IR 05000528/1998002
| ML17313A318 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17313A317 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-98-02, 50-528-98-2, 50-529-98-02, 50-529-98-2, 50-530-98-02, 50-530-98-2, NUDOCS 9804070320 | |
| Download: ML17313A318 (42) | |
Text
ENCLOSUR U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
50-528 50-529 50-530 NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74
~ 50-528/98-02 50-529/98-02 50-530/98-02 Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 5951 S. Wintersburg Road Tonopah, Arizona January 19 through March 7, 1998 Jim Moorman, Senior Resident Inspector Nancy Salgado, Resident Inspector Dyle Acker, Senior Project Engineer Dennis F. Kirsch, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch F Attachment:
Supplemental Information 9804070320 98032b PDR ADQCK 05000528
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-2-U Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 NRC Inspection Report 50-528/98-02; 50-529/98-02; 50-530/98-02
~Oaihaa Operator response to a Unit 1 reactor trip, caused by a decreasing steam generator (SG) level, was good. The management review team (MRT) and plant review board deliberations and assessments,.to evaluate the root cause and determine the plant readiness to restart, were thorough and effective (Section 01.1).
As-built plant configuration of Unit 1 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) conformed to plant drawings.
EDGs in all three Palo Verde units performed with 100% reliability. The system engineer was very knowledgeable about the system (Section 02.1).
Licensee actions to continue receipt/inspection of new fuel, after having dropped a new fuel shipping container a small distance, demonstrated an improper level of sensitivity on the part of the new fuel receipt team to the seriousness of the event.
Untimely communications between the new fuel receipt/inspection team and operations demonstrated a continuing problem with interdepartmental communications (Section 02.2).
Licensed operators were knowledgeable of existing workarounds, such as the one for opening the feedwater downcomer isolation vavles after a cooldown event. The program to track operator workarounds was effectively implemented (Section 03.1).
Weaknesses in Operations Department logkeeping practices allowed inconsistencies in the way different crews maintain logs. Operations management was aggressive in their assessment of the problem with log entries, and was taking action to reinforce expectations with all Operations personnel (Section 04.1).
An auxiliary operator exercised an insufficient degree of attention when restoring a clearance, which resulted in unplanned opening of control room essential air-handling unit (AHU) outside air intake Damper HJB-M02. This was a noncited violation of the clearance processing procedure (Section 04.2).
A control room supervisor (CRS) exercised an insufficient degree of attention when approving a clearance for issuance.
This resulted in unplanned opening of the a.c.
supply breaker to the "A"vital battery charger, leaving only the "A"battery supplying PKA-M41 (125-Vdc bus) for 35 minutes (Section 0 4.3).
-3-r Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were generally conducted in a safety-conscious manner by knowledgeable technicians.
The inspectors identified a minor violation for an instance where documentation was not kept current (Section M1.3).
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The visual material condition of the three units was good. Licensee efforts, initiated as a result of the Unit 2 sulfuric acid spill, to assess and identify material condition problems in all Units at a low threshold were good (Section M2.1).
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The licensee had not adequately maintained design control for startup transformer voltage in degraded voltage sceanrios.
The licensee event report (LER) which reported this condition was not self-critical in that it did not report or discuss the loss of design control as a root cause.
A noncited violation was identified for failure to maintain adequate design control (Section E8.2).
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The Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance to verify diesel fuel oil quality was performed professionally and methodically by a qualified technician and with proper procedural adherence (Section R4.1).
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a Unit 1 began the period at 100 percent power. On February 22, 1998, the unit experienced a
reactor trip on low SG water level due to a failed dynamic compensator card in the feedwater control system.
On February 24, 1998, the unit conducted a reactor startup and power ascension.
On March 1, the unit returned to 100 percent power and remained there for the duration of the inspection period.
Unit 2 remained at essentially 100 percent power throughout this inspection period.
Unit 3 remained at essentially 100 percent power throughout this inspection period, except for a power reduction to 85 percent on March 1, 1998, to repair a failed open relief valve on the 5B feedwater heater.
The Unit returned to 100 percent power on March 2, and remained there for the duration of the inspection period.
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Conduct of Operations 01.1 On February 22, 1998, at 10:22 p.m., Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip due to low level in SG 2. The low level was the result of closure of SG economizer control Valve SGN-FV-1122, due to a failed dynamic compensator card in the feedwater control system.
The inspectors responded to the site and observed a portion of the operator response to the event.
In addition, the inspectors observed the MRT and plant review board meetings prior to restart.
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and indin Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent power with'o maintenance or surveilances in progress.
Control room operators observed calorimetric reactor power lowering and began to diagnose the cause of the changing plant conditions. When they determined that level in SG 2 was lowering rapidly, an operator took manual control of the feedwater control system for SG 2 and attempted to restore level. The SG economizer control valve responded to manual control, however, SG level had decreased to near the reactor trip setpoint and could not be recovered.
The Unit automatically tripped on low SG level and, as expected for this transient, received an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal-2 to start the auxiliary feedwater pumps and the diesel generators.
The operators performed and exited Procedures 40EP-9EO01, "Standard Post Trip Actions," Revision 2, and 40EP-9EO02, "Reactor Trip," Revision 1. The Unit was stabilized in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressur The inspectors observed operator posttrip actions in the control room during implementation of,Procedure 40OP-9ZZ10, "Mode 3 to Mode 5 Operations,"
Revision 17. The inspectors also reviewed logs and plant data related to the trip.
Operator recognition that a problem existed was timely and the initial operator actions in response to the lowering SG level were good. Operators were attentive to the control boards.
The inspectors observed other licensee activities related to trip response.
The four hour notification to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72, was made in a timely manner.
Equipment suspected as having caused the trip was quarantined in a timely manner to aid in the root cause investigation. An MRT meeting was convened on February 23, at 4 a.m., to analyze the trip response and determine actions needed for restart. Another MRT meeting was conducted at 4 p.m. on February 23, followed immediately by a plant review board meeting.
These meetings discussed the root cause of the trip and addressed issues raised by the trip to ensure that there were no outstanding safety issues.
The licensee effectively analyzed information related to the trip and to resolved issues prior to restart.
The root cause of the trip was determined to be a failed dynamic flow compensation card in the SG level control circuitry which was replaced.
The licensee Instrumentation and Control Department was in the process of analyzing the card to determine the root cause of the failure. Other equipment issues that were identified during the trip were minor and all were in the steam plant.
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~Cncli~i Operator response to a Unit 1 reactor trip, caused by a decreasing SG level, was good.
The MRT and plant review board deliberations and assessments, to evaluate the root cause and determine the plant readiness to restart, were thorough and effective.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 ni
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I s ec ion
7 During this inspection period the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the Unit 1 EDG system and subsystems using Piping and Instrument Diagram 01-M-DGP-001, Diesel Generator System, Sheets 1-9. The inspectors also discussed the EDG system with the system engineer.
e a ions ndFindin s Using plant drawings the inspectors verified as-built conditions by verifying positions of various safety related valves in the system lineup. As part of the walkdown, the
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-3-inspectors verified that all instrumentation associated with the EDG system was available.
No deficiencies or work arounds were documented on the system.
Material condition of the system was considered to be good.
No corrosion was identified on the EDG associated piping and valves.
The inspector identified several minor discrepancies to the licensee.
The discrepancies had no affect on the operability of the system.
The licensee evaluated the discrepancies and implemented corrective actions as required.
The inspector conducted part of the walkdown with the EDG system engineer.
The system engineer was very knowledgeable of the system and performed inspections of the EDG system on as-needed basis.
The engineer provided information that all the EDGs (two per unit) have a 100 percent reliability.
As-built plant configuration of Unit 1 emergency EDGs conformed to plant drawings.
EDGs in all three Palo Verde units performed with 100% reliability. The system engineer was very knowledgeable about the system.
02.2 On February 4, 1998, the new fuel receiptfinspection team was opening a new fuel shipping container.
In the process of removing the lid, the entire container was lifted approximately 2 inches above a platform before the bottom half separated from the lid and dropped to the platform. The inspectors examined the licensee actions in response to this event.
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b a 'o and F'icensee personnel were receiving new fuel to support the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outage.
New fuel receipt inspection activities were being conducted in the Unit 1 fuel building in accordance with Procedure 78MT-9FH01, "New Fuel Receipt," Revision 4.
In accordance with procedural guidance in Section 4.2, "Opening Container," the team had unbolted the two halves of the shipping container, attached the lifting rig, and were operating the crane to liftthe upper half, the lid, of the container.
While removing the container fasteners the team had determined that the fasteners were not torqued to the expected degree.
While attempting'to liftonly the upper half of the container the entire container was lifted approximately 2 inches above a platform. Upon recognizing that the entire container had lifted, the technicians attempted to lower the container back to the platform. Before the technicians could land the coritainer, the bottom half separated from the top and dropped flat to the platform. As the halves separated, the technicians heard the sound of rushing air. It was determined that a vacuum existed in the container, which caused the halves to stay togethe There was no visible damage to either the container or the two fuel assemblies contained therein.
Impact recorders (accelerometers)
in the container and in the conveyance vehicle were checked and found not tripped. The licensee manually tripped the impact recorders to verify that they functioned properly. Although the impact recorders had not tripped additional inspection of the fuel was conducted that afternoon.
The additional inspection consisted of measuring clearances between the perimeter pins and visual inspection for evidence of loose pins or spacer grid damage, dents or distortion. There was no damage observed and the fuel was determined to be acceptable for use.
Receipt of new fuel was not halted after the event.
The new fuel receipt team continued with receipt inspection of the remaining two shipping containers.
The Nuclear Fuels Director and Reactor Engineering Section Leader were not notified until after all fuel had been receipt/inspected for the day. The Unit 1 control room was not notified of the event. After learning of the event, operations management stopped fuel receipt/inspection to determine the proper corrective actions.
New fuel receipt/inspection activities recommenced the afternoon of February 5. The licensee generated CRDR 1-8-0055 to document the event.
To address the potential that a vacuum may exist in other containers, Procedure 78MT-9FH01 was revised.
Revision 5 to the procedure added step 4.2.3 to Section 4.2. This step would relieve any pressure/vacuum by opening a manual vent valve on the container.
The inspectors reviewed the change and the process for making the change and determined that they were accomplished in accordance with licensee procedures.
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Licensee actions to continue receipt/inspection of new fuel, after having dropped a new fuel shipping container a small distance, demonstrated an improper level of sensitivity on the part of the new fuel receipt team to the seriousness of the event.
Untimely communications between the new fuel receipt/inspection team and operations demonstrated a continuing problem with interdepartmental communications.
Operations Procedures and Documentation 03.1
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71707 Inspectors reviewed the control room deficiency log in each unit to determine ifthe operator workaround portion of the log was being maintained in accordance with Procedure 40DP-9OP15, "Operator Workarounds and Discrepancy Tracking."
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ai n an in in The inspectors observed that the operator workarounds section of each unit's control room deficiency log contained an entry for a work around related to opening the SG feedwater downcomer isolation valves following a cooldown event.
The entries contained all information required by the controlling procedure and included the estimated time to complete the workaround.
The inspectors observed that the expected time to complete the above action was different in each unit's log. The times were 30 minutes in Unit 1, 2 minutes in Unit 2, and 40 minutes in Unit 3. Also, the Unit 1 workaround log improperly classified the action as an auxiliary operator (AO)
workaround instead of a control room workaround.
The inspectors questioned the licensee about the above items and determined that the above entries were incorrect.
The licensee updated the time estimate for the workarounds to 5 minutes.
For the task involved, the inspectors considered this estimate reasonable.
The workaround is proceduralized in Procedure 40OP-9AF02, "Nonessential Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operation," Revision 11, Appendix F, "Opening a Stuck Closed Downcomer Feedwater Isolation Valve." Licensed operators in all units were interviewed to determine ifthey were aware that a workaround existed for the SG feedwater downcomer isolation valves. Alloperators interviewed were aware of the workaround and of the procedural guidance that existed.
The licensee reviewed each unit's workaround log to verify that they were up to date and accurate.
The review determined that three entries needed to be deleted.
The inspectors agreed with the justification for each of the deleted items.
However, the entries for the SG feedwater downcomer isolation valves were also, inadvertently, deleted. A review of the updated log by the operations support department leader resulted in these entries being returned to the workaround log. The inspector determined that a misunderstanding of the definition of workaround by the operator assigned to identify and disposition work arounds was the cause of the improper deletion. The operator was recently assigned to the job and has been instructed further.
on the definition of workaround.
onclusions Licensed operators were knowledgeable of existing workarounds, such as the one for opening the feedwater downcomer isolation vavles after a cooldown event.
The program to track operator workarounds was effectively implemente II II
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Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 r 'n Lo in Pr
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1 0 During this inspection period the inspectors reviewed control room and unit logs to verify
~control room log keeping was in accordance with Procedure 40DP-9OP22, "Operations Logkeeping," Revision 9.
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F'he inspectors identified various discrepancies with the control room and unit logs for all three units. Most discrepancies invloved issues of threshold for log entries and completeness of log entries.
The inspectors verified from review of logs and discussions with various licensed operators that there was inadequate consistency for the way operations maintains their logs. The inspectors discussed this issue with Operations management.
Operations management had already identified logkeeping practices as an area needing improvement.
On January 31 through February 1, 1998, the licensee performed an assessment on current crew application of the logkeeping program. The assessment titled, "Log Keeping Practices Assessment," was provided to the inspectors.
The assessment concluded that:
Crew personnel do not have a consistent understanding of logkeeping procedural requirements.
~ Crew personnel do not have a consistent understanding of mangement expectation for log entries.
There is little supervisory feedback provided to individuals on the quality of log entries.
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Crew personnel did not have a clear understanding of the need to have complete log entries.
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Operations personnel have not received trairiing on how to write a good log entry.
The assessment had numerous recommendations for improvement.
One recommendation, to post a copy of procedure requirements in those areas that log-keeping activities are typically conducted, was complete l
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Weaknesses in Operations Department logkeeping practices caused inconsistencies in the way different crews maintain logs. Operations management was aggressive in their assessment of the recognized problem with log entries, and was taking action to reinforce expectations with all Operations personnel.
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le r eRe rai Uni e
7 7 On January 29, 1998, during the restoration of Clearance 3-98-00017, "Control Building Control Room AHUA ESS. OSA Duct lso. Damper," a human performance error occurred that caused control room essential AHU outside air intake Damper HJB-M02 to fail open.
The inspectors reviewed the Unit Logs, condition report/disposition request (CRDR) 3-8-0021, Clearance 3-98-00017, and the associated Human Performance Evaluation (HPE) on this issue.
An AO restoring Clearance 3-98-00017 inadvertently opened Breaker PHB-D32/52-06.
This action caused Damper HJB-M02 to deenergize and fail open, which was recognized by the control room reactor operators.
The consequence of this inappropriate action led to an unplanned entry into action b of TS limiting condition operation (LCO) 3.3.3.5.
The control room operators evaluated the situation, and instructed the AO to close the breaker.
The damper returned to its normal position, and the LCO was exited.
The licensee initiated CRDR 3-8-0021 and performed an HPE investigation into this event. The HPE determined that the AO exercised an insufficient degree of attention when the breaker was repositioned and did not check the original position of the breaker before repositioning the breaker.
The completed corrective action included coaching the individual and providing lessons learned from this issue to all operations crews.
The AOs failure to properly perform the restoration of Clearance 3-98-0001? was a violation of the licensee's clearance processing procedure.
This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncted violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NR Enforc men Po ic (NCV 50-530/98002-01).
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An AO exercised an insufficient degree of attention when restoring a clearance, which resulted in unplanned opening of Control Room Essential AHU Outside AirIntake Damper HJB-M02. This was a noncited violation of the clearance processing procedur h t
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-8-04.3 Char r "A" ni Sc
The inspectors reviewed an event associated with the "A"battery being the sole-power supply supplying Bus PKA-M41 (125-Vdc bus). The inspector reviewed Clearance 3-97-00996, "Battery Charger AAC Supply Circuit Breaker,"
CRDR 3-8-0014, and an HPE.
bserva i n d
On January 21, 1998, the work control (WC) senior reactor operator (SRO) requested permission from the CRS to hang Clearance 3-97-00996.
The clearance was required in order to replace the "AC Input Breaker," for Battery Charger "A." At the time, the system was aligned nomally, with the "A"battery charger supplying PKA-M41 and the
"AC" battery charger idle. The CRS was observing other ongoing testing in the control room and was aware that the "AC"battery charger was not in service at the time.
Normally, the CRS would have authorized hanging the clearance, however, he requested the WC SRO to authorize the clearance and send it to the field.
The AO assigned to perform the task displayed a good questioning attitude.
He contacted the control room to determine ifa procedure should be used to remove the battery charger from service.
The CRS, believing that work was to be performed on the
"AC" battery charger, verified that the "AC"battery charger was not in service and determined that no procedure was required.
The AO, in accordance with the clearance, opened the a.c. supply breaker to the "A"battery charger.
When the'a.c. supply breaker to the "A"battery charger was opened, the control room unexpectedly received alarm "Battery Charger A trouble." The anticipated alarm was
"Battery Charger AC trouble." After evaluating the alarm response and realizing that the
"A"battery charger had been removed from service, the AO was contacted and told to stop the evolution and return to the control room. During this time, the "A"battery was
'he only power supply to Bus PKA-M41. The licensee entered LCO 3.8.2.1 at 11:56 a.m.
When the AO returned to the control room it was discovered that the WC SRO had misread the equipment description portion of the clearance form. The WC SRO had read the equipment description as "battery charger AC supply circuit breaker," instead of
"battery charger A AC supply circuit breaker." The CRS and WC SRO determined that the correct battery charger had been removed from service but in the wrong sequence.
The AO was given the procedure for removing the "A"battery charger from service and placing the "AC" battery charger into service.
Upon completion of the task, the licensee exited the LCO at 12:31 p.m.. The licensee initiated CRDR 3-8-0014 and an HPE was initiated to understand the causes of the even 'J
The inspectors requested the licensee provide their assessment of how this unplanned loading of the battery affected operation of the battery and what type of recharge the battery underwent following the event.
This information was not available at the close of the inspection period.
Pending the inspectors'eview of this information, this willbe identified as an inspection followup item (IFI 50-530/98002-02).
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A CRS exercised an insufficient degree of attention when approving a clearance for issuance.
This resulted in unplanned opening of the a.c. supply breaker to the "A"vital battery charger, leaving only the "A"battery supplying PKA-M41 (125-Vdc bus) for 35 minutes.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
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- 2 /97-
-0 I-5 97-0-
-1: main steam safety valves found out-of-tolerance.
NRC Inspection Report 50-528; 529; 530/97-1 9 documented a violation for failure to report six main steam safety valves out-of-tolerance.
However, this report concluded that the licensee had performed appropriate design basis evaluations and corrective actions.
NRC Inspection Report 50-528; 529; 530/97-25 reviewed the licensee's corrective actions to the violation and concluded they were adequate.
Subsequent to this report, the licensee
. issued LER 50-529/97-001 to report an additional steam safety valve found out-of-tolerance. The inspectors reviewed both LERs and considered that the evaluations and corrective actions previously identified were adequate.
eace M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 ener I Co e so i
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0 The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:
32MT-9ZZ52: Preventative Maintenance Procedure Battery Charger WO 814362:
Inspect, Lubricate, Test SIAUV0645 WO 823312:
Remove/Replace Gearbox - A Charging Pump, Unit 1
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Observa'o sa i din s The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and thorough.
Allwork observed was performed with the work package present and in active use.
Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned task v I
a.nei The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
SG 1 Containment Isolation Valves Inservice Test 40OP-9SI03:
Safety Injection Tank Operations 2ST-2DG02:
Diesel Generator B Test 4.8.1.1.2a 77ST-1SB12:
Control Element Assembly Calculator No. 2 Functional test 32ST-2QH02: 12-Month Surveillance Test Of The Diesel Fuel Tank Cathodic Protection 32ST-2QH01: 60-Day Surveillance Test Of The Diesel Fuel Cathodic Protection b.
I n The inspectors found these surveillances were generally performed acceptably and as specified by applicable procedures.
However, during the observation of the cathodic protection surveillance tests, the inspectors identified that the prerequisites were not signed offas being complete. The inspectors concluded, after discussing the issue with the electrical maintenance technicians, that the steps had been performed, but the technicians had failed to sign off as complete.
Procedure 01DP-OAP01, "Procedure Process," Revision 5, requires that steps be signed offprior to proceeding to the next step.
This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a noricited violation consistent with Section IVof the f
li (NCV 50-529/98002-03).
Part of the corrective action to prevent recurrence included requiring review of Procedure 01DP-OAP01 for all electrical maintenance teams and initiating CRDR 980159.
The inspectors discussed with management that the journeyman technician was providing on-the-job training for a new apprentice during the performance of these surveillance tasks and the potential poor practice instruction that was provided to the apprentice.
Management recognized the concern, and held discussions with technicians on this subject.
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d Su eillances Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were generally conducted in a safety conscious manner by knowledgeable technicians.
The inspectors identified a minor violation for an instance where documentation was not kept curren I
-11-M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 eview f d'o Durin Pl Tour a.
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62 07 During this inspection period, routine tours were conducted to observe the status of plant equipment and evaluate plant material condition.
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Inspector observations of plant material condition during the report period identified no major observable material condition deficiencies.
Minordeficiencies brought to the attention of the licensee were documented with work requests.
As a result of the Unit 2 sulfuric acid spill (see NRC Inspection Report 50-529/98-12) the licensee conducted a structured walkdown of plant systems in all three units to determine ifproblems similar to that which led to the sulfuric acid spill existed.
Teams conducting the walkdown were given guidance to use a low threshold for identification of discrepancies.
As a result, the team identified 1,413 items, all of a minor nature.,At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was in the process entering these discrepancies into the work request program.
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Qggglu~i The visual material condition of the three units was good. Licensee efforts, initiated as a result of the Unit 2 sulfuric acid spill, to assess and identify material condition problems in all Units at a low threshold were good E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
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5 9'0/96007-03 reviewof Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) indicated inconsistencies for the design of the spent fuel pool (SFP) and for testing of trisodium phosphate.
These inconsistencies included the need for: clarification of full core offload calculational data in the UFSAR, review of testing of SFP cooling pumps, clarification of required water levels in the SFP, clarification of makeup sources to the heat exchangers, and clarification of makeup sources to the SFP.
The inspectors verified that the UFSAR had been clarified for all the issues noted in the followup item. The inspectors verified that current SFP design calculation results were refiected in the UFSAR. The inspectors also reviewed calculations and tests for the SFP heat exchanges and considered that the heat exchanger performance characteristics used in the SFP temperature calculations were conservativ E8.2 50-528
/
- 11-: potential safety-related equipment problems due to degraded grid voltage.
Revision 2 of this LER, dated June 17, 1996, added two new potential conditions, Scenarios 3 and 4, which could lead to double sequencing of safety-related equipment during a loss of coolant accident, concurrent with Iow offsite (grid) voltages and described administrative controls that were put in place to maintain operability of offsite power and safety-related equipment.
NRC Inspection Report 50-528; 529; 530/96-17 initiallyreviewed the LER revision and concluded that two aspects of the LER required further review. These two issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Palo Verde studies and calculations concluded that offsite power to the site would remain operable as long as the grid voltage level was maintained at 100 percent or above.
This conclusion was based on computer modeling of the grid from a model provided by the Western States Coordinating Council. The licensee had not done any software validation of the model. The Palo Verde offsite power operability study did not include any uncertainty for the modeling.
The second new potential problem, added by Revision 2 of the LER, called Scenario 4, concerned operators potentially causing degraded voltage by overloading a startup transformer when one, of the three transformers was out of service.
Scenario 4 appeared to be the same technical issue identified by the NRC in NRC Inspection Report 50-528; 529; 50-530/90-42.
The licensee's response to this finding was to establish administrative controls to preclude potentially overloading the startup transformers.
The inspectors questioned the licensee concerning the difference between Scenario 4 and the previous NRC finding and found that they were similar, which appeared to indicate that the licensee had not maintained adequate design control. Licensee engineering personnel had noted, in March 1996, that licensee operating procedures could allow degraded startup transformer voltage and had initiated CRDR 960273. A preliminary review of CRDR 960273 indicated that the CRDR was closed without addressing the root cause of the problem.
The inspectors considered that Revision 2 of the LER appeared to'be incomplete, in that it did not address the apparent root cause of Scenario 4, the recent failure of the licensee to maintain design control for a known problem. The licensee initiated CRDR 961355 to evaluate the acceptability of the closing of CRDR 960273.
Licensee personnel stated that they planned to issue Revision 3 to the LER to address the root cause inconsistency noted by the inspectors.
The inspectors reviewed Revision 2 of the LER and the results of Palo Verde actions
" concerning the two issues, grid modeling and design coritrol, discussed abov erv ion d Fin in ri Mod lin The inspectors determined that the Western States Coordinating Council had procured new software for modeling the western grid and were in the process of validating the new software by comparison to the old software and to known events.
In addition, Palo Verde personnel provided the inspectors with information that indicated that the new'oftware acceptably modeled the local area responses to selected transients.
Licensee engineering personnel stated that they would continue to monitor the acceptability of the new software.
The inspectors considered the licensee's actions to be acceptable.
i onr The licensee determined, in CR 961355, that, in the process of., issuing improved calculations, engineering personnel had determined in 1993 that the transformer overload condition identified in 1990 also included the potential for degraded voltage.
However, this information was not provided to operations personnel or incorporated in procedures for transformer operation.
In addition, in 1995 operations personnel made changes to startup transformer operating procedures that allowed additional operator flexibilityin transformer loading, which the inspectors considered increased the possibility for degraded voltage.
However, extensive research by the licensee determined that it had never implemented the procedures, which potentially could have led to degraded voltage and had never overloaded the startup transformers.
The licensee changed their calculation control procedures to require operations review of engineering calculations that affected the design basis and made improvements to internal commitment tracking processes.
The inspectors reviewed these changes and considered they improved the licensee's control of design basis information and related commitments.
However, failure of the licensee to translate known design information into operating procedures for the startup transformers is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforceme Polic (NCV 50-528; 529; 530/98002-04).
During this inspection, licensee personnel informed the inspectors that they did not plan to issue Revision 3 to the LER. The inspectors reviewed the LER and concluded that it met the minimum reporting criteria. However, the inspectors considered that the LER, was not self-critical, in that it did not report or discuss loss of design control as a root caus I
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-14-The licensee had not adequately maintained design control for startup transformer voltage in degraded voltage sceanrios.
The LER that reported this condition was not self-critical in that it did not report or discuss the loss of design control as a root cause.
~A noncited violation was identified for failure to maintain adequate design control.
IV Plan Su o
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 e
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The inspectors observed radiation protection personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas.
Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation work practices.
Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted.
Area surveys posted outside rooms were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and all were in accordance with requirements.
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance R4.1 ED u
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e 7170 On January 13, 1998, the inspectors observed Chemistry personnel perform Procedure 74ST-9DF01, "Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Surveillance Test," Revision 5 and Procedure 74CH-9XC08, "Diesel Fuel Oil Test Methods," Revision 9.
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s The purpose of Surveillance 74ST-9DF01 was to verify that the quality of the EDG fuel oil met the acceptance requirements specified in TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.b.
The inspectors independently verified that the requirements of ASTM D975-81, referenced by TS 4.8.1.12.b, were correctly incorporated into Surveillance 74ST-9DF01.
The chemistry technician performed the surveillance professionally and methodically with proper procedural adherence.
The inspectors verified that the acceptance criteria were me I
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-15-Surveillance 74ST-9DF01 required that the chemistry technicians conducting the test to be qualified in accordance with the Site Chemistry Training Program Description and Regulatory Guide 1.8 (ANSI 3.1-1978).
The inspector requested the applicable training records to verify this requirement was being met. The chemistry technicians were appropriately trained to perform the task.
However, in the process of retrieving the records the licensee identified various administrative errors on one chemistry technician's job qualification card. The licensee initiated CRDR 9-8-0061 to address the administrative errors.
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The TS required surveillance to verify diesel fuel oil quality was performed professionally and methodically by a qualified technician and with proper procedural adherence.
V. Ma em Mee X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 5, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identifie TTA MENT 1 TIA I T F P RSON C
NT CTED Ljgyi~see P. Brandjes, Department Leader, Electrical Maintenance Engineering D. Garnes, Unit 2 Department Leader, Operations R. Henry, Salt River Project site Representative J. Hesser, Director, Engineering W. Ide, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering D. Kanitz, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs P. Kirker, Unit 3 Department Leader, Operations A. Krainik, Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs J. Levine, Senior Vice President, Nuclear D. Marks, Section Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs G. Overbeck, Vice President, Nuclear Production T. Radke, Director, Outages B. Rash, Department Leader, System Engineering M. Shea, Director, Radiation Protection D. Smith, Director, Operations G. Sowers, PRA Section Leader J. Taylor, Nuclear Assurance Operations Dept. Leader J. Velotta, Director, Training P. Wiley, Department Leader, Operations
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-2-IN PE TION PR D
USED 60705 62707 71707 71750 92901 92903 93702 Preparation For Refueling Maintenance Observations Plant Operations Plant Support Activities Plant Operations Follow-up Engineering Follow-up Prompt Onsite Response To Events At Operating Power Reactors D
NDDI Qk@1Kt 50-530/98002-02 IFI assessment of unplanned loading of Unit 3 "A"vital battery Qg~ef 50-528; 529; 530/
93-011-02 LER potential safety-related equipment problems due to degraded grid voltage 50-529/97-001-00 LER main steam valves found out of tolerance 50-530/97-003-00 LER main steam valves found out of tolerance 50-530/97-003-01 50-528; 50-529; 50-530/96-007-03 LER main steam valves found out of tolerance IFI review of UFSAR indicated inconsistencies for the design of the SFP 50-530/98002-01 NCV failure to restore clearance properly 50-529/98002-03 50-528; 529; 530/
98002-04 NCV failure to keep documentation current on cathodic protection testing NCV inadequately maintained design control for startup transformer voltage
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-3-AO CRDR CRS EDG HPE LCO LER MRT SFP SG SRO TS UFSAR WC auxiliary operator condition report/disposition request control room supervisor emergency diesel generator Human Performance Evaluation limiting condition for operation licensee event report management review team spent fuel pool steam generator senior reactor operator Technical Specifications updated final safety analysis report work control
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