IR 05000315/2018003
| ML18309A285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook, 07200072  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/2018 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Gebbie J Indiana Michigan Power Co |
| References | |
| IR 2018001, IR 2018003 | |
| Download: ML18309A285 (18) | |
Text
November 5, 2018
SUBJECT:
DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2018003; 05000316/2018003; AND 07200072/2018001
Dear Mr. Gebbie:
On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. On October 4, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with yourself and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified one issue that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that there are no violations associated with this issue.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC resident inspector at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316;72-072
License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74 Enclosure:
IR 05000315/2018003; 05000316/2018003; 07200072/2018001 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Misaligned Heater Level Column Valves Leads to Manual Reactor Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000316/2018003-01 Open and Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71152 A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the operators manually tripped the Unit 2 reactor in response to a hi-hi level in the Left Moisture Separator Drain Tank.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000315/2018003-02; 05000316/2018003-02 Site Specific Shielding and Barriers for HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Require NRC Approval Prior to Use 60855.1 Open LER 05000316/2018-003-00 Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip Due to High-High Moisture Separator Drain Tank Level 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent power. On July 14, power was reduced to about 55 percent due to a leak on the electro-hydraulic control system for the west main feedwater pump. On July 15, following repair, Unit 1 returned to 100 percent power.
Unit 2 remained at or near 100 percent power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 west containment spray on July 26, 2018;
- (2) Diesel-driven fire pumps on July 9, 2018;
- (3) Unit 2 west motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump on August 8, 2018; and
- (4) Unit 2 plant air compressor (PAC) trip as documented in AR 2018-9194 during the week of September 23, 2018.
Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) during the week of September 23, 2018.
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (3) Unit 1 CD EDG room on August 22, 2018; and
- (4) Unit 2 CD EDG room on August 22, 2018
71111.06Flood Protection Measures Internal Flooding
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDG areas during the week of August 20, 2018.
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification in the simulator on August 14, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated a plant downpower and troubleshooting on a heater drain pump control valve during turbine valve testing on September 14, 2018.
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) EDGs, the week of August 20, 2018;
- (2) 4kv and 600v breaker closing circuit issues, completed September 28, 2018; and
- (3) Air-operated valves associated with ice condenser glycol system following a failure in Unit 2, completed September 28, 2018.
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Risk and mitigation thereof related to force on force training, July 16 through July 19, 2018;
- (2) Unit 2 turbine driven AFW pump maintenance on August 1, 2018; and
- (3) Unit 2 east motor driven AFW pump and Auxiliary Building fire header outage during the week of August 6, 2018.
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2 distributed ignition system (DIS) low voltage on July 16, 2018;
- (2) Replacement of fire piping in auxiliary building with non-qualified couplings, during the week of August 20, 2018;
- (3) Component cooling water heat exchanger leakage as documented in AR 2018-7570 during the week of September 23, 2018;
- (4) Unidentified high energy line break (HELB) locations as documented in AR 2018-6615 during the week of September 23, 2018; and
- (5) ESW past operability for bearing degradation noted on April 5, 2018.
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) 1-OHP-4030-132-027D, CD Diesel Generator Operability Test (Train A), on July 3, 2018;
August 1, 2018;
- (3) Loss of Reserve Feed Transformer 5 due to bird strike on August 13, 2018; and
- (4) Replacement of 6 fire protection piping in the auxiliary building, review completed on August 29, 2018.
71111.22Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine
- (1) Train A solid state protection system automatic trip and actuation logic operational test on July 11, 2018;
- (2) Unit 1 rod operability testing on July 12, 2018; and
In-Service Test (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 south safety injection pump testing on September 12, 2018.
71114.06Drill Evaluation Emergency Planning Drill
The inspectors evaluated a training drill involving an anticipated transient without a scram on July 17, 2018. The inspectors also evaluated a training drill on September 5, 2018, involving a steam generator tube rupture.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 2 manual reactor trip due to high-high Moisture Seperator Drain Tank level.
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Licensee Event Reports
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event report which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
- (1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000316/2018-003-00, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip due to High-High Moisture Seperator Drain Tank Level.
This event was the subject of a previously documented finding of very low safety significance (05000316/2018003-01, Misaligned Heater Level Column Valves Leads to Manual Reactor Trip).
OTHER ACTIVITIES
TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 60855.1Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation The inspectors evaluated the licensees operation of the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) onsite from July 23 to July 27, and in-office through August 23, 2018.
Specifically, the inspectors evaluated:
- (1) The material, thermal, and radiological condition of the ISFSI and loaded storage casks through independently observing the structural condition, observing use of the operational storage surveillance procedure No. 12-OHL-4030-SOM-009, and both performing independent radiological surveys and reviewing the licensees radiological surveys;
- (2) A heavy lift of the loaded transfer cask from the spent fuel pool to the cask processing area;
- (3) Welding of a Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC), in accordance with Welding Procedure Specification No. WPS 8 MC-GTAW;
- (4) Non-destructive evaluations, including helium leak testing as applicable, of the lid-to-shell and port cover welds for a MPC in accordance with procedures GQP-9.2 and MSLT-MPC-Holtec;
- (6) Transfer of an MPC;
- (7) The fuel loading and selection for the MPC loaded on July 23, 2018; and
- (8) Proposed changes to the 72.212 report that included changes to support loading of Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 1014, Amendment 9, Revision 1, and changes screened and evaluated using 10 CFR 72.48 and
INSPECTION RESULTS
71152Problem Identification and Resolution Misaligned Heater Level Column Valves Leads to Manual Reactor Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green FIN 05000316/2018003-01 Open and Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71152
Introduction:
A self-revealed, Green finding was identified when the operators manually tripped the Unit 2 reactor in response to a hi-hi level in the Left Moisture Separator Drain Tank.
Description:
On May 6, 2018, the Unit 2 reactor was at approximately 12 percent power following a startup at the conclusion of the spring 2018 refueling outage. While the station continued to make preparations to start the main turbine and synchronize with the grid, the moisture separator drain tank hi level alarm was received and remained standing for the better part of the shift.
The drain tank collects condensed steam and water from the moisture separator reheater and associated high pressure turbine exhaust lines and routes it either to the condenser or #4 feedwater heaters. The dayshift operators were hesitant to continue on with starting the main turbine until the cause of the alarm could be determined. Due to a series of miscommunications between day shift, night shift, the outage control center, and personnel performing troubleshooting, the night shift crew believed it was acceptable to continue with the turbine startup with the alarm still standing. The turbine was synchronized to the grid and power was stabilized at approximately 29 percent power with the alarm in for most of the turbine startup and synchronization. The alarm cleared for a period of time at 29 percent power, but then returned along with the hi-hi drain tank level alarm. Per the alarm response procedures, the operators tripped the reactor and main turbine to protect the turbine from excessive water in the system. Later investigation by the site revealed that the level columns for the #4 feedwater heaters had been left isolated following work and testing associated with the replacement of the #5 feedwater heaters. While the Operations Department had completed a valve lineup on the system per their startup procedures, which put the level columns in service, the Projects Department had not finished all of the work on the heaters at the time the lineup was performed. As a result, workers subsequently isolated the columns to complete testing after the Operations lineup was complete. A step in the Projects test procedure EC-51366-TP-001 directed workers to specifically inform the operators that the level columns were isolated following testing and that the system was ready to be lined up per operations procedures. However, the workers did not provide that detail, and simply stated that the test was complete. As a result, operations did not know the valves had been taken out of alignment. Contributing to the issue, the outage schedule did not provide any logic ties to ensure all work was complete on the heaters before allowing operations to do their valve lineups. With the level columns isolated during startup, the #4 heaters indicated an erroneous level. This resulted in the operators believing that the heaters were at a normal operating level when in fact, they were full. Therefore, when the operators (per procedure) opened a high pressure turbine exhaust valve to the 4A heater, this created a pathway for water to flow from the #4 heaters, through the high pressure turbine exhaust lines, and into the moisture separator drain tank. The excessive flow of water caused the hi and hi-hi alarms in the drain tank which then led to the reactor/turbine trip.
Corrective Actions: Following the reactor trip, the licensee formed a team dedicated to investigate the cause of the level alarms. A temporary modification was installed to monitor level in the tank, and lines from the tank were instrumented to assess the drain capabilities of the tank. With the added monitoring capabilities, the licensee carefully raised power and observed the system. When operators took manual control of the 4A heater level control system, they observed the drain tank level go down. At this point it was determined the heater level columns were isolated, which resulted in the erroneous level indication for the operators. Once restored, the system operated normally. Action Requests (AR) were initiated to look at both the valve misalignment issue and the failure in communications that occurred while the alarm was in prior to the reactor trip.
Corrective Action References: AR-2018-5113, AR-2018-5280
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Workers did not follow the test procedure EC-51366-TP-001 step 4.1.7 for the new #5 feedwater heaters on Unit 2. Specific details regarding the status of the system, as required by the step, were not conveyed to the operations staff.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, whose objective is to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, a manual reactor/turbine trip was required due to valves being out of the proper alignment.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using SDP Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors referenced Exhibit 1 since the finding impacted the Initiating Events cornerstone. The issue screened to Green based on answering no to the question in the Transient Initiator section because the finding did not result in the loss of any mitigation equipment.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Management component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, which states that the licensee will implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, a lack of coordination between Operations and Projects departments regarding work on the #4 feedwater heaters resulted in valves being out of position during a plant startup. Further, various groups did not coordinate well to address the standing high level alarm prior to the plant trip. (H.5)
Enforcement:
Because the feedwater heaters are non-safety related, the inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
60855.1Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Unresolved Item Site Specific Shielding and Barriers for HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Require NRC Approval Prior to Use 05000315/2018003-02; 05000316/2018003-02; Opened 60855.1
Description:
Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 1014, Amendment 9, Design Feature, Section 3.9, Environmental Temperature Requirements, requires building ambient temperatures be less than 110 degrees Fahrenheit during canister processing based upon the thermal analysis in the Holtec HI-STORM Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 13.
The thermal model documented in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 13, Section 4.5.1, HI-TRAC Thermal Model, states that heat is passively rejected to the ambient from the outer surface of the HI-TRAC transfer cask by natural convection and thermal radiation. However, at D.C. Cook, the licensee uses additional shielding materials for as low as reasonably acheiveable purposes that are in contact with and in the general area of the HI-TRAC.
The licensee requested Holtec to perform a site-specific thermal analysis, HI-2177676, Thermal Evaluation of Shielding Package around the HI-TRAC at DC Cook, to include the shielding material in the thermal model. The analysis contained inputs that were different than the design basis calculation inputs, which were previously incorporated into Design Feature Section 3.9 and Approved Contents Section 2.4.
The licensee performed a 10 CFR 72.48 Screening and Evaluation 2018-0139-02, which concluded that shielding could be used without prior NRC approval and subsequently issued 212CR-0017, which revised the 72.212 Report. The licensee implemented administrative controls on building temperature and fuel assembly heat load limits based upon the site specific thermal analysis.
This unresolved item is being opened to determine if:
A) the licensee is in compliance with Design Feature, Section 3.9, Environmental Temperature Requirements; B) the Design Feature Section 3.9 and Approved Contents Section 2.4 are non-conservative at D.C. Cook; and C) the licensee is in compliance with 10 CFR 72.48.
Planned Closure Actions: Region III will coordinate with the Division of Spent Fuel Management in the NRC Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards.
Corrective Action References: AR 2018-4056; AR 2018-6342; AR 2018-6642
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.
- On October 4, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Gebbie, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff; and
- On August 23, 2018, the inspectors presented the independent spent fuel storage installation inspection results to the Director of Regulatory Affairs, Mr. M. Scarpello, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.04Equipment Alignment
- 12-OHP-4021-064-006; Operation of the Back-Up Plant Air Compressor; Revision 10
- 1-OHP-4012-032-008CD; Operating DG1CD Subsystems; Revision 37
- 1-OHP-4021-032-008AB; Operating DG1AB Subsystems; Revision 30
- 1-OHP-4021-064-001; Operation of Plant and Control Air Systems; Revision 50
- 2-OHP-4021-009-001; Plaing the Containment Spray System in Standby Readiness;
Revision 31
- 2-OHP-4030-256-017E; East Motor Driven Auxliary Feedwater System Test; 08/07/2018
- 2-U2C24 N-ESW-ESWW-1181; Containment Spray Clearance; 07/26/2018
- 8003069-FA; Failure Analysis of Woodward EGB-35P Governor /Acutator; 07/16/2018
- AR 2018-0075; U1 CD EDG Tripped Due to Air System Issues; 01/02/2018
- AR 2018-0242; DG1CD Tripped on Overspeed During a Start; 01/08/2018
- AR 2018-6841; Unit 1 CD EDG not Synchronizing to T11D Bus; 07/02/2018
- AR 2018-6917; Potential Commonality in Recent Repeat Events; 07/05/2018
- AR 2018-9194; U2 PAC Trip; 0927/2018
- AR-2017-13117; South Fire Protection Tank Level Low Alarm Standing; 12/27/2017
- AR-2018-1517; Standing Alarm; 02/14/2018
- AR-2018-5147; Unable to Control Loading on 2EDGCD from Control Room; 05/07/2018
- Drawing OP-1-5113A-9; Flow Diagram Essential Service Water
- Drawing OP-1-5148C-30; Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Area & Elec. Switchgear Room
Heating & Ventilation Sys Unit #1
- Drawing OP-1-5151A-50; Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator AB Unit No 1
- Drawing OP-1-5151B-61; Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator AB Unit #1
- Drawing OP-1-5151C-58; Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator CD Unit No 1
- Drawing OP-1-5151D-72; Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator CD Unit No 1
- Drawing OP-1-98013-42; Diesel Generator 1AB and Auxiliaries Elementary Diagram
- Drawing OP-1-98014-40; Diesel Generator 1CD and Auxiliaries Elementary Diagram
- Drawing OP-1-98016-41; Diesel Generator 1AB Misc. Auxiliaries Elementary Diagram
- Drawing OP-1-98017-46; Diesel Generator 1CD Misc. Auxiliaries Elementary Diagram
- OP-12-5152T-14; Fire Protection Water Piping in Pump House
- WO 55501397-04; MTRI; 2-PPS-1; Calibrate / Replace as Necessary
- WO 55501397-05; MTRI; 2-PPS-1; Post Maintenance Test
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
-
- D.C. Cook Fire Protection Program Fire Pre-Plans, Volume 1, Fire Areas AA14, AA15, AA23,
AA24; Revision 21
-
- D.C. Cook Fire Safety Analysis, Fire Areas AA14, AA15, AA23, AA24; Revision 2
- D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Fire Safey Analysis (FSA); Revision 2
- AR 2018-7722; AR to Document Lessons Learned ffor Drill Controller; 08/02/2018
- DC Cook Fire Protection Program Fire Pre-Plans; Volume 1, Revision 21 (Fire Areas AA14,
AA15, AA23, AA24)
- DC Cook Fire Safety Analysis; Revision 2 (Fire Areas AA14, AA15, AA23, AA24)
- NFPA 805; Fire Protection Program Manual, pp 3-22; Revision 2
71111.06Flood Protection Measures
- AED Report No. NED-2000-560-REP; HELB Program Flooding Evaluation Report D.C. Cook
Unit 1; 10/02/2000
- AR 2018-8352; Unit 2 Condenser Pit Sump Level High Alarm; 08/21/2018
- Calculation MD-12-CW-005-N; Flooding Due to Circulating Water Expansion Joint Failure;
11/02/2015
- Calculation N920101; Fire Protection Water Storage Tanks with Unit 1 and Unit 2 at Cook
Plant; 02/27/2013
- Calculation SD-061206-001; Flooding Evaluation Report for D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant;
05/31/2013
- GT 2013-10447; Flood Program Quick Hit Self-Assessment; 09/2013
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
- 1-OHP-5030-050-001, Main Turbine and Feed Pump Turbine Valve Functional Checks,
Revision 26
- Troubleshooting Plan for WO 55519945, 1-CRV-252 not Controlling 5B Heater Level During
Turbine Valve Testing, September 12, 2018
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
- 12-IHP-5030-EMP-013, Electrical Enclosure 10 Year Preventative Maintenance and
MCCB/TOLR Testing, Revision 52
- 12-IHP-5030-EMP-013, Electrical Enclosure 10 Year Preventative Maintenance and
MCCB/TOLR Testing, Revision 51
- 2nd Quarter System Health Reports for Units 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generators;
08/15/2018
- AR 2015-15206; 1-DCR-205 Failed Closed; 11/23/2015
- AR 2016-12733-4; 2-DGCD-VRCKT Loose Wires and Unresponsive Potentiometer;
11/08/2016
- AR 2016-12733-4; 2DGCD-VRCKT Loose Wires and Unresponsive Potentiometer, 11/3/2016
- AR 2016-13073-8; Swagelock Fitting On, 11/11/2016
- AR 2016-13470-5; Leak on 1DG253A has Worsened Leading to Failed Surveillance;
11/23/2016
- AR 2016-13470-5; Leak on 1DG253A has Worsened Leading to Failed Surveillance,
11/23/2016
- AR 2016-14181-14; 1-OME-150-AB, Diesel Generator 1AB Developed Fuel Oil Leak;
2/13/2016
- AR 2017-10327-8; 1-HE-47-ABS Tube Material Discrepancy, 10/12/2017
- AR 2017-10932; 1-DCR-205 Degraded Actuator Replacement; 10/27/2017
- AR 2017-11560-2; U2 AB EDG Lo Cooler ESW Normalized D/P is High, 11/13/2017
- AR 2017-115670-2; US AB Emergency Diesel Generator Lo Cool Wssential Service Water
Normalized D/P is High; 11/13/2017
- AR 2017-4968; 1-DCR-205 Would not Open; 05/15/2017
- AR 2017-8891-4; Unit 1 Boric Acid Heat Trace Transformer #3 Stayed Energized, 9/15/2017
- AR 2018-0075-6; U1 CD EDG Tripped Due to Air System Issues, 1/2/2018
- AR 2018-0075-6; Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator Tripped Due to Air System Issues;
01/02/2018
- AR 2018-0242-2; Diesel Generator 1 CD Tripped on Overspeed During a Start; 01/08/2018
- AR 2018-0246-8; DGCD-PS Incorrect Fuses Installed, 1/8/2018
- AR 2018-0246-8; Diesel Generator CD - PS Incorrect Fuses Installed; 01/08/2018
- AR 2018-1000-5; Suspect Starting Air Valve Leakage on 1CD4F, 1/31/2018
- AR 2018-1534-7; Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation is not Working
Properly/Inoperable; 02/14/2018
- AR 2018-4126-3; Unexpected Start of 2-Diesel Generator CD During 12-EHP-4030-056-218;
04/13/2018
- AR 2018-5147-1; Unable to Control Loading on 2 Emergency Dieselg Generator from Control
Room; 05/07/2018
- AR 2018-5249-5; Unit 2 Cd Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance Rule a(1)
Consideration; 05/10/2018
- AR 2018-6841-5; Unit 1 CD Emergency Dieesel Generator not Syncing to T1ID Bus;
07/02/2018
- AR 2018-8715; Unplanned Entry in to a 48 Hour Shutdown Condition; 09/01/2018
- AR-2014-6397, Unit 1 CD EDG failed to parallel, 0/27/2014
- AR-2018-3271, 2-21B11 did not Close when Cross-Tie Breaker was Opened, 03/22/2018
- EPRI TR-109642, Routine Preventative Maintenance Guidance for ABB HK Circuit Breakers,
November 1999
- GT 2016-2168; Update PM Frequency for ITT Actuator Models 32100; 09/24/2016
- Maintenance Rule Scoping Document for Emergency Diesel Generators; Revision 5;
2/02/2018
- Maintenance Rule Scoping Document for Emergency Diesel Generators; Revision 5
- Maintenance Rule Scoping Document; Ice Condenser; Revision 10
- NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at
Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 4
- UFSAR; Revision 28.0
- VTD-ASEA-0005, ABB Power Distribution (Formally ITE Imperial) Installation/Maintenance
Instructions for Medium-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
- AR 2018-7257, Validate No Play Signage and Current Evaluation of SAAB, 07/18/2018
- Clearance N-FP-SDAL-1709, 12-ZFP-371 Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Water Sprinkler
Valve
- MILES Gear Warning Posting Maps
- OP-12-5152L-36, Fire Protection Water System Details - Turbine Building and Service
Building Units 1 and 2
- Operating Logs, 07/31-08/01/2018
- Plant Status Report, 09/07/2018
- Plant Status Report, 08/01/2018
- PMP-2291-OLR-001, On-Line Risk Management, Revision 44
- PMP-2291-WMP-001, Work Management Process Flowchart, Revision 52
- Security force on Force Drill Scenario, 07/26/2018
- WO 55507753, 12-ZFP-371, Proactively Replace 75 ft. Section Fire Piping
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
- 12-OHP-4021-016-003; Component Cooling Water System Operation; Revision 48
- 12-OHP-5030-016-001; Supply ESW to CCW for Makeup Using Temporary Modification;
Revision 4
- 2-IHP-4030-234-001; Unit 2 Distributed Ignition system Surveillance and Baseline Testing;
Revision 34
- 51-9285751-000, Vibratio Cause Evaluation-DC Cook Esw Motor S/N 998009-F1, 06/11/2018
- AR 2018-6093; Increasing Unit 1 CCW Out-Leakage; 06/06/2018
- AR 2018-6615; Unidentified HELB Break Locations; 06/26/2018
- AR 2018-7570-01; Operability Determination Evaluation (Unit 1 East CCW Hx Leak);
07/27/2018
- AR-2018-7810; FP Repair not in Accordance with Applicable Pipe Specification; 08/06/2018
- AR-2018-8128; Portable Pipe Stand in Contact with In-Service CCW Piping; 08/15/2018
- Calculation DC-D-01-CS-4; Piping and Pipe Support Analysis of CS and RC System for
EBASCO Walkdown Package Nos. CS-11 and RC-09; Revision 02
- Drawing 1-CS-780-L1-2; Containment; Revision 3
- Drawing OP-1-5129; CVCS-Reactor Letdown & Charging; Revision 68
- EC 0000055754; Install Mechanical Jumper to Connect the Essential Service Water System to
the Component Cooling Water System in Either Unit to Provide a Source of Makeup Water to
the CCW System; Revision 01
- Equipment Apparent Cause Evalaution, 2018-3803, Unit-1 ESW Pump Motor Bearing Failure,
08/01/2018
- IFAL1805101, Failure Analysis of 1 SKF P/N 29328E, Sphereical Roller Bearing, 05/29/2018
- Pioneer Job #1161-1, Damage Investigation SKF-29328E-Tapered Spherical Thrust Bearing;
05/2018
- Temporary Modification 12-TM-15-49-Design; Install Mechanical Jumper to Connect the
Essential Service Water System to the Component Cooling Water System in Either Unit to
Provide a Source of Makeup Water to the CCW System; Revision 03
- UFSAR Chapter 5.8; Distributed Ignition System; Revision 28
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
- 1-OHP-4030-132-027CD; CD Diesel Generator Operability Test (Train A); Revision 48
- AEP Transformer Restoration Policy Statement and Restoration Procedures, Revision 0
- AR-2018-8014, Train B Reserve Feed Lost Due to BE Breaker Opening, 08/11/2018
- AR-2018-8386, PMT Requirements for Replaced Fire Piping, 08/24/2018
- AR-2018-8396, 12-ZFP-371 Losing Air Pressure, 08/25/2018
- DB-12-AFWS, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Revision 10
- DCC-PV-110-QCF, Shop and Field Fabrication and Erection of Fire Protection Piping,
Revision 9
- EC-56131, Replacement of the Turbine Driven Aux. Feed Pump Overspeed Monitor Power
Supply, 2-TDAFP-OSM-PS, Revision 0
- OP-2-98215-62, Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Supply System Sheet No. 1 Elementary
Diagram
- PMP-2291-PMT-001, Work Management Post Maintenance Testing Matrices, Revision 37
- Transformer 5 Potential Transformer Doble Test Results, 08/13/2018
- WO 55465178, 2-TDAFP-OSM-PS, Replace Power Supply
- WO 55507753, 12-ZFP-371, Proactively Replace 75 Ft Section Fire Piping
71111.22Surveillance Testing
- 1-OHP-4030-108-051S, South Safety Injection Pump System Test, Revision 15
- 1-OHP-4030-112-015; Full Length Control Rod Operability Test; Revision 13
- 2-IHP-4030-211-001A, Train A Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Automatic Trip and
Actuation Logic Operational Test and Reactor Trip Breaker Operational Test
- 2-IHP-4030-266-002, AB & CD Diesel Generator Rooms Fire Detection System Thermistor
String Channel Operational Test and Supervisory Circuit Check, Revision 2
- OP-12-5153-9, Fire Protection CO2 17 Ton System-Key Plan
- OP-1-5142-48, Flow Diagram, Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)
71114.06Drill Evaluation
- Donald
- C. Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan, Revision 39
- Emergency Plan Administrative Manual-State of Michigan Job Aid, Revision 2
- EP Training Drill (team 2) Scenario Manual, July 17, 2018
- EP Training Drill Guide, 07/17/2018
- PMP-2080-EPP-100, Emergency Response, Revision 34
- PMP-2080-EPP-101, Emergency Classification, Revision 21
- PMP-2080-EPP-101, Emergency Classification, Revision 21
- RMT-2080-EOF-001, Activation and Operation of the EOF, Revision 37
- September 5, 2018 Drill Scenario Guide71152Problem Identification and Resolution
- EC-0000051366-TP-001, Unit 2 High Pressure Feedwater Heater Level Control System
Functional Test, Revision 2
- 2-OHP-4024-216, Drop 30, E(L) Moist Sep Drain Tank Level Hi, Revision 38
- 2-OHP-4024-216, Drop 29, E(L) Moist Sep Drain Tank Level Hi-Hi, Revision 38
- OP-2-5109D-51, Heater Drains and Vents, Unit 2, Sheet 5 of 5
- OP-2-5108-36, Bleed Steam, Unit 2
- OP-2-5105-37, Main Steam, Unit 2, Sheet 1 of 2
- OP-2-5105A-55, Main Steam Unit 2, Sheet 2 of 4
- AR-2018-5280, U2 4A/4B Heater Level Columns Found Isolated, May 11, 2018
- 2-OHP-4021-060-001, Aligning Bleed Steam and Heater Drains for Service, Revision 20
- 2-OHP-4021-001-001, Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, Revision 92
- AR-2018-5113, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip Initiated, May 7, 2018
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
- LER 05000316/2018-003-00, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip due to High-High Moisture Seperator
Drain Tank Level, 04/13/2018
60855.1Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
- 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report; Revision 3
- 12-MHP-4050-FHP-006; Control of Loads Over the Spent Fuel Pool and Fuel/Insert Handling
in the Spent Fuel Pool; Revision 005
- 12-OHL-4030-SOM-009; Unit 12 Tours - ISFSI; Revision 19
- 12-OHP-4051-DCO-100; Transport Operations; Revision 021
- 12-OHP-4051-DCO-101; Goldhofer Operations; Revision 003
- 12-OHP-4051-DCO-200; MPC Preparation for Loading; Revision 017
- 12-OHP-4051-DCO-300; MPC Loading Operations; Revision 022
- 12-OHP-4051-DCO-301; MPC Boron Sampling; Revision 004
- 12-OHP-4051-DCO-400; MPC Welding, Blowdown, Drying and Backfill; Revision 022
- 12-OHP-4051-DCO-500; Transfer Operations; Revision 018
- 12-OHP-4051-DCO-600; Dry Cask Operations Response to Abnormal Conditions;
Revision 010
- 12-QM-3E; Perform Quarterly Crane Inspections; 05/05/2018
- 12-THP-6010-RPP-401; Performance of Radiation and Contamination Surveys; Revision 42
- 12-TM-15-17-R0; Dry Cask Temporary Modification; 05/07/2015
- 212CR-0015; 10 CFR 72.212 Regulatory Compliance Report Change Request; Revision 0
- 212CR-0016; 10 CFR 72.212 Regulatory Compliance Report Change Request; Revision 0
- 212CR-0017; 10 CFR 72.212 Regulatory Compliance Report Change Request; Revision 0
- 212CR-0018; 10 CFR 72.212 Regulatory Compliance Report Change Request; Revision 1
- 72.48 Screenings and Evaluation; 2016-2018
- 72.48-2018-0139-02; Thermal Evaluation of Shielding Package around the HI-TRAC at DC
Cook; Revision 01
- AR 2018-4056; Work Platform Use for Dry Cask Loading Campaigns #1 and #2; 04/11/2018
- AR 2018-6342; 212CR Approval Renders HI-STORM 100 TS Non-Conservative; 06/15/2018
- AR 2018-6541; Dry Cask MPC Lid Insert Stuck during Installation; 06/22/2018
- AR 2018-6642; Use of Radiation Shielding Package Renders ISFSI TS Non-Conservative;
06/26/2018
- AR 2018-6698; Dose Rate Alarms; 06/28/2018
- AR 2018-6699; Increased Dose Rates on Dry Cask; 07/27/2018
- AR 2018-8439; Please Validate Temperature Range for Penetrant Testing; 08/27/2018
- DC Cook Nuclear Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) 10 CFR 72.212
Evaluations Report; Revision 3
- DIT-B-03735-00; DC Cook Dry Cask Loading Campaign #3, MPC Loading Arrangement and
HI-STORM Placement on ISFSI Pad; 05/22/2018
- EC-0000054927; DC Cook Dry Cask Loading Campaign #3; Revision 0
- Fire Pre-Plans Units 1 & 2 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Volume II; Revision 6
- GQP - 9.2; High Temperature Liquid Penetrant Examination and Acceptance Standards for
Welds, Base Materials and Cladding (50° - 350°F); Revision 10
- HI-2084189; HI-STORM CoC Radiation Protection Program Dose Rate Limits; Revision 3
- HI-2177676; Thermal Evaluation of Shielding Package Around the HI-TRAC at DC Cook;
Revision 1
- ISFSI Corrective Action Reports; Dated 2016-2018
- ISFSI Loading Radiation and Contamination Survey; Dated 2018
- MSLT-MPC-HOLTEC; Helium Mass Spectrometer Leak Test Procedure Multipurpose
Canister; Revision 3665-01
- NFG-DCO-10-01; Decay Heat Calculation to Support Dry Cask Storage Campaign #3;
Revision 0
- Nuclear Oversight Master Audit and Assessment Plan Year 2017; Revision 4
- PA-15-06; Performance Assurance Audit - Spent Fuel Storage; 12/14/2015
- PI-CNSTR-EM-SC-112; CNSTR Weld: Power Supply and Weld Head, Gold Track V and PCI
Canister Closure Weld Head - System Configuration; Revision 7
- PI-CNSTR-OP-HLTC-H-01; Closure Welding of Holtec Multi-Purpose Canisters -
HI-STORM 100, HI-STAR 100, HI-STORM FW & UMAX Systems; Revision 2
- PMP-2010-PRC-003; Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence; Revision 050
- WCP-3; Weld Material Control; Revision 2
- WCP-5; Weld and Base Metal Repair; Revision 0
- WCP-8; Preheating and Postweld Heat Treatment; Revision 0