ML021350673
| ML021350673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/2002 |
| From: | Conte R Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I |
| To: | Keiser H Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Shared Package | |
| ML012980106 | List: |
| References | |
| 05000354/2002-301 IR-02-301 | |
| Download: ML021350673 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000387/2002301
Text
May 15, 2002
Mr. Harold W. Keiser
Chief Nuclear Officer and President
P.O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038
SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION REACTOR OPERATOR AND SENIOR
REACTOR OPERATOR INITIAL EXAMINATION REPORT NO. 50-354/02-301
Dear Mr. Keiser:
This report transmits the results of the reactor operator and senior reactor operator licensing
examinations conducted by the NRC during the period of March 11-18, 2002. These
examinations addressed areas important to public health and safety and were developed and
administered using the guidelines of the Examination Standards for Power Reactors
(NUREG-1021, Revision 8).
Based on the results of the examination, all three Senior Reactor Operator and four of five
Reactor Operator applicants passed all portions of the examination. One Reactor Operator
applicant failed the administrative section of the examination. Performance insights observed
during the examination process were discussed between Mr. DAntonio and training personnel
on March 15, 2002. Results of the examinations were given to training department
management on April 4, 2002.
There were a large number of changes to the written exam after it was administered - eight
deletions for the RO test and four deletions for the SRO test, and three other answer key
changes on both the RO and SRO examination, two of which involved questions with two
correct answers. Overall this resulted in deleting or changing the answers for 11% of the RO
test and 7% of the SRO test. Because many of the changes (>5%) were related to site specific
information, this problem indicated preliminarily a poor quality of review by your staff. The
region verified no impact on the written test outline sampling plan. However, in accordance with
Examination Standards (NUREG-1021), Section ES-501, item C.2.c., we request a response to
this letter in which you provide your perspective on the problem, including why so many
changes were necessary and what actions, if any, have been taken or will be taken to improve
future initial licensing examinations.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Mr. Harold W. Keiser -2-
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system
(ADAMS). These records which include the final examinations are available in ADAMS
(RO/SRO Written-Accession No. ML021350097; RO/SRO Operating Section A-Accession
No. ML021080751; RO/SRO Operating Section B- Accession No. ML021090019 and
ML021350127; RO/SRO Operating Section C-Accession No. ML021090041; Facility Post
Examination Comments on the Written Exams - Accession No. ML021350211. ADAMS is
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public
Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Richard J. Conte, Chief
Operational Safety Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No: 50-354
License No: NPF-57
Enclosure: Examination Report 50-354/2002-301 with Attachment 1
cc w/encl; w/Attachment 1:
D. Jackson, Manager - Operations Training
cc w/encl w/o Attachment 1:
E. Simpson, Senior Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer
M. Bezilla, Vice President - Technical support
D. Garchow, Vice President - Operations
G. Salamon, Manager - Licensing
R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs
J. J. Keenan, Esquire
Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate
F. Pompper, Chief of Police and Emergency Management Coordinator
M. Wetterhahn, Esquire
N. Cohen, Coordinator - Unplug Salem Campaign
E. Gbur, Coordinator - Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch
E. Zobian, Coordinator - Jersey Shore Anti Nuclear Alliance
State of New Jersey
State of Delaware
Mr. Harold W. Keiser -3-
Distribution w/encl; w/o Attachment 1:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
J. Schoppy - NRC Resident Inspector
H. Miller, RA/J. Wiggins, DRA
G. Meyer, DRP
R. Barkley, DRP
T. Haverkamp, DRP
L. Prividy, DRS
T. Bergman, OEDO
S. Richards, NRR
W. Lanning, DRS
J. DAntonio, Chief Examiner, DRS
C. Buracker, DRS
DRS File
DOCUMENT NAME:C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML021350673.wpd
ADAMS Package No.: ML012980106
After declaring this document An Official Agency Record it will be released to the Public.
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy
OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS
NAME JDAntonio GMeyer RConte
DATE 04/ /02 05/ /02 05/ /02 05/ /02 05/ /02
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket No. 50-354
License No. NPF-57
Report No. 50-354/2002-301
Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09
Facility: Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Location: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey
Dates: March 11-18, 2002 (Operating and Written Exam Administration)
March 26-April 3, 2002 (Grading)
Examiners: J. DAntonio, Operations Engineer (Chief Examiner)
T. Fish, Operations Engineer
C. Sisco, Operations Engineer
Approved by: Richard J. Conte, Chief
Operational Safety Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000387/2002-301 and 05000388/2002-301; March 11-18, 2002; PSEG Nuclear LLC -
N09; Hope Creek Generating Station; Initial Operator Licensing Examinations.
The inspection was conducted by three regional operator licensing examiners.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Three of three SRO and four of five RO applicants passed all portions of the
examinations. The written examinations were administered by the facility and the
operating tests were administered by three NRC examiners. Because of the relatively
large number of post exam changes to the written exam (in excess of 5%), the quality of
the initial submital was considered problematic.
-ii-
Report Details
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Reactor and Senior Reactor Operator Initial Licensing Examination
a. Scope
The NRC examination team reviewed the written and operating examinations and post
exam materials submitted by the Susquehanna training staff to verify or ensure, as
applicable, the following:
The examinations were developed in accordance with the guidelines of Revision
8 of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power
Reactors and they met the overall quality goals (range of acceptability) of these
standards. The review was conducted both in the Region I office and at the
Susquehanna training facility. Final resolution of comments and incorporation of
test revisions were made during and following the onsite preparation week.
Simulation facility operation was proper.
Facility licensee completed a test item analysis on the written exams for
feedback into the systems approach to training program.
Examination security requirements were met.
The NRC examiners administered the operating portion of the exams to all applicants on
March 11-15, 2002. Hope Creek training staff administered the written examinations on
March 18, 2002.
Findings
Grading and Results:
Three of three SRO and four of five RO Applicants passed all portions of the
examinations.
Examination Preparation and Quality:
During the pre-exam NRC review, the exam did not exceed the quality tolerances of the
examiners standards. After the examination, the facility had twelve (12) post-
examination comments on the written exam - eight deletions for the RO test and four
deletions for the SRO test, and three other answer key changes on both the RO and
SRO examination two of which involved questions with two correct answers. Overall this
resulted in deleting or changing the answers for 11% of the RO test and 7% of the SRO
test. This was a relatively large number of changes to the written exam (in excess of
2
5% ) of the total questions submitted for the RO and SRO exams. The NRC accepted
ten facility comments, denied one deletion, and deleted one question for which the
facility requested an answer key change. A summary of facility comments on the written
test and NRC resolution is attached to this report.
The facility also requested modification of the critical task standard for one
administrative JPM. No change to the critical task standard for the administrative JPM
occurred as addressed below.
The licensee request that the task standard for JPM RO-A.4 be modified. The
requirement to circle LPCI flow to indicate the plant is in other than LPCI injection mode
is not critical for several reasons:
Plant pressure is too high for the indicated LPCI flow to be injection flow.
Plant pressure elevated 20 min after a LOCA indicates a very small LOCA.
RPV level is being maintained with normal feed and condensate.
If the operator had circled LPCI flow, additional information would still be
necessary.
The personnel receiving this status sheet are knowledgeable and would not be
confused about plant status by the absence of the circle indicating LPCI not in
injection mode.
There were a number of items for the applicant to check in this JPM, circling
RHR flow is a small part of the total task.
The facility indicated that locating the appropriate instrumentation to validate the status
board sheet was the critical aspect of this JPM; failing to indicate LPCI mode was a
minor omission of no safety consequence.
The NRC staff did not accept the comment. The requirement to identify RHR not in
LPCI mode was the only aspect of this JPM that was something other than a
verification. If not circled, it could have misled the recipients of the information, i.e., the
Technical Support Center (TSC) on actual status of LPCI mode during an emergency
resulting in misinformation on unnecessary additional communications. The applicant or
operator has the responsibility to pay attention to all procedural details and provide
accurate information whether or not LPCI was actually injecting, the adequacy of the
data sheet, or the ability of personnel outside the control room to deduce actual plant
status from other information on the sheet, For future use the JPM should be enhanced
in order to have the applicant or operator demonstrate the ability to find and record
accurate data and clearly indicate in the JPM the end point of the task, e.g., applicant or
operator ready to send the information to the TSC.
Examination Administration and Performance:
No findings of significance were identified
4.0 OTHER ACTIVITIES
3
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
On March 15, 2002 the NRC provided observations associated with the exam to Hope
Creek training personnel. Examination results were provided to the facility on April 4,
2002. License numbers were also provided during the April 4 telephone call.
The NRC expressed appreciation for the cooperation and assistance that was provided
during the preparation and administration of the exams by the licensees training and
operation staffs.
4
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
Jim Reid........................................Manager, Nuclear Operations Training
Nick Conicella................................Operations Superintendent - Hope Creek Licensed Training
Archie Faulkner..............................NRC Exam Development Supervisor
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
ITEM NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
NONE
Summary of Hope Creek Requested Changes and NRC Resolution
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
4 4/- No Delete question. No correct answer. Answer
Correc choice "C" does not limit flow to only
t "system" flow. HC.OP-SO.BC-0002 step
Answe
5.2.31 and 5.2.33 allow throttling flow with
r
F003A(B) which are NOT affected by the
stated bus loss. Also, as stated in Caution
5.2.31 and 5.2.33, the F003A(B) may be used
to throttle flow through the heat exchanger.
System flow is normally established with the
F015A(B). In the question, both F015 A and B
valves lose power from the 10A404 bus loss.
NRC Resolution: Delete question due to no correct answer
The NRC requested and reviewed the following additional material - related RHR system
prints and electrical prints showing power supplies to valves F003A(B). The question asks
the applicant to identify the effect on Shutdown Cooling flow for a given electrical bus loss.
The examiner verified that the bus loss does not affect F003A(B) and as such the condition
does not result in the loss of ability to adjust flow as stated in answer C. Therefore there is
no correct answer.
Based on the above review, the NRC staff accepted the facility comment.
2
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
13 11/12 X Recommend accept 2 correct answers B and
D. The Technical Specification Bases 3/4 3.9
supports answer B, which states the reason for
the high RPV Level Main Turbine trip is to
prevent Main Turbine damage. The bases is
brief and does not contain detailed discussion
of the high level trip. Lesson Plan 0301-
000.00H-000002-15 page 13 and 14 supports
answer choice D which states HPCI, RCIC,
and Reactor Feed Pumps are tripped to prevent
RPV overfill and flooding the main steam
lines, then states the significant safety concerns
if overfill occurred including "Stressing of the
reactor main steam line nozzles, steam line
snubbers, pipe supports and hangers as a result
of: - The weight of water in the main steam
lines; and the dynamic transient loads caused
by water flow in the main steam lines." This is
further supported by NRC INFO NOTICE 88-
77, which is also referenced in the lesson plan
and addresses RPV overfill and flooding the
main steam lines. This is further supported by
the bases in Improved Standard Technical
Specifications.
NRC Resolution: Change answer key to accept two correct answers
The examiner reviewed the Technical Specifications and applicable lesson plans submitted
by the facility and verified that answer choices B and D are reasons for the automatic trip
of the reactor feedwater pumps on increasing reactor water level for a malfunction of the
Digital Feedwater System.
Based on the above review, the NRC staff accepted the facility comment.
3
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
31 21/28 X Recommend Answer Key change from B to
D. Upon trip of the CRD Pump, HCU
Accumulator charging water check valves
(V115) begin leaking through the valve seats,
causing the accumulator pistons to move. The
N2 gas pressure lowers when the accumulator
piston moves. (See P&ID M-47 Sheet 1) The
surveillance requirements of HC.OP-IS.BF-
0103 demonstrate the leakage rate is low
enough to prevent accumulator trouble alarms
for greater than 2 minutes. The accumulator
alarms when nitrogen gas side pressure lowers
to 940 psig. The original assumption was that
there was no leakage past the check valves,
however, as stated previously there is some
leakage past the check valves that would affect
gas pressure and cause it to lower.
NRC Resolution: Change answer key from B to D
The NRC requested and reviewed additional material - copy of last completed surveillance
accumulator surveillance. There was evidence of leakage based on actual plant conditions
making answer choice D the correct answer based on actual plant conditions.
Based on above review, the NRC staff accepted the facility comment.
4
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
46 34/- Level Delete question. RO candidates were not
of provided the HC Event Classification Guide to
Difficul correlate the ALERT level EOP 103/4 entry
ty
condition to a radiation level. ECG Section 6.1
provides that correlation. Without the ECG, the
question becomes a Level of Difficulty 5
memory question relying on memory of
wording contained in Lesson Plan 0302-
000.00H-000127-12. The text for Learning
Objective 2 states: "The entry condition for
Radioactivity Release Control corresponds to
an action level defined in the site Emergency
Plan."
ECG Bases document states that the ECG
Initiating Condition is entered when
radioactive release rates reach levels
corresponding to 200 times 10CFR20,
Appendix B Limits. These levels are high
enough that they will not occur during normal
operation, but still low enough that the
immediate health and safety of the general
public is not threatened by the release."
NRC Resolution: Delete question due to excessive difficulty
The NRC requested and reviewed additional material - RO lesson plan showing lesson
objectives regarding expected RO knowledge of ECG classifications. Accordingly it was
overly difficult for the RO applicants to answer this question without the ECG classification
guide.
Based on review, the NRC staff accepted the facility comment.
5
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
48 36/43 *X Recommend Answer Key change to D.
The Hydrogen alarms are set to alarm at 2.0%
Hydrogen concentration on the H2/O2
Analyzers. Conditions provided in the stem
indicate the reactor core would be degraded
and producing hydrogen. EOP 102 Step
PC/H3 directs the Hydrogen Recombiners to
be placed in service if H2 concentration
reaches 0.5%. Placing the H2 Recombiners in
service IAW step PC/H3 would be the required
action. (Answer D)
Hydrogen alarms are clear indicating
Hydrogen Concentration is less than 2.0%,
therefore, EXIT EOP 102 and enter SAG is
not required. (Answer B)
NRC Resolution: *Facility recommendation changed to delete question due to no correct
answer
The NRC reviewed the applicable EOP and determined that this question cannot be
answered. The question stem does not give enough information about H2 concentration,
therefore applicants cannot determine that H2 >.5% to select the proposed answer.
Based on the above review, the NRC staff did not accepted the facility comment in part.
6
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
68 55/- Level Delete question. Level of Difficulty 5. The
of question requires memorization of the
Difficul prerequisite 2.6.2 of HC.OP-SO.SB-0001. The
ty
procedure should have been referenced in the
question.
NRC Resolution: Delete question due to excessive difficulty
The NRC requested and reviewed additional material - Reactor Protection System lesson
plan, full copy of SB-001 and
Problem Report referenced in note at step 5.6. This question requires knowledge of a note
at step 5.6 of the procedure SB-001 rather than the prerequisites as to when the reactor
mode switch shutdown position scram may be bypassed. This particular knowledge item is
not addressed in the lesson objectives or the lesson plan.
Based on the above review, the NRC staff accepted the facility comment.
7
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
73 59/60 No Delete question. No correct answer.
Correc LPRM 32-33-C is assigned to LPRM Group A
t IAW HC.RE-ST.SE-0003 Attachment 1. All
Answe
answer choices affect an APRM. The answer
r
would have been correct if the LPRM chosen
belonged to APRM C or D. Additionally, the
candidates were not given a reference to
determine which APRM the LPRM was
assigned. The readings of the LPRM and
APRM before the failure occurred would also
be necessary to determine if the average went
up or down after the failure.
NRC Resolution: Delete the question due to no correct answer.
The examiner verified that this question references a specific LPRM which does not provide
an input to the APRMs.
Based on the above review, the NRC accepted the facility comment.
8
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
106 87/83 *No Delete question. No correct answer.
Correc Immediate Operator Action of HC.OP-AB.ZZ-
t 0129 3.1 states "If smoke OR toxic gases are
Answe
detected in the control room air supply, isolate
r
the Control Room ventilation and place CREF
in the RECIRC MODE" . Keyed answer D
contains part of that answer. Pressing the
Control room EMER FILTER UNIT A and B
RECIRC MODE pushbuttons alone will not
start CREF or place CREF in the RECIRC
MODE. CREF must be running for the Recirc
Dampers to open.
NRC Resolution: * No change to the answer key
The NRC requested and reviewed additional material - Operating procedure to isolate CR
ventilation and place CREF in RECIRC. The question asks for AN immediate action; the
fact that the abnormal procedure specifies two actions in one sentence and the key answer is
not the first of those actions does not invalidate the question.
Based on the above review, the NRC staff did not accept this comment.
9
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
116 92/- No Delete question. No Correct answer. IAW
Correc NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0049, Definitions 7.2. "Formal
t declaration of Suspension of Core Alterations
Answe
or Fuel Handling is performed by the
r
Refueling SRO or a condition required by
Technical Specifications." None of the answer
choices contained conditions required by
Technical Specifications that would require
Suspension of Core Alterations.
Additionally, Lesson Plan 302-000-00H-
000113-10 Obj 66 states< "Determine the
conditions under which handling of fuel must
be suspended, IAW NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0049.
(SRO ONLY)". Therefore the question is not
appropriate
NRC Resolution: Delete due to no correct answer
The NRC requested and reviewed additional material - Refueling Operations procedure, and
administrative lesson plan addressing responsibility for suspension of fuel handling
operations. The examiner verified there was no correct answer.
Based on the above review, the NRC accepted the facility comment.
10
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
120 94/93 No Delete question for four candidates due to question
Correc contained a typographical error that allowed no correct
answer choice. These 4 students had completed and
t turned in their exams prior to the discovery of the error.
Answe The error was in the stem, Entry 2, Neutron dose should
r have read 24 instead of 54 mrem. Calculating the
for answer based on the error resulted in a remaining dose
of 1491 mrem. (Reference NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0024)
Four Previous history TEDE = DDE + CEDE; TEDE = 210 +
Applic 45; TEDE = 255 mrem
ants Todays dose: Gamma dose + Neutron dose Entry 1 +
Gamma dose + Neutron dose Entry 2 = DDE
Entry 1 = (52 + 24) + Entry 2 = (124 + 54)
Typo Todays dose = 76 + 178 = 254 mrem
Fixed Remaining dose = Admin limit (2000 mrem TEDE) -
for Previous history (255 mrem) - todays dose (254 mrem)
Four Remaining dose = 1491 mrem
The closest answers were A: 1488 mrem and B: 1521
Applic mrem, both of which are incorrect for the question
ants asked.
Once the error was identified, it was made known to the
4 remaining candidates. The correction was then written
on the board. The question will remain valid for these 4
candidates.
NRC Resolution: Answer key unchanged for 4 applicants who were made aware of the
typographical error in the stem of the question and question deleted for
other applicants who were not aware of the typographical error in the
stem of the question
The NRC verified exam completion times for the applicants who were not made aware of the
typographical error to ensure this question would be deleted only for those applicants who
had left prior to correction of the error,
Based on the above review, the NRC staff accepted the facility comment.
11
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
126 98/97 X Recommend accept 2 correct answers A
and C. SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0102 step 5.5.2
supports answer C. However, there are
numerous 100 series Abnormal procedures
that are operational transients. Abnormal
procedures HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0138 Main Turbine
Trip and HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0110 Loss of an RPS
Channel are examples of operational
transients. Answer A stated 100 series are
operational transient procedures which is
technically correct.
There is currently a major effort underway to
correct identified deficiencies to enhance
these procedures and governing documents.
NRC Resolution: Change answer key to accept two correct answers
The NRC requested and reviewed additional material - Procedure index for 100 series
procedures. The examiner verified that various 100 and 200 series procedures address
events which are normally considered operational transients.
Based on the above review, the NRC staff accepted the facility comment.
12
Exa RO/S Facilit Facility Facility Facility Comment
m RO y Rec.: Rec.:
Rec Quest Rec.: Two Change
ord ion Delete correct Answer
No. No. / answer
Reaso s
n
129 100/1 No Delete question. No correct answer.
00 Correc Procedure HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008 was revised to
t remove reference to using HCU Accumulator
Answe pressures as verification means. The
r procedure now uses SPDS, CRIDS or RMCS
Activity Control.
NRC Resolution: Delete the question due to no correct answer.
The NRC requested and reviewed additional material - Documentation of date of procedure
change - 1997. The basis for the change indicates that HCU accumulator pressure is not
adequate as a means of verifying rods are into the core which was the intent of the question.
Based on the above review, NRC staff accepted the facility comment.