IR 05000498/1979012
| ML19208B209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1979 |
| From: | Hubacek W, Tapia J, Tomlinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B198 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-79-12, 50-499-79-12, NUDOCS 7909190351 | |
| Download: ML19208B209 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
'1 Report No.
50-498/79-12; 50-499/79-12 Docket No.
50-498; 50-499 Category A2 Licensee:
Mauston Lighting and Power Company Post Office Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name:
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection conducted:
July 9-11 and July 16-19, 1979 Inspectors:
6-3 - VI J. IJ ' apia,'Kehchor Inspector, Engineering Support Date c ion (July \\ -11, 1979) (Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4,
Sc 5,
, & 8)
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pfw Sco3-79 nsyn, Reactor Inscector, Engin'eering Support Date
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Section (July 16-19,1979; (Paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6, 7,
& 8.)
Reviewed: ddkjw,d
?[3 />9 W. G. Hubacek, Reactor Inspector, Projects Section Date Approved: M N.@d4b 7/3[>9
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W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section Date
~ f rMr R. E. Hall, Chief, Engineering Support Section Date/
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7909190 N'I
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Inspectica Summary:
Inspection on July 9-11 and July 16-19, 1979 (Report No. 50-498/79-12; 50-499/79-12)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of reactor vessel installation; concrete voids in Unit I containment wall; identification of anchor bolt material; and follow-up review of unresolved items and previously identified items of non-compliance. The inspection involved forty-seven inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel W. N. Phillips, Project QA Manager
+*T. D. Stanley, Project QA Supervisor
- H. E. Orban, Construction Supervisor
+L. D. Wilson, Site QA Supervisor
+*T. J. Jordan, QA Lead Em3 neer i
+*D. G. Long, QA Lead Engineer M. S. Monteith, QA Technician
+*M. H. Smith, Plant QA Supervisor
+C. L. Grosso, QA Associate Engineer
+R.
L. Ulrey, Sr. QA Specialist Other Personnel
- G. T. Warnick, Site QA Manager, Brown & Root (B&R)
+*G. F. Ewert, Internal Surveillance Supervisor, B&P
- S. Rasnick, Assistant Manager of Construction Engineering B&R
+*J. Salvitti, Assistant Construction Project Manager, B&R G. R. Murphy, Assistant Project Structural Engineer, B&R B. D. Pointer, 'ngineering Concrete Technologist, B&R G. 1. Fisher, Discipline Manager, B&R M. K. Wanchoo, Engineering Supervisor of Construction, B&R J. Baker, Site Representative, Westinghouse M. Craig, Senior Civil Engineer, B&R
+B. N. Kesarinath, Area Chief Engineer RCB 1 & 2, B&R
+J. Dodd, Senior Construction Manager, B&R The IE inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor employees including members of the QA/QC and engineering staffs.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on July 11, 1979.
+ Denotes those attending the exit interview on July 19, 1979.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved item (50-498/78-16-1; 50-499/78-16-1):
Laci of QA/QC Surveillacce Requirement in Two Procedures.
Procedure A040KPECP-4, Revision 0, " Inspection of Terminal Lug Crimping Tools," and Procedure A040KPECP-5, Revision 0, " Inspection of Wire and Cable Strippers,"
have been deleted. The requirement for QA/QC surveillaace of inspection responsibility with respect ta these instruments has been included in Revisica 3 to Quality Construction Procedure A040KPECP-6, " Electrical Instaliations." Based on a review of this procedure, this item is con-sidered resolved.
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(Closed) Intraction (50-498/79-02; 50-499/79-02): Failure to Control Superseded Drawings. The corrective action and recurrence control initiated in response to this infraction were reviewed. As part of the corrective action, the licensee conducted a surveillance of 1,281 drawings in the field for the purpose of determining the extent of the problem. Of the total number of drawings reviewed, three were found to be of an incorrect revision.
It was further determined that these three drawings were assigned to one individual. As such, this problem is con-sidered an isolated case. This matter is considered closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-498/70-53; 50-499/79-03): Omission of Dimen-sicna Check of Reactor Vessel Internals. A waiver issued by Westinghouse for tne omitted dimensional verification on the reactor vessel internals was reviewed.
Subsequent dimensional checks have shown repeatability of measurements. This matter is considered resolved.
(Closed) Infraction (50-498/79-04; 50-499/79-04): Failure to Follow Con-crete Placement Procedures. A review was conducted of the corrective action and recurrence centrol taken in response to this item of non-compliance. Appropriate construction craft personnel and all QC placement inspectors were retrained on April 11, 1979. Training records were reviewed during this inspection. Adverse consequences of the failure to remove water from construction joints and of overconsolidation of con-crete were stressed in the training session.
Subsequent monitoring of concrete placements by the licensee has not identified procedura.1 viola-tions of this type.
This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Infraction (50-498/79-05; 50-499/79-05):
Failure to Follow Pro-cedures for the Preparation of Nonconformance Reports. A description of the deficiency involving a low megger reading on the motor for a Residual Heat Removal pump has been included in a revision to the nonconformance report. All QA/QC engineering personnel have been instructed by memorandum to provide sufficient detail establishing the sequence of eveitts per-taining :o any nonconformance and an accurate physical description of any nonconfo rmance. This item is considered closed.
3.
Site Tour The IE inspectors walked through various areas of the site to observe con-struction activities in progress and to inspect housekeaping and equipment storage.
The stop-work order imposed by the licensee sa containment wall
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placements was observed to still be in effect.
4.
Containr'ent Wall Voids The voids identified in lift 8 of the Unit 1 Reactor Containment Building (RCB) wall have been further investigated to determine their extent.
As of this inspection, 156 exploratory holes have been drilled in the liner plate.
Twenty-six holes are associated with void areas. The rest of the holes have shown solid concrete. Additional holes have been
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proposed for the purpose of further tuvestigation and for the purpose of establishing vents and drains for grouting. The repair procedure pro-posed for the drilled holes will be the sama as that used for the void areas behind the polar crane brsckets in lift 15.
The adequacy of the void repairs in lift 15 has been verified by individual polar crane support bracket load tests.
The licensee has determined that the voids were formed beneath the eight inch channel plate stiffeners in areas of high reinforcing steel con-gestion.
These areas of high congestion exist around penetrations in the CB wall such as the equipment hatch. The licensee therefore plans to establish a grid pattern around the equipment hatch, the main steam and feed water lines, and the personnel airlock for the purpose of conducting additional sounding in these areas of high reinforcing steel congestion on all lifts involved. The congestion is due to double layers of No. 11 reinforcing steel bars on the inside face of the wall along with a reduction in the spacing between bars from twelve inches to six inches.
A proposed change to the placement procedure for the Unit 2 RCB wall is to alter the height of the next lift to coincide with the top of the eight inch channel to reduce the probability that voids will form under it.
All subsequent lifts will then be to a ten foot height to match the spacing of the channels.
The proposed procedural changes, repair efforts and a-
.tional invest-
-gations will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Reactor Vessel Installation The IE inspectors reviewed the procedure and associated data sheets for reactor vessel installation and observed portions of the reactor vessel placement operations.
No major difficulties were encountered and the vessel was properly set in place on Wednesday morning, July 18, 1979.
The IE inspector verified that the vessel placement was within the dimensional tolerances for location and levelness.
No items of noncomnliance or deviations were identife_2.
6.
Identification of Anchor Bolt Material HL&P is presently drafting a proposed conditional release from the stop-work order issued for all anchor bolts. The proposed release will require positive identification of all anchor bolt material in storage and in place prior to embedding.
Identification is to be accomplished by performing a Brinell hardness test on each piece of material and converting this to tensile strength (ASTM A-370 Table 3). The hardness and tensile ranges of the two materials in question (ASTM A-36 and A-193) are of a difference sufficient to allow segregation if the hardness test is properly performed.
Trial hardness testing of in place anchor bolt material was observed by the IE inspector and two HL&P QA personnel. The test was performed on a total
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of eigb* anchor bolt-using portable "Telebrinell" equipment. The test ends of the bolts weca
- erved to be rusty. They were not flat and the
test in,'.rument was -. in all cases held squate to the test surface.
These conott ons led to impressions t'aat were n accurately measureable because of surface interferencr. and impressions that were not truly round.
In one case, an anchor bolt hid been tested three times with each impres-sion overlapping another resu~.. ting in questionable rec.._ts. In one instance, the impression was made into L,th the anchor bolt end and a thread protecting nut resulting in an erroneous Brinell Hardness Number (BHN). As a result of these observations, the results of all previous hardness testing were considered questionable. A verbal commitment was made by HLu" to conduct inspector training, establish an improved hardness testing procedure and possibly procure more reliable or sophisticated test equipment.
Until valid test results can be demonstrated, this will be considered an unresolved item.
7.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-compliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.
8.
' Exit Interview The IE inspectors met with licesee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 11 and July 19, 1979. The IE inspectors summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the findings. A licensee representative acknowledged the statement of the IE inspector concerning the unresolved item.
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