LIC-17-0037, Response to Request for Additional Information, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No.1 - Final Request for Additional Information Concerning Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E

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Response to Request for Additional Information, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No.1 - Final Request for Additional Information Concerning Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E
ML17104A191
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 04/14/2017
From: Fisher M
Omaha Public Power District
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CAC MF9067, LIC-17-0037
Download: ML17104A191 (20)
v • d • e


Text

Omaha Public Power District LIC-17-0037 April14, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Fort Calhoun Station (FCS), Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 NRC Docket No. 50-285

Subject:

Response to Request for Additional Information, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No.1

  • Final Request for Additional Information Concerning Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E (CAC MF9067)

References:

1. Letter from OPPD (S. M. Marik) to USNRC (Document Control Desk), "Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E," dated December 16, 2016 (LIC-16-0109) (ML16356A578)
2. EMAIL from NRC (J. Kim) to OPPD (E. P. Matzke), "Fort Calhoun Station- Final Request for Additional Information Concerning Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E (CAC MF8326)", dated March 21,2017 (ML17081A019}

By letter dated December 16, 2016 (Reference 1) (ML16356A578), Omaha Public Power District (OPPD} requested exemptions from portions of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR 50) for the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 (FCS) Radiological Emergency Response Plan to reflect the risk associated with the permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. Specifically, OPPD requested an exemption from certain emergency planning requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b}, 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and Section IV to Appendix E of 10 CFR 50.

On March 21 , 2017 (Reference 2), the NRC provided OPPD with Requests for Additional Information (RAI) regarding the requested exemptions. Attachment 1 of this letter provides the responses to the RAI. Attachments 2 and 3 of this letter provides the necessary changes to Reference 1 resulting from the responses to the RAI.

444 SOUTH 16TH STREET MALL* OMAHA, NE 68102-2247

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission UC-17-0037 Page2 This letter contains no regulatory commitments.

If you should have any questions regarding this submittal or require additional information, please contact Mr. Bradley H. Blome at (402) 533-7270.

Re. spectfully, ~(~ *

~*~7~

Mary J. Fisher Senior Director Decommissioning Fort Calhoun Station MJF/epm Attachments: 1. Response to Request for Additional Information

2. Revised Pages of Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Showing markups
3. Revised Pages of Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Clean, without markups c: K. M. Kennedy, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV J. S. Kim, NRC Project Manager S. M. Schneider, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Director of Consumer Health Services, Department of Regulation and Licensure, Nebraska Health and Human Services, State of Nebraska

LIC-17-0037 Page 1 ATTACHMENT 1 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION EXEMPTION FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50.47 AND APPENDIX E OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION. UNIT N0.1 DOCKET NO. 50-285 By letter dated June 24, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16176A213), supplemented by letter dated August 25, 2016 (Accession No. ML16242A127), OPPD submitted certification to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) indicating its intention to permanently cease power operations at the FCS facility on October 24, 2016, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1){i). By letter dated November 13, 2016 (Accession No. ML16319A254), OPPD submitted a certification to the NRC of the removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii). Upon docketing of the certifications, the 10 CFR Part 50 license for FCS no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2).

By letter dated December 16, 2016 (Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16356A578), as supplemented by letter dated February 10, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17041A443), Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) requested exemptions from portions of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50) for the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Specifically, OPPD requested exemption from certain Emergency Plan Requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and Section IV to Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50. The requested exemptions would allow OPPD to modify the FCS emergency plan commensurate with the reduced likelihood of significant radiological events presented by the permanently defueled condition of the reactor and low decay heat rate of the stored fuel.

In reviewing the request for exemption, the NRC staff used the guidance from recent emergency preparedness (EP)-related decommissioning exemption reviews provided in Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) document- NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, "Emergency Planning Exemption Requests For Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants" (ADAMS Accession No. ML14106A057). The staff also informed its review with guidance and regulations applicable to an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).

Based on the NRC staffs initial review of OPPD's EP exemption request, the following requests for additional information (RAis) are required to facilitate completion of the staffs technical review:

LIC-17-0037 Page2 RAI-NSIR/DPR-001 In Table 1, "Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 50.47(c)(2)", Item 18 (page 12), to Attachment 1 of the December 16, 20161etter, OPPD provides the basis for the exemption to 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), which references the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) document, entitled "Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, Draft for Interim Use and Public Comment," dated March 2013. It provides a quote from the referenced document that "EPZs are not necessary at those facilities where it is not possible for PAGs to be exceeded off-site." Since OPPD's December 16, 20161etter, EPA issued a revision to the PAG Manual: "Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, EPA-400/R-17/001," dated January 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17044A073), which no longer includes the quote cited.

Please update the basis for the exemption in Table 1 to Attachment 1 accordingly, to reflect current Federal guidance provided in EPA-400/R-17/001.

Response

As noted in the Request for Additional Information (RAI), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a revision to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs) following submittal of Fort Calhoun Station's (FCS) letter, "Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E," dated December 16, 2016 (LIC-16-0109) (ML16356A578)

(Reference 1). In January 2017, EPA's "Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, EPA-400/R-17/001," (ADAMS Accession No. ML17044A073) (EPA PAG Manual) was issued and no longer includes the quote cited in Table 1, "Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 50.47(c)(2)", Item 18 (page 12), to Attachment 1 of Reference 1.

Revised Federal guidance provided in EPA-400/R-17/001 states that the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is based on the maximum distance at which a PAG might be exceeded. The premise of the basis for exemption remains applicable. FCS has developed an analysis indicating that 530 days (1 year, 165 days) after permanent cessation of power operations, no credible accident at FCS will result in radiological releases requiring offsite protective actions.

The analysis of the potential radiological impact of the postulated accident for FCS in a permanently defueled condition indicates that any releases beyond the site boundary are limited to small fractions of the EPA PAG exposure levels. The basis for requested exemption has been revised to address current Federal guidance provided in EPA-400/R-17/001.

In addition to the citation in Table 1 of Reference 1, the outdated EPA PAG Manual is also referenced in Section 4.1 and Section 7 of Reference 1. These additional references to the EPA PAG Manual will be updated to refer to EPA-400/R-17/001. The revisions to Reference 1 are included in Attachments 2 and 3 of this response. Corresponding changes will be made to the Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) to document the updated EPA PAG Manual.

LIC-17-0037 Page 3 RAI-NSIR/DPR-002 Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 states, in part that "emergency action levels shall be reviewed with the State and local government authorities on an annual basis." OPPD proposes in Table 2, "Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E", Item 37 (page 21), to Attachment 1 ofthe December 16, 20161etter, to "continue to review EALs with the State of Nebraska and Washington County on an annual basis."

Please provide further explanation as to why the State of Iowa and Harrison County, which are contiguous to the FCS site (directly across the Missouri River from the FCS site), are not planned to be part of any EAL annual review. Please provide any documentation of discussions with the State of Iowa and Harrison County indicating agreement with proposed change.

Response

FCS will continue to include the State of Iowa and Harrison County in the annual EAL review.

The revisions to Reference 1 are included in Attachments 2 and 3 of this response.

Corresponding changes will be made to the PDEP to document the annual review with Iowa and Harrison County.

RAI-NSIR/DPR-003 Proposed exemptions related to the notification and communications with State and local response organizations include:

  • Exemption to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), as proposed in Table 1, Item 6 (page 8) to Attachment 1 states that "Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations .*. "
  • Exemption to Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as proposed in Table 2, Item 43 (page 26) to Attachment 1 continues to provide that "A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local government agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency."
  • Exemption to Section IV.E.9.a of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as proposed in Table 2, Item 65 (page 34) to Attachment 1 continues to provide that "Provision for communications with contiguous State/local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such communications shall be tested monthly."

However, in the Basis for Exemption for Item 43 (page 27) on Table 2 to Attachment 1, OPPD states, "FCS proposes to complete emergency notification to the State of Nebraska within 60 minutes after an emergency declaration or a change in classification." This appears to be inconsistent with Item 65 (page 33) of Table 2 to where OPPD states, "FCS will maintain communications with the State of Nebraska, Washington County, and the NRC." [Emphasis added]

LIC-17-0037 Page 4

a. Please clarify the apparent inconsistencies as to what communications will occur between FCS and the site's host county (Washington County, NE), as well as with Harrison County, lA, which is located contiguous to the FCS site.

Response "a" FCS will provide notifications of an emergency declaration to the States of Nebraska and Iowa within 60 minutes after an emergency declaration or a change in classification . The States of Nebraska and Iowa will provide notification of an emergency declaration to Washington County (Nebraska) and Harrison County (Iowa). The revisions to Reference 1 are included in Attachments 2 and 3 of this response. Corresponding changes will be made to the PDEP to document the notification to the States of Nebraska and Iowa.

Cognizant officials with the States of Nebraska and Iowa, Washington County (Nebraska), and Harrison County (Iowa) have reviewed the proposed communications, as described, and concurrence is documented in letters maintained on file at FCS.

b. The Basis for Exemption for Item 43 (page 27) on Table 2 also states the 11 Emergency management officials with both states have agreed that the proposed notification to Nebraska within 60 minutes is appropriate." Please provide documentation that the State of Iowa and Harrison County, which reside contiguous to the FCS site, concur in the proposed notification being exclusively to the State of Nebraska. In addition, if FCS does not propose to include Washington County in emergency notification, then documentation should include discussions with Washington County.

Response "b" FCS will continue to include the State of Iowa when providing notification of an emergency declaration. The revisions to Reference 1 are included in Attachments 2 and 3 of this response. Corresponding changes will be made to the PDEP to document the notification to the State of Iowa. As previous stated in 'a.' above: FCS will provide notifications of an emergency declaration to the States of Nebraska and Iowa within 60 minutes after an emergency declaration or a change in classification. The States of Nebraska and Iowa will provide notification of an emergency declaration to Washington County (Nebraska) and Harrison County (Iowa).

LIC-17-0037 Page 1 ATTACHMENT 2 REVISED PAGES OF REQUEST FOR EXEMPTIONS FROM PORTIONS OF 10 CFR 50.47 AND 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E, SHOWING MARKUPS OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION. UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-285

LIC-16-0109 Page 12 Table 1 Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50.47{b} and 50.47(c}{2}

Item# Regulation in 10 CFR 50.47 Basis for Exemption 17 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16): Responsibilities for plan development No exemption is requested.

and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained .

18 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2): GeReFall~. ll:ie pi~FRe e!Epes~Fe Jjall:iwa~ FCS has developed an analysis indicating that 530 days (1 year, I!~ KIF R~eleaF pe*~rer plaRis sl:iall eeRsisl a~ aA aFaa aile~ ~ Q 165 days) after permanent cessation of power operations, no FRiles (~ 6 kFR) iR rasi~s aR9 ll:ie iAgeetieA patl:iwa~ I!Pi: sl:iall credible accident at FCS will result in radiological releases requiring eeRsist e~ a A aFea aile~ 5Q FRiles {8Q kFR) iA ragi~j&, +Re e11asl offsite protective actions. The analysis of the potential radiological sli!e aR9 eeR~ig~ralieA e~ ll:ie ePi:s Sllfl'e~jASiAg a paFiie~laF impact of the postulated accident for FCS in a permanently defueled RljeleaF peweF FeaeteF sl:ialllle 9eterFRiAe9 iR relalieR te leeal condition indicates that any releases beyond the site boundary are 9FReFgBA6)' FBSpeRSe Reeds a Ad ealilallililies as IRe~ aFe limited to small fractions of the EPA PAG exposure levels. ,tl,eseFdiA§ aUeete9 e~ SileR eeAd~ieRs as 9eFRegrapl:i~. tepegrapl:i~. IaRs t-a Current Federal guidance provided in the EPA's "Protective Action el:iarasleFisliss, assess rallies, aAd jllFissielieRal 9ellR9aries. Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, EPA-The size of the EPZs aiSG may be determined on a case-by- 400/R-1 7/00 H:lFalt leF IAieFiffl ldse aA9 P~J91is GefflfflSAI," dated case basis for gas cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors MaFsh 2G13Januarv 2017 (EPA PAG Manual) states that the EPZ is with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermai.-+Ae based on the maxim~Jm gistance at which a PAG might be pleAs KIF tl:ie iRgeslieR pall:iwa~ sl=iall K!e~s eR s~el:i aetieRs as exceeded , "eP~s aFe Rei Resessaf)' allhese lasililies wheFe it is Rei aFe apprepriate Ia liiFBieet IRe ~as iRgestieR patl=iwa~. flSSsiele ~r W>.Gste ee e~Esee9e9 eff site." (Reference 10).

Also see the basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

LIC-16-0109 Page 21 Table 2 Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Item# Regulation In Part 50, Appendix E a Fe Rei BSSi§ReS FeS!l9RSillililies!tlal¥~9!,liS llFe*JeR!!Ae !iFRely l Basis for Exemption and exercises, audited, and inspected by FCS and the NRC . The ller:feFFRaRse af !lleiF assigRas fi,jRS!iaRs as Slleslfied iR llle duties of the on-shift personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility eFReF§eRsy !liBR. are not as complicated and diverse as those for an operating power reactor.

In the EP Final Rule (Reference 11 ), the NRC acknowledged that the staffing analysis requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees because staffing at non-power reactors is generally small, which is commensurate with operating the facility in i a manner that is protective of the public health and safety. The I minimal systems and equipment needed to maintain the spent II nuclear fuel in the SFP or in a dry cask storage system in a safe i condition requires minimal personnel and is governed by Technical I Specifications. Because of the slow rate of the event scenarios in the postulated accident and postulated beyond design basis events analyses and because the duties of the on-shift personnel at a I decommissioning reactor facility are not as complicated and diverse I as those for an operating reactor, significant time is available to I' complete actions necessary to mitigate an emergency without impeding timely performance of emergency plan functions. For these reasons, it can be concluded that a decommissioning NPP is II exempt from the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9.

II 37 B. Assessment Actions FCS will develop EALs consistent with the Permanently Defueled EALs detailed in Appendix C of NEI 99-01, Revision 6 (Reference 8 .1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, 7). FCS proposes to continue to review EALs with the State§ of and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of Nebraska and Iowa aM-Washington County (Nebraska), and radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency Harrison Count~ (Iowa) on an annual basis. However, based upon

LIC-16-0109 Page27 Table 2 I Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Item# Regulation in Part 50, Appendix E Basis for Exemption IRe BJlJlFeJlFiale geYeFAFABAial al:liAeFilies AaYe IRe saJlal!ilil~ Ia government agencies' notification time up to 60 minutes based on FABkB a Jllll!lis aleFiiR!! BREI RBiifisaliBA ElesisieR JlFBFA!illi~ BA the site-specific justification provided.

I!BiA!! iAfeFFABEII!~ IRe liSBRSBB aJaR BFABF!JBRS~ SBREiilieA.

FCS proposes to complete emergency notification to the State§. of PFiaF Ia iRiliakl!ilBFBiiBA !!FBBIBF IABR a JlBFSBAI eJ FalaEIIReFmal Nebraska and Iowa within 60 minutes after an emergency JlB'I<1BF BJIRB fiFSI FBaslaF ala &ile, BaSA Rll&leaF !ilBWBF FBBSIBF declaration or a change in classification. This timeframe is liseA&BB &Rail EIBFABASIFBie IRa! aEIFAiRi&IFali"'e aREIJlAysisal consistent with the 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) notification to the NRC and FABaR& Aa\18 IIBBA eslal!li&RBEI feF aleFiiR!! BREI!ilFB¥iEiiR!iJ Is appropriate because in the permanently defueled condition, the

!ilFeFAJll iRSIFil&liaR& Ia lAB Jllllllie wi!RiR IRe Jlll:lFAB el!JlBSI:lFe rapidly developing scenarios associated with events initiated during

!ilBIAway ePO!:. +t:le EleeigR el!jesli~*e eJ IRe flFBFAfllfll,ll!lie aleFI reactor power operation are no longer credible and there is no need aREI RelifisalieR s~leFA sl=lalll!e le t:la*.*e IRe eaJlal!ilily le for State or local response organizations to implement any e&&BRiiall~ &aFAfliBIB lAB iRIIIal aleF!iR!! aAEI iAiliale AalifiaalieR protective actions.

ef lAB Jllll!lie wi!RiR IRe J3IIIFAB BliJla&llFe JlBIRWay ePO!: wiiAiR all Bill ~ li FAiR Illes. +Re IIBB eJ IRiS aleFiiA!! BREI RelifiealiBR Because of the geographic location of FCS , emergency planning SBI'JBI!ilily Will FBR!iJB JFBFA iFAFABEiiale aleFiiR!! BREI RBiifisaliBR ef and responsibilities have historically involved coordination with the IRe Jllllllie ~Yiitt:liR ~ li FAiR !,liB& ef IRB liFAe IRa! Slate aREIIesal States of Nebraska and Iowa. Decommissioning-related emergency ef:fisials aFB RB!ilieEIIAal a silllaliBA Blli&IS FBqlliFiA!i)llf!!BRI plan submittals for FCS have been discussed with offsite response asliBR)IB lAB FABFB likel~* BYBRIS WReFe tt:leFe is Sl:lBSieRiial organizations since OPPD provided notification that it would liFAe a...ailal!le feF tt:le BJlflFBflFiale !j8\1BFRFABRIBI Bl,liRBFi!iee le permanently cease power operations. These discussions have FABI1e a jl:lel!jFABAI Y~ReiReF BF ABila asli¥BIB lAB Jll,lBiis aleFI addressed changes to onsite and offsite emergency preparedness BREl RBiifisaliBA S~SieFA . =i=RB eleFiiA!iJ BREI RelifiealiBA 6ai'JBBilily throughout the decommissioning process, including the proposed SRall aelEiilieRally IRSII,lEIB aelFAiRiS!Fali*,*e aAelJ3R~isal FABBRB 60-minute notification le IRe Stale ef NeeFasl1a . Emergency feF a l!aSkl,lJ3 FABIReEI eJ I'JilBiie aleFiiR!iJ BREI RBiifiealieR SBJlaele management officials with both states have agreed that the eJ eeiA!! l,lSBel iA IRe eYeAIIt:le JlFiFABfY FAeli=leel ef aleFiiA!l aREI proposed notification Ia ~leeFaska within 60 minutes is appropriate.

ABiifiealiaR is l,lABYailal!le Sl,lRA!j BA BFABF!JBAS~ le aleFI BF FCS analyses demonstrate that 530 days (1 year, 165 days) after Relify all eF J3BFiieRs ef IRe flll,lFAB BliJlB&I,lFB JlBIA*Na~ EP~ permanent cessation of power operations, no remaining postulated JlBJll,llaliBR. +t:le l!ask11p FABI~eEI s~ali RaYS tt:le SaJlaeilily le accidents at FCS will result in radiological releases requiring offsite aleFI aRel Relify IRe Jll,lBiis wiiAiR IRe pl~o~FRe BllpBSIIFB pal~way protective actions, or in the event of beyond design basis accidents, eP~. BYI dees ABt RBBEIIB meell~e Hi FAiRIIIB eleSi!lR 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is available to take mitigative actions, and if needed,

LIC-16-0109 Page 33 Table 2 Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Item# Regulation In Part 50, Appendix E Basis for Exemption 63 E.B.d. l=eF Ri,~sleaF peweF FeasleF liseRsees, aR aiiBFRali~*e See the basis for Section IV.1 regarding hostile action.

fasilily {eF fasililies)lt:lai*.Ye~,~IEI be assessi91e e¥eR I~ IRe site is i,~REieF IAFeal e~ eF e!lpeFieRsiR!J t:leslile aslieR, 1e fi:IRslieR as a Sla!jiR!l aFea ~SF ai,I!JFRBR!alieR e~ 8FRBF!j8RS!f F8Sf19R68 S!a#

aRa sellesliYely t:la*JIR!JIRe fallewiR!I sRaFasleFisliss: IRe SaJiabili~ ~SF 89FRFRi,~RiSalieR 'llitR lt:IB 8FR8F!JeRSY 9f19FeliBRS fasilily, seR!Fel FeeFR, aREI plaRI sesYFily; IRe sapa9illl~ Ia peFfaFFR effsile RelilisalieRs; aREI lAB sapa9ilily faF BR!liR98FiR!l assessFRenl asliYilies, insiYEiiR!J ElaFRage sen!FelleaFR plaRRiRg aRa f1F9flaFalieR, faF YSe WRBR 9Rsile eFReF!jBRS~

fasililies saRRGI ba safal~ asseseeEI Bi,~RR!! t:leslile asliGR. +he FeEjl:liFeFReR!S iR IRis JjaFaJFafiA 8.a FRI:lSI 9e iFRJji9FR6RieEI R9 laleF lhan QeeeFReeF 23, 29~ 4, wilt:lllle BlEseplien a~ lt:le sapabifi~ faF slagiR!j 8FReFJ8RS~ FeSfi9RSB Sf!laRii!elieR peFseAnel allt:le alleFRali~~e fasilil~ (eF fasililies) anEIIAe sapabilil~ faF eeFRFRI:lRiealieAs y,*iiR IRe eFRef!leRey epeFalieAs fasilil>;, seRIFel F99FR, aAEI 13IBAI seel:lFi~. 'NRisR FRYSI be iR'IJliSR'IeR!eEI R9 laleF ll:taA JYR8 29, 29~2 .

64 E.B.e. ,fl. liseReee shall Aellle sylljeslle IRe FeE!!.IiFeFReRis ef See the basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) and Appendix E, Section JlaFB!JFBfiA 8.9 9~ IRis seslieA faF SA SllisliAg eFR8F!j8RS'; IV.E.B.b.

e13eFalieAs faeilil~ appFe*~eEI as ef QeeeFRbeF 2:3, 29~ ~;

65 E.9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications See the basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and (b}(10).

system; each system shall have a backup power source . All FCS will maintain communications with the State§. of Nebraska and communication plans shall have arrangements for lowa,.-Wafhington County, and the NRC. The onsite response emergencies, including titles and alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication links and the

LIC-16-0 109 Page 48

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.1 Accident Analysis Overview 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2) specifies that the 10 CFR Part 50 license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel after docketing the certifications for permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) and (ii). Following the termination of power operations at FCS and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, the postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor and supporting structures, systems, and components are no longer applicable.

A summary of the postulated radiological accidents analyzed for the permanently shut down and defueled condition is presented below. According toCurrent Federal guidance provided in the EPA's, "Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, EPA-400/R-17/001 Draft for Interim Use and Public Comment," dated March 2013Januarv 2017 (Reference 10), Section ~2.2.4 , "PAGs and Nuclear Facilities Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ)," states that the EPZ is based on the maximum distance at which a PAG might be exceededPZs are not necessary at those facilities whore it is not possible for PAGs to be exceeded offsite .

Section 5.0 of ISG-02 (Reference 1) indicates that site-specific analyses should demonstrate that: (1) the radiological consequences of the remaining applicable postulated accident would not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the EAB; (2) in the event of a beyond design basis event resulting in the partial drain down of the SFP to the point that cooling is not effective, there is at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (assuming an adiabatic heat up) from the time that the fuel is no longer being cooled until the hottest fuel assembly reaches 900°C; (3) adequate physical security is in place to assure implementation of security strategies that protect against spent fuel sabotage; and (4) in the unlikely event of a beyond design basis events resulting in a loss of all SFP cooling, there is sufficient time to implement pre-planned mitigation measures to provide makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of a zirconium cladding ignition.

Table 3 contains a listing of seven analyses that are expected to be evaluated by a decommissioning power reactor licensee requesting exemption of emergency planning requirements. The table also contains a description of how FCS addresses each of these analyses.

LIC-16-0109 Page 76

7.0 REFERENCES

1. NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, dated May 11, 2015 (ML14302A490)
2. OPPD Letter (T. Burke) to USNRC (Document Control Desk)- "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations," dated June 24,2016 (LIC-16-0043) (ML16176A213)
3. OPPD Letter (T. Burke) to USNRC (Document Control Desk) - "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations," dated August 25, 2016 (LIC-16-0067) (ML16242A127)
4. OPPD Letter (T. Burke) to USNRC (Document Control Desk), "Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel," dated November 13, 2016 (LIC-16-0074)

(ML16319A254)

5. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 60, No. 120 (60 FR 32430), Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS), dated June 22, 1995
6. USNRC, "Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning,"

Commission Paper SECY-00-0145, dated June 28, 2000 (ML003721626)

7. NEI 99-01, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," Revision 6, dated November 2012 (ML12326A809)
8. Letter, Mark Thaggard (USNRC) to Susan Perkins-Grew (NEI), "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review and Endorsement of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Dated November, 2012 (TAC No. D92368)," dated March 28, 2013 (ML12346A463)
9. Commission Paper SECY-13-0112, "Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor," dated October, 2013 (ML13256A334)
10. Environmental Protection Agency, "Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents," EPA-400/R-17/001, dated January 2017 (EPA PAG Manuai)Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, Draft for Interim Use and Public Comment, dated March 2013
11. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 76, No. 226 (76 FR 72596), Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, dated November 23, 2011 (ML13091A112)
12. NUREG-1738, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," dated February 2001 (ML010430066)
13. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 74, No. 94 (74 FR 23254), Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, dated May 18, 2009
14. NUREG-0696, "Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," dated February 1981 (ML051390358)
15. OPPD Letter (L. Cortopassi) to USNRC (Document Control Desk) - "Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 31, 2014 (LIC-14-0047)(ML14097A087)
16. USNRC Letter to OPPD (S. Marik)- "Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 -Staff Review of Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementing Near-

LIC-17-0037 Page 1 ATTACHMENT 3 REVISED PAGES OF REQUEST FOR EXEMPTIONS FROM PORTIONS OF 10 CFR 50.47 AND 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E, CLEAN, WITHOUT MARKUPS OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION. UNIT N0.1 DOCKET NO. 50-285

LIC-16-0109 Page 12 Table 1 Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 50.47(c)(2)

Item# Regulation in 10 CFR 50.47 Basis for Exemption 17 10 CFR 50.47(b )(16): Responsibilities for plan development No exemption is requested.

and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained.

18 10 CFR 50 .47(c)(2): GeAeFally, ttle l!li"*FRe exj!IGS"*Fe j!lattlway FCS has developed an analysis indicating that 530 days (1 year.

EFI;?; feF Al:fSieaF j!IGW9F j!liaAts SRali GGASiSI ef aA aFea aoout ~ Q 165 days) after permanent cessation of power operations, no miles {Hl kFR) iA Faelius a Rei tt:le iR!JeStieA j!latt:lway eP;?; st:lall credible accident at FCS will result in radiological releases requiring seAsist ef aR aFea aeeul !iQ FRiles {iiQ km) iR Faelius. +t:le e*asl offsite protective actions. The analysis of the potential radiological Si~e aREI SGAfi!jUFatieR ef IRe eFils SUFFGUReliR!j a pal'tisulaF impact of the postulated accident for FCS in a permanently defueled RUSieaF j!IGWeF FeasteF stlall ee eleteFFRiAeel iA FeialieA Ia lesal condition indicates that any releases beyond the site boundary are eFReF!JeRsy FespeAse Reeels a Rei sapaeililies as tRey aFe limited to small fractions of the EPA PAG exposure levels. Current affeeteel ey sust:l seRelitieRs as eleFRe!JFapt:ly, tepe!JFapt:ly, laRel Federal guidance provided in the EPA's "Protective Action Guides st:laFasleristiss, assess Feutes, aRel juFiselie!ieRal eeuAelaFies . and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, EPA-400/R-The size of the EPZs als9 may be determined on a case-by- 17/001 ," dated January 2017 (EPA PAG Manual) states that the case basis for gas cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors EPZ is based on the maximum distance at which a PAG might be with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal.-+tle exceeded (Reference 10).

j!liaRs feF !tle iA!jeslieA j!ISIRWay SRall fesus 9R SUGR aslieRS as Also see the basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).

aFe appFepFiate Ia JlFetesl the feeel iRgestieR pa!Rway.

LIC-16-01 09 Page 21 Table 2 Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Item# Regulation In Part 50, Appendix E Basis for Exemption BFe RBI asSi!jABB FeSi'!BASieilities !RBI WBIJIB i'!Fe\*en! IRe liFAely and exercises, audited, and inspected by FCS and the NRC. The petiorFAam;e af their aesigAea fj,jAstiene as S!Jeciflea in the duties of the on-shift personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility 8FAeFieAsy plan. are not as complicated and diverse as those for an operating power reactor.

In the EP Final Rule (Reference 11 ), the NRC acknowledged that the staffing analysis requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees because staffing at non-power reactors is generally small, which is commensurate with operating the facility in a manner that is protective of the public health and safety. The minimal systems and equipment needed to maintain the spent nuclear fuel in the SFP or in a dry cask storage system in a safe condition requires minimal personnel and is governed by Technical Specifications. Because of the slow rate of the event scenarios in the postulated accident and postulated beyond design basis events analyses and because the duties of the on-shift personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility are not as complicated and diverse as those for an operating reactor, significant time is available to complete actions necessary to mitigate an emergency without impeding timely performance of emergency plan functions. For these reasons, it can be concluded that a decommissioning NPP is exempt from the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9.

37 B. Assessment Actions FCS will develop EALs consistent with the PermanenUy Defueled EALs detailed in Appendix C of NEI 99-01, Revision 6 (Reference B.1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, 7). FCS proposes to continue to review EALs with the States of and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of Nebraska and Iowa, Washington County (Nebraska), and Harrison radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency County (Iowa) on an annual basis. However, based upon the

LIC-16-0109 Page27 Table 2 Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Item# Regulation In Part 50, Appendix E Basis for Exemption IRe B!"JlFGj3Fiale !jeYeFRmeRial 91,1\ReFilies Rave IRe sapability Ia government agencies' notification time up to 60 minutes based on make a p~,~illis aleFtiRg aRe RelifisalieR eesisieA JlFSmj3lly eR the site-specific justification provided.

beiRg iRfeFR'!ed by IRe liseRsee ahA emeFgeRsy seAElilieR.

FCS proposes to complete emergency notification to the States of PFieF Ia iRilial epeFalieA gFealeF IRaA i l'leFseRI ef Fated U'leFmal Nebraska and Iowa within 60 minutes after an emergency pe*,*,<eF ef IRe fiFSI FGasleF at a site, easR AYsleaF peweF FeasleF declaration or a change in classification. This timeframe is liseRsee sRall eemeAsiFale IRa! admiRisiFali*~e aRe pRysisal consistent with the 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) notification to the NRC and meaRs RaYe beeR eslablisl:led feF aler:tiRg aAd JlFS*JidiAg is appropriate because in the permanently defueled condition, the pFem!'ll iASIFYslieAs Ia IRe !"Yillis wiiRiR IRe !'II~,~FAe elE!)GSYFe rapidly developing scenarios associated with events initiated during pall:lway el22:. +Re eesigR abjesliYe 9f IRe i"FSFA!)I 'Hiblis aleFt reactor power operation are no longer credible and there is no need aRe RalifisalieA system sl:lall be Ia !=lave ll=le sapabilily Ia for State or local response organizations to implement any esseAiially samplele IRe iAilial aleFliRg aRe iAiliale AalifisatiaR protective actions.

afIRe !)Yblis vAtl=liA tl:le J!IYme eKJ!BSYFe !'IBIRway El22: 'tliiRiA aila~,~l ~Iii miRYies. +l=le yse ef IRis aleF!iRg aRe AellfisaliaR Because of the geographic location of FCS, emergency planning sapabilily *~~ill FaRge fFeFA immediate aleFliA!l aRe AetifisaliaR ef and responsibilities have historically involved coordination with the ll=le JlYblis !u~IRiR ~Iii miR~o~les ef ll=le lime IRa! Stale aRe lesal States of Nebraska and Iowa. Decommissioning-related emergency effisial6 aFe Relifiee IRa! a si!YalieR e11i6l6 FeqYiFiAg YFgeAI plan submittals for FCS have been discussed with offsite response aslieA) Ia IRe meFe likely e*JeAis wl=leFe ll:leFe is s~o~bslaRiial organizations since OPPD provided notification that it would lime a*Jailaele feF IRe 9JlJ!FapFiale geYeFAFAeAial a~o~IReFilies Ia permanently cease power operations. These discussions have mal~e a jYElgmeAI*I~i=leiReF eF Rella aslivata ll=le pyblis aleFI addressed changes to onsite and offsite emergency preparedness aRe Aeli~iselieR system. +Re aleFliR§ aRe RatifisalieR sapaeilily throughout the decommissioning process, including the proposed sl:lall aaeitieAally iRsl~,~se aeFAiAistFali~Je aRe 13Rysisal meaRs 60-minute notification . Emergency management officials with both feF a ilaskYJl mell:led e~ J!Yillis aleF!iA!l aRe AelifisatieR sapaille states have agreed that the proposed notification within 60 minutes af eeiR!jlol6eG iR IRe 8¥8RIIRe pFimaFy metRae ef aleFliA!l BAG is appropriate.

RelifisalieA is !,!Aa¥ailaele 8~o~FiA§ aR emeF!JSAsy Ia aleF! sF FCS analyses demonstrate that 530 days (1 year, 165 days) after RSiify all SF peF!ieAs ef ll:le pi!,!FAe B:Kil8SYF8 paiR\* ray E~ permanent cessation of power operations, no remaining postulated J!ap~o~lalieA. +Re baskYJl FAetl:lee sRall RaYe IRe sapal3ility Ia accidents at FCS will result in radiological releases requiring offsite aleF! aAa ASiify IRe J!Yillis WiiRiA IRe J!lume 811Jl86YFG pall:lway protective actions, or in the event of beyond design basis accidents, eP;?,, Bl,ll sees Ret Aeae Ia meet IRe ~Iii miRYte eesi!JA 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is available to take mitigative actions, and if needed,

LIC-16-0109 Page 33 Table 2 Exemptions Requested from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Item# Regulation In Part 50, Appendix E Basis for Exemption 63 E. B.d. l=eF FIIJGieaF !i1911,<8F FeaGI9F liGeRsees, aR alleFRali*~e See the basis for Section IV.1 regarding hostile action.

fasility {eF fasililies) thai we~JIEI tie assessiele e¥eR if ll:!e site is llREieF !!:!Feel ef eF e~elileFieRsiRg Reslile aalieR, Ia fllRstieR as a stagiR§ aFea faF 8ll§FR8RialieR ef 8FR8F§8RSY FeSJ'l9R69 slaff aREI sellesli¥ely l:!a*~iRg IRa felle*.YiR9 sRaFasleFisliss: !l:!e Sa!ila9ilil)* faF S9FRFRIJRisalieR Will:! IRe 9FRef98RSY epeFali9FIS faeility, eeR!Fel FeeFR, aRd !'llaRI seG~JFil)*; IRe sapaeilily Ia peFfeFFR effsile RelifiealieRs; aRd IRe eaJ'laeility faF eRgiReeFiR§ assessFReRI aeliYilies, IRai~JdiRg ElaFRage eeRIFei leaFR l"iaRRiA9 aAEI f3F9f3BFalieR, faF ~JSe wReA eRsite eFReFgeRsy fasililies saRRel ee safely aeeesseEI ElllFiRg Reslile astieR. +!:!a F9EllliFeFReRIS iR IRis f38Fa§Fajll:! 8.EI Ffl~,JSI ee iFRjli9FR9FlleEI FIG lalaF theA QeeeFReeF 23, ag~ 4' '"iiR the 9l!G9f3lieR ef IRe Gajlaeilily faF Sla§iR§ 9FR9F!j9AGY F9Sf39FIS9 9F§aRii!BiieA f3SFseAAel aiiRe alteFAali*te faeility (eF faeililies) a Ad IRe Sajlaeilily feF GGFRFRIJRiSaliGFIS WiiA IRe eFReF§eAsy 9f39FatiGRS fasilil)*, SGRIFei F99FR, aAEI JllaAI SeG~;JFily, WRiGR FAllS! ee iFRjlleFReRieEI FIG laleF II:! aA d~;JAe :lG, ag~ 2.

64 E.8.e. A lieeRsee SRail FIGiee SIJ9jeelle IRe F9EjlliFeFRBRIS sf See the basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) and Appendix E, Section jlaFa§F8f3R 8.13 eHRiS seelieR faF aR e~eisliA§ 9FR9F§9ASY IV.E.B.b.

Gf3eFalieAs fasilily af3f3Fe¥eEI as ef QeeeFRileF 23, ag~ ~;

65 E.9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications See the basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and (b)(10).

system; each system shall have a backup power source. All FCS will maintain communications with the States of Nebraska and communication plans shall have arrangements for Iowa and the NRC. The onsite response facilities will be combined emergencies, including titles and alternates for those in into a single facility, as described in IV.E.8.a(ii).

charge at both ends of the communication links and the

LIC-16-0109 Page 48

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.1 Accident Analysis Overview 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2) specifies that the 10 CFR Part 50 license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel after docketing the certifications for permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) and (ii). Following the termination of power operations at FCS and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, the postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor and supporting structures, systems. and components are no longer applicable.

A summary of the postulated radiological accidents analyzed for the permanently shut down and defueled condition is presented below. Current Federal guidance provided in the EPA's, "Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, EPA-400/R-17/001," dated January 2017 (Reference 10), Section 2.2.4, "PAGs and Nuclear Facilities Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ)," states that the EPZ is based on the maximum distance at which a PAG might be exceeded.

Section 5.0 of ISG-02 (Reference 1) indicates that site-specific analyses should demonstrate that: ( 1) the radiological consequences of the remaining applicable postulated accident would not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the EAB; (2) in the event of a beyond design basis event resulting in the partial drain down of the SFP to the point that cooling is not effective, there is at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (assuming an adiabatic heat up) from the time that the fuel is no longer being cooled until the hottest fuel assembly reaches 900°C; (3) adequate physical security is in place to assure implementation of security strategies that protect against spent fuel sabotage; and (4) in the unlikely event of a beyond design basis events resulting in a loss of all SFP cooling, there is sufficient time to implement pre-planned mitigation measures to provide makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of a zirconium cladding ignition.

Table 3 contains a listing of seven analyses that are expected to be evaluated by a decommissioning power reactor licensee requesting exemption of emergency planning requirements. The table also contains a description of how FCS addresses each of these analyses.

LIC-16-0109 Page 76

7.0 REFERENCES

1. NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, dated May 11, 2015 (ML14302A490)
2. OPPD Letter (T. Burke) to USNRC (Document Control Desk)- "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations," dated June 24, 2016 (LIC-16-0043) (ML16176A213)
3. OPPD Letter (T. Burke) to USNRC (Document Control Desk)- "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations," dated August 25, 2016 (LIC-16-0067) (ML16242A127)
4. OPPD Letter (T. Burke) to USNRC (Document Control Desk), "Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel," dated November 13, 2016 (LIC-16-0074)

(ML16319A254)

5. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 60, No. 120 (60 FR 32430), Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS), dated June 22, 1995
6. USNRC, "Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning,"

Commission Paper SECY-00-0145, dated June 28, 2000 (ML003721626)

7. NEI 99-01, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," Revision 6, dated November 2012 (ML12326A809)
8. Letter, Mark Thaggard (USNRC) to Susan Perkins-Grew (NEI), "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review and Endorsement of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Dated November, 2012 (TAC No. D92368)," dated March 28, 2013 (ML12346A463)
9. Commission Paper SECY-13-0112, "Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor," dated October, 2013 (ML13256A334)
10. Environmental Protection Agency, "Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents," EPA-400/R-17/001, dated January 2017 (EPA PAG Manual)
11. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 76, No. 226 (76 FR 72596), Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, dated November 23, 2011 (ML13091A112)
12. NUREG-1738, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," dated February 2001 (ML010430066)
13. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 74, No. 94 (74 FR 23254), Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, dated May 18, 2009
14. NUREG-0696, "Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," dated February 1981 (ML051390358)
15. OPPD Letter (L. Cortopassi) to USNRC (Document Control Desk) - "Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 31,2014 (LIC-14-0047)(ML14097A087)
16. USNRC Letter to OPPD (S. Marik)- "Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 -Staff Review of Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementing Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (CAC NO. MF3735)," dated August 4, 2016 (ML16182A361)
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