• Verify all MSIV bypass valves shut

• Verify main FW isolation valves shut

• Shut main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs

• Check SG blowdown AND SG sample isolation valves shut

15) Determine NO SGs are faulted

16) Determine NO SGs are ruptured

17) Control AFW flow to maintain all SG levels between 25%

and 50%

18) When turbine coastdown complete place the DC bearing

pump in Pull-To-Lock

19) Direct AOs to locally align equipment to conserve DC

power

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 16 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: EDG A trips - loss of all power (Page 3)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

20) Direct AO to locally vent main generator and secure DC air

side seal oil backup pump

21) Monitor CST Level > 10%

22) Check Intact SG Levels at least one > 25%

• 23) Depressurize Intact SGs TO 180 PSIG by dumping

steam at maximum rate using all intact SG PORVs:

• SG C PORV from MCB

• Locally operate SG A and SG B PORVs

NOTE: Delay locally operatingSG A and SG B PORVs to

allow control to be restoredto MCB when power is restored

later in scenario.

24) Control SG PORVs to maintain SG pressures between 180

PSIG and 140 psig

NOTE: InitiateEvent 7, "EDGA is restartedafter S/G

depressurizationhas started" after SG depressurizationis

commenced

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 17 of 20 SCENARIO ft I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: EDG A is restarted after S/G depressurization has started

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+70 (approximate - based on time to perform

EOP-EPP-001 actions)

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• EDG A-SA starts due to local actions

• Control Room lighting becomes available

• Numerous alarms clear

1) Per foldout page, determine EDG A has been restored and

go to Step 29 for recovery actions

2) Stabilize Intact SG Pressure:

"* Set each SG PORV controller to maintain existing SG

pressure

"* Place each controller in auto AND verify proper operation of

SG PORVs

TERMINATE THE SCENARIO (AT THE LEAD

EXAMINER'S DISCRETION) WHEN ALL SG PORVs

ARE BEING CONTROLLED INA UTOMA TIC AT THE

MCB.

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 18 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 8 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Classifies the Event

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: NA

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

None

1) Classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency due to both

IA-SA and lB-SB being deenergized for > 15 minutes

NOTE: Performance Rating for Admin JPM based on

20% for satisfactory classification during simulator

scenario, 20% for satisfactory classification during

JPM, and 60% for satisfactory protective action

recommendation during JPM.

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 19 of 20 SCENARIO # I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 CRITICAL TASKS FACILITY: Harris

Event 2

Take manual control of FK-498 and reduce feed flow to prevent turbine / reactor trip on high

SG level - On transmitter failure, with proper actions, the operators should be able to control S/G

water level in manual without causing a high S/G water level turbine / reactor trip. Per NUREG

1021, App D, Step D.Ia., "prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such

as an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) or ESF actuation)."

Event 6

Depressurize Intact SGs TO 180 PSIG by dumping steam at maximum rate using all intact SG

PORVs - Reduce temp and press of RCS to reduce RCP seal leakage and minimize RCS inventory

loss (no way to makeup). (preventing a challenge to plant safety (App D, Step D. .a))

Page 20 of 20 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

Appendix D Simulator Scenario Outline FORM ES-D-1

Facility: HARRIS Scenario Number: 2 Op-Test Number: 200a.-301

Examiners Operators

Objectives: To evaluate the candidate's ability to operate the plant in a controlled and safe manner

during a plant startup and subsequent power decrease and diagnose and respond to the

following events in accordance with applicable Harris plant procedures:

• Loss of a vital instrument bus

• Service Water Pump sheared shaft

• SG PORV pressure channel high failure

I

• SG tube leakage requiring plant shutdown

• Ruptured / Faulted SG due to a seismic event

Initial Conditions: IC-14; 52% power EOL; STOP Condensate Booster Pump 'B' and Condensate Pump

'B'; RHR Pump A-SA OOS (RHR022 RACKOUT)

Turnover: The unit is at 49% power at EOL, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a reactor startup from xenon-free

conditions.

Severe thunderstorms have been reported in the area for the past 30 minutes. AP-301,

"Seasonal Preparations and Monitoring," has been completed.

A 6.7 gpd tube leak exists in SG 'A'.

Boron concentration is 735 ppm. Bank D rods are at 152 steps.

RHR Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to

contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Technical Specification 3.5.2 has been entered. OWP-RH-0l has been completed.

Risk is YELLOW.

Shift orders are to place a second feedwater train in service, continue the power

increase and restore RHR Pump 'A' to service when it becomes available. GP-005 has

been completed through Step 5.0.137.

Event Malfunction Event Event Description

Number Number Type*

1 NA N (BOP) Place a Second Feedwater Train in service (OP-134)

N (SRO)

2 EPS02 3 C (ALL) Loss of Instrument Bus SIII (AOP-024)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Page I of 23 SCENARIO 02 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

Event Malfunction Event Event Description

Number Number Type*

3 SWS07A C (RO) Normal Service Water Pump A Shaft Shear (AOP-022)

C (SRO)

4 PT:308A I (BOP) S/G A PORV Pressure Transmitter PT-308 fails high (ALB-014)

130090 I (SRO)

5 SGN05B 2 0 C (ALL) SG B tube leak at 2 gpm (AOP-016)

6 NA N (SRO) Commence plant shutdown due to SG tube leak (AOP-038)

N (BOP)

R (RO)

7 XNIOA25 M (ALL) Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults

ALARM-ON S/O B (EOP-PATH-1, EOP-EPP-014, EOP-PATH-2, EOP-EPP

SGN5B 700 020)

600

MSS2B 1E6

600

8 NA (SRO) Classifies the Event

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

<12

<-V

Page 2 of 23 SCENARIO 42 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: I FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Start Up a Second Feedwater Train

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: NA

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

NONE

1) Enter and direct the actions of GP-005, "Power Operation,"

and OP-134, "Condensate System"

2) Direct BOP to place second Condensate Pump and second

Condensate Booster Pump in service per OP-134

3) Verify initial conditions are met to start lB Condensate

Pump

4) Direct operator to open IB Condensate Pump Seal Water

Isolation from Condensate Transfer Pump, ICE- 1109

5) Direct operator to perform prestart checks on Condensate

Pump B per Attachment 5

6) Verify open 1CE-129 Condensate Pump B Discharge valve

7) Start Condensate Pump B

8) Verify initial conditions are met to start lB Condensate

Booster Pump

9) Direct operator to perform prestart cheeks on Condensate

Booster Pump B per Attachment 6

10) Verify Condensate Booster Pump B recire, 1CE-261 in

MODU and shut

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 3 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 1 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Start Up a Second Feedwater Train (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

11) Place the Condensate Booster Pump B Speed Controller to

MAN and zero the demand signal

12) Open, 1CE-268 Condensate Booster Pump B Discharge

valve

13) Place the control switch for the associated recirc valve, ICE

261 in the OPEN position immediately prior to starting

Condensate Booster Pump B

14) Start Condensate Booster Pump B

15) Direct operator to verify differential pressure across the Pall

Replaceable Duplex Filter as indicated between PI-O0LO

2304B1 and PI-O1LO-2304B2 is less than 15 psid

16) Slowly increase the demand signal on the Condensate

Booster Pump B Speed Controller to match the demand

signal on the previously running Condensate Booster Pump

Speed Controller

17) Place the Condensate Booster Pump B Speed Controller to

AUTO when the demand signals are matched

18) Place the control switch for the associated recire valve 1CE

261 in the MODU position

19) Direct operator to verify the VSF coupling oil level is in the

normal operating range after 5 to 10 minutes of running

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 4 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of Instrument Bus SIll

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+0

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

"* ALB-015-4-4, CHANNEL III UPS FAILURE

"* NI Alarms on ALB-013

"* TSLBs I and 3 , 3 rd row of lights lit

"* Numerous plant alarms

1) Enter and direct the actions of AOP-024, "Loss Of

Uninterruptible Power Supply"

2) Refer to PEP- 110, Emergency Classification and Protective

Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry

point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

3) Determine Instrument Bus SIII lost and go to Section 3.1,

"Loss of Instrument Bus," of AOP-024

4) Place Rod Control in MANUAL, and perform the following:

"* Place the N43 NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS at the

Detector Current Comparator Drawer

"* Restore Tavg as necessary

• 5) Perform the following:

"* Place Main FW Regulator Valves in MANUAL

"* Control SG levels between 52% and 62%

6) Take manual control of C SG PORV

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 5 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of Instrument Bus SIII (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

7) Verify PRZ Level Controller Selector switch in CHAN

459/460

8) Refer to Tech Specs

• 3.7.4, Emergency Service Water

• 3.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating

9) Perform OST-1023, "Offsite Power Availability Verification

Weekly Interval Modes 1-6" (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)

10) Check letdown in service

11) Check all PRZ heaters in service.

12) Check any WC-2 Essential Chiller running

13) Contact Maintenance

"* Check the inverter and vital bus for indications of grounds or

other faults

"* Correct any problems found

14) Dispatch an operator to check the affected instrument

inverter (7.5 KVA UPS PANEL Sill for ANY of the

following:

"* Red OVERCURRENT I-1L light lit

"* Obvious signs of damage

NOTE: Operatorreportsovercurrentlight lit, but no obvious

signs of damage.

15) Dispatch an operator to transfer the Instrument Bus to the

alternate power supply per OP-156.02, "AC Electrical

Distribution"

NOTE: TransferBus Sill to alternatepower supply when

directed

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 6 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of Instrument Bus SIII (Page 3)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

16) Refer to the Attachment 3, "SIll Instrument Bus Power

Supplies and Loads," to determine instrumentation affected

17) Refer to Tech Specs

• 3.3.1, Reactor trip System Instrumentation

• 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System

• Instrumentation

• 3.3.3.5a, Remote Shutdown System

• 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring System

• 3.7.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater System

• 3.7.4, Emergency Service Water

• 3.8.3.1, Onsite Power Distribution - Operating

18) When power is restored to Sill

"* Reset the Reactor Trip Power Range High Flux Rate alarm

at the NIS panel

"* Return the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to

OPERATE at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer

"* Set AFW flow control valve controllers to 100%

"* Check Steam Dump bypass permissive lights (C7A or C7B)

indicate the Steam Dumps not armed

"* Reset Steam Dumps, if required

19) Place Rod Control in auto if desired

20) Place Main FW Regulator Valves in auto

21) Place C SG PORV in AUTO control at 85% demand

22) Perform a channel check of any RPS and ESF

instrumentation affected by the loss of power

23) Check RVLIS Plasma Displays updating

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 7 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Normal Service Water Pump A sheared shaft

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+15 (approximate - ensure SIII on bypass

supply and plant conditions restored)

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

"* ALB-002-6-5, SERV WTR HEADER B HIGH-LOW

FLOW

"* ALB-002-7-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR B LOW PRESS

"* ALB-002-7-2, SERV WTR PUMPS DISCHARGE LOW

PRESS

"* Loss of flow on ESW Train B

"* Loss of flow on NSW

1) Enter and direct the actions of AOP-022, "Loss Of Service

Water"

2) Check loss of ESW header due to loss of NSW flow and

restore ESW

"* Verify ESW Pump B started

"* Verify open ISW-271, Header B To Auxiliary Reservoir

"* Verify shut 1SW-274, Header B Return To Normal Header

"* Verify shut ISW-40, Normal SW Supply To Header B

3) Start standby NSW pump

"* Start NSW Pump 'B' and verify discharge valve for NSW

Pump A is closing by placing NSW Pump A switch to stop

"* Start NSW Pump B in priming mode by momentarily

placing switch to start

"* When discharge valve for NSW Pump A is fully shut, then

place and hold control for NSW Pump B to start to fully

open discharge valve

4) Go to Section 3.2, "Loss Of Normal Service Water Pump

And/Or Header" of AOP-022

5) Notify Maintenance to investigate reason for pump trip

6) Initiate WR

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 8 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 4 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: S/G A PORV Pressure Transmitter PT-308 fails high

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+25

ANNI NCIATORS / CUES:

"* ALB-014-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM STEAM

GENERATORS

"* SG A PORV open

• RCS temperature lowering

• Steam flow increasing

1) Directs operator to take manual control of SG 'A' PORV

and close per requirements of OMM-001

"* Condition / cause communicated to SRO

"* SRO provides concurrence to take manual control

• SRO provides control limits

"* Appropriate procedure implemented when plant stabilized

"* Log entry made when controller in manual

2) Places SG 'A'PORV controller in manual

3) Closes SG 'A' PORV

4) Initiate a WR

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 9 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: SG B tube leak at 2 gpm

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+30

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• REM-ITV-3534, COND VAC PUMP EFFLUENT HIGH,

on RM- 11

1) Enters and directs the action of AOP-016, "Excessive

Primary Plant Leakage"

2) Refer TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification and Protective

Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry

point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

3) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check RCS Leakage within

VCT makeup capability

4) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check PRZ Pressure > 1960

psig

5) Check that RMS alarm indicates that a SG tube leak exists

6) Sound local evacuation alarm and make plant announcement

7) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check radiation monitors

indicate normal

"* CNMT ventilation isolation monitors (REM-3561A/B/C/D)

"* RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor (RM 3502A)

8) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check PRZ level > 17%

9) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check VCT level > 5%

10) Check ALB-5-1-2A, RCP THER BAR HDR HIGH FLOW,

alarm clear

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 10 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: SG B tube leak at 2 gpm (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

11) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check radiation monitors

indicate normal

• Area rad monitors

• Stack rad monitors

12) Isolate Primary Sampling System

"* Shut ISP-945, RCS Loop B Hot Leg Smpl Isol

"* Verify all other sample valves closed

13) Perform an RCS flow balance calculation

"* Control charging flow using FK-122.1, to stabilize PZR

level

"* Operate letdown orifice valves as necessary to maintain

charging flow on scale

• 1CS-7

• ICS-8

• 1CS-9

• Calculate leak rate

14) Perform OST-1026 or OST-1226 (RCS Leakage Evaluation

Calculation)

15) Evaluate RCS leakage per Tech Spec 3.4.6.2

16) Determine leakage to be SG tube leakage

17) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check RCP seals for normal

conditions

18) Notify Health Physics of leak location and radiation levels

19) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) When leakage location has been

determined to be SG tube leakage, then go to Attachment 1

of AOP-016

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page I11 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: SG B tube leak at 2 gpm (Page 3)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

20) Notify Chemistry to implement CRC-804

21) Estimate Primary-to-Secondary Leak Rate to be > 150 gpd

using Condenser Vacuum Pump Rad Monitor (3534) and

plant curves

22) Determine SG 'B' is leaking using individual SGBD

samples and local surveys (Main Steamline Rad Monitors

are not likely to identify - other indications must be obtained

from Chemistry and HP)

23) Check secondary rad monitors not normal and direct HP to

perform surveys and evacuate local areas

24) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check SG tube leakage is

greater than TS limits and start CVPETS per OP-133

25) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check WPB radiation monitors

indicate normal

26) Notify Chemistry to sample Aux Steam system for activity

27) Determine Action Level 3 has been reached due to SG tube

leakage > 75 gpd with a rapid increase in leak rate

28) Enter and direct the actions of Attachment 11

29) Check PZR level stable or trending to reference level

30) Verify Reactor Makeup Control System operating to

maintain VCT level

31) Verify Attachment 9, Increased Monitoring Actions for

Primary-To-Secondary Leakage, is in progress or has been

completed

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 12 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: SG B tube leak at 2 gpm (Page 4)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

32) Check Attachment 10, Escalated Monitoring Actions for

Primary-To-Secondary Leakage Action Level 1, has been

completed or estimate primary-to-secondary leak rate every

15 minutes

33) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Notify Chemistry and Plant

Management of major changes in leak rate

34) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check primary-to-secondary

leakage rate-of-change > 30 gpd in a one hour period and

commence a power reduction to be < 50% within one hour

and in Mode 3 within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per AOP-038

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 13 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Commence plant shutdown due to SG tube leak

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: NA

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• Plant shutdown to < 50% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and Mode 3 within next

2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> total) directed to be performed per AOP

038 due to tube leakage

1) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-038, "Rapid

Downpower"

2) Discuss Reactor Trip Criteria using Attachment I

3) Refer TO PEP- 110, Emergency Classification and Protective

Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry

point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110 at conclusion of scenario

4) Notify Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load

5) Determine required boric acid addition for desired power

reduction by obtaining values from Attachment 2, Gallons of

Boric Acid Required for Power Reduction (1023 gallons

required)

6) Notify Radwaste Control Room to be prepared for the

increased water processing requirements due to boration

7) Notify Chemistry that a reactor power change will exceed

15% in a one hour period

8) Check Rod Control in auto

9) Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters

10) Check the DEH System in auto

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 14 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Commence plant shutdown due to SG tube leak (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

11) PERFORM the following at the DEH panel

"* Check secondary plant stable

"* Place Impulse Pressure Feedback Loop in service

"* Place the Megawatt Feedback Loop in service

"* Depress the Load Rate MW/MIN pushbutton

"* Enter desired rate (Not to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in

DEMAND display.

"* Depress ENTER pushbutton

"* Depress REF pushbutton

"* Enter desired load in DEMAND display

"* Depress ENTER pushbutton

"* Check HOLD pushbutton LIT

"* Depress GO pushbutton

"* Verify the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS

12) Commence RCS boration as required to maintain Control

Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit

13) Verify Generator load and Reactor power lowering

14) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain Generator reactive

load (VARs) within guidelines

15) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check Tavg within 51F of Tref

NOTE: InitiateEvent 7, "Seismic event causes S/G B tube

rupture at 700 gpm andfaults S/G B," after Lead Examiner

determines adequatepower change has occurred.

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 15 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults

S/G B

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: At discretion of Lead Examiner

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

"* ALB-010-4-4, SEISMIC MON SYS OBE EXCEEDED

"* Steam Line Radiation Monitor Alarm on RM- 11

• Steam Tunnel Temperatures increasing

"* Reactor Power increasing

"* Rods stepping out in response to Tavg decreasing

"* Numerous plant alarms

1) Determines SG leakage has escalated, orders a Reactor Trip

and Safety Injection, and enters EOP PATH-1

2) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip

"* Trip breakers RTA and BYA - open

"* Trip breakers RTB and BYB - open

"* Rod bottom lights - lit

"* Neutron flux decreasing

3) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip

"* All turbine throttle valves - shut

"* All turbine governor valves - shut

14) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Power To AC Emergency

Buses

"* Check AC emergency buses IA-SA and IB-SB - energized

by offsite power or EDGs

"* Check bus voltages

"* Check 6.9 KV bus IA-SA breaker breaker 105 (OFFSITE)

closed

"* Check 6.9 KV bus IB-SB breaker breaker 125 (OFFSITE)

closed

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 16 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults

S/G B (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

4) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Actuates SI Actuation and

determines SI has actuated

"* SI Actuated bypass permissive light LIT

"* ALB-1 1-5-3, REACTOR TRIP MANUAL SI

5) Perform The Following:

"* Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees

"* Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

6) Monitor Foldout A

7) Verify all CSIPs and RHR Pump 'B' running

8) Verify SI flow > 200 gpm

9) Verify RCS pressure > 230 psig

10) Verify Main Steam Isolation actuated if SG pressure has

lowered below 601 psig due to faulted SG

11) Verify Containment pressure has remained < 10 psig

12) Verify > 210 KPPH AFW flow

13) Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS

signals using PATH-I Guide, Attachment 6

14) Attempt to control RCS temperature using AFW flow and

steam dumps

15) Energize buses IAI and 1BI B

16) Verify proper PRZ PORV and spray valve response

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 17 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults

S/G B (Page 3)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

17) Determines SG B faulted by pressure decreasing in an

uncontrolled manner (will not completely depressurize due

to concurrent SGTR)

18) Transition to and direct the actions of EOP-EPP-014,

"Faulted Steam Generator Isolation"

19) Checks Critical Safety Function Status Trees

20) Verify all MSIV and MSIV bypass valves shut

21) Determines SGs A and C are NOT faulted

22) Confirms SG B faulted

• 23) Isolate SG B

"* Verify SG B PORV shut

"* Verify FW isolation valves shut

"* Verify MDAFW and TDAFW pump isolation valves to SG

B shut

"* Shut faulted SG B steam supply valve, IMS-70, to TDAFW

pump (may have been performed earlier for RCS

temperature control)

"* Verify main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs shut

"* Verify SG blowdown isolation valves shut

"* Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves shut

"* Verify hydrazine and ammonia addition valves shut

24) Check CST level > 10%

25) Determines SG B is also ruptured

"* SG blowdown radiation

"* Main Steam Line radiation

"* SG B not completely depressurizing after isolation

"* Previous indications

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 18 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults

S/G B (Page 4)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

26) Transition to and direct the actions of EOP PATH-2, Entry

Point J

27) Monitor Foldout C

28) Evaluate EAL Network using entry point U

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

29) Implement FRPs as required

• 30) Trip RCPs when RCP trip criteria is reached (MAY

HAVE BEEN TRIPPED EARLIER DUE TO FOLDOUT

PAGE CONDTIONS BEING MET)

"* SI flow > 200 gpm

"* RCS pressure < 1400 psig

31) Identify SG B as ruptured SG

32) Adjust ruptured SG PORV controller to 88% and place in

AUTO and check shut

33) Verify SG B isolated (performed during EOP-EPP-0 14)

34) Determine ruptured SG should not be fed to restore level due

to also being faulted

35) Determine ruptured SG pressure < 260 psig

36) Transition to and direct the actions of EOP-EPP-020,

"SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery"

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 19 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults

S/G B (Page 5)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

37) Monitor Foldout Page

38) Reset SI

39) Reset Phase A and Phase B

NOTE: Phase B did NOT occur during this scenario

40) Establish IA and Nitrogen to Containment

41) Monitor AC Buses

"* 1A-SA and lB-SB energized from offsite

"* All non-emergency AC buses energized

42) Verify SG B level < 78%

43) Secure PRZ heaters

44) Determine Containment Spray has NOT actuated

45) Verifies SO B is ruptured and faulted and maintains AFW

flow to SG B isolated

46) Stops RHR Pumps

"* RCS pressure > 230 psig, stable or increasing

"* Suction NOT aligned to RWST

47) Coordinate with plant operations staff and chemistry to

obtain primary and secondary samples

48) Initiate evaluation of plant status

49) Control AFW flow to maintain SGs A and C levels between

30% and 50%

50) Block low steam press SI when RCS pressure < 2000 psig

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 20 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-102 1, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Seismic event causes S/G B tube rupture at 700 gpm and faults

S/G B (Page 6)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

51) Initiate cooldown to cold shutdown conditions

"* Maintain RCS cooldown rate < 100l / hour

"* Use SG 'A' and 'C' PORVs for cooldown

NOTE: Cooldown due to faulted SG is likely to have exceeded

100IF already,so no additionalcooldown will be

performed at this time.

52) Monitor SDM while performing cooldown

53) Determine EOP-EPP-020 acceptable for performing

cooldown

"* RWST level > 70%

"* SGB level <95%

54) Determine adequate subcooling exists

55) Check SI flow > 200 gpm

56) Depressurize RCS to refill PRZ

"* PRZ level <25%

"* Depressurize using PORVs

"* Stop depressurization when PRZ level > 25%

TERMINATE THE SCENARIO (AT THE LEAD

EXAMINER'S DISCRETION) WHEN

DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE RCS HAS BEEN

OBSERVED.

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 21 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 8 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Classifies the Event

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: NA

ANNIT NCCATORS / CUES:

None

1) Classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency due to two

fission product barriers (RCS and Containment) being

breached

NOTE: Performance Rating for Admin JPM based on

20% for satisfactory classification during simulator

scenario, 20% for satisfactory classification during

JPM, and 60% for satisfactory protective action

recommendation during JPM.

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 22 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 CRITICAL TASKS FACILITY: Harris

Event 2

Place Main FW Regulator Valves in MANUAL - On transmitter failure as a result of loss of

instrument power, with proper actions, the operators should be able to control S/G water level in

manual without causing a high S/G water level turbine / reactor trip or a low water level reactor trip.

Per NUREG 1021, App D, Step DIa., "prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant

safety (such as an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) or ESF actuation)."

Event 7

Determines RCP trip criteria met and trips all RCPs - depending on the conditions of the

accident, for a SBLOCA, the RCPs should be tripped when specified parameters are met. The RCPs

should be tripped to avoid more serious impacts. If the criteria is not satisfied, the pumps should

continue to be operated because they can provide core heat removal without ECCS in operation

(preventing a challenge to plant safety (App D, Step D. 1.a))

Page 23 of 23 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

Appendix D Simulator Scenario Outline FORM ES-D-I

Facility: HARRIS Scenario Number: 3 (Spare) Op-Test Number: ,2 0 0 2-0a

Examiners Operators

Objectives: To evaluate the candidate's ability to operate the plant in a controlled and safe manner

during a power decrease and diagnose and respond to the following events in..accordance

with applicable Harris plant procedures:

"* VCT Level Channel High Failure

"* T-ref failure resulting in abnormal rod motion

"* Condenser vacuum pump trip

"* Controlling channel of feed flow fails low

"* Rapid downpower

"* RCS leakage inside containment requiring manual reactor trip

"* Failure of reactor to trip automatically or manually

"* RHR pump failure on Safety Injection

Initial Conditions: IC-20; 100% power equilibrium EOL; RHR Pump A-SA OOS (RHR022 RACKOUT)

Turnover: The unit is at 100% equilibrium conditions at EOL.

Severe thunderstorms have been reported in the area for the past 30 minutes. AP-301,

"Seasonal Preparations and Monitoring," has been completed.

A 6.7 gpd tube leak exists in SG 'A'.

Boron concentration is 319 ppm. Bank D rods are at 218 steps.

RHR Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to

contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Technical

Specification 3.5.2 has been entered. OWP-RH-01 has been completed. Risk is

YELLOW.

Main Feed Pump 'A' has been inspected for potential vibration concerns and Engineering

is currently evaluating the data.

Shift orders are to maintain power and restore RHR Pump 'A' to service when it becomes

available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3 weeks.

Page 1 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

Event Malfunction Event Event Description

Number Number Type*

I LT:1 12 100 0 1 (SRO) LT-1 12, VCT Level, High Failure (AOP-003)

1 (RO)

2 CRF08 557 0 1 (SRO) T-ref Processor low failure (AOP-001)

I (RO)

3 CND04A C (BOP) Condenser Vacuum Pump A trip (AOP-012)

C (SRO)

4 FT:477 0 0 1 (SRO) Controlling channel of SG A feed flow FT-477 fails low (OWP

I (BOP) RP)

5 NA N (SRO) Rapid downpower to remove MFP A from service (AOP-038)

R (RO)

N (BOP)

6 RCS18A 8 M (ALL) RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15

900 minutes (AOP-0 16, EOP-PATH- 1)

7 RPSOIB 3 3 C (ALL) Rx will not trip in manual or automatic (EOP-FRP-S. 1)

8 ZDSQ2:52B C(BOP) Train B RHR Pump fails to autostart on SI (EOP-PATH- 1)

FAIL ASIS

9 NA SRO Classifies the Event

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Page 2 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 1 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: LT-112, VCT Level, High Failure

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+0

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

"* ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL

SYSTEMS

"* ICS-120 (LCV-1 15A), Letdown VCT/ Holdup Tank, aligns

to HUT

1) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-003, "Malfunction of

Reactor Makeup Control"

2) Check IA available

3) Determines LK- 112 output has failed and goes to Section

3.1, "LT- 112 or LT- 115 Malfunction"

4) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Assesses effects of LT-l112

failure (Attachment 1)

5) Determines failure is NOT due to LT-1 15

6) Determines failure caused by LT-1 12

7) Monitor VCT level using either:

• ERFIS point LCS01 15

• LT-115

8) Determines that LT- 112 is failed high and places 1CS-120

(LCV- 115A), Letdown VCT / Holdup Tank, to VCT

position

9) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain VCT level below 70%

by manually diverting to HUT as needed

10) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain VCT level above 20%

using auto makeup

11) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain VCT level above 5%

auto switchover point to RWST

12) Determines LT-1 12 has failed high and directs Maintenance

to lift leads in SSPS for auto switchover to RWST

13) Maintain LCV-115A in VCT position

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 3 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: T-ref Processor low failure

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+10

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• ALB-010-6-4B, RCS Tref/ Tavg HIGH-LOW

• Rods stepping in at 72 steps per minute

I) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-001, "Malfunction of

Rod Control and Indication System"

2) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines NO control rods have

dropped

3) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Place rod control in manual

4) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check rod motion stopped

5) Go to Section 3.2, "Continuous Spurious Control Bank

Motion," of AOP-00 1

6) Manually operate rods to restore temperature

7) Determine cause of rod movement was a low failure of Tref

instrument

8) Initiate a WR

9) Maintain rods in manual until Tref restored

10) Verify proper operation of boration sources

• CVCS demineralizers

• BTRS

• Reactor Makeup

• CSIP aligned to VCT

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 4 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Condenser Vacuum Pump A trip

SRO RO BOP

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE

TIME: T+20

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• ALB-021-4-1, CONDENSER VACUUM PUMP A TRIP

• ALB-021-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM CIRC WATER

SYSTEMS

• Condenser Vacuum Pump 'A' light indication

• Slowly lowering condenser vacuum

1) If condenser vacuum lowers, refers to and directs the actions

of AOP-012, "Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum"

2) Directs AO to investigate cause of trip of vacuum pump

3) Directs AO to verify suction valve on Condenser Vacuum

Pump A closed

4) Starts Condenser Vacuum Pump B

5) Initiate aWR

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

COMMENTS:

SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

Page 5 of 19

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Controlling channel of SG A feed flow FT-477 fails low

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+30

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• ALB-014-4-1A, SG A STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH

• FI-477 indicating 0

• SG A feed reg valve opening

• SG A level increasing

• SG A actual feed flow > steam flow

1) Directs the BOP to take manual control of FK-478 and

reduce feed flow per requirements of OMM-001

• Condition / cause communicated to SRO

• SRO provides concurrence to take manual control

• SRO provides control limits

• Appropriate procedure implemented when plant stabilized

• Log entry made when controller in manual

• 2) Take manual control of FK-478 and reduce feed flow to

prevent turbine / reactor trip on high SG level

3) Restore SG A level with feed flow and steam flow matched

4) Enters and directs the actions ofAOP-010, "Feedwater

Malfunctions"

5) Determines NO FW Pumps are tripped

6) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain at least I FW Pump

running, flow to all SGs, all SGs > 30%

7) Determines Feed Reg Valve 'A' not operating properly in

auto and verifies in manual

8) Maintain SG levels between 52% and 62%

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 6 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Controlling channel of SG A feed flow FT-477 fails low (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

9) Check MCR annunciators available

10) Check all FW Train Pumps and both Heater Drain Pumps

running

11) Goes to Section 3.1 of AOP-010 for All Condensate /

Feedwater Flow Malfunctions (other than pump trips)

12) Checks all Recirc and Dump valves operating properly in

MODU

13) Check Condensate and Feedwater system intact

14) Check all Feedwater Train and Heater Drain Pumps

operating normally

15) Notify Load Dispatcher of any load limitations (NONE)

16) Check reactor thermal power changed by < 15% in any one

hour period

17) Refer to OWP-RP for SG A feed flow failure

18) Selects Channel 476 for control in accordance with OWP

RP

NOTE: Also likely to select Channel475for SG steamflow

although not required.

19) Refers to TS 3.3.1 (Item 14) - 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> requirement to trip

bistables

20) Initiate a WR

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 7 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Rapid downpower to remove MFP A from service

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: T+45

ANNI NCIATORS / CUES:

"* Plant management informs the control room that the

evaluation for FWP 'A' requires the pump be removed from

service within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

"* Direct the crew to lower power at a rate to be below 60%

within the next 60 minutes.

1) Enters and directs the actions of AOP-038, "Rapid

Downpower"

2) Discuss Reactor Trip Criteria using Attachment 1

3) Refer TO PEP-I 10, Emergency Classification and Protective

Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry

point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

4) Notify Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load

5) Determine required boric acid addition for desired power

reduction by obtaining values from the latest completed

OPT-1525, "Reactivity Plan Generation Weekly Interval

Mode I at Full Power"

6) Notify Radwaste Control Room to be prepared for the

increased water processing requirements due to boration

7) Notify Chemistry that a reactor power change will exceed

15% in a one hour period

8) Control rods in manual as necessary to maintain Tavg within

2°F of Tref

9) Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters

10) Check the DEH System in auto

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 8 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Rapid downpower to remove MFP A from service (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

11) PERFORM the following at the DEH panel

• Check secondary plant stable

• Place Impulse Pressure Feedback Loop in service

• Place the Megawatt Feedback Loop in service

• Depress the Load Rate MW/MIN pushbutton

• Enter desired rate (Not to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in

DEMAND display.

• Depress ENTER pushbutton

• Depress REF pushbutton

• Enter desired load in DEMAND display

• Depress ENTER pushbutton

• Check HOLD pushbutton LIT

• Depress GO pushbutton

• Verify the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS

12) Commence RCS boration as required to maintain Control

Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit

13) Verify Generator load and Reactor power lowering

14) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Maintain Generator reactive

load (VARs) within guidelines

15) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check Tavg within 5°F of Tref

NOTE: InitiateEvent 6, "RCS Loop A cold leg small break

LOCA, rampedin over 15 minutes," after Lead Examiner

determines adequatepower change has occurred.

COMMENTS: BOLD and * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 9 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15

minutes

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: At discretion of Lead Examiner

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

• RM-lCR-3575, CONT S STAIR EL 261 HIGH, on RM-1 1

• Charging flow increasing

• Pressurizer level decreasing

• ALB-028-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION

SYSTEM

1) Enters and directs the action of AOP-016

2) Refer to PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification and Protective

Action Recommendations, and enter EAL network at entry

point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

3) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check RCS Leakage within

VCT makeup capability

4) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check PRZ Pressure > 1960

psig

NOTE: Reactor Trip and SI will eventually be requiredbased

upon RCS leakage exceeding makeup capabilitiesand/or

RCS pressure.

5) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check radiation monitors

indicate normal

• CNMT ventilation isolation monitors (REM-3561A/B/C/D)

• RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor (RM 3502A)

6) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check PRZ level > 17%

7) (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Check VCT level > 5%

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 10 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6/ 7 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15

minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

8) Orders a reactor trip and safety injection and enters and

directs the actions of EOP PATH- 1

9) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Attempts to manually trip the

reactor and informs SRO that reactor will NOT trip

10) Enters and directs the actions of EOP-FRS-0.1, "Response to

Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS"

• 11) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Manually insert control rods

due to reactor failure to trip

12) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Manually trip Turbine

• All turbine throttle valves - shut

• All turbine governor valves - shut

13) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Start all AFW Pumps

14) (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Direct an operator to contact or

report to the main control room (to receive instructions to

locally trip the reactor).

NOTE: Approximately 15 seconds after being directedto

contact the ControlRoom, call the ControlRoom to receive

instructions.After approximately I additionalminute, locally

open the Reactor Trip breakers.

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page I1I ofl19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6/7 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15

minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

15) Perform The Following:

• Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees

• Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

16) Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS from the RWST due to

Boric Acid Pumps being blocked by sequencer operation

• Open at least one CSIP suction from the RWST (1 15B/D)

• Shut at least one VCT outlet valve (1 15C/E)

• Verify CSIP flow to RCS >_90 GPM

• Check PRZ <2335 PSIG

17) Isolate CNMT Ventilation

• Stop Normal Purge Supply and Pre-Entry Purge Exhaust

Fans

• Verify valves and dampers closed

18) Check reactor tripped locally

19) Check turbine tripped

20) Monitor Foldout Page

21) Verify proper operation of safeguards equipment using

PATH-I GUIDE, Attachment 6

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 12 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15

minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR

Pump fails to autostart on SI

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

• 22) Determines neither RHR pump is operating, informs

SRO, and starts RHR pump B

23) Control feed flow to maintain all intact SG levels between

40% and 50% (adverse containment values)

24) Verify All Dilution Paths Isolated

25) Determines NO positive reactivity addition from RCS

cooldown

26) Determines NO faulted SG exists

27) Determines core exit thermocouples < 12000 F

28) Checks reactor subcritical

• Power range channels < 5%

• Intermediate startup range channels have negative SUR

29) Implement FRPs as required

30) Return to EOP PATH-I, Step 1

31) Verify reactor tripped

32) Verify turbine tripped

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 13 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15

minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR

Pump fails to autostart on SI (Page 2)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

33) Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses

• Check AC emergency buses IA-SA and lB-SB - energized

by offsite power or EDGs

• Check bus voltages

• Check 6.9 KV bus IA-SA breaker breaker 105 (OFFSITE)

closed

• Check 6.9 KV bus lB-SB breaker breaker 125 (OFFSITE)

closed

34) Determines SI has actuated (actuated during performance of

EOP-FRS-0.1)

35) Perform The Following:

• Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees

• Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X

NOTE: Will review PEP-110at conclusion of scenario

36) Monitor Foldout A

• 37) Determines RCP trip criteria met and trips all RCPs

SSl flow>200gpm

• RCS pressure < 1400 psig

38) Verify all CSIPs and RHR Pump B running (RHR Pump A

OOS)

39) Verify SI flow > 200 gpm

40) Verify RCS pressure > 230 psig

41) Verify Main Steam Isolation actuated due to containment

pressure > 3.0 psig

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 14 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15

minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR

Pump fails to autostart on SI (Page 3)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

42) Verify Containment Spray actuation if containment pressure

exceeds 10 psig (not expected to occur)

43) Verify > 210 KPPH AFW flow

44) Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS

signals using PATH-I Guide, Attachment 6 (already

performed during EOP-FRS-0.1)

45) Control RCS temperature using AFW flow and steam dumps

46) Verify buses 1Al and IB I energized

47) Verify proper PRZ PORV and spray valve response

48) Determine no faulted SGs

49) Determine no ruptured SGs

50) Determine Containment pressure NOT normal

51) Implement Functional Restoration Procedures as required

52) Monitor Foldout Pages A and B

53) Maintain seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm

54) Control AFW flow to maintain SG levels between 40% and

50% (adverse containment values)

55) Energize buses IAI and 1B1

56) Verify proper PRZ PORV response

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 15 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15

minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR

Pump fails to autostart on SI (Page 4)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

57) Determine SI Termination criteria NOT met and continues

in PATH- I

• RCS subcooling < 40°F (adverse containment value)

• RCS pressure NOT stable or increasing

• PRZ level < 30% (adverse containment value)

58) Consult plant staff to determine if Containment Spray should

be placed in standby if running

59) Verify SR detectors energized below 5 x 10"-1 amps and

transfer recorder

60) Determines RCS pressure is > 230 psig and stable or

increasing and stops RHR Pump B

61) Determines RCS and SG pressures are both stable or

increasing

62) For each running CCW pump, open the associated CCW

return valve from the RHR HX

63) Verify 1A-SA and lB-SB energized by offsite power

64) Reset SI

65) Shutdown both EDGs using OP-155

66) Determine RHR Train B is capable of Cold Leg Recirc

67) Determine Aux and Radwaste Bldg rad levels normal

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 16 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: RCS Loop A cold leg small break LOCA, ramped in over 15

minutes - Rx will not trip in manual or automatic - Train B RHR

Pump fails to autostart on SI (Page 4)

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

68) Determine RCS pressure > 230 psig and RHR Pumps

secured

69) Transition to EOP-EPP-009, "Post LOCA Cooldown and

Depressurization"

TERMINATE THE SCENARIO (AT THE LEAD

EXAMINER'S DISCRETION) WHEN A

DETERMINA TION HAS BEEN MADE T2HAT A

TRANSITION TO EPP-009IS REQUIRED.

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 17 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 9 FACILITY: Harris

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Classifies the Event

EXPECTED OPERATOR / PLANT RESPONSE SRO RO BOP

TIME: NA

ANNUNCIATORS / CUES:

None

1) Classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency due to ATWS

while in Mode 1 with a failure of both manual trip switches

in the Control Room

OR

2) Classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency due to two

fission product barriers (RCS and Containment) being

breached

NOTE: Performance Rating for Admin JPM based on

20% for satisfactory classification during simulator

scenario, 20% for satisfactory classification during

JPM, and 60% for satisfactory protective action

recommendation during JPM.

COMMENTS: BOLD AND * DENOTES CRITICAL TASK

Page 18 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 CRITICAL TASKS FACILITY: Harris

Event 4

Take manual control of FK-478 and reduce feed flow to prevent turbine / reactor trip on high

SG level - On transmitter failure, with proper actions, the operators should be able to control S/G

water level in manual without causing a high S/G water level turbine / reactor trip. Per NUREG

1021, App D, Step D. Ia., "prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such

as an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) or ESF actuation)."

Event 7

Manually insert control rods due to reactor failure to trip - Correct reactivity control (such as

failure to initiate emergency boration or manually insert control rods) following a failure of the

reactor to trip - Note that Emergency Boration is NOT considered a Critical Task in this scenario due

to automatic actuation of SI providing alignment from RWST (App D, Step D. .a)

Event 8

Starts RHR pump B - Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or

component with neither pump operating during a LOCA (preventing a challenge to plant safety (App

D, Step D.1 .a))

Event 6

Determines RCP trip criteria met and trips all RCPs - depending on the conditions of the

accident, for a SBLOCA, the RCPs should be tripped when specified parameters are met. The RCPs

should be tripped to avoid more serious impacts. If the criteria is not satisfied, the pumps should

continue to be operated because they can provide core heat removal without ECCS in operation

(preventing a challenge to plant safety (App D, Step D.1 .a))

Page 19 of 19 SCENARIO #3 (Spare) NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I