IR 05000498/2025004
| ML26036A258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/2026 |
| From: | Douglas Dodson NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBC |
| To: | Kharrl C South Texas |
| Kumana R | |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26036A258 (0) | |
Text
February 11, 2026
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2025004 AND 05000499/2025004
Dear Charles Kharrl:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. On January 14, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Robert Norris, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief Reactor Projects Branch C Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000498 and 05000499 License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000498 and 05000499
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000498/2025004 and 05000499/2025004
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-004-0012
Licensee:
STP Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Wadsworth, TX
Inspection Dates:
August 3, 2025, to December 31, 2025
Inspectors:
B. Baca, Health Physicist
R. Bywater, Senior Project Engineer
N. Denney, Health Physicist
J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector
L. Flores, Resident Inspector
J. Kirkland, Senior Operations Engineer
B. Tharakan, Technical Assistant
J. Vera, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Williams, Operations Engineer
Approved By:
Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Monitor the Performance of the Qualified Display Processing System Performance Under the Maintenance Rule Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] - Procedure Adherence 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65(a)(1), for failure to monitor the performance of a maintenance rule scoped system against licensee-established goals. Specifically, the licensee failed to monitor the performance of the Qualified Display Processing System (QDPS) in a manner sufficient to provide assurance that it was capable of fulfilling its intended functions.
Specifically, the licensee managed QDPS performance under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) performance criteria while not having preventive maintenance established to ensure QDPS remained capable of performing its intended functions, resulting in the failure to monitor QDPS performance against licensee-established goals as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).
Foreign Material Results in Failure of Reactor Containment Isolation Valve to Close Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000498/2025004-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to perform an adequate foreign material closeout inspection as required by Procedure 0PGP03-ZA-0014, Foreign Material Exclusion Program, Revision 41, a quality related procedure. Specifically, a foreign material exclusion cover was not removed after performing work that breached a system connected to safety-related reactor containment fan coolers, and it became lodged in the valve, preventing its closure.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000498,05000499/2024050-06 Repeated Failures of Steam Generator Power-Operated Relief Valves 71152A Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and commenced a reactor shutdown on October 3, 2025, to begin refueling outage 2RE24. The main generator breaker was closed on November 5, 2025, ending the refueling outage. The unit returned to rated thermal power on November 8, 2025. On November 21, 2025, the unit automatically tripped due to unit main transformer and auxiliary transformer lockouts and entered forced outage 2F2501 to perform repairs. The main generator breaker was closed on November 25, 2025, ending forced outage 2F2501. The unit returned to rated thermal power on November 26, 2025, and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1, trains A and C residual heat removal system on October 23, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, trains A, B, and C electrical switchgear rooms on December 19, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 2, reactor containment building on October 23, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, train A control room HVAC equipment room on December 8, 2025 71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)
Due to the government shutdown, this inspection was completed remotely via in office document review. The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing documents associated with the following activities in Unit 2 during refueling outage 2RE24.
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding
Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:
- (1) Ultrasonic Examination
- reactor coolant system, 4-RC-2323-BBI Weld 2, 2-WD-105620, thermal fatigue: pipe to elbow
- reactor coolant system, 4-RC-2323-BBI Weld 3, 2-WD-105630, thermal fatigue: elbow to pipe
- component cooling water (CCW), 30 EW-2105-WT3 CCW heat exchanger 2A, emergency cooling water (ECW) return line 30 pipe spool EW 2105-B
- CCW, ECW pump 2A discharge vent line 3 EW-2406, 1.5 and 1 piping spool
- chemical and volume control system, WIB-503, socket weld
- reactor coolant system, WIB-848, socket weld Visual 1 Examination
- main steam system, S/G 2A main steam outlet power-operated relief valve
- pressurizer, pressurizer manway bolts, 16 PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.02)
There was no ASME Code required inspection of the reactor vessel upper head this outage.
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following screenings and evaluations:
(1)
- 24-3317 7R212TFC0021B, spent fuel pool demineralizer 2B inlet valve
- 24-4109 N2CVPI0208B, boric acid filter outlet pressure indicator
- 24-4689 2R162TRH0159, residual heat removal loop 2C return to refueling water storage tank isolation valve
- 24-4692 1R162XRH0060A, residual heat removal pump 2A suction from loop 2A hot leg isolation motor-operated valve
- 25-3240 2R172XCV0090B, chemical and volume control system letdown TCV-0381B outlet isolation valve
- 25-6831 2N122XSI0001A, refueling water storage tank safety injection pumps train a suction isolation motor-operated valve
- 25-3248 2R172TCV5006, centrifugal charging pump 2B discharge vent valve PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (Section 03.04)
There was no ASME Code required inspection of steam generator tubes this outage.
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered from July 21 to September 4, 2025, and the biennial written examinations completed on December 17, 2025.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on Nov 17, 2025.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during plant shutdown and startup for refueling outage 2RE24 on November 5, 2025
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training involving a loss of offsite power and recovery actions on December 9, 2025
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1, train C reactor containment fan cooler chilled water/component cooling water return inside reactor containment isolation motor-operated valve leakage on October 17, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, QDPS Lo-Lo steam generator level and Delta-T Low Tave bistables on December 19, 2025
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2, essential chiller temperature and current limit control module on October 22, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1, train C jacket water temperature switch failure on October 16, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, train A essential chiller not maintaining outlet temperature on October 22, 2025
- (3) Unit 1, train C essential chiller exceeding maximum allowable outlet temperature on October 27, 2025
- (4) Unit 1, train B reactor containment fan cooler outside containment isolation valve, MOV-0137, failure to close on November 6, 2025
- (5) Unit 2, train B engineered safety features load sequencer manual local test failure on November 14, 2025
- (6) Unit 1, train C essential cooling water pump discharge strainer backflush throttle valve contained foreign material on November 24, 2025
- (7) Unit 1, train C diesel generator feeder breaker fuse misalignment on December 2, 2025
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the forced outage 2F2501 due to the primary differential protection circuit relay 87A actuation from November 21-25, 2025
- (2) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 2RE24 activities from October 3 to November 5, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2, train B engineered safety feature actuation and response time test on October 30, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, low power physics testing on November 14, 2025
- (3) Unit 2, control rod drop timing measurement testing on November 24, 2025
- (4) Unit 2, main steam safety relief valve testing on November 25, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2, train A low head safety injection/high head safety injection comprehensive pump testing on October 17, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, train B emergency diesel generator engineered safety feature actuation test for a loss of offsite power on October 30, 2025
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2, containment penetration M-41 testing during refueling outage 2RE24 on November 6, 2025
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2, increase in reactor coolant system unidentified leakage on December 18, 2025
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2, train B FLEX diesel generator loaded run on December 3, 2025
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicator submittals listed below:
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1 through September 31, 2025 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1 through September 31, 2025 71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2, repetitive failures of steam generator power-operated relief valves (URI 05000498, 05000499 /2024050-06) on September 5, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, switchyard fire cause and subsequent switchyard component performance on September 5, 2025
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions associated with the cross-cutting theme in Avoid Complacency to develop insights into the licensees progress in addressing the theme.
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a Unit 2 reactor trip and licensee performance on November 21, 2025
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Monitor the Performance of the Qualified Display Processing System Performance Under the Maintenance Rule Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] - Procedure Adherence 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), for failure to monitor the performance of a maintenance rule scoped system against licensee-established goals. Specifically, the licensee failed to monitor the performance of the QDPS in a manner sufficient to provide assurance that it was capable of fulfilling its intended functions. Specifically, the licensee managed QDPS performance under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) performance criteria while not having preventive maintenance established to ensure QDPS remained capable of performing its intended functions, resulting in the failure to monitor QDPS performance against licensee-established goals as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).
Description:
The QDPS is an integrated system designed, in part, to process safety grade signal processing and control of several safety-related SSCs and is subject to the maintenance rule.
On January 11, 2025, the Unit 1 control room received multiple alarms and noted loop 3 Thot/Tave began to fluctuate erratically. The failures resulted in the unplanned inoperability of multiple channels of reactor trip system and engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation including reactor coolant system (RCS) loop 3 delta T/Tave and steam generator narrow range levels. The licensee determined the cause to be a digital to analog board failure and replaced the board.
On March 11, 2025, the Unit 1 control room received multiple alarms associated with QDPS card APC-B2. The failure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of multiple channels of reactor trip system and ESFAS instrumentation including RCS loop 2 delta T/Tave and steam generator narrow range levels. This prompted the inspectors to review the maintenance program for the QDPS to understand whether the licensee was appropriately conducting maintenance. On this occasion, the licensee again determined the cause to be a digital to analog board failure and replaced the board.
The inspectors reviewed the implementation of the maintenance rule regarding the QDPS. The inspectors noted that the licensee managed the system as one with performance being effectively controlled through preventive maintenance and meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). The performance criteria for the system to remain in (a)(2) included, in part, no more than six maintenance rule functional failures (MRFFs) per unit per 18 months, no repetitive MRFFs, and no more than 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of unavailability per train per 18 months.
The inspectors reviewed the preventive maintenance strategy for the circuit boards and noted that they were run-to-failure, with no preventive maintenance in place to periodically inspect or replace the boards. The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedure SEG-0014, Maintenance Rule Program Users Guide, Revision 3 and noted that step 2.31 states, in part, run-to-failure implies that the associated maintenance rule function is of low or no risk significance, in which the consequences of planned maintenance to prevent failure are comparable with the consequences of actual failure. The inspectors found that QDPS is identified as a risk significant system under the licensees maintenance rule system scoping basis report and that the subject circuit boards were graded as high-risk components. The inspectors also reviewed the system health report and equipment reliability data for the QDPS and noted that the reliability of the QDPS is considered low and that the system is at high risk of failures due to circuit boards reaching end-of-life.
The inspectors reviewed QDPS performance within the last 4 years, with failures noted as follows:
1. On February 22, 2021, the Unit 1 control room received multiple alarms associated with
QDPS card APC-A2 failure. The failure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of multiple safety-related SSCs. In particular, the inoperability of the train A steam generator power-operated relief valve (PORV) required entry into a 72-hour shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO) due to previous ongoing planned maintenance on the train C PORV, which had rendered it inoperable. Additionally, the train A auxiliary feedwater pump was declared inoperable. The licensee determined the cause of the failure was a communication board failure.
2. On May 8, 2022, the Unit 2 control room received multiple alarms associated with
QDPS card APC-D2 failure. The failure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of multiple safety-related SSCs. In particular, the inoperability of the train D auxiliary feedwater pump required entry into a 72-hour shutdown LCO without the Configuration Risk Management Program available, and the inoperability of the train D steam generator PORV required entry into a 7-day shutdown LCO. The licensee determined the cause of the failure to be a communication board failure and replaced the board.
3. On June 26, 2022, the Unit 1 control room received multiple alarms associated with
QDPS card APC-A1 and APC-A2 failures. The failure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of multiple safety-related SSCs. In particular, the inoperability of the train A residual heat removal pump required entry into a 7-day shutdown LCO, and the inoperability of the train A steam generator PORV required entry into a 7-day shutdown LCO. Additionally, the train A auxiliary feedwater pump was declared inoperable. The licensee determined the cause of the failure was the central processing unit (CPU)board and replaced the board.
4. On July 23, 2022, the Unit 1 control room received multiple alarms associated with a
QDPS card APC-B2 failure. The failure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of multiple safety-related SSCs. In particular, the inoperability of the train B steam generator PORV required entry into a 7-day shutdown LCO. Additionally, the train B auxiliary feedwater pump was declared inoperable. The licensee determined the cause of the failure was a communication board failure and replaced the board.
5. On May 3 and 18, 2023, the Unit 1 control room received multiple alarms associated
with QDPS card APC-D2. The failures resulted in the unplanned inoperability of multiple channels of reactor trip system and ESFAS instrumentation including RCS loop 2 delta T/Tave and steam generator narrow range levels. The licensee determined the cause of the failure was the CPU board in both cases and replaced the boards.
In addition, the inspectors noted that subsequent to the failures in January and March, 2025, further failures occurred on April 1, 2025; April 16, 2025; July 7, 2025; July 24, 2025; August 1, 2025; and August 16, 2025.
On May 26, 2021, the system was placed in (a)(1) due to exceeding unavailability hours but subsequently returned to (a)(2) on September 22, 2021. On August 31, 2022, the licensee placed the system in (a)(1) status due to train 1B exceeding unavailability hours. The following goal for monitoring performance of the QDPS was established: less than 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of unavailability for train B. Additionally, train 1D exceeded unavailability hours on August 30, 2023, and the following goal was established: less than one repetitive MRFF for train 1D. On September 26, 2024, and December 5, 2024, train 1B and train 1D, respectively, were placed back in (a)(2) status after meeting their established goals. The QDPS was placed in (a)(2)status on December 5, 2024. Subsequently, the system was placed in (a)(1) again on June 11, 2025.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the QDPS circuit boards was effectively being controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance because no preventive maintenance had been established or performed, even as multiple failures occurred. The inspectors concluded that the licensee had, therefore, failed to monitor the system as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)during the periods of time the system was placed under (a)(2) status.
Corrective Actions:
The licensee currently maintains spare circuit boards onsite and has a long-range plan to replace the QDPS. Additionally, the QDPS will now remain in (a)(1) status until it is replaced.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report (CR)s: 2021-3510, 2022-4487, 2022-7145, 2022-6207, 2023-4728, 2023-5226, 2025-344, 2025-2468, 2025-3147
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance to demonstrate that the performance of the QDPS was being effectively controlled per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee adopted a run-to-failure approach for QDPS components, performing no preventive maintenance while managing the system as one that had performance that was effectively controlled through preventive maintenance, even as multiple QDPS failures occurred.
Screening:
The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to incorporate preventive maintenance for safety-related circuit boards in the QDPS resulted in the unplanned inoperability of multiple safety-related systems.
Significance:
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated November 30, 2020. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because it (1)was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC,
- (2) does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) function of a single train technical specification (TS) system for greater than its TS allowed outage time,
- (3) does not represent a loss of the PRA function of one train of a multi-train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time,
- (4) does not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate TS systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
- (5) does not represent a loss of PRA system and/or function as defined by the plant risk information e-book or the licensees PRA for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and (6)does not represent a loss of the PRA function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect:
H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee did not follow their procedures when establishing preventive maintenance for the QDPS resulting in implementation of a run-to-failure strategy that was not valid for risk significant components of the QDPS that have safety functions.
Enforcement:
Violation: As required, in part, by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), the holders of an operating license shall monitor the performance or condition of SSCs within the scope of the rule as defined by 10 CFR 50.65(b), against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), states, in part, that monitoring as specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) is not required where it has been demonstrated that the performance or condition of an SSC is being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function.
Contrary to the above, from September 22, 2021, to August 31, 2022, and December 5, 2024, to June 11, 2025, the licensee failed to monitor the performance or condition of SSCs within the scope of the rule against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide assurance that it was capable of fulfilling its intended functions. Specifically, the licensee managed QDPS performance under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) performance criteria while not demonstrating that the performance of QDPS was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance, resulting in the failure to monitor QDPS performance against licensee-established goals in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that QDPS remained capable of fulfilling its intended safety-related functions.
Enforcement Action:
This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Foreign Material Results in Failure of Reactor Containment Isolation Valve to Close Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000498/2025004-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to perform an adequate foreign material closeout inspection as required by Procedure 0PGP03-ZA-0014, Foreign Material Exclusion Program, Revision 41, a quality related procedure. Specifically, a foreign material exclusion cover was not removed after performing work that breached a system connected to safety-related reactor containment fan coolers, and it became lodged in the valve, preventing its closure.
Description:
The reactor containment fan cooler (RCFC) outside containment isolation valve (OCIV), CC-0137, is an 8-inch motor-operated butterfly valve that is normally open to provide water to the RCFCs from the non-safety-related reactor containment building (RCB) chilled water system. Upon receipt of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) or safety injection signal, the valves safety function is to close to provide containment isolation, and the safety-related component cooling water system (CCW) then provides water to the RCFCs. The subject valve can be manually operated from the control room using a hand switch. Failure of the valve to close prevents the opening of both the CCW supply and return containment isolation valves due to an interlock; thus, failure of the valve to close prevents CCW flow to the RCFCs during accident conditions.
On September 23, 2025, while securing train B RCFC for equipment rotation, the RCFC train B chilled water supply OCIV, CC-0137, failed to close using the control room hand switch. The control room indication showed the valve in the intermediate position. An operator was dispatched to investigate and found that the CC-0137 motor was hot to the touch, emitting acrid vapors, and the lubricant was smoldering. Local indication showed the valve to be partially open; the breaker was not trip free but showed an overload indication light. The licensee declared the train B RCFCs inoperable and disassembled CC-0137 to perform troubleshooting.
Upon disassembly of the valve, the licensee found an 18-inch partially intact FME cover lodged in the valve seat, which prevented the valve from fully closing. The FME cover was missing part of the nylon material, the black string, and plastic cord lock. The licensee reviewed recent work history of both the RCB chilled water system and CCW system but could not determine when the foreign material was introduced into the breached system. Based on the location of the FME, the licensee presumed that the FME cover came from the RCB chilled water system.
The inspectors questioned the licensee about the type of maintenance that would require use of an 18-inch FME cover in the RCB chilled water system. The licensee could not provide a definitive answer but stated that 18-inch FME covers would be used during installation and removal of temporary coolers to support refueling outages. The last refueling outage, 1RE25, ended on November 10, 2024.
A review of recent CCW pump surveillances was performed to determine if there was any challenge to operation of the CCW pumps, and no challenges were identified. The inspectors reviewed recent maintenance and surveillances and noted that the valve was last operated successfully on September 14, 2025, during surveillance testing.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 0PGP03-ZA-0014, Foreign Material Exclusion Program, Revision 41 and noted that FMEZ 2 controls are required when breaching of a system or component is performed. Step 5.5.7 states, in part, when all work activities are completed, all FME devices and FME covers are to be removed. Further, for FMEZ 2 controls, a two-person closeout inspection is required to be performed. Step 5.5.19 states, in part, remove and account for all FME devices used to establish and maintain FME controls. The inspectors were unable to determine if a two-party FME closeout inspection was performed because the licensee was unable to determine the exact maintenance performed that breached the system and introduced the FME cover.
The licensee performed borescope inspections on piping upstream and downstream of the CC-0137 OCIV but did not identify any further FME. The valve and actuator were rebuilt, and the motor was replaced. Train B RCFCs were returned to operable after successful post-maintenance testing on September 26, 2025.
Corrective Actions:
The licensee restored the valve and performed an engineering evaluation of the unretrievable FME and determined that it would not challenge train B RCFCs or CCW system operation.
Corrective Action References: CRs 2025-8512 and 2025-8375
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to perform an adequate foreign material closeout inspection for work performed on a breached system as required by site Procedure 0PGP03-ZA-0014, Foreign Material Exclusion Program, Revision 41 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, an FME cover was not removed during restoration from maintenance, and the cover became lodged in the RCFC OCIV, CC-0137, preventing its closure.
Screening:
The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the presence of the foreign material prevented RCFC OCIV, CC-0137, from performing its safety function to close for containment isolation and align CCW for containment heat removal.
Significance:
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, Section C, Reactor Containment, dated November 21, 2020. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency represented a failure of containment heat removal components, and as a result, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, dated March 23, 2020. The inspectors applied Appendix H, Table 4.1, Containment-Related SSCs Considered for LERF [large early release frequency]
Implications, and Figure 4.1, LER-based Significance Determination Process, for Type B findings. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because the RCFC OCIV, CC-0137, does not impact LERF significance.
Cross-Cutting Aspect:
H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the inadequate FME closeout inspection resulted in an FME cover being left behind in a breached system, causing OCIV CC-0137 to fail to close, an undesired consequence, and unplanned inoperability of train B RCFCs.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Procedure 0PGP03-ZA-0014, Foreign Material Exclusion Program, a quality related procedure, requires the licensee to remove all FME devices used to establish and maintain FME controls.
Contrary to the above, on or about November 10, 2024, the licensee failed to accomplish an activity affecting quality in accordance with prescribed instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee failed to remove all FME devices used to establish and maintain FME controls in accordance with Procedure 0PGP03-ZA-0014, Foreign Material Exclusion Program, a quality related procedure to which 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, applies. Specifically, an FME cover was not removed during restoration activities from work performed on a breached system, resulting in the FME cover becoming lodged in RCFC OCIV CC-0137 and preventing its closure on September 23, 2025.
Enforcement Action:
This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item (Closed)
Repeated Failures of Steam Generator Power-Operated Relief Valves URI 05000498,05000499/2024050-06 71152A
Description:
In 2024 South Texas Project experienced multiple steam generator (SG) PORV failures in both units. These failures involved erratic movement or the failure of the SG PORV to stroke on demand. The licensee dispositioned each of them in their corrective action program using their lowest level causal evaluation, a Prompt Equipment Performance Checklist. The charter for a special inspection team that was onsite in September 2024 included review of SG PORV failures over the past 2 years, review of the licensees causal products for the SG PORVs, and gathering of information to support the significance determination process, if required. The licensee had not begun work on a common cause evaluation by the time of the special inspection; therefore, this URI was opened to review the licensees common cause evaluation when completed.
The inspectors followed up on the common cause evaluation and noted that the most notable equipment issue leading to SG PORV failures was associated with a control/indication potentiometer. The inspectors noted that a finding and associated non-cited violation 05000498/2024001-03 had been previously issued in inspection report 05000498/2024001 and 05000499/2024001 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML24123A073) for two of the failures included in the scope of the evaluation, which were not due to potentiometer issues.
The inspectors noted that STP had independently evaluated SG PORV potentiometer failures as recently as late 2023. On October 27, 2023, STP received a 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) interim evaluation of deviation from Curtiss Wright Flow Control Co. indicating that a shorter wiper had been used in the manufacture of potentiometers, which could introduce momentary signal interruptions. STP identified four of these potentiometers installed in SG PORVs onsite. On December 12, 2023, Curtiss Wright notified STP that the evaluation had been completed and that their assessment confirmed that the deviation does not pose a substantial safety hazard nor violate any license technical specification safety limits. The inspectors assessed that the failures that occurred in 2024 and the licensees subsequent failure analysis results conflicted with Curtis Wrights assessment. Based on the knowledge the licensee had at the time the failures occurred in 2024, the inspectors concluded that the cause of the failures was not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and did not identify a performance deficiency associated with the SG PORV failures due to potentiometer issues. URI 05000498,05000499/2024050-06 is closed.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR 2024-10685, CR 2024-750, CR 2024-4183, CR 2024-4879, and CR 2024-7221 Observation: Semiannual Trend Review - Avoid Complacency Cross-Cutting Theme Corrective Actions 71152S The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program, performance indicators, CRs, and other documentation available to help identify performance trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. Specifically, the inspectors verified that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address a cross-cutting theme in the Avoid Complacency aspect of the Human Performance Area, which was identified by the NRC in the annual assessment letter dated March 11, 2025 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML25062A164).
The inspectors reviewed the licensees actions to address the theme. The licensee wrote CR 24-9528 and CR 25-2464, which included a streaming analysis to assess staff motivation, work prioritization, and awareness of the issue. The licensee identified that the majority of the issues fell into the Programmatic Deficiencies category relating to insufficient program details.
The licensee identified deficiencies such as gaps in program design, insufficient feedback for individuals using procedures, a lack of Questioning Attitude, and instances of rationalization to find and sustainability fix issues. The licensee found that investigations, in most instances, utilized a low level, surface-deep analysis and did not address the root cause or the behavioral aspect of the issue. Through benchmarking, the licensee found the gaps were not procedural but behavioral.
The licensee leveraged actions from previous efforts in CR 24-11222 to address the theme, focusing on causal products, contracting vendor experts to perform causal investigations to reduce backlog and scheduling training on performing causal investigations. Other actions, such as improving leadership fundamentals and setting high-level station goals, also assisted in improving station performance in Avoid Complacency.
The inspectors noted that during 2025, only one finding was assigned the Avoid Complacency cross-cutting aspect, which will be documented in this report under the results section.
Therefore, station performance has improved in this aspect in 2025.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On December 22, 2025, the inspectors presented the Unit 2 inservice inspection results to Andrew Richards, Director of Regulatory Affairs and Emergency Response, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 30, 2025, the inspectors presented the licensed operator requalification inspection results to Andrew Richards, Directory of Regulatory Assurance, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On January 14, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Robert Norris, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Residual Heat Removal System Operation
Switchgear E1A(E2A) Bus Outage
Switchgear E1B(E2B) Bus Outage
Procedures
Switchgear E1C(E2C) Bus Outage
Fire Preplan Electrical Auxiliary Building Control Room HVAC
Equipment Room, Train A
Fire Preplan Reactor Containment Building Central Reactor
Area (Upper)
Fire Preplan Reactor Containment Building NW Peripheral
Area
Fire Plans
Fire Preplan Reactor Containment Building NW Peripheral
Area
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-
20-2783, 20-12391, 22-8090, 22-11701, 22-12102, 23-1255,
23-10699, 23-10700, 23-10701, 24-1738, 24-2899, 24-3143,
24-3176, 24-3313, 24-3316, 24-3366, 24-3402, 24-3642,
24-3732, 24-3813, 24-3819, 24-4039, 24-4042, 24-4071,
24-4072, 24-4073, 24-4666, 24-4728, 24-4798, 24-4943,
24-4946, 24-4975, 24-5961, 24-6607, 24-7444, 24-7715,
24-8155, 24-8202, 24-8513, 24-8515, 24-8518, 24-8519,
24-8525, 24-8527, 24-8533, 24-8665, 24-8672, 24-9348,
24-9476, 24-9490, 24-11042, 24-11849, 24-11866, 24-12509,
25-1945, 25-2932, 25-3138, 25-3244, 25-3248, 25-3685,
25-4341, 25-4462, 25-5208, 25-5239, 25-5283, 25-5544, 25-
6314, 25-7015, 25-7338, 25-7342
3M369PCH0211
Chilled Water Sheet 3
4C369PRC0457
Essential Cooling Water Sheet A03
Drawings
4C369PRC457
Reactor Coolant, Sheet A03
Engineering
Changes
24-2899-8
Installation of Socket Weld Coupling Downstream of Elbow on
2"-RC-2418-BB1 Line
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Condition Report
Engineering
Evaluation (CREE)
20-12391-11
Structural Integrity Associates' (SIA's) Evaluation Report
2001280.302
07/28/2021
Miscellaneous
Condition Report
Engineering
Evaluation (CREE)
24-1738-1
Essential Cooling Water Self-Cleaning Strainer 2C
2/22/2024
0PEP10ZA0010
0PEP10ZA0017
Magnetic Particle
0PEP10ZA0023
Visual Component Supports
0PEP10ZA0024
VT1 and VT3
Chemical Control Program
ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Activities
RCS Pressure Boundary Inspection for Boric Acid Leaks
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
Control of Transient Fire Loads and Use of Combustible and
Flammable Liquids and Gases
Station Self-Assessment Program
Engineering and Vendor Document Processing
0PMP02-ZW-0001 General Welding Requirements
0001A
ASME Repair/Replacement Welding Requirement
0001B
ASME/ANSI B31.1 Welding Requirements
0001C
AWS/HVAC Welding Requirements
Procedures
0001D
Welding Documentation Requirements
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
0PMP02-ZW-0002 Welding Procedure Specification Preparation and
Qualification
0PMP02-ZW-0003 Welder Qualification and Certification
0PMP02-ZW-0004 Control of Filler Materials
0PMP02-ZW-0005 Control of Post Weld Heat Treatment
0PMP02-ZW-0006 Arc Wire Thermal Spray Coatings
0PMP04-EW-0003 Essential Cooling Water Self Cleaning Strainer Maintenance
0018A
Non-Rapid Refueling Mechanical Support
0POP02-EW-0001 Essential Cooling Water Operations
TR 1025145
Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook
Work Orders
WAN
610407, 658637, 661422, 662842, 665981, 666979, 666978,
679803, 691414, 699656, 705080
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-
25-5625, 25-5626, 25-5627, 25-6552, 25-6598
ANSI/ANS-3.4-
1983Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI/ANS-3.4-</br></br>1983" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process.
Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring
Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants
1983
Miscellaneous
Scenarios 22, 31;
JPMs 026.01,
2.02,
60.02,144.02,
155.01, 161.01
Annual Requalification Operating Tests for Week 5
08/04/2025
Qualification of Plant Staff Personnel
28A
Medical Examinations-NRC Regulated
Licensed Operator Requalification
Examination Security
LOR Training Program
Procedures
Initial Operator License and Licensed Operator Programs
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Reactor Startup
Plant Shutdown From 100% to Hot Standby
0POP05-EO-ES01 Reactor Trip Response
71111.11Q Procedures
0POP05-EO-ES02 Natural Circulation Cooldown
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
25-7212, 2025-6833, 2025-6593, 2025-6067, 2025-3147,
25-2468, 2025-0344, 2025-0251, 2023-5226, 2023-4728,
22-4487, 2022-6207, 2025-6355
Engineering
Changes
14-5311-23
Approve UCI-TCM-1A Temperature Control Modules for
Essential Chillers
04/19/2017
4310--002121M
Vendor Technical Document Seismic Qualification Report
Temperature & Current Limit Control Module Replacement
Potentiometer Adjustment Assemblies
A
4310--002131M
Vendor Technical Document Specifications Certificate of
Conformance Repair Report Temperature & Current Limit
Control Module
A
4310--00219IM
Equivalency Evaluation for Upgrade of Temperature Control
Point and Max Load Adjustment of Part Number UCI-TCM-1A
A
MREP Meeting
Agenda 06.11.25
Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Agenda
06/11/2025
MREP Meeting
Agenda 12.10.25
Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Agenda
2/10/2025
STI 31862201
Functional Test Procedure for Temperature Current Modules
11/13/2000
Miscellaneous
STI#34699942
Maintenance Rule System Scoping Basis Report
SEG-0009
Maintenance Rule Basis Document Guideline
Procedures
SEG-0014
Maintenance Rule Program Users Guideline
Work Orders
Work Authorization
Number (WAN)
689772, 730742
Calculations
MC06482
Essential Chilled Water/EAB HVAC Design Basis Loas with
Capacity of 300 Tons per Train
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
25-7645, 2024-8430, 2024-8472, 2025-6772, 2025-8375,
25-7103, 2025-8415
5Q159F22540#1
Piping & Instrument Diagram Standby Diesel Jacket Water
Drawings
5R209F05018#1
Piping and Instrument Diagram Component Cooling Water
System
5Q159MB1023
Design Basis Document Standby Diesel Generator System
Miscellaneous
5V369VB00120
Design Basis Document Chilled Water System
Foreign Material Exclusion Program
Procedures
Essential Chiller Operation
Reactor Startup
Plant Shutdown from 100% to Hot Standby
Plant Cooldown
101
Procedures
Refueling Operations
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
25-8932, 2025-8299, 2024-3387, 2025-8508
Initial Criticality and Low Power Physics Testing Using
RhoPRO
RCS Leakage Monitoring
FLEX Diesel Generator Performance Test
Reactor Coolant Inventory
Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1A(2A) Comprehensive
Pump Test
High Head Safety Injection Pump 1A(2A) Comprehensive
Pump Test
Automatic Multiple Rod Drop Time Measurement
Main Steam Safety Valve Inservice Test
OPSP03-DG-0007
Standby Diesel 11(21) LOOP Test
Procedures
OPSP03-DG-0013
Standby Diesel 11(21) LOOP - ESF Actuation Test
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
Work Authorization
Number (WAN)
650909, 650935, 723809, 723786, 723822, 723826, 723810,
23813, 723814, 723817, 723815, 723819, 714476, 714478,
698358, 707937, 698528, 687879, 687826
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
24-07893, 2024-09870, 2024-10296, 2024-10343,
24-10367, 2024-10756, 2024-10897, 2025-03602
Personnel RCA entries greater than 100 mrem: April 2024
through September 2025
NOC-AE-
25004102
24 Radioactive Effluent Release Report
04/21/2025
Permit 3881
Liquid Effluent Permit: Unit 2 First Quarter 2025
03/23/2025
Permit 3882
Liquid Effluent Permit: Unit 1 First Quarter 2025
03/24/2025
Permit 3914
Liquid Effluent Permit: Unit 2 Second Quarter 2025
06/27/2025
Permit 3917
Liquid Effluent Permit: Unit 1 Second Quarter 2025
06/30/2025
Permit 3969
Liquid Effluent Permit: Unit 1 Third Quarter 2025
09/26/2025
Permit 3970
Liquid Effluent Permit: Unit 2 Third Quarter 2025
09/29/2025
Work Activity
Number 704392
Offsite Dose Procedure Performance Data Sheet: 2025
Second Quarter
07/07/2025
Work Activity
Number 708923
Offsite Dose Procedure Performance Data Sheet: 2025 Third
Quarter
10/03/2025
Miscellaneous
Work Activity
Number: 699359
Offsite Dose Procedure Performance Data Sheet: 2025 First
Quarter
04/08/2025
MSPI Bases Document
Preparation and Submittal of NRC Performance Indicators
Procedures
SEG-0007
Mitigating System Performance Indicator Collection,
Processing, and Maintenance of Data
71151
Radiation Surveys
Plant Air Sample Results report: April 2024 through
September 2025
CR 24-10685
Common Cause for Steam Generator PORVs
11/9/2024
Miscellaneous
CR 24-4879
Root Cause Evaluation: Failure of SG PORV 2C
07/2/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR 24-7216
Root Cause Evaluation: Loss of Offsite Power Resulting in a
Unit 1 Automatic Reactor Trip and an Unplanned Power
Reduction in Unit 2
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
24-9528, 2025-2464, 2024-11222, 2024-1162, 2024-4015,
24-1979, 2024-6506, 2024-8896
Procedures
Reactor Trip Response
30