ML021090041
| ML021090041 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/2002 |
| From: | Diane Jackson NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| To: | Conte R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| 05000354/2002-301 05000354/2002-301 | |
| Download: ML021090041 (48) | |
Text
SCENARIO TITLE: 02-01 NRC EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EFFECTIVE DATE:
EXPECTED DURATION: 1.5 Hours REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: L.O. REQUAL SX INITIAL LICENSE OTHER REVISION
SUMMARY
Page 1 of 14
Enabling Objectives A.
B.
M#AJOR EVNS A. Place 3 rd Reactor Feed Pump in Recirc.
B. Reduce power with Control Rods C. 'C' Flow Comparator Failure D. Loss of Reactor Building Ventilation/Secondary Containment E. 'A'CRD Pump trip F. RCIC steam leak w/ failure to isolate/High HPCI Room Temp/Scram G. ADS failure to initiate during Emergency Depressurization
~SCENARIO SUJMMARY::
The scenario commences with Reactor power at 80% and a Shutdown in progress. The 3 rd Reactor Feed Pump will be placed in Recirc before reducing power with control rods.
A failure of 'C' Flow Comparator will require the operators to bypass the failed instrument and determine the applicable Technical Specifications. Once Technical Specification actions are determined then a Reactor Building ventilation damper (HD-9414B) will fail closed causing a loss of Reactor Building pressure. The operators will respond in accordance with the Abnormal procedures to place FRVS in service to restore pressure.
'A' CRD pump trips requiring the alternate pump to be placed in service.
A steam leak develops in the RCIC room. The HPCI room temperatures will also rise because the intervening door was left open by an operator in his/her haste to exit the area.
The steam leak will require RCIC to be isolated. All attempts to isolate RCIC will fail.
Entry into the Emergency Operating Procedures will be required. The leak is severe enough to require a unit scram. Room temperatures will rise high enough to require an emergency depressurization.
The scenario will be terminated when the Reactor is depressurized and RPV level is being controlled in the band required by the EOPs.
Page 2 of 14
Initialize the simulator to IC-01; 100% power, MOL, Xe equilibrium, pull sequence step #723 Reduce Reactor power with Recirc to 80%.
Complete Attachment 1 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist."
Initial I Description
_ 1. Mark up 10-4 through step 5.1.4.
EVENT TRIGGERS:C Initial ET # Description S1. EVENT ACTION: ZDRCF07C COMMAND:
PURPOSE: HV-F007 Switch placed in CLOSE MAFNTION
SUMMARY
Initial Description Delay Ramp Remote/Event mit Final
- 1. RR19C2 Recirc flow transmitter failure 1/None 100
- 2. CD1OA CRD pump failure 3/None
- 4. RCl0 RCIC steam isolation vlvs fail to auto close 4/None
- 5. HP09 HPCI steam line break inside HPCI Rm 4111 4/None 1 RE1\O1QE/FIELtY'FUNCTIONSM AY Initial Description Delay Ramp RemotelEvent Init Final Rack
- 1. ET015 GROUP 6A HV-F007 RCIC steam supply None/1 Open Initial Description Delay Ramp Remote/Event Init] Final I.
8S37 A OVDI ADS LOGIC B man init armed Preinsert OFF
- 2. 8S46 B OVDI ADS LOGIC H man init depress Preinsert OFF
- 3. 1A175 F OVDI HD-9414B Close-Reactor Bldg 2/None ON
- 4. 1A175 E OVDI HD-9414B Open-Outbd Exh-Reactor Bldg 2/None OFF
- 5. 9S5 C OVDI HS-F008 Preinsert OFF Page 3 of 14
A. Crew and individual evaluations shall be performed by all evaluators using the simulator examination evaluation instruments lAW NC.TQ-WB.ZZ-0003(Z).
B. State shift job assignments.
C. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift.
(Provide crewmembers a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
D. Unfreeze the simulator and inform the crew:
"The simulator is running. You may commence panel walk downs at this time. OS/CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift."
E. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the OS/CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, inform the crew the scenario has commenced.
F. Incorporate/evaluate the following activities during the scenario exam:
Page 4 of 14
"* lAW HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, the CRS directs placing the C RFP in Recirc.
"* PO places the C RFP in Recirc lAW HC.OP-SO.AE 0001,
=> Places C RFP control in MAN and reduces pump speed until it is no longer feeding the RPV.
"* lAW HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 and RE guidance, the CRS directs insertion of control rods.
"* RO inserts control rods lAW the Shutdown Sequence and HC.OP-SO.SF-0001.
"* RO/PO recognize failure of the C Flow Unit and informs the CRS.
== [C6-D1] "APRM/RBM FLOW REF OFF NORMAL".
=> [C6-D3] "RO OUT MOTION BLOCK" SFlow Units A & C "COMPAR" status lights.
= CRIDS C049 "RECIRC FLOW COMPAR".
Crew responds to alarm response procedures and determines "C" Flow unit is failed upscale.
Page 5 of 14
CRS directs:
SBypassing the "C" Flow Unit lAW HC.OP-SO-SE 0001.
SPlacing Flow unit in test at 10C608 panel.
"* Crew bypasses flow unit lAW HC.OP-SO.SE-0001.
"* RO bypasses the C Flow Unit by placing the Bypass Joystick to the "C" position and observes the BYPASS light illuminates and the overhead annunciators clear.
"* CRS reviews Technical Specification 3.3.6 for applicability. (Tracking)
"* CRS directs Shift Maintenance Manager to have I&C place the flow unit in TEST and dummy in false high flow signal.
"* Crew recognizes RBVS problem via annunciator E6 C5 and digital alarm D3960 and informs CRS.
" CRS directs placing a FRVS Vent Fan in service lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0115.
" PO places FRVS Vent Fan in service to maintain Rx bldg DP lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-01 15 Immediate Operator Actions.
Page 6 of 14
Report as EO after an " RO/PO dispatches EO to appropriate time delay that investigate problem with low flow alarms are present RBVS.
for all RBVS fans. Report that all RBVS fans have tripped.
If dispatched, report as "° Crew recognizes loss of RBEO report that HD RBVS via Rx bldg DP 9414B is shut and there are decreasing on SPDS and no indications of any informs CRS.
problems.
" PO recognizes isolation of RBVS via closed indication for HD-9414B and informs CRS.
"* RO/PO dispatches RBEO to check HD-9414B and FRVS ready for start.
"* CRS implements HC.OP AB.ZZ-0115 and directs actions to correct RBVS problem.
NOTE: "* OS/CRS evaluates Tech Tech Spec 3.6.5.1 may not Specs 3.6.5.1 and 3.6.5.2 for be referenced if Rx bldg dP applicability; enters 3.6.5.2.
is maintained negative.
" CRS directs actions to investigate cause of HD 9414B closure.
"* CRS directs placing FRVS in service.
"* PO places FRVS in service lAW HC.OP-SO.GU-0001.
" RO/PO dispatches maintenance personnel to determine cause of HD 9414B closure lAW CRS direction.
Page 7 of 14
5 RDPum ip. Crew recognizes pump trip T GGE T43a via annunciator CRD iSYSTEM TROUBLE (C6-F2),
CRIDS, and Bezel E indications, and informs CRS.
- CRS directs actions to start the standby pump lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0105.
- PO starts the B CRD Pump lAW HC.OP-SO.BF-0001 Section 5.2.7(either method is acceptable)
- 6. RCIC Stea Lak W/ . Crew recognizes ROIC steam Fl t leak via: RCIC STEAM LINE DIFF PRESSURE HI (B1-A2);
Tt p r RCIC OUT OF SERVICE (B1 TRIE aB2); RCIC TURBINE TRIP (B1-AI); RADIATION MONITORING ALARM/TRBL (C6-C1), CRIDS, SPDS Room Temperatures, and/or RCIC panel indications of lowering steam pressure, and informs CRS.
Note:
inside the RCIC room a steam leak had developed on the RCIC turbine.
"* PO attempts to isolate RCIC.
"* PO recognizes failure of RCIC to isolate and informs the CRS.
Page 8 of 14
RAISE HPCI room temperature
- Crew recognizes HPCI room to maintain 15-25F less than temperatures are rising via RCIC room temperature using SPDS.
Monitor Items; OPEN d :\hopecrk\monitor\roomtemp.
RAISE temperature in HPCI Room (line 2) and RCIC Room (line 8).
If unable to open roomtemp file, USE Monitor Items variable hvtr4111 for HPCI and hvtr4110 for RCIC.
"* Crew determines that the RCIC room will reach its Maximum Safe Operating Temperature.
"* CRS orders Recirc run to minimum and Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN.
- Crew scrams the Reactor before RCIC room temperatures exceed the Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (250F).
- RO/PO performs scram actions of HC.OP-AB.ZZ 0000 / HC.OP-EO.ZZ-01 01.
oRO:
= Locks the MS in shutdown
= Verifies the Reactor is shutdown SSelects IRM recorders STrips the Main Generator when 0 Mwe are reached SLocks out the Main Generator Page 9 of 14
" CRS may anticipate an Emergency Depressurization and open all Turbine Bypass Valves lAW EO-1 01.
" RO/PO opens BPV if directed by the CRS using the BPV Jack.
"* CRS determines that both the HPCI and RCIC room temperatures are greater than their Maximum Safe Operating Temperatures and enters EOP-202 to emergency depressurize the Reactor.
"* CRS orders ADS valves opened
"* PO initiates ADS lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001, by arming and depressing the ADS initiating push buttons (4).
"* PO recognizes failure of ADS to open the 5 ADS valves, opens 5 SRVs lAW HC.OP AB.ZZ-0001, and informs CRS.
- Crew enters HC.OP-EO.ZZ 0202, Emergency Depressurization, and opens at least 5 SRVs to depressurize the Reactor within 3 minutes of RCIC and HPCI room temperatures exceeding their Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (250F).
Page 10 of 14
j Page 11 of 14
A. Conduct of Simulator Training.
B. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards C. JTA Listing D. Probabilistic Risk Assessment E. Technical Specifications F. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
G. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0115 Loss Of Reactor Building Integrity H. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101 RPV Control I. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101A ATWS-RPV Control J. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102 Primary Containment Control K. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0103/4 Reactor Building & Rad Release Control L. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0202 Emergency RPV Depressurization M. HC.OP-SO.AE-0001 Feedwater System Operation N. SH.OP-AS.ZZ-0001 Operations Standards
- 0. HC.OP-SO.SF-0001 Reactor Manual Control System Operation P. HC.OP-SO.GU.0001 Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation System Operation Q. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-01 05 Loss of CRD Regulating Function R. HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 Shutdown from Rated Power to Cold Shutdown S. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001 Transient Plant Conditions T.
U.
V.
Page 12 of 14
ESG-NRC / I I.
"*Crew scrams the Reactor before RCIC room temperatures exceed the Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (250F).
(K/A 217000A2.15 3.813.8)
Temperatures approaching the Maximum Safe Operating Temperature of any one room imply that adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operation of equipment to perform EOP actions can no longer be assured. Actions taken to scram the reactor lAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0103, Reactor Building & Rad Release Control, will reduce to decay heat levels the energy that the RPV may be discharging to the Reactor Building.
2.
- Crew enters HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0202, Emergency Depressurization, and opens at least 5 SRVs to depressurize the Reactor within 3 minutes of RCIC and HPCI room temperatures exceeding their Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (250F).
(K/A 295032EK3.01 3.5/3.8) (K/A 239002A4.01 4.4/4.4) (K/A 218002A4.02 4.2/4.2)
The reactor must be depressurized to preclude further temperature increases. More than one area above the Maximum Safe Operating Temperature indicates a possible wide spread problem that may pose a direct and immediate threat to Reactor Building integrity, equipment located in the Reactor Building, and continued safe operation of the plant. 5 SRVs are the minimum required to remove all the decay heat from the core and maintain the RPV depressurized. 3 minutes is deemed adequate time to recognize and open 5 SRVs when RCIC and HPCI room temperatures exceed their Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (250F).
Page 13 of 14
Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Oncoming Shift: Days [ X ] Nights [ ]
Op Con: I Risk Color: Green 'B' Channel Work Week SMD Warning: NONE Reactor Power: 80% Generator Power: 850 MWe Major activities accomplishedon the last shift: Major activities scheduled for this shift:
- Commenced Reactor shutdown lAW 10-4 Step 5.1.5. "* Continue Reactor Shutdown
"* Reduce power to 70% with Control Rods, contact RE for further guidance
-Operations Superintendent Issues:
Protected Equip.
Emergent Problems WIN Team Operator Workarounds Active Technical Specification Action Statements:
Ine 19 S-1 EIINYf6 -i. -Exir Addirtional Action.
SIM-001 Compensatory Actions in Effect (Required by CROD/CRFA for Operability)
Number DEFICIENCY COMPENSATORY ACTIONS Due Date Follow-up Operability Assessments (CRFA) Assigned Number LDEFICIENCY ASSIGNED Due Date Reactivity Controls:
- Plant MOL, Step #723 Shutdown Sequence
- RE guidance is that continuously inserting control rods in accordance with the Shutdown Sequence is acceptable.
- Lower power at <15%/hour Standby Safety Systems:
Balance of Plant:
RestrictedlEmergency Use Only Equipment:
Electrical:
Chemistry:
Cooling Water:
Computer:
Radiation Monitoring Systems:
Cold Weather Issues:
Administrative:
Page 14 of 14
SCENARIO TITLE: 02-01 NRC EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO NUMBER: Spars EFFECTIVE DATE:
EXPECTED DURATION: 1.5 Hours REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: I IZ L.O. REQUAL ZIxZI INITIAL LICENSE EIZZOTHER REVISION
SUMMARY
Page 1 of 18
Enabling Objectives A.
B.
MAJOR EVENTS; A. Transfer B RPS to the Alternate Power Supply B. Raise power with Control Rods C. APRM Malfunction D. Loss of a RACS pump B E. Loss of SWC/ATWS/SLC Pump Failure/Loss of Off-site Power F. Failure of RWCU Isolation Logic G. HPCI auto initiation failure SCENAR.IO0
SUMMARY
The scenario commences with Reactor power at 36%. The crew will transfer B RPS to its alternate power supply due to required MG set maintenance. Following completion of the transfer, the startup will continue with Control Rod withdrawal.
The D APRM will fail requiring it to be bypassed and Technical Specifications reviewed.
A loss of B RACS pump requires the standby pump to be placed in service.
A Reactor scram will be required due to a loss of SWC above 25% power. An ATWS occurs on the scram. The crew will take actions lAW the EOPs. When SLC is started, the RWCU system will fail to isolate. The operators will be required to isolate RWCU to prevent SLC solution removal.
The Main Turbine will trip, and a loss of off-site power occurs when the Main Generator is locked out. In order to maintain RPV level, the HPCI system will have to be started manually due to a failure of its Auxiliary Oil Pump to auto start. If water level cannot be restored and maintained above -190 inches, then the crew will emergency depressurize and restore level with low pressure injection systems.
The scenario can be terminated when the RPV pressure and RPV level are being controlled in the bands required by the EOPs.
Page 2 of 18
Initialize the simulator to IC-05; 36% power, MOL, Xe equilibrium, pull sequence step #485 Complete Attachment 1 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist."
Initial I Description 1.
Initial ET # Description
_1. EVENTACTION: !RP:K14A// RPS LOGIC A COMMAND:
PURPOSE: Initiates ATWS and MT Trip (Delayed) 2.
S3. EVENT ACTION: TC:TRIP I/ MAIN TURBINE TRIP COMMAND:
PURPOSE: INITIATES LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER Initial Description Delay Ramp Remote/Event [nit Final
__. 1. EG04A Stator cooling pump A trip 4/None
- 2. EG04B Stator cooling pump B trip 4/None
- 3. RP06 Half-core ATWS - left side 2 None/1
- 4. CUL11 A RWCU isolation valve F001 failure Preinsert
- 5. CU11B RWCU isolation valve F004 failure Preinsert
- 6. HP06E HPCI aux. oil pump failure to auto Preinsert
- 7. NM21D APRM channel D reads high or low 1/None 0
- 8. AN-D1B3 CRYWOLF ANN DIB3 9/None
- 9. AN-C8E5 CRYWOLF ANN C8E5 9/None
- 10. CD18 High rod worth's Preinsert 20
- 11. CW08B RACS pump BP209 trip 3/None
- 12. EG12 Loss of all off site power None/3
- 13. RP07 Half-core ATWS - right side 2 None/1
- 14. TC09 Turbine Trip 360 None/1 Initial Description Delay Ramp Remote/Event Init Final RACK
- 1. ET020 GROUP 7A HV-F004 RWCU Supply Isol 2/None OPEN Page 3 of 18
Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Ini I Final
- 1. 3A106 A OVLO HV-FO19 OVLD/PWR FAIL-CTMT INBD STEAMLINE 9/None ON
- 2. 3A106 E OVLO HV-F019 OPEN-CTMT INBD STEAMLINE DRAIN HEAD 9/None OFF
- 3. 3A106 F OVLO HV-F019 CLOSE-CTMT INBD STEAMLINE DRAIN HEAD 9/None OFF
- 4. 7DS4 A OVLO CH D INBD-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 9/None ON
- 5. 7DS12 A OVLO HV-F019 OPEN-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 9/None OFF
- 6. 7DS12 B OVLO HV-F019 CLOSED-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 9/None OFF
- 7. 3A106 E OVDI HV-F019 OPEN-CTMT INBD STEAMLINE DRAIN HEAD 9/None ON 8.
Page 4 of 18
A. Crew and individual evaluations shall be performed by all evaluators using the simulator examination evaluation instruments lAW NC.TQ-WB.ZZ-0003(Z).
B. State shift job assignments.
C. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift.
(Provide crewmembers a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
D. Unfreeze the simulator and inform the crew:
"The simulator is running. You may commence panel walk downs at this time. OS/CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift."
E. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the OS/CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, inform the crew the scenario has commenced.
F. Incorporate/evaluate the following activities during the scenario exam:
Page 5 of 18
" CRS directs placing the B RPS on its alternate power supply lAW HC.OP-SO.SB 0001.
Note: "* PO with CRS permission has Respond as EO to Control the power removed from HV Room instructions to remove F004 and HV-F019.
power from HV-F004 (INSERT RT-2) and HV-F019 (INSERT RT-9).
CRS refers to Technical Specifications 3.6.1.1, 3.6.3, and 3.3.7.5.
- PO observes the ALTERNATE B FEED and GENERATOR B FEED is illuminated. (10-C610)
(10-C610)
Page 6 of 18
- PO directs the RO to refer to Section 5.3 and reset the Half Scram. RO:
= Turns RPS TRIP SYSTEM B TRIP LOGIC B1 and B2 to RESET AND RETURN to NORM
= Observes the TRIP LOGICB1 and B2 NORMAL/RESET lights are illuminated.
= Observes the PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID TRIP ACTUATOR LOGICS A NORMAL AND B NORMAL lights are illuminated (Four Control Rod Groups).
S Observes the REACTOR SCRAM TRIP LOGIC B1 and B2 annunciators are de-energized.
- PO directs the RO to refer to HC.OP-SO.SM-0001(Q),
Primary Containment Isolation System Operation, and reset Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System and PCIS.
= Depresses the RESET push buttons for all four channels of PCIS and NSSSS.
PO resets PAMs Recorders by pressing the High Speed Chart Drive Reset push buttons. (10C650C)
Page 7 of 18
Note: " PO directs restoration of Respond as EO to Control power to the valves that were Room instructions to and de-energized in Step 5.4.4.
restore power to HV-F004 (Change Rem ET020 TO NORMAL) and HV-F019 (Delete RT-9 Malfunction and I/O events).
Note: " PO directs Chemistry to close Respond as Chemistry that P-RC-V9670 RWR SAMPLE valves are closed. ISLN TO PANEL 10-C251 and 1-RC-V006, RWCU SAMPLE PNL 10-C251 ISLN VLV.
" When P-RC-V9670 and 1 RC-V006 are CLOSED then the PO has the RO open BB SV-431 1, Reactor Water Sample Valve Note: "* PO directs Chemistry to open Respond as Chemistry that the P-RC-V9670 RWR Sample valves are open. IsIn to Panel 10-C251 and 1 RC-V006, RWCU Sample Pnl 10-C251 Isln Vlv
"* CRS directs power rise lAW RE guidance.
"* RO withdraws control rods lAW CRS/RE directions and HC.OP-SO.SF-0001.
"* RO determines a failure of the D APRM by observing CRIDS, Recorder, and overhead annunciator and informs CRS.
" RO determines that the D APRM has failed downscale Page 8 of 18
" CRS directs actions lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0108
=> Bypass D APRM SObserve Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.6.
" RO bypasses the D APRM by placing the B, D, F APRM Bypass to position D.
" RO/PO recognizes loss of B RACS Pump via CRIDS digital alarm and/or CRIDS page indications, and informs CRS.
" CORS directs actions to lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0123.
=> Attempt to start any available standby pumps
"* PO starts the A RACS Pump lAW HC.OP-SO.ED-0001.
"* CRS directs troubleshooting of B RACS pump.
Page 9 of 18
-1
- RO / PO recognizes loss of SWC via CRIDS and overhead annunciators and informs the CRS CRS enters / directs actions lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0138 and HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0300 SDispatches operator to local panel 10C120 to start both Stator Cooling Pumps and ensure tank level is normal
=> Directs RO to monitor for power oscillations SDirects RO to insert Control Rods per stuff sheet to reduce power SDirects PO to runback main turbine to < 7055 amps and reduce MVARs to zero
=> Directs PO/RO to open all available Steam Line Drains Page 10 of 18
- CRS enters/directs actions and CREW performs lAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101A to:
- LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENTING injection (except for SLC, CRD and RCIC) UNTIL RPV level drops below -50 in OR
- IF Supp Pool Temp > 110
'F and Drywell Press > 1.68 psig or SRV open or cycling, LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENT injection (except for SLC, CRD and RCIC) until any of the following:
"* Rx Power < 4%, or
"* RPV Level reaches 129", or
" All SRVs remain closed and Drywell press remains < 1.68 psig (K/A 203000A4.02 4.3/4.1)
(K/A 209001A4.01 3.8/3.6)
"* RO inserts control rods per ATWS guidance as directed by the CRS.
"* PO manually runs back main turbine to less than 7055 amps and reduces generator MVARs to zero.
"* CRS monitors Reactor Power and if > 25% and Stator Water Cooling has not been restored within 2 minutes, Directs CREW to Scram the Reactor, trip the Turbine and implements HC.OP-EO.ZZ 101 Page 11 of 18
"* RO carries out immediate scram actions.
=: Locks the MS in shutdown
=> Verifies the Reactor is shutdown
=> Selects IRM recorders
= Trips the Main Generator when 0 Mwe are reached
= Locks out the Main Generator
" PO maintains RPV water level with condensate / FW, as directed by the CRS.
"* RO recognizes the failure to scram, informs CRS NOTE:
- CRS enters / directs actions Ensure Main Turbine trips lAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101A; approximately 7 minutes into = Directs initiation of SLC the ATWS. th Directs RR pumps tripped
=> Directs inhibit ADS
=> Directs alternate control rod insertion methods
" RO records tank level and initiates SLC;
= Verifies RWCU isolation
"* PO inhibits ADS by placing the four Inhibit switches to inhibit.
- Crew prevents an uncontrolled depressurization during ATWS conditions by placing ADS Actuation Timer Inhibit switches to INHIBIT position.
(K/A 218000A4.04 4.1/4. 1)
(K/A 218000A4.05 4.2/4.2)
Page 12 of 18
" RO recognizes RWCU failure to isolate upon SLC initiation and manually closes HV-FOO1 AND HV-F004 to isolate RWCU, and informs CRS.
" PO monitors / maintains RPV level as directed by the CRS.
" CRS directs the crew to terminate and prevent except from CRD, RCIC and SLC to lower RPV level to less than
-50 inches.
" RO/PO terminate and prevent injection into the RPV lAW CRS directions
"* PO controls RPV level and pressure lAW CRS directions.
"* PO takes manual control of RFPs and HPCI.
"* PO recognizes HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump failure and informs CRS.
Note: "* CRS directs PO to inject with Delay report of EOP-322 HPCI if RPV level gets <-129 completion until RPV water inches.
level is controlled between -50 and -129 with feedwater, or do not report completion if full flow on HPCI is required to restore and maintain RPV level above
-190 inches.
- CREW assures adequate core cooling by:
- Restoring/Maintaining Reactor water level to
> -190", or
- Emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 ADS valves and restoring above RPV level above -190" with low pressure systems lAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101A.
NOTE: CRS orders termination of C
injection systems, emergency The following actions would be depressurization, and taken only if the crew were restoration of RPV level to unable to restore and maintain above -190, lAW EOP-101A level above -190 inches. IF the determination is made that RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above -190".
"* RO/PO terminate injection systems lAW CRS instructions
"* PO opens 5 ADS valves lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001.
"* CRS determines the MARFP based on the number of SRVs open, and directs lining up and injecting with low pressure injection systems when pressure falls below the MARFP.
"* RO/PO restore injection systems lAW CRS directions
"* RO/PO restore and maintain RPV water level above -190" lAW CRS instructions.
Page 14 of 18
Page 15 of 18 A. Conduct of Simulator Training.
B. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards C. JTA Listing D. Probabilistic Risk Assessment E. Technical Specifications F. Emergency Plan (ECG)
G. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
H. HC.OP-SO.SB-0001 Reactor Protection System Operation I. HC.OP-SO.SM-0001 Isolation Systems Operation J. HC.OP-SO.SF-0001 Reactor Manual Control System Operation K. HC.OP-SO.ED-0001 Reactor Auxiliaries Cooling System Operation L. HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 Startup from Cold Shutdown to Rated Power M. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0108 LPRM/APRM Malfunction N. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0138 Main Turbine Trip/Malfunction
- 0. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0300 Reactor Power Oscillations P. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-101 RPV Control Q. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-101A ATWS - RPV Control R. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-301 Bypassing MSIV Isolation Interlocks S. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-311 Defeating PCIG Isolation Interlocks T. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-319 Restoring Instrument Air in an Emergency U. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-322 Core Spray Injection Valve Override V. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0202 Emergency Depressurization W.
X.
Page 16 of 18
ESG - NRC 2
- Crew prevents an uncontrolled depressurization during ATWS conditions by placing ADS Actuation Timer Inhibit switches to INHIBIT position.
(K/A 218000A4.04 4.1/4.1) (K/A 218000A4.05 4.2/4.2)
Given the current ATWS conditions of this scenario, preventing ADS automatic operation and potential uncontrolled reactor level flood up prevents a significant transient and subsequent positive reactivity addition to the reactor. EOPs direct this action under the current conditions.
2.
- CREW assures adequate core cooling by:
"* Restoring/Maintaining Reactor water level to > -190", or
"* Emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 ADS valves and restoring above RPV level above -190" with low pressure systems lAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101A.
(K/A 295037 EA2.02 4.1/4.2)
Maintaining adequate Core cooling under ATWS conditions is accomplished by restoring/maintaining RPV level above -190".
Page 17 of 18
Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Oncoming Shift: Days [ X ] Nights [ ]
Op Con: 1 Risk Color: Green 'C' Channel Work Week SMD Warning: NONE Reactor Power: 36% Generator Power: XXX MWe Maioractivities accomplishedon the last shift: Maioractivities scheduled for this shift:
- Continued with Reactor Startup through 10-3, Step 5.4.19.d "* Transfer B RPS to its Alternate Power Supply
- Higher than normal vibrations reported on the B RPS MG set "* Continue with power increase per RE directions OnertionsSuneiti ndent Issues:; : ;* * * **¸ila !
Protected Equip. .
Emergent Problems WIN Team Operator Workarounds Active Technical Specification Action Statements:
N FA bb e De at Compensatory Actions in Effect (Required by CRODICRFA for Operability)
Number DEFICIENCY COMPENSATORY ACTIONS Due Date Follow-up Operability Assessments (CRFA) Assigned Number DEFICIENCY ASSIGNED Due Date Reactivity Controls:
"* Plant MOL, Step 485
"* RE guidance, raise power with Control Rods. Withdraw through RWM group ????.
Standby Safety Systems:
Balance of Plant:
Restricted/Emergency Use Only Equipment:
Electrical:
Chemistry:
Cooling Water:
Computer:
Radiation Monitoring Systems:
Cold Weather Issues:
Administrative:
Page 18 of 18
SCENARIO TITLE: 02-01 NRC EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EFFECTIVE DATE:
EXPECTED DURATION: 1.5 Hours REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: EZIL.O. REQUAL ZXZIINITIAL LICENSE
[ IZ OTHER REVISION
SUMMARY
Page 1 of 16
Enabling Objectives A.
B.
A. Place Reactor Feed Pump in service.
B. Inadvertent Loss of a Circulating Water Pump C. Reduce Reactor power D. Dual Recirculation Pump seal failure E. Recirculation Pump speed control failure/High vibrations/Scram F. Recirculation Line Break/Primary Containment Failure G. Containment Spray Valve Failure SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario commences with Reactor power at 95%. D Circulating Water Pump is OOS for maintenance. B Reactor Feed Pump will be placed in service.
When the RFP is in service, an inadvertent loss of the B Circulating Water Pump will require: reducing power to maintain Condenser vacuum, and restoration of Circulating Water pump or overriding and opening the remaining pump discharge valves to prevent a Main Turbine trip.
A dual Recirculation Pump seal failure occurs on the A RR pump. This will require tripping and isolating the pump. Once the pump is isolated, the B RR pump runs away causing a high vibration condition occurs. This will require a scram and trip of the B RR pump.
Once initial actions for the scram are completed, a leak develops from the B RR piping.
Entry into the Primary Containment Control Emergency Operating Procedure will be required. The containment fails during the leak. This will require RHR to be placed into Drywell Spray to prevent exceeding the Pressure Suppression capabilities.
The scenario will be terminated when the Drywell pressure is lowering and RPV pressure and RPV level are being controlled in the bands required by the EOPs.
Page 2 of 16
Initialize the simulator to IC-01; 100% power, MOL, Xe equilibrium, pull sequence step #723 Reduce Reactor power with Recirc to 95%.
Complete Attachment 1 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist."
Initial I Description 1.
Initial ET # Description S1. 1 EVENT ACTION: ZCRPSUDN //MODE SWITCH IN SHUTDOWN COMMAND:
PURPOSE: Initiates RR break
- 2. 2 EVENT ACTION: ZDRHFOO(38) >= 1 && ETARRAY(3) < 1 COMMAND:
PURPOSE: Overload F021A IF opened before F021 B
- 3. 3 EVENT ACTION: ZDRHFOO(40) >= 1 && ETARRAY(2) < 1 COMMAND:
PURPOSE: Overload F021 B IF opened before F021A Initial Description Delay Ramp Remote/Event Init Final
- 1. RR05A Recirc pump A inboard seal failure 120 2/None 100
- 2. RR06A Recirc pump A outboard seal failure 120 300 2/None 100
- 3. RR08B Recirc system B speed controller failure 3/None
- 4. RR26B Recirc pump BP201 high vibration 3/None
- 5. RR31B2 Recirc loop B large break 60 300 None/1 20
- 6. AN-A2E5 CRYWOLF ANN A2E5 CW PUMP 1DP501TROUBLE Preinsert
- 7. PC04 Downcomer break None/1 REMOTE/FIELDFUNCTION
SUMMARY
- ~
Initial I Description Delay Ramp Remote/Event Init Final
- 1. AN06 A2-C5 CW System Panel 100520 7/None NORM RACK
/nitial I Description ntalI Decito IDela II Ramp I Remote/Event Dela Ram Rm I e/ et I Init I Final nIt ia
- 1. 5A80 Al OVLO DP501 OVLD/PWR FAIL Preinsert OFF
- 2. 5A80 D1 OVLO DP501 ENABLE Preinsert OFF
- 3. 5A80 D2 OVLO DP501 START Preinsert OFF
- 4. 5A80 E2 OVLO DP501 STOP Preinsert OFF
- 5. 5A80 A2 OVLO DP501 INOP Preinsert ON
- 6. 5A78F OVDI BP501 EMERG TRIP l/None ON Page 4 of 16
A. Crew and individual evaluations shall be performed by all evaluators using the simulator examination evaluation instruments lAW NC.TQ-WB.ZZ-0003(Z).
B. State shift job assignments.
C. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift.
(Provide crewmembers a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
D. Unfreeze the simulator and inform the crew:
"The simulator is running. You may commence panel walk downs at this time. OS/CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift."
E. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the OS/CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, inform the crew the scenario has commenced.
F. Incorporate/evaluate the following activities during the scenario exam:
Page 5 of 16
PO places the B RFP in service lAW HC.OP-SO.AE 0001:
=> Opens HV-1769B, Reactor Feed Pump B Disch Stop Chk Vlv Mot Oper
= Closes HV-1772B, RFPT B Steam Low Pressure Supply Stop Vlv Below Seat Drain Mov
= Selects DEMAND indication on the RFPT(S) in AUTO whose demand will be matched
=> Selects RFPT B SPEED CTRLR DMND
= Presses RFPT B Speed Ctrlr Dmnd Inc Or Dec Push-Button's as required until Demand is equal to the Reactor Feed Pump operating in auto on the Master Level Controller STransfers RFPT B SPEED CTRLR to automatic by pressing the A/M push button AND observing "A" illuminates.
Page 6 of 16
- 2. -inadverte-t- of a Crew recognizes the loss of B Circlatin e CW pump.
TRIGER T-1afte C RF s
~remove th mrec Trip CRS directs actions lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0125 and 0208.
= Reduce Reactor power as necessary to maintain Condenser vacuum less than 5.0 inches Hg A.
STerminate Surveillance testing
= Ensure that the discharge valve on the tripped pump is closed
= Open remaining CW Pump Discharge Valves from OPEN/CLOSE MID to FULL OPEN to maintain Condenser vacuum.
Note: PO ensures that the B CW The CRS may decide not to Pump Discharge Valve is override and open the CW closed Discharge Valves for the operating CW Pumps.
If the discharge valves are not overridden and opened for the A and C CW pumps, then Report as EO that you determined that workers on the D CW pump had inadvertently tripped the B Circ Water Pump breaker, and that all conditions are satisfactory for a restart.
Page 7 of 16
7
- PO overrides and opens the A and C CW Pump Discharge valves, OR starts the B CW pump and opens the A, B, &
C CW Pump Discharge Valves per CRS directions.
- 3. Red*ce Reactorpower. 9 RO reduces Reactor power lAW Stuff Sheet instructions and CRS directions to maintain vacuum less than 5 inches Hg A.
SUses RR Master controller to reduce RR Pump speed
=> Inserts control rods per Stuff Sheet groups Note: 0 RO inserts Control Rods to If APRM Upscale alarms are clear APRM Upscale alarms received, the CRS will direct lAW CRS/Stuff Sheet the RO to insert Control Rods directions.
to clear the APRM Upscales.
~4.pua ratPump RO recognizes RR seal problem via CRIDS digital G afte alarm and/or RR CRIDS page indications, and informs CRS.
0 CRS directs actions to monitor seal conditions lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-01 12.
SMonitor seal parameters and record data every two hours 0 RO monitors for power oscillations lAW AB-300.
0 RO/PO recognizes a dual seal failure has occurred on the A RR pump and informs the CRS.
Page 8 of 16
PO secures and isolates "A" Recirc Pump lAW HC.OP AB.ZZ-01 12:
= Trips the pump by depressing the motor bkr trip pushbutton
= Closes suction valve (F023A) when pump is stopped SCloses pump seal purge and RWCU suction valves (HV-3800A & HV-F1OOA)
SCloses pump discharge valve (F031A) when the suction valve is fully closed
- CREW isolates the RR Pump A seal failure before DRWL pressure reaches 1.68 psig.
CRS may direct maximizing DW Cooling lAW HC.OP AB.ZZ-0201.
" PO maximizes DW Cooling lAW CRS instructions.
" RO / PO monitors plant parameters / assists as directed including drywell temperatures and pressures after pump secured and isolated.
" CRS refers to TS 3.4.1.1 and checks operation within limits of figure 3.4.1.1-1.
" Crew notifies Rad Pro and Chemistry of >15% power change in one hour for T.S samples lAW SH.OP-AP.ZZ 0108 Exhibit 4.
Page 9 of 16
" RO / PO recognizes / takes action for rising "B" RR pump speed, and informs CS;
=> Recognizes rising pump vibrations, and informs CRS
= Recognizes / takes actions lAW C1-E4
"* CRS continues actions lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0112 & 204 and directs a manual scram and tripping of "B" Recirc Pump.
"* RO / PO places mode switch in S/D and trips "B" RR Pump as directed.
" CRS enters / directs actions lAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101.
" RO verifies proper operation of EHC for pressure control, and maintains condenser vacuum, as directed by the CRS.
" RO carries out immediate scram actions.
= Locks the MS in shutdown SInserts SRMs and IRMs SVerifies the Reactor is shutdown
= Selects IRM recorders
= Trips the Main Generator when 0 Mwe are reached
=> Locks out the Main Generator PO maintains RPV water level with condensate / FW, as directed by the CRS.
Page 10 of 16
"* CRS directs investigation on "B" Recirc Pump.
"* CREW recognizes / takes action for rising D/W press /
temp, OHAs C6-B1, A7-E4 &
D4, C5-B5, and informs CRS.
"* CRS re-enters / directs actions lAW HC.OP-AB.ZZ 0201;
- Directs investigation of increasing drywell pressure I temperature
- Ensures DRWL cooling is maximized
" At 1.68 psig DRWL pressure, enters/re-enters/directs actions lAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101 and 0102.
SVerifies proper D/W cooling
= Monitors D/W sump for leaks
= Verifies scram signal
=> Verifies isolations, ECCS actions, EDG operations
=> Monitors RPV pressure decrease for low ECCS injection pressure
=> Directs Suppression Chamber sprays before 9.5 psig
= May direct rapid depressurization with bypass valves PO monitors / maintains RPV level +12.5" to + 54" as directed by the CRS.
Page 11 of 16
0 *CREW controls and maintains RPV water level
>-190" during the loss of coolant accident.
. ontainmn Spra ValveK e PO initiates DRWL sprays Fu Ensures DRWL fans are off SEnsures RR pumps secured
= Recognizes spray valve failure to open and informs CRS NOTE: 0 CRS directs placing the other Delete appropriate IO-Ovrd RHR loop in Drywell Spray.
(10S117 or 10S200) to allow operation of the other RHR Drywell Spray Valve
- PO place other RHR loop in Drywell Spray
- PO initiates Drywell Sprays as directed by the CRS.
- PO reports to CRS that Drywell Sprays in service
- CREW monitors Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP)
Curve, recognizes rapid rise toward "Action Required" Region and informs CRS
- CRS implements HC.OP EO.ZZ-0202, Emergency RPV Depressurization, IF the CRS determines that Supp Chamber Press cannot be maintained below curve SCP-L Page 12 of 16
Page 13 of 16 A. Conduct of Simulator Training.
B. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards C. JTA Listing D. Technical Specifications E. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
F. HC.OP-SO.AE-0001 Feedwater System Operation G. HC.OP-SO.BB-0001 Reactor Recirculation System Operation H. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-01 12 Recirc Pump Trip I. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0125 Circulating Water System Malfunction J. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0201 Drywell High Pressure/Loss of Drywell Cooling K. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0204 Positive Reactivity Addition L. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0208 Main Condenser Low Vacuum M. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0300 Reactor Power Oscillations N. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101 RPV Control
- 0. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102 Primary Containment Control P. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0202 Emergency Depressurization Q. SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0108 Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program R.
Page 14 of 16
ESG - NRC 2
- CREW isolates the RR pump A seal failure before DRWL pressure reaches 1.68 psig.
(K/A 202001A2.10 3.5/3.9)
Isolation of the dual seal failure terminates a loss of coolant to the drywell.
Accomplishing this task before reaching a high drywell pressure precludes an automatic reactor scram and ECCS actuation.
2.
- CREW controls and maintains RPV water level > -190" during the loss of coolant accident.
(K/A 202001A2.02 3.7/3.9)
Maintaining RPV level above -190" will assure adequate core cooling throughout the LOCA. Condensate/Feedwater as well as RCIC and HPCI are available for injection.
Page 15 of 16
Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Oncoming Shift: Days [ X ] Nights [ ]
Op Con: 1 Risk Color: Green 'C' Channel Work Week SMD Warning: NONE Reactor Power: 95% Generator Power: 1030 MWe Major activities accomplishedon the last shift: Major activities scheduled for this shift:
- Continued maintenance on D CW pump (Motor problems) "* Place B RFP in service on Master Level Control
- Maintenance completed on B RFP. B RFP is in Recirc "* Raise Reactor power to 100% with RR @ < 1%/min
-Operations Superintendent slues:
Protected Equip. 0 Emergent Problems WIN Team
- Operator
- Workarounds Active Technical Specification Action Statements:
, . * ,*, = = == , . .. . . =. .
Compensatory Actions in Effect (Required by CROD1CRFA for Operability)
Number DEFICIENCY COMPENSATORY ACTIONS Due Date Follow-up Operability Assessments (CRFA) Assigned Number DEFICIENCY ASSIGNED Due Date Reactivity Controls:
- Plant MOL, Step 727
- RE guidance, raise power with RR @ < 1 %/min. No PCIOMRPRamp restrictions in effect.
Standby Safety Systems:
Balance of Plant:
Restricted/Emergency Use Only Equipment:
Electrical:
Chemistry:
Cooling Water:
Computer:
Radiation Monitoring Systems:
Cold Weather Issues:
Administrative:
Page 16 of 16