IR 05000498/1979011
| ML19207C516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1979 |
| From: | Crossman W, Randy Hall, Hubacek W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19207C515 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-79-11, 50-499-79-11, NUDOCS 7909120165 | |
| Download: ML19207C516 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No.
50-498/79-11; 50-499/79-11 Docket No.
50-498; 50-499 Category A2 Licensee:
lloustou Lighting and Power Company Post Office Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name:
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection conducted:
June 26-28, 1979
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7[/7[79 Inspectors:
y W. G. Hubacek, Reactor Inspector, Projects Date Section (Paragraphs 1, 2, 4 & 5)
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g.P.Tomlinson,ReactorInspector, Engineering Dat'e Support Section (Paragraph 3)
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Other Accompanying Personnel:
D. P. Richardson, Co-Op, Engineering Support Section
7!77 Approved by:
m W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section Date
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R. E.
Hall, Chief, Engineering Support Section
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on June 26-28 1979 (Report No. 50-498/79-11; 50-499/79-11)
n Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of construction activities to include review of a reported 50.55(e) item related to voids in the concrete of lift 8 of the Unit 1 Reactor Containment Building wall; and observation of work activities and review of records related to fabrication of NSSS equipment supports.
The inspection involved forty inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Details 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees R. A. Frazar, QA Manager
- D. G. Barker, Manager, South Texas Project
- T.
R. Alford, Site Manager
- T. D. Stanley, Project QA Supervisor
- L. D. Wilson, Site QA Supervisor
- C. L. Grosso, QA Associate Engineer
- F. W. Stoerkel, Project QA Supervisor, Allens Creek G. A. Marshall, Senior QA Specialist Other Personnel
- J. Dodd, Senior Construction Manager, Brown and Root (B&R)
- R. A. Sanford, Assistant Project General Manager, B&R
- C. W. Vincent, Project QA Manager, B&R kG. T. Warnick, Site QA Manager, B&R G. Morgan, Subcontract Surveillance Supervisor, B&R H. L. Casanova, Senior Lead Inspector / Field Coordinator, B&R S. Horton, Internal Surveillance Specialist, B&R S. Shah, Engineer, B&R E. Tolley, Construction Chief Engineer, B&R B. N. Kesarinath, Chief Engineer, RCB 1 and 2, B&R ET. J. Foley, Site QA Manager, Pittsburgh Des Moines (PDM)
- W. Hinz, Inspector, PDM AA. Prosch, Inspector, PDM The IE inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor employees including members of the QA/QC and engineering staffs.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Review of the Status of a Reported 50.55(e) Item The IE inspector reviewed the status of a reported 50.55(e) construction deficiency concerning three voids which were discovered in the concrete behind the steel liner of the Unit 1 Reactor Contaimnent Building (RCB)
exterior shell wall. The voids are located near the equipment hatch in lift 8 of the exterior shell wall. The voids were discovered by drilling into suspected void areas which were detected by sounding on the steel liner.
Drilling of all suspected void areas in lift 8 has not been completed.
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As a result of the discovery of the voids, the licensee issued an order on June 22, 1979, which stopped work on the placement of all safety related concrete, including the RCB exterior shell walls.
Ir. addition the licensee is currently reviewing concrete placement. procedures and performing an evaluation of the RCB Unit I void areas to determine possible causes for the formation of the voids. A licensee representative stated that a program is being developed for examination of other under-the-liner concrete areas of the RCBs for Units 1 and 2.
The IE inspector examined the void areas which were visible through 1-1/4" holes drilled in the 3/8" steel liner.
The voids were observed to be in an area under the eight inch wide horizontal steel channels which serve as stiffeners for the liner. Exposed reinforcing steel was observed in the voids.
The IE inspector reviewed documents related to concrete placements in lift 8 to determine if any conditions leading to formation of voids were recorded by QC inspectors during concrete placement activities. The following documents were reviewed:
Concrete Pour Card and related inspection records for CSI-W8, EL 57'
to 67' AZ 166", 45' to 203, 19' 13" Concrete Pour Card and related inspection records for CSI-W8, EL 57'
to 67' AZ 0 to 23, 43', AZ 36, 17' to 106, 44' 38", AZ 239,
40' 47" to 360 Concrete Pour Card and related inspection records for CSI-W8A, EL 58'
to 63' equipment hatch blockout Concrete Pour Card and related inspection records for CSI-8E, EL 63'
to 63'
9", equipment hatch blockout Concrete Pour Card and related inspection records for CSI-W8G, EL 63'
to 67'
9", equipment hatch blockout Inspection records for CSI-W8, El 57' to 67', AZ 21 25' to 38, 35'
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The IE inspector observed that the Concrete Pour Card f or pour CSI-W8 was annotated by the QC inspector indicating the presence of two voids on the vertical construction joints at the personnel airlock.
Repair of these voids was documented on Field Request for Engineering Action 1-C-0873, dated April 26, 1978. None of the other documents contained references to the presence of voids or indicated problems during the placements.
The IE inspector also observgd that the gA vault record package for pour CSI-W8, EL 57' to 67', AZ 21, 25' to 38, 35', did not contain a Concrete Pour Card.
The reason for the lack of a pour card for this placement was not determined; therefore, the IE inspector informed the licensee that this matter is considered unresolved pending the licensee's resolution and follow up by IE during a future inspection.
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During review of B&R Procedure CCP-4 " Concrete Placement and Finishing,"
Revision 9, dated June 25, 1979, the IE inspector observed that paragraphs 3.1.8, 3.1.9, 3.1.10 and 3.1.13 pertaining to venting of >ir pockets, congested areas, special preplacement inst ructions, ant. raining and experience of craft and supervisory personnel had been deleted.
(Procedure CCP-4, Revision 9, had just been issued; but, due to the stop work in effect on June 22, 1979, had not been used in safety related concrete placements).
During discussions with licensee representatives, it was stated that the above procedural requirements would be reinstated in CCP-4.
The matter of the reinstatement of the procedural requirements in CCP-4 is considered an unresolved item and will be followed during a subsequent IE inspection.
3.
Review of NSSS Support Welding And Related Activities a.
Review of Work Procedures The IE inspectors reviewed a total of thirteen work procedures presently being utilized in the procurement, fabrication, stress relief and inspection of eighteen support columns to be used in the Unit No. 2 containment structure.
In-use revisions of these procedures were checked against the current computer print-out to verify that correct documents and revisions were being used.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Review of Stress Relief Records The IE inspectors reviewed the stress relief records for columns AA-5 and AA-7.
The heat-treat recording charts were inspected and ccrapared to the Universal Stress Relieving, Inc., interpretation sheets and the parameters of procedure llT-2.
PDM had previously reviewed these charts and had identified and documented three apparent procedural deficiencies for each of the columns.
These are the only columns (AA-5 and AA-7) that have been through the stress relief cycle following welding. The six defi-ciencies noted were minor in nature and conflicted only with the procedure, but were not in violation of the ASME B&PV code.
Proper documentation has been generated by PDM.
The calibration records for a group of twenty thermocouples and four universal twenty-four point recorders were also checked.
One of the re orders was found by PDM to be operating erratically, two are to be used for redundant monitoring of each thermocouple, and the fourth recorder is to be used as a back-up in the event of a failure of an in-use instrument.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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c.
Observation of Work Activities A tour was made of the PDB1 fabrication shop by the IE inspectors.
Welding operations, fit-up of parts and ultrasonic examinations were witnessed along with an inspection of the PDFI weld filler material storage and issue facility.
Welders were observed performing both stick electrode and flux-core welding operations.
Individual welders'
identification code numbers were recorded and checked against the rod issue records.nd the current welder qualification list.
Personnel Qualification records and verification of current vision tests for all on-site PDF1 inspectors were reviewed and found to meet the requirements of SNT-TC-1A.
Ultrasonic inspectors were observed during the performance of instrument calibration, inspection and evaluation of indications.
Calibration records for inspection equipment used on site were also reviewed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Two unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraph 2.
5.
Exit Interview The IE inspectors met with licensee reprsentatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on June 28, 1979.
The IE inspectors summarized the purpose and che scope of the inspection and the findings.
A licensee representative acknowledged statements of the IE inspectot concerning the unresolved items.
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