L-PI-03-018, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures

ML030660498
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	02/27/2003
From:	Solymossy J Nuclear Management Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-PI-03-018
Download: ML030660498 (78)

Text

NMC Committed to NuclearExcellence

• Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC 1717 Wakonade Dr. East a Welch MN 55089 February 27, 2003 L-PI-03-018 10 CFR 50.4 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET NOS. 50-282 AND 50-306 LICENSE NOS. DPR-42 AND DPR-60 PRAIRIE ISLAND EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Furnished with this letter are the recent changes to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant(PINGP) Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. This submittal includes the following documents:

INDEXES:

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Table of Contents REVISIONS:

F3-2 Classifications of Emergencies Rev. 32 DELETIONS:

None INSTRUCTIONS:

Instructions for updating the manual are included.

As per 10 CFR 50.4, two copies have also been provided to the Regional III Office and one to the NRC Resident Inspector. The Nuclear Management Company has not made new or revised existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission commitments in this letter or the attachments.

If you have any I ns, please contact Mel Agen at 651-388-1121 Ext. 4240.

Jos h M. Solymossy ite ice President, P airie Island Nuclear Generating Plant CC Steve Orth, USNRC, Region III (2 copies)

NRC Resident Inspector-Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (w/o attachment)

Attachment:

PINGP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure F3-2; Rev. 32

Mfst Num: 2003 - 0108 Date  : 02/13/03 FROM  : Bruce Loesch/Mary Gadient Loc  : Prairie Island TO  : UNDERWOOD, BETTY J Copy Num: 515 Holder : US NRC DOC CONTROL DESK SUBJECT : Revisions to CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS Procedure # Rev Title Revisions:

F3-2 32 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES UPDATING INSTRUCTIONS Place this material in your Prairie Island Controlled Manual or File. Remove revised or cancelled material and recycle it. Sign and date this letter in the space provided below within ten working days and return to Bruce Loesch or Mary Gadient, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive E.,

Welch, MN 55089.

Contact Bruce Loesch (ext 4664) or Mary Gadient (ext 4478) if you have any questions.

Received the material stated above and complied with the updating instructions Date

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR

Title:

GENERATING PLANT Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC I Effective Date : 02/13/03 Approved By: 'U(ýKA d j/4 BPS Supt/ I Document # Title Rev F3-1 ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 19 F3-2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES 32 F3-3 RESPONSIBILITIES DURING A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL 18 EVENT F3-4 RESPONSIBILITIES DURING AN ALERT, SITE AREA, 28 OR GENERAL EMERGENCY F3-5 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 21 F3-5.1 SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR DUTIES 8 F3-5.2 RESPONSE TO FALSE SIREN ACTIVATION 9 F3-5.3 RESPONSE TO RAILROAD GRADE CROSSING BLOCKAGE 8 F3-6 ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 16 F3-7 ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 16 CENTER (OSC)

F3-8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 20 F3-8.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR 13 THE ON SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR /SHIFT MANAGER F3-9 EMERGENCY EVACUATION 18 F3-10 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY 19 F3-11 SEARCH & RESCUE 8 F3-12 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CONTROL 14 F3-13 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION 15 F3-13.3 MANUAL DOSE CALCULATIONS 11 F3-13.4 MIDAS METEOROLOGICAL DATA DISPLAY 7 F3-13.5 ALTERNATE METEOROLOGICAL DATA 5 Page 1 of 3

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR Title  : Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC GENERATING PLANT Effective Date : 02/13/03 Document # Title Rev F3-13.6 WEATHER FORECASTING INFORMATION 11 F3-14.1 ONSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING 11 F3-14.2 OPERATIONS EMERGENCY SURVEYS 9 F3-15 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS 22 DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE F3-16 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS 17 DURING A RADIOACTIVE LIQUID RELEASE F3-17 CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 10 F3-18 THYROID IODINE BLOCKING AGENT (POTASSIUM IODIDE) 10 F3-19 PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT MONITORING & DECONTAMINATION 8 F3-20 DETERMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASE 17 CONCENTRATIONS F3-20.1 DETERMINATION OF STEAM LINE DOSE RATES 9 F3-20.2 DETERMINATION OF SHIELD BUILDING VENT STACK 9 DOSE RATES F3-21 ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECONDARY ACCESS CONTROL POINT 10 F3-22 PRAIRIE ISLAND RADIATION PROTECTION GROUP RESPONSE 16 TO A MONTICELLO EMERGENCY F3-23 EMERGENCY SAMPLING 18 F3-23.1 EMERGENCY HOTCELL PROCEDURE 12 F3-24 RECORD KEEPING DURING AN EMERGENCY 7 F3-25 REENTRY 8 F3-26.1 OPERATION OF THE ERCS DISPLAY 7 F3-26.2 RADIATION MONITOR DATA ON ERCS 7 F3-26.3 ERDS - NRC DATA LINK 1 F3-29 EMERGENCY SECURITY PROCEDURES 18 F3-30 TRANSITION TO RECOVERY 6 Page 2 of 3

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR Title  : Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC GENERATING PLANT Effective Date : 02/13/03 Document # Title Rev F3-31 RESPONSE TO SECURITY RELATED THREATS 6 F3-32 REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DURING OR AFTER 2 NATURAL DISASTER EVENTS Page 3 of 3

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

.ERE ENCEJS~ tj

• Proceduresegments may be performed from memory.

• Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.

• Mark off steps within segment before continuing.

• Procedureshould be available at the work location.

K> O.C. REVIEW DATE:

OWNER: EFFECTIVE DATE 2- -I ý- oC) 02 NCvo 3 SC  !

M. Werner Page 1 of 13

V PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

• EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE .................................................................................................... 3 2.0 APPLICABILITY ................................................................................................ 3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS ............................................................................................... 3 4.0 RESPO NSIBILITIES ......................................................................................... 4 5.0 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................. 5 5.1 Definitions ............................................................................................... 5 5.2 Emergency Action Levels ..................................................................... 6 5.3 The Emergency Classification/Declaration/Implementation Process ....... 7 5.4 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs ................................ 8 5.5 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events ...................................... 9 5.6 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number ..................... 9 6.0 PREREQUISITES ......................................................................................... 10 7.0 PROCEDURE ................................................................................................ 11 LIST OF ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1 - Summary of Emergency Action Levels Page 2 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to specify the Emergency Action Levels that indicate an emergency condition exists and to properly classify the emergency into one of the four graded levels of emergency classifications.' This procedure partially satisfies the requirement of 10CFR50.47 concerning the existence of an emergency classification and action level scheme.

2.0 APPLICABILITY This instruction SHALL apply to all Shift Managers (SM), Shift Supervisors (SS), Control Room Operators (CRO), Emergency Directors (ED) and Emergency Manager (EM).

3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 Attempt to verify the indications by checking secondary or coincident indicators.

3.2 An emergency classification should be made based on current plant conditions described in Attachment 1 of this procedure.

3.3 These emergency classifications do not apply to offsite transportation incidents that do NOT affect safe operation of the plant. Currently, the Radiation Protection group is responsible for offsite transportation incident assessment involving plant related shipments.

3.4 Rapidly Escalating Then De-escalating Events 3.4.1 In the case of an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates or begins at a higher emergency class then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.

3.4.2 During initial notifications to the NRC, the NRC should be informed of the current emergency classification and also the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event. Emphasize the current emergency classification.

Page 3 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:

~3 ~ CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 <

REV: 32 3.4.3 It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.

3.5 Continuously monitor the Control Room instrumentation, radiation monitors, or any other developments which would be indicative of further system degradation. Be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Duty Shift Manager has the responsibility to authorize the initial emergency classification.

4.2 Shift Supervisor of the unaffected unit has the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager as necessary including authorization of an emergency classification.

4.3 Shift Supervisor of the affected unit has the responsibility to direct activities related to the operation of the affected unit.

4.4 Emergency Director has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification whenever an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency is declared and the EOF is not activated.

4.5 If the EOF is activated and fully functional, the Emergency Manager has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification.

4.6 Control Room Operators and affected unit Shift Supervisor have the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager or unaffected unit Shift Supervisor in the identification an verification of control board indications.

Page 4 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.0 DISCUSSION 5.1 Definitions 5.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event - events that are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

5.1.2 Alert - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. It is the lowest level of emergency classification when some necessity for emergency planning and offsite response is necessary.

Any releases expected are limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

5.1.3 Site Area Emer-gency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

Any releases are not expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

5.1.4 General Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with a potential for loss of containment integrity.

Releases during a General Emergency can be reasonably expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

5.1.5 Emergency Action Levels (EAL) - specific instrument readings, surface or airborne contamination levels or radiation dose rates that designate a specific emergency class requiring emergency measures for that class.

Page 5 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 REV: 32 5.1.6 Safety System(s) - refers to systems that are required to be functional during and following a design basis accident or transient to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition; or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents, which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guidelines of 10CFR1 00; or the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. The structures and components of a Safety System are "Safety Related SSC."

5.2 Emergency Action Levels Attached to this procedure is a Summary of Emergency Action Levels, Attachment 1. This summary identifies the four emergency classifications, the initiating condition(s), emergency action levels for each classification, and, where applicable, specific instruments and indications to be used to detect and classify an emergency.

The emergency action levels for each classification and the instrument readings anti 1 indications listed do not reflect a complete list of instrumentation that will show abnormal indications but does list those key parameters useful in classifying the event.

The Summary of Emergency Action Levels lists are based on the initiating conditions as required by Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, accidents analyzed in the Prairie Island USAR, and the NRC Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations From NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

Page 6 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.3 The Emergency Classification/Declaration/implementation Process There are three distinct phases to consider: Classification, Declaration and Implementation.

5.3.1 Classification

The act of assessing the EALs to determine the appropriate classification which the ongoing events are categorized. Assessing and classifying an event should be accomplished within a 15 minute period following the availability of indications that an emergency condition exists. This assessment period is consistent with the NRC Branch Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions, EPPOS No. 2.

5.3.2 Declaration

The act of formally declaring the classification based on the assessment of EALs. This is the point at which the classification time is set and the 10CFR50, App. E 15-minute offsite notification clock starts.

5.3.3 Implementation

The act of making the notification and/or augmentation of the emergency organizations.

5.3.4 Ideally, the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) should be filled out to near completion while the classification phase is being conducted. Once the declaration is made by the SM/ED/EM, the 15-minute offsite notification time starts. The SM/ED/EM should review the contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) to ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator (or Offsite Communicator in EOF) to implement the E-Plan notifications.

5.3.5 Per 10CFR50.72 (a)(3) NRC notification is required immediately after the notification of the state and local agencies (which is completed within about 15 minutes) and not later than one hour after the emergency declaration.

Page 7 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT E EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.4 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs 5.4.1 In some cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits (e.g., RCS leakage, reactor coolant activity, etc.) is considered to be precursors to more serious events and warrant declaration of an NUE.

5.4.2 In other cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits for the period designated in the T.S. ACTIONS Table is an analyzed condition of the plant and does not, by itself, represent an emergency. These events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 as a non-emergencies.

However, if the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable Technical Specifications action statement time limit T.S. ACTIONS Table COMPLETION Time, then a declaration of an Unusual Event should be declared.

5.4.3 With regard to Emergency Plan classifications, Operations should handle--'

Technical Specification required shutdown in the following manner:

A. The conditions of the plant should come first. That is, if the condition warrants initiating power reduction immediately, do so. The E-Plan classification can appropriately follow.

B. Following the initiation of the reduction in power or temperature, the classification phase of the E-Plan is started. Review of the EALs should be done to assess for proper classification. Once the Shift Manager has determined the appropriate classification for the event, the Shift Manager should declare the classification and note the time of declaration (this begins the 15-minute offsite notification clock).

This classification phase should be done within a reasonable time frame determined by the circumstances (within 15 minutes for most instances).

C. Once the declaration is made, the Shift Manager should review the contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) tc,_

ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator to implement the E-Plan notifications.

Page 8 of 13

,PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.5 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events In the case of an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates or begins at a higher emergency class then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.

It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.

The NRC should be informed of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC notification via the ENS phone. The Shift Manager should ensure that this notification be performed by an appropriate individual other than the SEC using PINGP Form 666, Event Notification Worksheet. To avoid possible confusion, other offsite authorities will be informed of the current classification during the initial notification and then given the full description of the highest emergency classification reached during the first update on the follow-up notification.

5.6 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant has prepared a written manual (EAL Reference Manual) to provide general information about Emergency Action Levels to offsite authorities who are involved in nuclear plant emergency planning. This manual provides a description with text and drawings of the various conditions that might cause the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant to classify an event. By understanding what a particular condition or event means, emergency workers at the various offsite agencies should develop a clear idea of what is occurring at the plant during the emergency.

Page 9 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Each initiating condition in this procedure is followed by a cross reference number that corresponds to the appropriate classification condition in the EAL Reference Manual. When the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) is completed, the initiating condition statement and the EAL Reference Manual cross reference number should be included on the form by using the label from "Emergency Initiating Conditions Labels - PINGP 1189" or writing this information as it appears in the shaded box on the appropriate page in the Summary of Emergency Action Levels.

6.0 PREREQUISITES An off-normal condition corresponding to one of the initiating events described in Attachment 1 of this procedure is occurring or has occurred.

Page 10 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.0 PROCEDURE 7.1 Any significant event that may be classified as an emergency condition SHALL be reported to the Shift Supervisor, Shift Manager and/or Emergency Director immediately.

The events may be instrumentation readings or visual Sobservations made by plant personnel.

7.2 Attempt to verify the initial indication by comparing the indication to redundant instrument channels or to other related parameters, visual observations, and field reports as applicable.

7.3 The Shift Manager, unaffected Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director SHALL assess the situation and determine the emergency classification, using the guidelines of Attachment 1.

7.4 In those cases when an event rapidly escalates, then de-escalates or begins at a higher classification, then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.

7.4.1 Inform the NRC of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC ENS notification.

7.4.2 It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.

Page 11 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.5 The Shift Supervisor of the affected unit should take immediate actions, using applicable plant operating procedures to return the plant to normal (or Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, if determined to be necessary).

7.6 Ifthe EOF is not activated, the Shift Manager or Emergency Director SHALL declare the appropriate emergency classification and perform actions as specified in the appropriate responsibility procedure applicable to emergency classification:

7.6.1 For a Notification of Unusual Event, proceed to F3-3.

7.6.2 For an Alert, Site or General Emergency, proceed to F3-4.

Ifthe EOF is activated, contact the Emergency Manager for consultation on whether or not to change the emergency classification. The Emergency Director is responsible to formulate the new classification while the Emergency Manager is responsible to authorize the reclassification.

7.7 Continue to assess and watch for changing parameters or visual indication of further system degradation and be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification as indicated by the Emergency Action Levels in Attachment 1.

7.8 As plant conditions stabilize during a Notification of an Unusual Event (NUE) or Alert, consider terminating the event classification.

7.8.1 For the NUE and Alert classifications, the event may be terminated once the following criteria are met:

A. The plant is in stable condition with at least one fission product barrier intact, and B. Radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent are being controlled within the following limits:

1. Gaseous effluent release rates (or resulting dose rates) are within plant limits as defined in Section 3.1 of H4, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and Page 12 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

2. Liquid effluent release rates (or resulting concentrations) are within the plant limits as defined in "Old 10CFR20 Appendix B in Table II, Column 2 (April 1992)" located in H4, ODCM, Table 4.3 and C. The potential for future degradation of plant conditions is small.

7.8.2 Termination of an NUE classification may be performed by the Shift Manager. Review of 5AWI 1.13.0, Plant Event Investigation and Recovery, should be completed to determine ifthis procedure needs to be implemented and the Plant Manager informed of the review.

7.8.3 Termination of an Alert classification may be performed by the Emergency Director if the EOF is not activated. Once the EOF is fully functional, the Emergency Manager SHALL terminate the Alert classification when the conditions are met for termination.

7.8.4 Termination of an AlertOrganization.

classification includes the dismissal of the site Emergency Response Any necessary in-plant or on-site follow-up activities should be coordinated and managed by the normal plant site organization. In some cases, conditions may require the establishment of a Recovery Organization in which case the Emergency Director and Emergency Manager should make this determination based on the extent of damage or other considerations. In this case 5AWI 1.13.0 should be reviewed and implemented as determined appropriate.

7.9 As plant conditions stabilize during a Site Area or General Emergency, consider transition to the Recovery phase.

If the Site Area Emergency event does not require significant repairs or analysis beyond the capabilities of the normal "plantsite organization and the conditions of 7.8.1. A, B, & C

-NOTE. 7 are met, then the Site Area Emergency may be terminated without a transition to Recovery. However review and implementation of 5AWI 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.

Transition to Recovery should be directed by the Emergency Manager with coordinated recovery planning by the site Emergency Response Organization.

See F3-30, "Recovery", for instruction on transition to Recovery. Review and implementation of 5AWI 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.

Page 13 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION

" OF EMERGENCIES ~NUMBER: F-2 ATTACHMENT 1RE: "

SUMMARY

OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Page 1 of 60

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE INITIATING CONDITION INDEX No. Condition Description Page 1 Safety System Functions 3 2 Abnormal Primary Leak Rate 4 3 Deleted 8 4 Abnormal Primary/Secondary Leak 9 5 Core Fuel Damage 13 6 Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers 15 7 Secondary Coolant Anomaly 21 8 Radiological Effluents 26 9 Major Electrical Failures 31 10 Control Room Evacuations 35 11 Fires 36 12 Plant Shutdown Functions 38 13 Fuel Handling Accidents 44 14 Deleted 46 15 Deleted 46 16 Security Threats 47 17 Hazards to Plant Operations 48 18 ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Events 53 19 Natural Events 54 20 Other 59 Page 2 of 60

OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 CLASSIFICATION 173-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 3 of 60 Condition 1 : Safety System Functions U

25 ra a 0elief~f~ al iasfsae relates*ek (EAL Ref Manual 1 B) to 01 r J o-o ic els

,ress re Visual and/or audible oa) indication at discharge of open steam generator q o safety or relief valve Notification of 6

Unusual Event Cl) As determined by SS or SM Pressurizer safety > 185 °F & NOT valve outlet decreasin 4 temperature, TI-436 I Co Pressurizer safety > 185 *F &NO 0 valve outlet decreasin temperature, TI-437 Cu Pressurizer relief > 185 °F &NOT valve outlet decreasing temperature, TI-438 Cu Co Acoustic Monitors indicate flow from 0.

0 either the pressurizer PORV's or safeties

'U PZR Pressure on at < 2335 psig U)

U) least 2/3 channelsI I...

I..

0 PRT Level increasing U)

CU Cl) PRT Temperature increasing N

0.

PRT Pressure increasing

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 4 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak lekrate trmuniddentifiled or- ~

ncio l 'ourcese'& dnT~nia (EAL Ref Manual 2A)

Ica~~ ~~ J ns.---

Primary system leak rate, other than controlled leakage sources, exceeds T.S.3.4.14 Notification of Unusual Event Requires a unit shutdown, as determined by the SM or SS Reactor power reduction or cooldown has been initiated Primary, 6colan t lieak-t greatertan 50m (EAL Ref Manual 2B1)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4

• Sum of charging line flow + seal -- Alert injection flow >50 gpm more than the sum of letdown flow + RCP seal leakoff flow A rapid temperature decrease in the RCS results in the same indications SS, SM, or ED opinion Decreasing pressurizer level, as indicated by LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R2 (Containment Area Rad Mon)

R7 (Containment Area Rad Mon)

R-1 1(Containment Vent Rad Mon)

[Containment Position]

R-1 2 (Containment Vent Rad Mon)

[Containment Position]

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 5 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak P lepum ca aci2C) Rfofla

ý1oy~Agre ~n (EAL Ref Manual 2C)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Site Area Emergency SI Actuated annunciator illuminated "A" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner "B"SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure RCS Pressure No SI Flow Subcooling

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 6 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak sevJr Au cessMu0 *1 (L r~ 41 eita reoaf AT[

WsI've Pt (EAL Ref Manual 2D)

Mode 1,2, 3, or 4 General LOCA has occurred Emergency SS, SM or ED opinion that loss of ECCS is imminent Containment temp has become excessive, and is still rising Containment pressure is high and increasing Operating containment spray pumps Operating containment fan coil unit trains

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 7 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak

[Sal iand~jargeLOQA' withf of,, EC*S'*to 6,,;6 Ilrorm J*eaong, to seýveire ore.,.-aegradaauoorlii*

ormejn*,i Sfro m -Ute 1o q'ours6. 1.1tlmalte fa61ilurer' o c o;n't a i nm ent' (EAL Ref Manual 2E) li6ý6~m it atioeorceesn Mode 1,2, 3, or 4 General SS, SM or ED opinion that Emergency core cooling capability does not exist High Head SI failure

-J LU Low Head Sl failure High dose equivalent 1-131 as determined by sample analysis Valid high radiaiton R-48 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

IL Valid high radiaiton R-49 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

Decreasing RCS pressure Low subcooling margin and decreasing "A" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner "B" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner 0

0 Pressurizer Low Pressure Trip C., RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 8 of 60 Condition 3 : Abnormal Coolant Temperature/Pressure DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviations From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 9 of 60 "Condition4: Abnormal Primary/ Secondary Leak Icmarv~cn ae Vk -- rng e107igehncl

- c '

(EAL Ref Manual 4A)

SG primary to secondary 150 GPD through any 1SG Notification of leakage exceeds T.S.3.4.14 limits Unusual Event IPrmary ISecondari leak rateater than 50 gpm,-, (EAL Ref Manual 4B)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Decreasing pressurizer level Alert LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R15 (Air Ejector Rad Mon)

Sum of charging line flow plus seal injection greater than 50 gpm more than the sum of Letdown Flow and RCP Seal Leakoff flow SS, SM, ED opinion

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 10 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak 4ire,'of, s-te a'91,enerator tube'(ýrs) ig~nECS-ý aesui6 gionCC (EAL Ref Manual 4C)

.~ ~' ý ,

"SI Actuated " annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Alert Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at > 5%

least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428

> bkg R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor

> bk R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor > 2xlo R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor > x1 Unexpected Rise in either SG level

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 IREV. 32 Page 11 of 60 Condition 4 : Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak eutingiý t EGGS niC acuniti h~ oig$tential for,~

lof 'o tainment - (EAL Ref Manual 4D)

"SI Actuated " annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Site Area Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 Emergency and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, PI-431 I < 1815 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least >5%

(3 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 Qi) R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor> bkg R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor I > bkg ZZ R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor >2x1° Unexpected Rise in either SG level Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV Failure of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV to close with indications of steam line break downstream of MSIV t.

Ruptured SG safety or relief valve opens and then fails to reseat indicated by visual and/or audible indication at discharges As determined by SS, SM, or ED If steam break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel Note: failure, this may be a General Emergency. See Condition # 6, Case 2.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 12 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak Falureo a -61erator1tue e l C;S (EAL Ref Manual 4E)

"SI Actuated" annunciator illuminated on I ILl the Aqua panel I ;J Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 Site Area 0* Emergency and/or FI-924 and pump dischargel pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, PI-431 <.

"Uj PZR level cannot be maintained on at >5%

least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 I

> bkg R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor >bk

3 4

R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor >2X10 Cpm Unexpected Rise in either SG level 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804] <3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 12 [221, 4119305 [4172805] < 3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]

< 3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 14 [241, 4119307 [4172807]

D1 [D5 ] Tachh q)

D1 [D5] Gen Volts 0

4.-j Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG I--

.vowU u, )I er , I- L-'-,j I D2[D]Tah 900 rpm [1200 rpm] -l D2 [D6 ]Tach J.**

D2 [D6 ] Gen Volts 40o - 4400 Volts Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 13 of 60 Condition 5: Core Fuel Damage Fuel Damage lndication ; (EAL Ref Manual 5A)

R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon in alarm Notification of R-9 Unusual Event R9 confirmed by portable instrumentationI High coolant activity sample exceeding T.S.3.4.17 for total specific activity in primary coolant High coolant activity sample exceeding T.S.3 4.17 limit on primary coolant iodine activity which requires a unit shutdown.

Severe Loss of fuel cladding (EAL Ref Manual 5B)

Dose equivalent 1-131 Alert R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon) in alarm R-9 confirmed by portable instrumentation

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 14 of 60 Condition 5: Core Fuel Damage Degraded, core with possible loss of COOlaolegeomet0y,*j (EAL Ref Manual 5C) 1 Site Area Emergency

'a

'a- I.

0 U

1F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 15 of 60 K>Condition 6 : Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier. (EAL Ref Manual 6)

GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Three permutations exist for loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier; A. Failure of cladding and primary coolant boundary with potential loss of containment.

B. Failure of cladding and containment with potential loss of primary coolant boundary.

C. Failure of containment and primary coolant boundary with potential loss of cladding.

These 3 permutations are represented in the following 5 cases, each with its own set of EAL's:

2. All cases are applicable to operations in Modes 1, 2, 3,

&4.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 16 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers pn ~hptnllfr1 (EAL Ref Manual 6) cao ntauiienC:

Vald hig raiain -8I Valid high radiation R-48 1X 3Rh (Containment High Range Area > lx10 3 Rihr Rad Mon)

Valid high radiation R-49 General (Containment High Range Area > lx3 ~r Emergency Rad Mon) >300 uCi/cc ZI 0I Dose equivalent 1-131 Pressurizer low pressure trip <10 si

" RCS pressure decreasing I uncontrollably

.i High containment pressure High containment humidity SHigh containment sump levels 1* High containment radiation

( levels "o "A SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner "B" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner Containment approaching I >23 s-- 46 psig design pressure and increasing I Control Room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM, or ED opinion Operating containment Zero U spray pumps 1.2 Operating containment fan < One train coil unit trains

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 17 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers ase2*!ossofclatd,*SG~ttube rdp~tkr an dhifIgh q~ntlatl loss of SG ~ (EAL Ref Manual 6)

Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of e the ruptured SG MSIV General Emergency Failure of ruptured SG MSIV to close with indications of steam line break C

C Ruptured SG stuck open safety or relief valve indicated by visual and/or audible steam relief As determined by SS, SM, or ED R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)

R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)

C L.

C. R-15 (Air Ejector)

C Unexpected Rise in either SG level St Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure P1-429, PI-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels o LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 aol Dose equivalent 1-131

-J

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 18 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers (EAL Ref Manual 6) 0}

to ,+. 'a I . .. . ; 1, 1,, I 4j 1*4

> 300 uCi/cc

j. I-/kJo =4,.,va,,, , ,1 m--- General Emergency Cold leg temperature decrease in th > 100 °F last 60 minutes I RCS cold leg temperature < 250 *F Steam line break between containment and the MSIV[

gi Steam line break downstream o MSIVI MSIV open-close indicator(s) shol 0

open or partially openl 0

0 0 Control room containment isolation

-J status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM,or ED opinion1

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 19 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers undary

• -... (LO

. .*,CA).. loss

• -=*ofRef

- *.- (EAL Ref Maa Manual 66)

Control room containment isolation 0

E. status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any 0 containment penetration

-,J General SS, SM,or ED opinion Emergency RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples

-'S.

Pressurizer low pressure trip RCS pressure decreasing O~

uncontrollably "A" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner "B" SG is not depressurizing C.) in an uncontrolled manner 0*

-J b,

High containment pressure

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 20 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Ca~sd5:,,LotssoflRCS~onav GiII64ýtiid ases of Lossainment;ý aoundary(tftiube Rupture)*os loss* o6fcotalnment,* ano n ii*potentlar f.,,or* lOdSS oi (EAL Ref Manual 6)

Steam line break between containment and the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV Ei General Stuck open ruptured SG Emergency PORV or Safety valve Steam line break downstream of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV MSIV open-close indicator shows open or partially open CL RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples cc R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)

R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)

R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure PI-429, PI-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 21 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly i;o (EAL Ref Manual 7A)

SS or SM opinion that a rapid reduction in secondary pressure Notification of occurred Unusual Event Steam Generator A/B pressure differential Increasing Containment Pressure Indications of a steam line break outside of containment Failed open Steam Dump, SG PORV, or SG Safety Valve Hi Steam Flow Lo-Lo Tavg Indication of steam line break downstream of MSIVs

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 22 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly

ýi *lsig(fic**tgdreater-t-inDIOgpm)',ý (EAL Ref Manual 7B) prinmairyto seconidary.-6ý t, leak rate>'-  !:.2r 4 psig

-> Alr High containment pressure I

• Alert 4

R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading > 2x10 cpm

- Steam Line Monitor reading above I

• .* normal background on faulted SG

-J Unexpected rise in faulted SG level Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation > 10 gpm Steam generator A/B pressure > 100 psig Sdifferential

.r* Valid Steamline low pressure safety I.< 5007psi injection signal I Cs Hi steam flow 745x10 6 lb/hr Lo-Lo Tavg < 540 -F

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 23 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly U~nlsrolableý stamlinmJebreak outslde? -;*

contanmmentiwith si ghificant (groater--fe l gnaficnt ( ,.-eri (EAL Ref Manual 7C)

Win c~t~I4t1 °pma*ry- LO seconudau yltn,e ii ) *

• 1 i* i * . . . . . .. . .

• r=

Indications of unisolable steam line break outside containment Site Area Emergency R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading Steam Line Monitor reading above normal background on faulted SG C:

Unexpected rise in faulted SG level 0 C1 Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation Steam generator A/B pressure (I) differential Valid Steamline low pressure safety injection signal Hi steam flow Lo-Lo Tavg

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 24 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly I-r Mai t (EAL Ref Manual 7D)

If steam line break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel failure, this may be a General Emergency. See condition # 6, case 2 Primary to Secondary Leakage Site Area Valid high radiaiton R-48 Emergency (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

Valid high radiaiton R-49 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

Steam generator A/B pressure [

differential a)c High containment pressure tu Valid steamline low pressure[

a) safety injection signal I Hi steam flow I Lo-Lo Tavg

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 25 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly

,Transien nitilated by Ioss offeedwiateTi ana PdOF nat,ýsystedsp(pr r6Ke W1tysi6r) fbitw by~faildure ofic e~eig*5 systemb emergency feedW*tem -. , .. for,....... (EAL Ref Manual 7E) 1 (

in several hours.:Ultmate faillre of.:<:

cotainmentlikely if core6melt. z,1 .

Condensate and Main Feedwater cannot be established to either SG General Aux Feedwater flow cannot be established Emergency to either SG High Head Safety Injection flow cannot be established to the RCS 30 minutes have elapsed since implementation of step in FR-H.1 requiring actuation of SI No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow to either SG No Auxiliary Feedwater flow to either SG No High Head Safety Injection flow to the RCS

. No 6: "Cannot be established" means that procedural guidance for establishing condition will not be I,, successful based on knowledge of system/component condition/availability.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 26 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents IrA 'brn~eRadiolog!6alleffluent*;, o.**

chncalSjecifjiati (EAL Ref Manual 8A) p;T" 6 n sexceded_

Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Notification of Sect. 3.1 limits as determined by Rad Unusual Event Protection Confirmation of total gaseous activity by Rad Chemist that a 300 second marinelli gas grab sample analysis from 1[2]R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

Valid 1R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

,ýLi~quid Radiological effluent-Technical *:2 ication imits exceeded.- (EAL Ref Manual 8B)

Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as determined by Notification of Rad Protection Unusual Event Liquid release exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4,ODCM, Sect. 2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)

>High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon)

>High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) >High Alarm LU setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)

R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 27 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents quid Rtj eibfert4140k (EAL Ref Manual 8C)

Te hn'catLSOpe-~~aiD eb~ips Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as Alert determined by Rad Protection Liquid release exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect.

2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)

> 10 times High Alarm setpoint R1 8 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) 0

> 10 times High Alarm setpoint R-1 8 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon)> 10 times High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)

R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close Airborne Radiologlcal effluents'greater than ten times Technicale Specification instataatineous limts(ans'intneousratewhich, if Continued for over,two t6ours, would result in aboutlmrem TEDE,. (EAL Ref Manual 8D) a~ii s, site bouindary ui966 avierage m~et conditions. TEDE Total Dose Eq'uivalent).. .V Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed 10 times Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as Alert determined by Rad Protection.

Confirmation by RPS that local measured count rate on 1[2]R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon) gas chamber Valid 1R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon) 03 Valid 1R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range a0 Rad Mon) i2)

Valid 2R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon)

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 28 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents (EAL Ref Manual 8E)

Radiation survey teams measure gamma dose rates at site boundary U)

Ce Radiation survey teams measure field data at site boundary corresponding to Thyroid CDE U).

Valid 1 R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

Qj Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

U) Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections a at the site boundary C.)

0 0..

(I) 0 TEDE offsite dose projections at the Q site boundary

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 - REgV. 32 Page 29 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents (EAL Ref Manual 8F)

-M Radiation survey teams measure gamma dose rates at or beyond the site boundary Emergency Radiation survey teams measure field data at the site boundary, corresponding to Thyroid CDE Valid 1 R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

TEDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary o(

Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 30 of 60 Condition 8 : Radiological Effluents Radiatiorl eve lg-dr airborne C*ota mn at*w*ht*hi radioactive materials(e.g.J 1actor (EAL Ref Manual 8G) increase of o old 0i direct 'diM~bn~rnreiswitinfit.. ,

SS, SM, or ED opinion P.Alert Unexpected increase in plant area radiation factor of 1000 monitors Widespread unexpected iodine or >I 000 DAC particulate airborne concentrations as per 10CFR20 appendix B table 1, Column 3.

2 Widespread unexpected contamination in 1.000.000 dpm/100cm beta-gamma the Auxiliary Building > 50,000 dpn/I 00cm 2 alpha activity

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 31 of 60 Condition 9 Major Electrical Failures S(EAL Ref Manual 9A) 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21],4119304 [4172804]

Notification of 4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805] Unusual Event 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806) 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]

D1 [D5 ] Tach D1 [15] Gen Volts (I) 0 Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG 0.. closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]

D2 [D6 ] Tach D2 [D6 ] Gen Volts Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]

Loss of onsite AC power capab*ility. (EAL Ref Manual 9B)

Loss of D1 & D2 [D5 & D6] diesel generators when they are required toI Notification of be operable by Tech Specs Unusual Event

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 32 of 60 Condition 9 : Major Electrical Failures Loss

'ons~te Ioofte powerandSe loss of allj*I'*

Los f AC--ýpower, fft',--_ý:(SdeeS

ý, Area6 ** ;=

(EAL Ref Manual 9C)

-mergency* r-extended~d ss): ,

""f 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804] 1 <3500 Volts -1 U) Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [41728051 I<3500 Volts 0 I- 4.16 KV Alert

'4.

0 Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806] 1<3500 Volts U)

U) 4.16 KV 0

-J Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807] 1<3500 Volts 4.16 KV 4.16 KV Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401] 1 <4000Volts J. 0 4.16 KV Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301] <4000 Volts Loss' of offsite powver' and losý'S' of onsite

ýACpoiwie-r fr more6fthn 15 minutes.ý; (EAL Ref Manual 9D)

Blackout duration > 10 minutes Site Area Emergency 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [41728041 <3500 Volts U) 4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805] <3500 Volts

'.. 9o 0

4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [41728061 <3500 Volts

-J 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807] <3500 Volts Cx Q

4.16 KV Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401] <4000 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301] 1<4000 Volts

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 33 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures NreaIt (EAL Ref Manual 9E)

>200 °F Mode 1,2, 3, or 4 General Emergency Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater pump unavailable Motor Driven Aux Feedwater pump from other unit unavailable 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]

A I-,

0 4.16 KV Bus 12 [221, 4119305 [4172805]

0 0

-J 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]

4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]

0ASL. 4.16 KV Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401]

4.16 KV Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301 ]

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 34 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures ower sie (EAL Ref Manual 9F)

SS, SM opinion that DC power is not available for one unit o' Alert "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DC FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-0501]

"SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502]

(EAL Ref Manual 9G)

"SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DC FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-0501] Site Area Emergency "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502]

Loss of DC power has lasted more than 15 minutes

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 35 of 60 Condition 10: Control Room Evacuations lE~iacuatimn of tlhe Control,,R~oom ,;**:,

Santicip~ated or*-ret ured wiontrol of"14b .:

,shtdowsystemssreWhed from Hotf (EAL Ref Manual 10A)

/Shutdown'Panels and local stations. ,

SS,SM, or ED determines evacuation of Control Room is anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established Alert from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations If reason for evacuation is fire in Control Room or Relay Room, see initiating condition 11 C, "Fire compromising the functions of safety systems" for possible reclassification.

Evac*uation' of ihe'Control Room ah d,

[control of shoutd~wn systemsnot (EAL Ref Manual 10B)

Sestablished froni Hot Shutdowvn Panels' t - , A.

min*utes and locaI stations within,15 Evacuation of Control Room conducted Site Area Emergency Control of shutdown systems not established > 15 mi.

from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations within 15 minutes

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 36 of 60 Condition 11: Fires I(EAL Ref Manual 11A)

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Notification of fire or fire detection alarm in the Control Room Notification of Unusual Event Fire confirmed within the Reactor Bldg.,

Auxiliary Bldg., Turbine Bldg., Service Bldg., Rad Waste Bldg., Plant Screen House, D5/D6 Bldg., Cooling Tower Equip.

House, Transformers, or on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask in the ISFSI Area Fire not extinguished within 10-minutes of alarm or notification Fire potentally affecting safety systems..ý (EAL Ref Manual 11B)

I1 FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of

• smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do

. not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Physical observation of a fire that is I affecting one train of a safety system I 1b Alert SS, SM, or ED opinion [

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 37 of 60 Condition 11 : Fires Farec ornpr6mioing the functionsof (EAL Ref Manual 11C) saf ety systems -

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Physical observation of a fire that is affecting both trains of a safety system for Site Area the same unit Emergency SS, SM, or ED opinion

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 38 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions s it'heContro (EAL Ref Manual 12B)

SS or SM opinion that annunciators 0 are nonfunctional Notification of Unusual Event Loss of NSSS Annunciator System CL u and loss of plant computer Loss of BOP Annunciator System and

5= loss of plant computer (ERCS)

Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and BOP Annunciator System (EAL Ref Manual 12C)

Alert SS, SM, or ED opinion that annunciators are non-functional Loss of plant computer (ERCS) 0

'.4 Loss of NSSS Annunciator System Loss of BOP Annunciator System

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 39 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions

.Most o, al a'os Dl)a(

4 tteitdn,* (EAL Ref Manual 12D)

A d 'W ' AnltP%6tifin Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Site Area Emergency Loss of plant computer (ERCS)

SS, SM, or ED opinion that annunciators are non-functional SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient has occurred or is in progress

.0 0, q) a Loss of NSSS Annunciator System Loss of BOP Annunciator System A transient is an UNPLANNED event involving one of more of the following:

-Note:.1 (1) automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) electrical 0, load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection actuation, or (5) thermal power increase or oscillations >10%.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 40 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions Mormen!ry osEoofc pr*c'ooling neeil (EAL Ref Manual 12E) oiforplanlMod6 6iColId'Shutd6Wn~;~

Mode 5. Cold Shutdnwn I T.S.<200 °F - I Notification of Unusual Event Interruption of RHR core cooling Entry into procedure E4, Core Cooling Following Loss of RHR flowI (EAL Ref Manual 12F)

Mitigation actions are unable to prevent RCS temperature > 200 °F Alert exceeding 200 OF Loss of water. ieviltat has ... ucovered*

l uncover thMe wileor 5fueldn tShereactor. (EAL Ref Manual 12G)

,vessel while at Mod'e 5;Cold dhtd6~iii~~i.-ý Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Site Area Emergency Total loss of RHR system cooling Mitigating actions unable to restore makeup flow greater than inventory loss

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 41 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions eipkteiloss of anyfunction needed for.

jAlit St1ii-1by

- (EAL Ref Manual 12H)

.. ,....67 Mode1,2,or3 Site Area Emergency Inadequate hi pressure injection capability (i.e., loss of 2/2 SI pumps > 15 min and loss of all charging pumps for more than 15 minutes)

SS, SM, or ED opinion that plant functions required to maintain Mode 3, Hot Standby not available All steam generator safety valves inoperable I Both steam generator PORVs inoperable All steam generator steam dump to atmosphere valves inoperable Steam generator steam dump to condenser valve inoperable No Condensate or Main Feedwater No Auxiliary Feedwater flow Wide range level in both <25 %

SG's

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 42 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions g a reactor -4I (EAL Ref Manual 121)

Reactor or turbine trip due to turbine failure Notification of Unusual Event SS or SM opinion (EAL Ref Manual 12J)

As determined by visual inspection 0- Alert SS, SM or ED opinion rF:n

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 43 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions j'

Filure ofitl rsays"pro ecion syitemfein S

to, lnitite:and comrletea trip which',ýý (EAL Ref Manual 12K) h9,;0er~ai~rs-6ubcrlica--

Any valid reactor trip setpoint has I been exceeded I Alert Intermediate range detector output not decaying I Transient requiring 6peration of*

ishutd6wn systems with failure totri ptii (continued power generation but no *:'. (EAL Ref Manual 12L) core damage immediately evident).

Failure to bring reactor subcritical with control rods inserted Site Area Emergency No indication of core damage SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient is in progress

,Transient requiring operation of shuttdoWn systems with failure to trip-p

,which results in core damage or addiinal faiure of core cooling and, (EAL Ref Manual 12M) makeups ystemns (wlhichi could lead to core melt): -2 Failure to bring reactor subcritical General with control rods inserted Emergency U) RCS pressure Rapidly increasing containment ac pressure and temperature Dose equivalent 1-131

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 44 of 60 Condition 13 : Fuel Handling Accidents (EAL Ref Manual 13A)

During refueling operations Alert SS, SM,or ED opinion Valid R2 (containment area)

Valid R7 (containment area)

Containment vent monitor in the Containment Position Valid R 11(containment vent)

Valid R12 (containment vent)

Fuel damage accident withlrelease of?.

radioactivity tthe fuelhandling' (EAL Ref Manual 13B) building.'

SS, SM, or ED opinion Alert Valid Spent Fuel Pool Area rad monitor R5 Valid R-22 (shield bldg vent)

Valid R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

[

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 45 of 60 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents (EAL Ref Manual 13C)

Q _ SS, SM, or ED opinion Site Area Is Emergency r Valid R48 (containment area hi range) hi Alarm

~ Valid R49 (containment area hi range) hi Alarm SS, SM, or ED opinion a) -

Valid R50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

Valid R5 (SFP area)

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 46 of 60 Condition 14: Coolant Pump DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

Condition 15 : Contaminated Injured Person DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 173-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 47 of 60 Condition 16 : Security Credible ~site-speciflsecurity thrept ?-*

notfication orpattemdpeae'n ory. 'A, (EAL Ref Manual 16A) attempted sabbtage  :

Security determines the threat to be credible Threat would have an adverse impact on safe Notification of operation or shutdown capability of the plant Unusual Event Security discovers an unauthorized attempted entry by force or stealth (secret) into the plant's protected area The FBI confirms that an act of attempted sabotage did occur to vital plant equipment or security equipment Low Credible Security Threat notification received Ongoing security compromiseii ,,,.'. (EAL Ref Manual 16B)

Security Safeguards Contingency event that results in unauthorized personnel commandeering an area within the plant protected area, but not controlling shutdown Alert capability or any vital areas Bomb device discovered within plant protected area and outside of any vital area High Credible Security Threat notification received

[Ir m'ien-t loss of physical control ifthe plan. -(EAL Ref Manual 16C)

Physical attack on the plant involving imminent occupancy of the Control Room, auxiliary Site Area shutdown panels or other vital areas Emergency Bomb device discovered within a vital area Loss of physical control of the plant (EAL Ref Manual 16D)

Physical attack on the plant has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the Control Room or any other vital areas

[ General Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 48 of 60 Condition 17 : Hazards to Plant Operations crash onsiteor&unusualaircraftv (EAL Ref Manual 17A) acivef~i t lyý Reported to the SS or SM Notification of 0 Unusual Event Aircraft crash onsite within owner controlled (I) fence I.

0 Unusual threatening aircraft activity over facility iAircraftcr"scr inm the protected area;", (EAL Ref Manual 17B)

Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash o Alert in the protected area Aircraft rash"withinp'ire~ted arfea nd affecting ShtuI" .. trucu re b impac. oi,.,,;

fires w~ith plantuniot in Mbode 5,Cbl&- (EAL Ref Manual 17C)

Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash T.S. >200 *F Site Area within protected area and affecting vital 0- Emergency structures by impact or fires with either unit in Mode 1,2, 3, or 4

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 I REV. 32 Page 49 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations

".Near,, Frns t-,e*p*oso ' jn ' . . (EAL Ref Manual 17D)

Visually observed evidence of an unplanned or unexplained explosion within the owner Notification of controlled fence but not affecting plant safe Unusual Event operation Reported to the SS or SM Know iin xplosion danipage tof'aacillty affecting I ":+*plant

• ++++""operation

+` `:* +. ..o ,+ --.*+ ,-4 +- ,, 7.,**

(EAL Ref Manual 17E)

Visually observed evidence of an unplanned Al-r explosion directly affecting plant safe operation Alert Reported to SS or SM

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 50 of 60 Condition 17 : Hazards to Plant Operations "lilMissile imp6acts!ro§ waev*suce5 (EAL Ref Manual 17F)

Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of missile impacts on facility from whatever source

[ I.. Alert Severe damage to safe shutdowni I quipment from missilesqor explosion 1 (EAL Ref Manual 17G) p13w ntht'not Mode 5,, Cold Sh utdovin-Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Site Area Visually observed evidence by plant Emergency personnel and/or plant security personnel of missile impacts and/or explosion on facility from whatever source Reactor trip system is inoperable Inadequate high pressure injection flow (no safety injection or charging pumps are available)

All steam generator safety valves inoperable Both steam generator PORVs P. inoperable

% All steam generator steam dump to atmosphere valves inoperable Steam generator steam dump to condenser valve inoperable Cu J

Ca Unable to establish* any Condensate and Main Feedwater flow Unable to establish* any Auxiliary Feedwater flow

'Unable to establish" criteria met if procedural attempt to establish condition Note:

has been made, but was unsuccessful or if an attempt cannot be made.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 51 of 60 Condition 17 : Hazards to Plant Operations i aroronitll6-icof h6ammrAbe as (EAL Ref Manual 17H)

Widespread toxic or flammable gaseous hazard being experienced or projected onsite Notification of (outside of plant) leading to evacuation or Unusual Event sheltering of personnel outside the plant Receipt of recommendation by Local, County or State Officials to evacuate personnel from site based on an offsite hazardous or flammable gaseous release event Enry into tepa6 o flammable the plant' :

gases-- "* . o toxic org' (EAL Ref Manual 171)

Explosive gas concentrations being measured within the plant at a distance of *explosive limits Alert greater than 10 feet from the source

• 50 ppm hydrazine

• Toxic gaseous concentrations being > 300 ppm ammonia measured within a large area of the plant at the breathing zone

> 50 ppm hydrochlonc acid F

> 1400 ppm morpholine

> 30 ppm ethanolamine (ETA)

> IDLH for any toxic gas (see D14 4 AOP 1)

Note IDLH mmediately

... Dangerous to LIfe or Health.

IDLH Reference NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemcal Hazards, June 1994

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 52 of 60 Condition 17 : Hazards to Plant Operations

]Ertlyofo t*;.j.**,-

ol

~ avise wa li~a re

.r6,fiamiT*

al ' p ClhtgS ni se

• a .*i-******4 lnl*"

t (EAL Ref Manual 17J)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Site Area Emergency Explosive gas concentrations being measured in a maior portion of a vital area from an unisolable source such that further access to the vital area is being prevented at a time when it is needed Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured in a maior portion of a vital area at the breathing zone such that further access to the vital area is being restricted at a time when it is needed Note IDLH = Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health IDLH Reference NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, June 1994

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 53 of 60 Condition 18 :ISFSI Events ISFSI cask tlp cover ordrop resulting i

}cabssealleakage . - (EAL Ref Manual 18A)

Loaded cask tipped over or dropped Notification of Unusual Event Overpressure monitoring tank I o psig pressure decreasing to 0 psigI Loss ofISFS! cask/fuel containment (EAL Ref Manual 18B)

While loaded cask is outside the plant I protected area I Alert 0

A radiation field near ISFSI cask increase by a factor of 1000 above the ambient radiation field (background > 1,000 X ambient rad field plus the normal radiation field from the cask(s))

U) tu 0 t

> 1,000,000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma

.6 J!

2bg to Widespread contamination outside the ISFSI protected > 50,000dpm/100

-u) area cm2 alpha

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 54 of 61 Condition 19 : Natural Events tnyoirmed eartnqUaKz (EAL Ref Manual 19A)

Confirmed by one or more off-site ._____ - Notification No__ of sources Unusual Event "Seismic Event" Annunciator received on the Seismograph Alarm Panel Earthquake felt by plant personnel SS or SM or ED opinion hquake greater.than, Optoal 0-410 (EAL Ref Manual 19B)

Basi atqae ~ ' "~

Confirmed by one or more off-site sources "Operational Basis Earthquake" Annunciator received on the Alert Seismograph Alarm Panel Earthquake felt by plant personnel SS or SM or ED opinion

'Earthqoake gjreateb than, Design Basis*

Earth Juakewitth pIant not in' M6de5,-

(EAL Ref Manual 19C)

Modes 1, 2, 3, or4 Site Area Confirmed by one or more off-site Emergency sources "Design Basis Earthquake Annunciator received on thef Seismograph Alarm Panel Earthquake felt by plant personnel Etr quA kr en inr.n t,

I

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 55 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events i" -

torna'M n'si ', (EAL Ref Manual 19D)

Reported to the SS or SM Notification of Unusual Event Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security

• Anytornfadostrildng the .I -. "

(EAL Ref Manual 19E)

Reported to the SS or SM, or ED Alert Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 56 of 60 Condition 19 : Natural Events

,5 -,a C-,

(EAL Ref Manual 19F)

River Intake Elevation > 686 ft Notification of Unusual Event Flod levelýs appr~oachind design levels'A (EAL Ref Manual 19G)

River Intake Elevation (USAR 2.4.3 5) - requires both unIts to > 692 ft b. Alert be shut down to Mode 2, 3, 4 or 5 FIod levels exceeding design levels, ,

prwit notnoin

.itlý1plant I' Mode ýiColdoli-Shetd'544 (EAL Ref Manual 19H)

Shutdown

>200 'F Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Site Area Emergency River Intake Elevation - Power operation design level (highest level transformers will function)

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 57 of 60 Condition 19 : Natural Events I

Low Water, levels-being 4xperie-nc ojecedpeyod u'Sual 61~~. (EAL Ref Manual 191)

River intake elevation (11/21 Cooling I < 672.5 ft Notification of Water Pump - Low Water Level Trip) I Unusual Event Low wateii ievelsbeing exierienced or (EAL Ref Manual 19J) o, enea, esg River intake elevation I <669.5 ft Alert With pl not hot in Mode 5,,C"1d Shutdown, low water ievels being experienced or projected tlv.o e than (EAL Ref Manual 19K) equ6i pme~nt w'ith`Ilo`wwater-6leve.

Modes 1,2, 3, or 4 Site Area Emergency River intake elevation corresponding to loss of Lock &

Dam # 3 Major vital equipment failure River Intake Elevation

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 58 of 60 Condition 19 : Natural Events.

wind& eing~expirieqiced o, 1plojecte na~res~iq Iev~eW-'-,,, i (EAL Ref Manual 19L)

Sustained wind speed indicated by I > 90 mph met tower I Alert

-Siustained winds b6eng in-excess ';-of esign levels befing experienced or*-,*

(EAL Ref Manual 19M) proSucdod With plant f, ir1 Mod.e 5, d Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 T.S >200 °F Site Area Emergency Sustained wind speed indicated by > 100 mph met towerI Any major internaI or exterrnal events (e.g.ý fires; earthquake, substanitiaaI j i (EAL Ref Manual 19N) beyonid design levels) which ~could or,.1**

haascaused massive damageto plant, systems resulting or potential for!',,

resiultiin~gin'* lair'g'e* r"-lease;s't o',th e'0ffsite,,{*

environ~menti In excess of the EPA Protective Action ~ui es;:~

As determined by the SS, SM, or ED [ 0 General Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 59 of 60 Condition 20: Other K Conditions that Wawarens 3arrant t state anlo erpaio6 increased

~pa ntopraIo 64pleration (EAL Ref Manual 20A) uTho19s.

anOocaiofsit6 >

SM and SS concurrence that plant L Notification of conditions warrant increased awareness I Unusual Event Inability to reach required shu'tdown*.

within Technical Spec1fi6tion Limits.-' (EAL Ref Manual 20B)

T.S.ACTION TABLE not met I requires plant shutdown or cooldown IxI Notification of Unusual Event Reactor power reduction or cooldown requirements have been exceeded oq!t Condltio~n~sthizi inv~o~lve other thain.

normal controlled shtdown.; 2. (EAL Ref Manual 20C)

Reactor power reduction or cooldown has Notification of been initiated Unusual Event Emergency Safeguard Function equipment did NOT perform its function if required Cooldown rate exceeded Tech Spec Limit SS or SM opinion that lack of control of shutdown or cooldown warrants offsite agency notification

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 32 Page 60 of 60 Condition 20 : Other Cnditltoris that warrant actvatlon of

• /rien ics rtIun aciniety (EAL Ref Manual 20D)

SS, SM, or ED opinion I - Alert cteroan6nditio~n'st ýt 'ii -t Sactivation of monitoring Scenters' and emergency-operation; teams ori- ,., ,ziý (EAL Ref Manual 20E) precautl6iary notification tothe public *,,.

near,the site ":2 Site Area SS, SM, or ED opinion I Emergency

' tiherpliat coniditlons exist, from whatever isourc~e,,that make release of targe amountsof radioactivity lnashort  !

(EAL Ref Manual 20F) itime period possible, e.g., any core melti.

situation . ,

SS, SM, or ED opinion I SGeneral Emergency