IR 05000508/1981004
| ML19345H174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1981 |
| From: | Bishop T, Dodds R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H173 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-508-81-04, 50-508-81-4, 50-509-81-04, 50-509-81-4, NUDOCS 8105010159 | |
| Download: ML19345H174 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATCFY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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50-508/81-04 50-509/81-04 R: port No.
Docket No.
50-508 & 50-509 License No.CPPR-154 and -155 Safeguards croup
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Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply S_ystem P. O. Box 968 Richland. Washinatan 44197 Facility Narne:
Wu hingrnn Mncinar prnjoc+e Mne 3 gna e fuso_3fe)
Inspection at.WNP-3/5 Site, Elma, Washington Inspection conducted:
February 2-27, 1981 Inspectors:
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T.W.yshop Senior Resident Inspector Date signed Date Signed Date signed Approved By:
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R. T. Dodos, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1, tate signed Reactor Construction Projects Branch l
Suwary:
Inspection during the period of February 2-27,1981 (Report Nos. 50-508/81-04 l
and 50-509/81-041 I.
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities including:
Electrical cable tray support welding; stud welding; apparent instances of deliberate malpractice; tours of site facilities; and followup on a previous inspection finding.
The inspection involved 42 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, no new items of noncompliance were identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted The inspector interviewed various engineering, management, inspection and construction personnel of the organizations listed below.
Key personnel including those who attended the exit interview are specifically identified below, a.
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
- D. E. Dobson, Project Manager, WNP-3/.5
- J. C. Lockhart, Project Quality Assurance Manager C. E. Love, Construction Manager 0. E. Trapp, Engineering Manager
- J. A. Puzauskas, Quality Assurance Engineering Supervisor b.
Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco)
- J. P. Sluka, Manager of Engineering
- A. M. Curtona, Deputy Project Quality Assurance Manager J. C. Murphy, Project Superintendent C. M. McClaskey, Lead Project Quality Engineer R. G. Peck, Project Quality Engineer c.
Morrison-Knudsen, Inc. (MK)
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R. Davis, Quality Manager d.
Fischbach & Moore (FM)
D. Shersen, Quality Control Engineer M. Garber, Quality Control Inspector
- Denotes those present at the NRC management meeting on February 27, 1981.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-508/509/81-02-09) Riveted construction of ASME III, Subsection NF pipe clamps.
The licensee has approved the design and use of safety related pipe clamps using a riveted construction. The clamps were designed by ITT-Grinnell under contract to Associated Pipe and Engineering (WPPSS contract No.
3240-004).
Riveted construction is not addressed in the ASME III Code, Subsection NF. The inspector requested the design information (and code cases) pertaining to the new design of clamps, which demonstrates that the design and materials are consistent with code requirements.
The inspector was provided a copy of the ITT-Grinnell Load Capacity Data Sheet, Revision 1, for the PE-41 pipe clamps.
Examination of this document revealed:
(1) the design procedure had utilized linear analysis, and (2) no material had been identified for the rivets.
It is noted that Appendix XVII of the ASME III
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code, which addresses linear analysis, clearly states that connections shall be either bolted or welded, or bolted and welded. These conditions were identified to the licensee, following which ITT-Grinnell submitted a revised Load Capacity Data Sheet (Revision 2, dated January 20, 1981) containing the following changes from Revision 1:
(1) the design procedure had been changed from linear analysis to load rating; (2) the spacer had been designated as a secondary member and material SA 675 Grade 50-70 deleted from the spacer material column; (3) the riveted strap materials had been changed from AISI 4130 (recertified to ASTM A434 Grade BD) to ASME SA 453 Grade 660, Condition A or B; and (4) rivets had been added with a material listing of ASTM A 453 Grade 660 Condition A or B or ASTM A564 Type 630, condition 1075. The inspector pointed out the inconsistencies in materials to licensee and Ebasco representatives.
Shortly thereafter ITT-Grinnell provided a second version of Revision 2 to the Load Capacity Data Sheet, which was still dated January 30, 1981, but contained different information. This data sheet was identical to the original Revision 2, except as follows:
(1) the riveted strap material was changed to ASME SA 564 Type 630, condition 1075; and (2) the rivet material was changed to ASME SA 453 Grade 660, Condition A or B.
Because of the numerous changes to the Load Capacity Data Sheets, and the apparent lack of change control (i.e. erroneous information in the design documents and two versions of a single revision) the licensee was requested to provide verifiable evidence, such as design calculations, load test res61ts, and detail design drawings which would clearly establish the design method and the materials used in the clamps. During discussions with Ebasco representatives it was stated that ITT-Grinnell had changed the sequence of strap heat treating.
It was reported that, originally, the strap was bent, heat treated, then riveted, but now the strap is bent, riveted, then heat treated.
Details were not available which would indicate if the heat treating of the rivets would result in any detrimental effects or whether the load rating tests had been performed with or without heat treated rivets. The subject of ITT-Grinnell pipe clamps will remain unresolved pending:
(1) completion of a determination regarding the use of rivets in ASME III, NF components (50-508/509/81-02-09); (2) clarification of the actual materials, design method, and change controls (50-508/509/81-04-01); and (3) clarification on the effects of changing the heat treating sequence (50-508/509/81-04-02).
Licensee and Ebasco representatives committed to further examine the concerns.
b.
(0 pen) 50-508/509-81-02-02, Unresolved - Development of a quality classification list.
The licensee's Quality Assurance Manual (Section QAP-3) addresses the Jevelopment of a quality classification list which identified the quality classification for items and services at the project.
Licensee representatives stated that a document entitled "WPPSS Equipment List" is being used as the quality classification list. The document is currently undergoing review and revision and is expected to be reissued in June 1981. This item will remain open pending completion and reissuance c# the quality classification lis.
3.
Electrical Cable Tray Support Welding
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Fischbach and Moore (FM) activities related to electrical cable tray support welding were examined.
The examination included a review of seven of the contractor's fabrication drawings (covering 21 supports), examination of four welded supports, examination of the weld record packages for 13 supports, and interviews with personnel.
The activities were examined for compliance to the PSAR, AWS Dl.1 (Structural Welding Code), the contract specification (No. 3240-225/253), and pertinent design drawings (No. WPPSS-3240-G 3477 series).
Examination of the contractor's fabrication drawings (Nos.
-26, -27, -28, -29, -36, and -46) identified instances where design drawing detail dimensions had not been properly incorporated into the fabrication drawings, these included: for drawings Nos. SS-3,
-36, and -46 no minimum dimension was identified for overlapping of intersecting angle members, this dimension defines the resultant fillet wald length and is specified as 1 1/2" on design drawing 3240-G347755; similarily the overlap length of diagonal angle members to these corresponding support plate of 4" to 6" is not identified on fabrication drawings SS-3, -26, -27, -28, and -29; fabrication drawings SS-3, -26, -27, -28, -36 and -46 identify an overlap of 3" for intersecting vertical and horizontal angles, whereas design drawing 3240-G3477S5 specifies a 31/2" overlap minimum.
These inconsistencies were discussed with licensee representatives who stated that the conditions had been previously identified and properly addressed. This item is unresolved pending examination of licensee and contractor action in this area (50-508/509-81-04-03).
The inspector examined the completed welding on supports E-162,
-163, -189, and 218. The welds were examined for size, location s and configuration. Welds selected had been painted so inspection of surface discontinuities was not performed for this sample.
The welds appeared to comply with the fabrication drawing and AWS Dl.1 requirements. As identified above, the fabrication drawings were not in strict accordance with the design drawings.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
The weld data sheets and related NDE records for supports Nos.
E-161, -162, -163, -164, -165, -166, -168, -169, -180, -189, -192,
-193, and -218 were examined. The records were found to comply with code and procedural requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
The inspector interviewed the quality control inspector involved in safety related weld inspections to determine his level of understanding.off code and procedure requirements as well as to discuss any _ difficulties being encountered. The individt.al exhibited a good understanding of requirements.
It was mentioned that the current weld inspection criteria provided in the contractor's procedures appeared overly restrictive in that no allowance was made for even marginal increases in specified weld size.
Licensee representatives were advised of this concern and stated that the procedure would be improved in this area.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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4.
Safety Related Components e
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Peter Kiewit Sons' (PKS) activities related to the inplace storage, handling, and protection of safety related components were examined.
Items inspected included: Unit 3 charging pumps (3), reactor drain pumps (2), and auxiliary feedwater pumps (4), and Unit 5 charging pumps (3), reactor drain pumps (2), and auxiliary feedwater pumps (4).
The examination included observations of identification, placement, mounting and support (temporary and permanent), and protection (covers, caps, dessiccants, coatings, lubricants).
The activities were observed to ascertain conformance to requirements of the PSAR, ANSI Standard N45-2.2, and the contract specification (No. 3240-251).
On February 18, 1981, the inspector found significant amounts of water around the pump bases for Unit 3 charging pumps Nos.
1 and 2, Unit 3 reactor drain pump No.1, Unit 5 charging pump No. 1 and Unit 5 reactor drain pumps Nos. I and 2.
The heating lights had also been removed from the protective enclosure for Unit 5 charging pump No.1.
These conditions were identified to licensee representatives on February 18, 1981. On February 20, 1981 the inspector found that two of the six pumps still had substantial amounts of water surrounding the pump bases (Unit 3 reactor drain pump No.1 and Unit 5 reactor drain pump No.1). This condition was identified to licensee representatives on February 20, 1981.
Reinspection of the areas on February 23, 1981 verified that the adverse conditions had been corrected. The subject of equipment oreservation and protection is currently an open item of noncompliance (50-508/509-80-10-02). The conditions identified during the current inspection period are considered a continuation of this noncompliance.
The licensee's permanent corrective measures will be examined following receipt and review of their written response to the Notice of Violation.
Other aspects of equipment storage, handling, and protection were found to be satisfactory.
5.
Structural Embed Plate Stud Welding 23, 1981, Ebasco representatives reported to the resident On February inspector that defects had been identified on structural embed plate studwelds provided by Chicago Bridge ad Iron (under contract No. 3240-113). The defects included a lacl. of 360 weld flash, and bending of studs in a nonconservative direction. Attempts by licensee and Ebasco representatives to straighten and rebend improperly bent studs resulted in some of the stud welds fracturing.
The embed plates are utilized in concrete structures inside the Prior to any further concrete placements inside containment.
the containment all studs were visually reinspected by contractor or Ebasco inspectors and repaired as required. The NRC inspector examined approximately twenty embed plates following the contractor /Ebasco action and found all stud welds examined to be visually satisfactory.
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The licensee has initiated action to reinspect all other embed plate stud welds prior to plate installation. The licensee had reported this to the NRC Reginn V office as a potential 50.55(e)
item.
6.
Deliberate Malpractice
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Morrison-Knudsen (MK) representatives identified four instances where it appears that requirements were intentionally violated:
Three of these conditions related to structural steel bolting and one to concrete curing. The on-going reinspection of structural steel bolting (see NRC Inspection Report 50-508/509-81-02) identified one instance where a bolt hole was excessively enlarged by flame cutting, and two instances where bolted joints were loosened after acceptance and painting of the structural connection.
The fourth instance involved the falsification of concrete curing records of fif teen concrete placements for February 21, 1981.
Each of the conditions was documented on a nonconformance report for technical evaluation and resolution.
In the case of the concrete curing records, the responsible individual was identified and his employment terminated. The responsible individuals have not been indentified for the other improper actions.
The inspector expressed his strong concerns, to licensee management representatives, regarding the situations and attitudes which allowed such events to occur.
Licensee representatives stated that some corrective measures had already been made (e.g., controlling tools used for loosening the large bolts, alerting security, and discussing the situation with supervision)
and that other actions are being reviewed. This situation will be further reviewed pending completion of licensee actions in this area (50-508/509/81-04-04).
7.
Inspection Tours of Site Facilities At various times during the inspection period the inspector made tours of the Unit 3 and 5 plant island and material storage areas, examining general housekeeping, QC and craft supervisory coverage for work activities, availability of work documents, equipment calibration status, tagging and identification of materials, and protection of installed equipment.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of ncacompliance or deviations'.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 2.a, 2.b and 3.
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9.
Manacement Meetino A management meeting was held on February 27, 1931.
Licensee and Ebasco representatives attending the meeting are denoted in paragraph 1.
During the meeting the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection identifying the unresolved item discussed in paragraphs 2.a. 2.b, and 3 and the continuing item of noncompliance discussed in paragraph 4.
Licensee representatives stated that further study regarding permanent correction of the noncompliance (improper protection of equipment) would be complete by March 13, 1981.
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