IR 05000508/1981010
| ML20009G776 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1981 |
| From: | Bishop T, Dodds R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009G768 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-508-81-10, 50-509-81-10, NUDOCS 8108040646 | |
| Download: ML20009G776 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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REGION V
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50-508/81-10
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,1 Report No.
60 500/R1-1n
i Docket No.
co-g sn sno License No.
CPPR-154. -155 Safeguards Group
- Licensee:
tJa c h i nn t n n Pnhl i t-Pnwor' SUDDly System i
P n Pnv 177't i
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F1m,_ tJu hinntnn o9541 I
Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Prc.iects Nos. 3/5 (WNP-3/5)
Inspection at:
WNp-3/5 Site. Elma. Washinaton Inspection conducted: __ May 4 - June 2. 1981
Inspectors:
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6[*29/kbl
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T. W. Bishop, Sr. Residenf Inspector Date Signed
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Date Signed Date Signed j
Approved By:
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R. T. Dodds, Chief
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Reactor Construction Project Section 2
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Summary:
Inspection during the period of May 4 to June 2, 1981 (Report Nos. 50-508/81-10 and 50-509/81-10)
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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities induding: containment steel structures; con-i tainment welding; containment vessel post weld heat treatment; containment
penetration installation and welding; safety-related piping and pipe weld-
ing; safety-related pipe supports; safety-related components; structural
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stud welding; concrete batch plant operations; containment structure re-l inforcing steel installation; followup on a previous inspection finding;
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and facility tours.
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The inspection involved 84 inspection hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the twelve areas inspected two items of noncompliance were j
identified: failure to qualify a welding procedure in accordance with ASME Code requirements (paragraph 6) and, failure to specify minimum weld t
sizes in accordance with ASME Code requirements (paragraph 8).
8108040646 810702'
PDR ADOCK 05000508
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PDR-RV - Fonn 219 (2)
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted The inspector interviewed various engineering, management, inspection and construction personnel of the organizations listed below. Key personnel including those who attended the exit interview are specifically identified below.
a.
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
- R. S. Leddick, Program Director, WNP-3/5 D. E. Dobson, Project Manager, WNP-3/5
- J. C. Lockhart, Project Quality Assurance Manager 0. E. Trapp Engineering Manager J. A. Puzauskas, Quality Assurance Engineering Supervisor C. H. Tewksbury, Quality Assurance Surveillance Supervisor N. Blaise, Sr. Project Quality Engineer J. Vanni; Sr. Project Quality Engineer b.
Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco)
- A. M. Curtona, Deputy Project Quality Assurance Manager
- J. C. Murphy, Project Superintendent L. F. Adams, Sr. Project Quality Engineer L. A. Bast, Project Quality Engineer M. R. Harris, Quality A;surance Engineer R. G. Peck, Quality Assurance Engineer R. Shetty, Civil Engineer piorrison-Knudsen, Inc. (MK)
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R. Davis, Quality Manager
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Associated Sand and Gravel (ASG)
A. Demers, Project Manager e.
Peter Kiewit Sons Co. (PKS)
D. Paulson, Quality Assurance Manager T. Bennington, Quality Assurance Administration Manager f.
Chicaac Bridge and Iron, (CBI)
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P. Van Niel, Construction Welding & Quality Assurance Manager 0. Wein, Project Welding & Quality Assurance Superintendent
- Denotes those attending the NRC Management Meeting on June 2, 1981
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2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Followup Item (50-508/509/80-13-04) Project Management a.
i Reorganization l
l The deintegration of licensee and Ebasco project management organiza-tions was completed on February 1,1981 for engineering, construction,
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and project management and on March 23, 1981 for quality assurance.
The deintegrated structure was examined during April 1981. Findings
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resulting from the examination are documented in NRC Inspection
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Report No. 50-508/509/81-08. This item is closed under number 50-508/
509/80-13-04 j
3.
Containment Steel Structures CBI containment steel structural activities for Units 3 and 5 were examined.
The examination included a review of ten containment drawings currently in use in the field for adaquacy, approval, and to assure the drawings reflected the latest approved revision. The drawings examined were CBI dwg 8, 9, 10,
2; and 11 for Unit 3 and 341, 342, 343, 344, 345 and 346 for Unit 5.
Other
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l activities examined included inspection of storage, handling, and receiving
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of materials, fit up and placement of materials, and inspection coverage.
The activities were examined for compliance te the requirements of the PSAR, the ASME B&PV Code, the CBI Quality Assurance Manual, and approved
drawings.
All items were found to be in accordance with requirements.
No items of
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l noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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4.
Containment-Structural Steel Welding j
CBI Activities related to Unit 3 and Unit 5 containment welding were ex-J amined for compliance to approved CBI welding procedures, the contract spctification, the ASME B&PV Code, and the PSAR. ' Observations were made l
of joint fit up and alignment, preheat, identification, weld location, use
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l of specified weld filler material and approved welding procedures, checks l
of burn off rate, interpass temperattr. e control, weld sequence, welder i
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i technique, final weld configuration, and quality control coverage. Unit 3
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observations were made of six dome joints and Unit 5 of four dome hard point l
installations. The qualifications of nine welders were reviewed as well as quality records for Unit 3 dome materials receiving inspections. Weld l
filler material stt, rage, temperature control, issuance, handling, and field i
control were examined at both the Unit 3 and 5 issue stations and work areas.
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All activities were found to be in accordance with pertainent requirements.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Unit 5 Containment Vessel Post Weld Heat Treatment
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The inspector examined the conduct of Unit 5 containment vessel PWHT activities for compliance with procedural, PSAR and ASME code specified
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j requirements.
I The containment vessel had been instrumented with dual thermocouples l
(one a spare) at each temperature monitoring location. Thermocouple
locations had been chosen to assure monitoring of the hottest and coldest i
temperatures and temperature variations. Strip chart recorders had been calibrated and sufficient spares were on hand. The inspector examined documentation verifying strip chart recorder calibration and thermocouple
l accuracy certification.
i The CBI training sessior.s for personnel involved in the activities were observed. The licensee and CBI had developed and utilized checklists to be used by contractor and licensee QA personnel assigned to surveillance
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functions. The checklists were examined and appeared satisfactory.
The inspectors toured the vessel and selectively examined insulation place-ment, preparations fcr dimensional stability and thermal expansion, burner
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i locations, and precautions precluding direct flame impingement.
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The PWHT heatup and cooldown rates, final temperature ar.d holding times were specified and consistent with applicable ASME code requirements,
Observation of the inprocess heatup, hold time and cooldown verified
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compliance with these code specified requirements.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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6.
Containment Penetrations Installation and Welding l
PKS activities related to the installation of Unit 3 containment penetrations l
for the safety injection system recirculc'.;on sump discharge (Nos. 23 and 24)
l were examined for compliance to the requirements of the PSAR, the ASME B&PV j
Code, the contract specification, and implementing procedures and design drawingt,. The examination included a review of PKS welding procedure No.
I PKS-WPS-8s, revision 4, and their subcontractor's liquid penetrant examinal -on procedure (Peabody procedure No. 23.A.1, revision 4) for technical adequacy, proper approval, and current revision. Other examinations included observa-tions of method of assembly, protection of the penetration assemblies, quality control inspection coverage, and welding activites. Welding exam-i ination included observation of fit up activities for field weld No. 5
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of penetration No. 23 and the following activities for field weld No. 5
of penetration No. 24:
preheat, filler material control, welder technique, welder qualification (three welders), welding equipment conditirn, interpass
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temperature control, weld interpass cleaning and grinding, quality control
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inspection coverage, and documentation of weld data sheets.
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Of the areas examined, a concern was identified relating to the technical
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adequacy of we' ding procedure No. PKS-WPS-8s, revision 4, being used on
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field weld No. 5 of penetration No. 24. The weld is specified as an ASME Section III, Class 2 weld. The materials being joined by this field wcld
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are a SA-106, Grade B, 40" diameter pipe previously welded to the contain-ment, and a 40" diameter SA-155 KCF70 material section of the penetration assembly. Weld joint thickness is 1 inches The SA-155 KCF70 material
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is classified as P-1, Group 2 type welding material and was required to be
impact tested. (Contract No. 3240-54, Section 2A-13.07).The SA-106 material
is classified as P-1, Group 1 welding material. The ASME B&PV. Code specifies supplanental requirements for welding involving impact tested materials and
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weld joint: exceeding 5/8" in thickness. These supplementary requirements
are specified by Section III, Subsection NC-4332 and Section IX, paragraph
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QW-251.2 and include the following requirements: (QW-403.4)..."whenjoints are to be made between base metals from two different groups, a procedure
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qualification must be made for the applicable combination of base metals...";
l (QW-406.3) requalification is required for "an increase in the specified
maximum interpass temperature..."; (QW-409.1) requalification is required for..." a change in the ranges of amperage, voltage, or travel speed...".
Contrary to these requirements, procedure PKS-WPS-8s was not qualified for l
the two different base metal group numbers involved in weld No. 5 of pen-l etration 24; no interpass temperature was identified 17. the welding pro-
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cedure specification; and the procedure allowed welding amperages in excess i
of that qualified, (for example, WPS-8s allows welding of 1/8 inch E7018 filler material at amperages up to 200 amps, whereas the procedure was qualified with amperages of 125 amps and 180 amps by PQR's No-8 and 3).
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The f ailure to qualify the welding procedure in accordance with the re-quirements of the ASME Code is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50,
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Appendix B, Crierion IX, and is an apparent item of aoncompliance (50-508/
509/81-10-01).
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Examination of the documentation associated with weld No. 5 of penetration 24 revealed that the quality control record copy of the weld data sheet
was not current (although the welders copy was current).
This condition
was immediately corrected. Other activities were found to be accomplished i
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in accordance with requirements. No other items of noncompliance or de-
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viations were identified.
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7.
Safety-Related Piping and Pipe Welding i
PKS activities related to the installation of two runs of Chemical acd i
Volumn Control System piping were examined for compliance to the require-
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ments of the PSAR, the ASME B&PV Code, the cnntract specifications and i
design drawings. The runs examined are designated 3CH-A13-85 and -95.
I The activites included a review of weld data shoatt for six field welds, nondestructive examination records, welder qualification sheets, and work t
packages, visual examination of the six field welds (Nos.13,14, and 15 i
for run 35 and Nos. 21,22, and 23 for run 95) and a walk down of the runs to verify installation in accordance with drawing and code requirements.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Safety-Related pipelup, port an't Restraint _Syatems n
The inspector examined four safety-related pipe support drawings and in process installation for compliance to the requirements of the PSAR, the ASME B&PV Code, and the contract specification. The supports examined are
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designated Nos. 3G-CH-291, 3G-CH-292, 3G-CH-267, and 3G-CH-269.
The examination revealed that one weld (No.1) on support No. 3G-CH-267
i was specified on the design drawing to be less than that allowed by the
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ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Appendix XVII, paragraph 2452.1 of the code provides the requirements far minimum fillet weld sizes. This section requires that for Jo;nino materials with the thicker member greater than 3/4 inches the minimum fillet shall be 5/16 inch. Weld No. 1 for hanger 3G-CH-267 joins 3/8 inch thick member to a 0.930 inch thick beam flange and calls for a weld size less than 5/16 (1/4 inch), contrary to Code requirement.
Four additional support drawings were then examined (Nos.:Tc SI-ll5R, 3G-CH-133, 3G-CH-135, and 3G-CH-163).
Of these four additional
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drawings two were found to specify welds smaller than the minimum sizt
l allowed by the ASME Code (welds 1 end 2 on support 3G CH-163 and weld.
l on 3G-CH-135). The failure to properly translate design requirements from j
the ASME Code to the design drawings is contrary to the requirement of j
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III and is'an apparent item of noncompliance (50-508/509/81-10-02).
No other items of noncompliane or deviations were identified, i
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Safety-Related Components
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Safety-related storage areas on the plant island were examined to determine I
compliance with requirements relative to equipment and piping identificction,
lubrication, protective caps, coatings, heaters, proper protection and handling,
and surveillance / inspection coverage. The PKS activities related to in-place protection and storage of the four Unit 3 and Unit 5 auxiliary fecc-I water pumps was also examined.
Each activity was reviewed for compliance
to the requirements of the PSAR, the contract specification, ANSI-N45.2.2,
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and ANSI-N45.2.3.
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i Lampson activities related to the handling of Unit 3 NSSS components (the reactor vessel, steam generators, and the RV head) were examined. This included a review of the. barge off-load procedures (LUR-WP-10, LUR-WP-ll, and LUR-WP-12), and observation of off-load, transport, and storage activ-i ities at the barge slip. The procedures and activities were examined for compliance to the requirements of the PSAR, contract specifications, ANSI-M45.2.2, and ANSI-N45.2.3.
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k No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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10.
Structures and Supports (Welding)
PK structural stud welding activities in Unit 3 and Unit, reactor auxiliary buildings were examined for compliance to the requirements of the PSAR, contract specifications, applicable design drawings, and MK procedure AI-15. Ten studs at Unit 3 reactor auxiliary building eleve+. ion 417.5 feet and fifteen studs at Unit 5 reactor auxiliary building 390 feet elevation were examined. The examination included observations of weather protection, fit up, surface condition, location, procedure compliance, materials, condition of welding equipment, completed weld quality, stud testing, and quality control coverage.
All activities observed were found to be in accordance with pertainent requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Concrete Batch Plant Operations The inspector examined the following aspects of Associated Sand and Gravel (AS&G) main and standby coricrete batch plant operations: accuracy of material control, temperature control, control of batch records, inspection, testing, equipment performance, aggregate / cement / water / admixture storage and handling, moisture control, and mix design adherence. The activities were examined for compliance to the contra-t specification, ASTM, PSAR, and pertinent contractor procedure requirements (ASG Inspection Procedure No. 4, ASG Ccntrol of Measuring and Test Equipment Procedure No. 6, and ASG Handling, Storage, and Shipping Procedure No. 7).
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The operations observed were found to be satisfactory. No items of non-compliance or deviations were identified.
12. Containment Structure Reinforcing Steel Installation J. A. Jones activities related to the installation of reinforcing steel for the Unit 3 containment D-ring structure and the reactor vessel primary shield were examined for conformance to the requirements of the PSAR, contract specification, ACI-318, design drawings (G-2300 and 2500 series)
and the bar bending schedules (B-2000 series). Reinforcing bar lap splice lengths were verified to be in accord' ace with drawing requirements. The drawing requiremar.ts were verified, by calculation, to be in accordance with ACI-318 requirements.
The activities observed were found to be in accnrdance with requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
13.
Employee Freedom to Express Concerns Reg, dinq Quality A site contractor (Wallace Super ior) recently issued a memorandum ( April 6, 1981) to his employees stating taat instances of questionable quality must
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be identified to the contractor's management before such matters are taken up with WPPSS/Ebasco or the NRC and that failure to do so will subject the individual to immediate dismissal. While the intention of the memo-randum is supported (i.e., identify all quality concerns through appropriate channels), it is con:eivable that conditions may exist where an employee may be fearful of identifying specific problems to his management.
In these cases it is appropriate for the individual to express his concerns to corstruction manager, owner, or regulatory body without fear of reprisal (e.g. dismissal). The inspector's concerns regarding the wording of the memorandum were identified to the contractor's and licensee's management representatives. Licensee management agreed to examine the situation and initiate appropriate action. This item will be further examined in the next inspection (50-508/509/81-10-03).
14. Insoection Tours of Site Facilities At various times during the inspection pericd the inspector made tours of the Unit 3 and 5 plant island and material storage areas, examinging gen-eral housekeeping, QC and craft suoervisory coverage for work activities, availability of work documents, equipment calibration status, tagging and identification of materials, and protection of installed equipment.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during the in-spection tours.
15. Management Meetings Management meetings were held on May 15 and June 2, 1981. Licensee and Ebasco representatives that attended the June 2, 1981 meeting are denoted in paragraph 1.
During the meetings the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection identifying the items of noncompliance dis-cussed in paragraphs 6 and 8.
Licensee representatives stated that actions would be initiated on the concerns identified.
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