IR 05000508/1981006
| ML19345H494 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1981 |
| From: | Dangelo A, Dodds R, Haist D, Hernandez G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H493 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-508-81-06, 50-508-81-6, 50-509-81-06, 50-509-81-6, NUDOCS 8105200420 | |
| Download: ML19345H494 (12) | |
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U. S. !iUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!OiISSIO!!
OFFICE OF I!;SPECT10 i A!iD E!! FORCE!E!iT REGIO!i V 50-508/81-06 Raport !!o. 50-509/81-06
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Docket !!o. 50-508, 50-509 License !io. CPPR-154, -155 Safeguards Group I.icensee: Washington Public Power Supply System P. O. Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 Facility !is=c: Washington Nuclear Projects Nos. 3 & 5 (WNP-3/5)
Inspection at:WNP-3/5 Site, Elma, Washington Inspection conducted: March 23-27, 1981 td 7,
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Inspectors:
D. P. Haist, Reactor Inspector
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E ti.~ Hernandez, Reacto'r inspector hate / Signed
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A. d. U' Arigelo, Reactor inspector
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R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2 D M e Signed
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Reactor Construction and Projects Branch Suc= arf:
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Inspection during the period of March 23-27, 1981 (Report Nos. 50-508/81-06 l '",',..
and 50-509/81-06)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced. inspection by. regional-based inspectors
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of construction activities including: placement of containment ' concrete;
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concrete testing; safety related corrponents; safety related pipe supports t
l and restraints systems stud weld activi+'es; and follow-up on previously identified,
items of enforcement and other special or open items.
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The inspection involved 96 inspection hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no items o'f noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The inspectors interviewed various engineering, management, inspection
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and const "ction personnel of the organizations listed below.
Key personnel, includins
.ose who attended the exit interview, are identified below, a.
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
- R. S. Leddick, Program Director, WNP-3/5
- D. E. Dobson, Project Manager, WHP-3/5
- J. C. Lockhart, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- C. E. Love, Construction Manager
- 0. E. Trapp, Project Engineering Manager
- M. M. Monopoli, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. M. Kovacs, Assistant Project Quality Assurance Manager
- J. A. Puzauskas, Quality A ssurance Enginearing Supervisor
- J. M. Walker, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer
- C. H. Tewksbury, Surveillance Supervisor Quality Assurance R. Rahn, Design Engineer C. Butros, Design Engineer b.
Ebasco Servicee, Incorporated (Ebasco)
- J. P. Sluka. Manager of Engineering
- A. M. Cutrona, Quality Assurance Manager
- T. E. Cottreu, Senior Resident Engineer
- P. K. Teleford, Materials Manager
- D. L. Quamme, Project General fianager
- V. J. Lovelace, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
- R. G. Peck, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer T. A. Letchford, Supervisor Receiving Inspection
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L. A. Bast, Project Quality Engineer C. M. McClaskey, Project Quality Assurance Engine:r V. Shappell, Quality Assurance Engineer R. Gross, Receiving Inspector J. Killian, Supervisor, Stress Analysis Engineering it. Bagale, Lead Pipe Support Engineer G. Scarfo, Supervisor, Pipe Support Engineering T. Kerns, Pipe Support Engineer c.
Morrison-Knudsen (M-X)
G. C. Rogstad, Lead Quality Control Engineer
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Pater Kiewit Sons' Company (PKS)
H. Barton, Quality Control Inspector J. Rasch, Quality Control Supervisor T. Bennington, Quality Assurance Engineer e.
J. A. Jones (JAJ)
T. N. McAllister, Quality Assurance Manager f.
Other_
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i G. Hansen, Chief, Operations Division, Washington Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council Denotes those present at the NRC management meeting on March P.7,
1981. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector also presented his inspection findings at this meeting.
2.
Site Tour
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On March 23, 1981, the inspectors conducted a tour of Units 3 and 5 to observe completed work and work in progress. Particular attention was given to the activities of safety related component storage conditions, structural steel welding and bolting, stud welding and concrete pre-placement activities.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items c.
(Closed? Noncompliance (50-508/509/81-01/01): M-K Failure to follow _
stud welding procedure,
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The licensee's response to the item of noncompliance was submitted by letters numbered G03-81-620 and G03-81-756, dated March 2, 1981 and March 17, 1981, respectively.
The inspector examined the licensee's corrective actions and observed that the corrective actions appeared to be accomplished as stated.
The licensee increased surveillance in this area and their examination of the surveillance documentation did not identify any further discrepancies. Also, observation of the stud welding activities on the south side of Unit 3, by the inspector, did not idantUy any items of noncompliance or deviations.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (50-509/79-10/06):
Failure to Requalify Welding Procedure Specifications Contrary to the requirements of the ASME B&PV Code Section IX, the maximum amperages allowed in the Chicago Bridge and Iron weld procedure specification no. WPS-E7018/3431, Rev. 2, were higher than those specified in the applicable welding procedure qualification records (PQR Nos. 2631 and 3250). This is considered a change in a supplementary essential variable. The welding procedure specification had not been requalified at the higher amperages.
The licensee responded to the NRC position, concerning qualification of weld procedures at maximum heat input where notch sensitive material is used, in letter no. G03-81-272, dated January 30, 1981. This response included additional procedure qualification records which satisfy the qualification requirements of ASf:E Section XI,1974 Edition, including the sumer 1974 addenda as interpreted by the NRC.
The inspector verified that the licensee has reviewed all other weld procedure specificatioits, in use by Chicago Bridge and Iron on notch-toughness type material, to ensure that they are adequately supported by procedure qualification records. The licensee stated that no other contractors are welding materials for which the code requires notch toughness properties.
The inspector considers this issue closed.
c.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (50-508/80-04-02) Incomplete Root Penetration in Stored Pipes (0 pen) Noncompliance (50-508/80-04-03) Excessive Offset on Pipe
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Subassemblies in Storage Contrary to the requirements of the ASME B&PV Code Section IV, the inspector had identified incomplete root penetration on one weld in each of two carbon steel pipe subassemblies and excessive
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offset at weld joints in four carbon steel pipe subassemblies.
During a subsequent inspection the inspector had identified an excessive offset condition on a stainless steel pipe spool.
The licensee responded to the repeat item of noncompliance in letter no. G03-81-511 dated February 19, 1981. This response detailed the corrective actions to be taken with respect to stainless steel pipe spools fabricated by Associated Pipe and Engineering of Compton, California. The inspector was unable to verify the corrective actions taken since the nonconforming spool had been returned to the vendor for correction.
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The inspectors ultrasonically examined the wall thickness of carbon i
steel pipe spools which were reworked by the vendor to correct i
excessive offset and incomplete penetration. A total of seventy-two wall thickness measurements were taken at various points on four pipe spool pieces (nos. 33CC24-030SA-5, 3 3CC24-067SB-6, 3 3CC24-0675B-12 and 3 3CC24-040SB-13). All wall thickness measurements were well in excess of the minimum allowable wall thickness.
The inspectors also examined the weld root areas of these spools to determine if any areas of excessive offset or incomplete penetration i
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remained. All spools appeared to conform to codc requirements.
l The inspectors examined carbon steel spool no. 3-3CC24-033SA-1 which l
included four circumferential welds and two sockolets. Three of I
the circumferential welds exhibited internal offset within the tolerance I
of the ASME Code Section III. This offset was not faired to at least a l
three-to-one taper as required by paragraph NO-4232(C). Additionally,
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l one of the sockolets exhibited an area of lack of penetration.
The licensee investigated the vendor's reinspection records for carbon steel spools received from the vendor's Clearfield, Utah facility and found that this spool was the only spool that could not be located for reinspection. The vendor had not notified the licensee of their inability to locate this spool and in fact had summarized the results of the inspection by stating that all 12-
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I inch and larger ASME Section III spools at the Saginaw laydown area had been inspected.
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As a result of this finding, the inspectors examined the inside diameters of an additional thirteen pipe spools which included j
over twenty circumferential welds.
No areas of incomplete penetration
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or inadequate taper over the weld transition were identified.
l The inspectors identified sockolets on spool nos. 3-3CC16-150SN-13 and 3-3CC16-140SN-15 which appear to have incomplete penetration.
These sockolets are inaccessible for inspection frdm the inside of the pipe. The licensee comitted to determine the joint configuration and inspect the adequacy of penetration on these sockolets.
The inadequate fairing on spool no. 3-3CC24-033SA-1 appears to be an isolated incident and corrective actions on this subject and the incomplete penetration on sockolets will remain open.
d.
(Closed) Noncompliance (50-508/509/80-15-01) J. A. Jones - Failure of Contractor Procedures to Incorporate Specification Requirements.
The J. A. Jones procedure for nonconformance reporting did not l
include specification requirements for witnessing of reinspections
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by the Engineer and for fontarding of supporting engineering and inspection documentation with completed nonconformance reports.
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-5-The licensee responded to this item of noncortpliance in letter no. G03-81-511, dated February 15, 1981. The inspector verified that the licensee had implemented the corrective actions specified in the response letter. One of uhe corrective actions taken is a revision to contractor section 2A requirements for handling nonconforming activities which will be imposed on all site construction contractors.
This revision has been prepared and I..cludes, inter alia, definitive requirements for the control of nonconformance report forms, the voiding of nonconformance reports, and review by the Engineer of nonconformance reports.
The inspector considers this issue resolved.
4.
Licensee Action on Previously identified Followuo and Unresolved Items i
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-508/509/81-01/04): JAJ/M-K Failure to Incorporate AC1 306-66 Requirements into Procedures.
A review of Interim Procedure Change Notice (IPCN) Number 123 to Morrison-Knudsen Procedure Number CP-01, Revision 5, " Post Placement" and J. A. Jones Procedure Number WE-WP-5, Revision 6. " Concrete Placing, Curing, Finishing and Inspection" disclosed that both civil contractors have incorporated the AC1 recuirements for adverse weather conditions into their respective procecures.
This item is closed.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-508/509/80-15-03) Procedure Approval l
for Use with Unresolved Engineer Coment.
J. A. Jones procedure no. P0P-N-706, Source Inspection, was approved for use with an unresolved comment by the Engineer concerning the
characteristics to be inspected and the method of surveillance to be used.
This coment by the Engineer remains unresolved and procedure P0P-N-706 does not address the areas of concern expressed in the coment.
The inspector examined source inspection planning for an anchor bolt supplier. The planning appeared to adequately address the characteristics to be inspected, the method of inspection, and the acceptance criteria to be used. The Engineer comitted to take prompt action to resolve the original comment with the contractor and revise procedure POP-N-706 as appropriate.
This item remains open.
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(Closed) Followup Item (50-508/509/80-17-01) Procedure Oualification l
Records for Weld Procedure Specification No. WPS-1.
The inspector had found that procedure qualification records for WPS-1 were not available on site for examination.
During this inspection the inspector examined procedure qualification record nos. 2922 and 360 and supporting test results and verified that these procedure
J qualification records support weld procedure specification no.1.
Weld procedure specification no.1 is 3 art of a standardized set of weld procedure spcifications used )y Chicago Bridge and Iron company to qualify welders. When welders are satisfactorily qualified to weld procedure specification no.1, they will be qualified to any other site-specific weld procedure which specifies variables encompassed by weld procedure specification no.1.
The inspector considers this item resolved.
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(Coen) Unresolved Item (50-508/509/80-15-02) J. A. Jones Inspection l
Procedure-Policy for Voiding Inspection Reports i
The inspector had identified that procedure no. POP-N-707, Site Inspection and Test, allows the Quality Verification Supervisor
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to review inspection reports for completeness and validity prior to adding the report number and logging the report into the system.
The inspector found that the only steps that have been taken to resolve this concern is the procurement by the contractor of a stamp to preassign numbers to inspection report fonns. The contractor stated the procedure will be changed, to address the voiding of inspection reports, within two weeks. The licensee committed to examine, generally, the practices used by the site contractors with regard to voiding of quality assurance documents. As'noted in paragraph 3d., action _has been taken in this regard for nonconformance j
reports.
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This item remains open and will be examined in a future inspection, e.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-508/509/81-01-02) J. A. Jones Failure l
to Incorporate Specification and Standard Requirements Into Procedures.
The inspectot had identified five instances of inadequate incorporation j
of specification and industry standard requirements into quality
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assurance implementing procedures. The actions taken are described
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below.
(1) The failure to incorporate the quality assurance records receipt
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control system requirements of ANSI N.45.2.9 and Ebasco specification
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no. 860-W has now been corrected by issuance of Quality Assurance Instruction No. QAI-001, Rev. 2. " Quality Assurance Documentation, Records System and Control." This item is considered closed.
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-7-(2) The failure to incorporate the quality assurance record authentication requirements of ANSI N45.2.9 and Ebasco specification no. 860-W has now been corrected in procedure no. P0P-N-709, he!. 2 " Project Quality Assurance Records".
This item is considered closed.
(3) The ANSI N.45.2.9 specified mininum audit requirements for the records storage system, although not included in the controlling specification no. 3240-265, nor Ebasco specification no. 860-W, may be implied by reference to ANSI N45.2.9 in procedure no.
P0P-N-70 9.
This item is considered closed.
(4) The failure to incorporate the quality assurance record alteration requirements of Ebasco Specification 860-W has been corrected in procedure no. P0P-N-709, Rev. 2.
This item is considered closed.
(5) The failure to specify supplier evaluation personnel qualifications, acceptance criteria for suppliers, and definition of conditionsd acceptance in procedure no. P0P-N-711, Rev. 2. " Supplier Evaluation" has not been resolved. The Engineer has formally transmitted these concerns to the contractor and is awaiting reply. This issue remains unresolved.
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Structural Concrete II a.
Observations of Work and Work Activities-Unit 3 Containment J. A. Jones activities related to the pre-placement and placement for concrete placement no. 3RBIO45 were observed. The observations included examinations of embedments, form work, reinforcing steel, cleanliness, concrete cover, concrete free fall, concrete horizontal free flow, consolidation and Quality control inspection. The activities were observed for compliance to the pertinent contract drawings, the approved J. A. Jones concrete placement procedure no. WE-WP-5 Revisien 6, and the PSAR.
Field testing of concrete by Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory perscnnel for placement no. 3RBIO45 was observed for compliance with the requirements of the PSAR, ACI, and ASTM standards. The testing observed included slump, air entrainment, and temperature.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Safety Related Components a.
Review of Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures
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-8-The inspector reviewed the following Ebasco/WPPSS procedures detailing the receipt inspection, storage, and maintenance of material and equipment:
(1) Quality Assurance Instruction Number QAI 10-1, Revision 1.0,
" Receiving Inspection and Material Requisitioning".
(2) Project Site Procedure Number PSP-MM-11-2, Revision 1.0 (Interim),
" Material Control".
(3) Project Site Procedure Number PSP-MM-11-6, Revision 1.0 (Interim),
" Standard requirement for maintenance of equiptrent and material in storage".
The inspector found that these procedures did reflect, in general, the requirements of ANSI N45.2.2 and ANSI N45.2.3 for receiving, storage, mainten e ce and housekeeping.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, b.
Observation of Work and Work Activities The storage, protection and maintenance of a number of safety related components from the site and off-site (Aberdeen) warehouses were selected for examination to detennine whether the components were being maintained in accordance with the licensee procedures, NRC requirements and PSAR comitments. The components selected were:
Description Serial Number 10" Globe Valve SI-307 14" Swing Check Valve 7-14256 HPSI Motor & Pump IS-77 HPSI Motor & Pump 2S-77 l,
Seal Injection Heat Exchanger 79239 (6 Seal Injection Heat Exchanger 79240 (7 A number of Class I electric panels The examination determined that the requirements relative to protection, segregation and identification of nonconforming items, lubrication, desiccants, heaters, inert gas blankets, documentation, and inspection activities were being met for those components selected.
j In addition, two valves in Unit 3 in the Chemical and Volume control System, a 3" Globe Valve (S/N NO315A) and a 3" Check Valve (S/N 51745),
were examined to assure that the installation was accomplished in accordance with the applicable Peter Kiewit Sons' construction drawings and work prc:edures. Also, the qualifications of six
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receiving inspectors were examined.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Containment (Steel Structures and Supports)
a.
Observations of Work and t'ork Activities Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBI) welding activities on the Unit 5 containment vessel were examined for compliance to approved CBI welding procedures, the contract specifications, and the ASME Code and PSAR requirements.
The inspector examined weld joint identification / location, joint preparation and fitup, use of specified filter material, welder technique, preheat control, weld size, grinding operations, removal of temporary attachments, and quality control coverage. The areas examined included in process and completed welding on penetration nos. P50, PS2, P56 and the containment ring girder and joint fitup on penetration no. P68B. The inspector also examined the control and identification of weld filler material at the work sites.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems a.
(Closed) Followup Item (50-508/509-80-17-02): Traceability of Pipe Support Materials Peter Kiewit Sons' (PKS) system to control traceability of hanger pieces was examined for compliance with PKS procedures. Eight Work Release packages were reviewad and contained the required information to maintain traceability of material used in fabricating the pipe support or frame. The inspector considered this item resolved.
b.
Pipe Support Design
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The inspector examined the application of the ITT-Grinnell " Stiff Clamp" for Quality Class I pipe supports. The " Stiff Clamp" is used to take out loads normal to the pipe axis.
No deviations were identified.
c.
Review of Quality Records PKS quality records pertaining to pipe support fabrication and welding were examined. PKS procedure PKS-CP-4, paragraph 6.3, states, in part, that "...in order to monitor the quality of the welds in relation to the welder and the materials used, the Weld Data Sheet developed during the planning stages shall document the following information." During the inspectors review of Work Release packages for pipe support frames, it was observed that the Work Release does not contain a Weld Data Sheet as required
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-10-by procedure PKS-CP-4. The PXS QA engineer stated that the practice was not to include the Weld Data Sheet on the Work Release for pipe support frares.
The inspector discussed the discrepancy at the exit meeting; whereupon, the licensee agreed to review the PKS system for the preparation of Work Release packages for pipe support frames. This item will be reviewed further pending completion of the licensee's actions.
(50-508/509/81-06-01)
9.
Project Plant Ash Cleanup and Chicago Bridge and Iron Derrick Collapse Investigation The licensee submitted reports to NP.C RV on: (1) the project plant cleanup of volcanic ash following the May 27, 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens and, (2) the project investigation of the collapse of the Chicago Bridge and Iron guyed derrick on May 29, 1980. The inspector reviewed these reports and examined the damage and progress of recovery efforts following the derrick collapse.
The volcanic ash fall does not appear to have had a deleterious effect on safety related structures or components due to the actions taken by the licensee and the results of tests conducted on the ash. The eruption of Mt. St. Helens deposited approximately 3/8-inch of ash on the WNP-3/5 site. All construction activity was halted after the eruption and did not resume until it had been determined that the fallout would not have detrimental effects on construction activities or storage of equipment. Actions taken included general inspections, restrictions on the release and movement of materials, removal of ash from aggregate storage piles, compressive strength correlations for cubes cast with contaminated sand, washdown of stored piping and embeds, and increased concrete testing frequencies.
When the 150-ton capacity guyed derrick used by Chicago ' Bridge and Iron to support construction of the containment vessel at WNP-3 collapsed, sections of the 496 foot tower and nast fell into the Reactor Auxiliary Building, where the base of the tower was located, damaging wall and floor slabs. Only three minor injuries resulted, primarily because of the reassignment of personnel to deal with the volcanic ash fall from tit. St. Helens.
The project investigation team attributed the derrick collapse to failure of three boom studs and the subsequent impact of the boom on the tower.
All areas of damage were identified by photographs and nonconformance reports were written on all damaged structural elements. Detailed inspection programs were developed to accompany the disposition of these nonconformances.
It appeared that rework and repairs were being carried out in accordance
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-11-10. Management Meeting On March 27, 1981, the inspectors met with the licensee and engineering unageraent personr.el denoted in Paragraph 1.
The inspectors discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. Licensee representatives acknowledged the concern over the possibility of voiding quality assurance deficiency documents and stated that action will be taken to develop
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a project policy on this issue.
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