IR 05000461/1990019
| ML20058D193 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1990 |
| From: | Lanksbury R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D187 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-90-19, NUDOCS 9011050404 | |
| Download: ML20058D193 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-461/90019(DRP)
Docket No. 50-461-License No. NPF-62
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Licensee:
Illinois Power Company 500 South 27th Street
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Decatur, IL 62525 Facility Name: Clinton Power Station Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, Illinois Inspection Conducted: August 22 through October 3, 1990
Inspectors:
P. G. Brochman F. L.-Brush
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J. E. Foster n
Approved By:
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Re ctor rojects Section 3B Date Inspection Summary.
Inspection from-August 22 through October 3, 1990 (Report No. 50-461/90019(DRP))
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident-inspectors and a region based inspector of licensee action on previous
inspection findings; operational safety; event follow-up; radiological controls; maintenance / surveillance; emergency preparedness; and licensee event reports.
Results: Of'the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in six areas; one violation was identified in the remaining area; however, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1, a Notice of Violation was not issued.
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9011050404 901023
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Plant Operations Operator performance during this repart period remained good with no
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operational events occurring and the unit operating for the entire report period.
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A condition was identified which involved the seismic qualification of
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the control room chillers due to some missing braces.
The condition had existed since original construction and was discovered due to the diligence of a system engineer.
The licensee declared both chillers inoperable and implemented corrective actions.
Licensee evaluation of the safety significance of the missing braces is ongoing (UNR 461/90019-01(DRP)).
Radiological Controls The performance of the radiation protection department _ remained good.
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One event occurred which involved the thermo-luminescent dosimeter (TLD)
vendor reporting an exposure of 8000 mrem beta for three individuals and 700 mrem gamma for one individual for the month of August.
Based on additional information, the licensee considered these exposures to be invalid'(i.e., one individual never entered the plant for the entire month)
'The licensee's response to this event was prompt and extensive and included an assessment of the vendor's facility.
Maintenance / Surveillance Maintenance personnel actions'in repairing the Division III shutdown
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service water pump were very good and were accomplished in an expeditious manner. However, the licensee's evaluation of the root cause of the problem on May 24, 1990,_did not solve the pmblem and the pump may have i
been inoperable since that date (UNR 461/90019-02(DRP)).
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-The licensee was very responsive to identified. concerns after the last
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accountability drill and consequently performed another full scale accountability drill during this report period. The licensee's performance significantly improved with only-six individuals initially being. unaccounted. -The licensee subsequently determined that all six
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individuals were in their proper location. This drill resolved the prior
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Concerns.
Safety Assessment-Quality Verification
.The quality of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) issued this month remained
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acceptable.
The quality of LER closure packages remained high.
A condition described in an LER which had existed since original
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construction and involved the failure.to remove protective grease from a containment isolation valve was evaluated and was indicative of problems with implementing corrective actions during the period of initial startup (NCV461/90019-03(DRP)).
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DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted-Illinois Power Company (IP)
- L. Haab, President
- J. Perry, Vice President
- J. Cook, Manager, Clinton Power Station
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- J. Palchak, Manager, Nuclear Planning and Support
- R. Wyatt, Manager, Quality Assurance
- F. Spangenberg, III, Manager, Licensing and Safety
- R. Phares, Director, Licensing
- R. Gardner, Director, Emergency Planning i
- R. Morgenstern, Manager, Scheduling and Outage Management
- J. Miller, Manager, Nuclear Station Engineering
- P. Yocum, Director, Plant Operations
- D. Miller, Director, Radiation Protection
- S. Hall, Director, Nuclear Program Assessment
- J. Sipek, Supervisor, Regulatory Interface
- R. Weedon, Radiological Assessor Soyland Power
- J. Greenwood, Ha~ nager, Power Supply
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The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and
contractor personnel during the course of this inspection, o
- Denotes' those present during.the management meeting on October 3,1990.
- Denotes those present during the exit interview on October 3, 1990.
2.
Action on' Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
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a.
(Closed) Open Item (461/88028-02(DRP)):
Some minor. loads such as battery. chargers for radios, radiation monitors, and. chemistry analysis equipment were plugged into vital AC power supplies without being controlled. A total loss of offsite power that would have required reliance on the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG),
which would have supplied unanalyzed miscellaneous loads not under
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procedural control, had the potential to overload the EDGs at a time of critical need.
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's response which stated that all. loads on the vital AC buses were analyzed.
Conservative estimates were used for loads from receptacles and if excessive loads were applied, the feeder breaker to the receptacles would trip. The licensee concluded that since there are no known unanalyzed miscellaneous loads that can be fed from the vital AC buses, no other EDG procedures are required to control loads.off vital AC buses. Based on this information, the inspectors have no further concerns; and this item is considered closed.
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b.
(Closed) Violation (461/89008-07(DRP)):
Failure to perform 10 CFR 50.59 reviews on procedure changes to Clinton Power Station (CPS)
procedures No. 1052.01 and No. 9861.02.
This led to a valve lineup change to a local leak rate test procedure which resulted in a breech of secondary containment integrity.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions which included reviewing and revising various procedures.
Based on the licensee's actions, the inspectors have no further concerns; and this item is considered closed, c.
(Closed) Violation (461/89021-01(DRP)):
Failure to properly implement Technical Procedure CPS No. 2800.04, " Generic Flush Procedure," and Administrative Procedure CPS No. 1052.01, " Conduct of System Lineups." The licensee's corrective actions included:
counseling the Assistant Shift Supervisor involved, issuing a night order to remind personnel that a thorough valve-by-valve cross-check must be performed to ensure valves are properly restored, and revising Administrative Procedure 1052.01 to add a " CAUTION" for partial system lineups.
Based on the licensee's actions, the inspectors have no further concerns; and this item is considered closed.
d.
(Closed) Violation (461/89027-01(DRP)):
Failure to ensure that the design basis for a Loss of Feedwater Heating Accident was correctly
translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions and failure to ensure coordination among General Electric and Sargent and Lundy Engineers.
The inspectors reviewed the. licensee's corrective actions for the violation and the associated Licensee Event Report (LER) (88-025-01). The corrective
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actions included revising CPS Procedure 4005.01, repairing the "B" reheater drain tank drain control valve, adjusting the level controllers for the :feedwater heaters, flash tanks, and moisture
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separator drain tanks, and raising the level trio setpoints for closing the extraction steam valves. Based on the licensee's-actions, the inspectors have no further concerns; and this item
is considered closed.
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(Closed) Violation (461/90009-01(DRP)): Withdrawal of control rods with main turbine bypass valves open.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the Civil Penalty and verified that the-
. corrective actions had been implemented as stated.
In addition, the
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licensee has made significant organizational and management changes following this event.
Based on all of these actions, this item is.
considered closed.
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(Closed) Open Item (461/90016-03(DRP)):
NRC concerns with
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performance of a full scale accountability drill.
The licensee subsequently performed an accountability drill on September 13,- 1990.
This item is discussed further in paragraph 6.
Based on the performance of a successful drill, the inspectors have nc further concerns; and this item is. considered closed.
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3.
Plant 4crations The unit was coasting down to a refueling outage scheduled to start on October 14, 1990, and operated at power levels up to 83 for the entire report period, a.
Operational Safety (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operation, reviemd applict.Lle logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during August, September, and October 1990.
During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, and attentive to changes in those conditions, and that they took prompt action when appropriate.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected er.iergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified the proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the containment, auxiliary, fuel-handling, diesel and control, radwaste, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors verified by observation and direct interviews that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation platection controls.
The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive wasto system controls associated with rad waste shipments and processing.
The observed facility operations were verified to be in accordance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR,-and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified, b.
Onsite Event Followup (93702)
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The inspectors performed onsite follow-up at'ivities for events which occurred during September 1990.
These follow-ups included reviews of operating logs, procedures, Condition Reports, Licensee Event Reports (where available), and interviews with licensee personnel.
For each event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, and reviewed licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures, license conditions, and the nature of the event.
Additionally, the inspector verified that the licensee's investigation had identified the root causes of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel errors and that the licensee had taken appropriate corrective actions prior o restarting the unit.
Details of the evuts and the licensee's corrective actions developed through
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in,pector follow-up are provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) below:
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i (1) Seismic Qualification of Control Room Chillers (LER 461/90016)
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On September 25,10?0, the licensee identified a problem with the seismic qutW 4 cation of both control room chillers (VC)
The VC chillers OVL. 7 and OVC13CB were required to be seismically
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qualified, A; Jescribed in binder SQ-7314, with opporting braces for the compressor motor's terminal box.
Huever, the vendor's drawing (750002037-A14) and the field condition did not match these requirements as the support braces were missing. A rough calculation indicated that a problem existed with the installed configuration. Therefore, the licensee declared both VC chillers
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inoperable and entored Technical Specification 3.0.3.
The licensee
removed the cover on the OVC13CA and declared it operable.
The licensee then entered Techniel Specification 3.7.2 which allowed seven days to restore chiller GVC13CB.
Braces were subsequently installed on OVC13CB.
The licensee intends to take OVC13CA out-of-service and install braces. The licensee's evaluation of the safety significance of the missing braces is considered an unresolved item (461/90019-01)(DRP)).
(2) Earth _ quake on the New Madrid Fault At 8:19 a.m. (CDT) on September 26, 1990, the licensee was notified by NRC Region III that an earthquake had occurred on the New Madrid fault.
i The National Earthquake Center in Colorado measured the magnitude o/
the quake at 4.6 on the Richter Scale and the epicenter was located approximately 250 miles from Clinton-station.
The licensee was performing a calibration of the accelerometers (active seismic monitoring equipment) when the earthquake occurred and consequently
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they did not record the earthquake. No vibrations were felt by site
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personnel.
TW scratch plates (passive seismic monitoring equipment)
were functiond and were removed for examination.
Initial examination
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and calculation indicated that the local acceleration was approximately
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0.004 g.
The plant is designed for a safe shutdown earthquake of
0.25,. A detailed examination of the scratch plates is being i
performed by the vendor.
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No violations or deviations were identified. One unresolved item was identified.
4.
Radiological Controls (83750)
On September 20, 1990, the licensee was notified by its vendor, TMA/Eberline, that three thermo-luminescent dosimeters (TLDs) had in excess of 8000 mrem beta dose for the month of August.
No gamma exposures were recorded for these same TLDs.
Additionally, one TLD had an exposure of 700 mrem pmma.
The licensee suspended the individuals access to the radiologically controlled area and initiated a dose investigation. The licensee suspected the validity of these dose readings for two reasons; (1) the probability of the individuals being exposed to only a pure beta
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l nuclide, rather than a typical beta / gamma nuclide, is extremely low; and l
(2) one of the individuals never entered the protected area during the month of August and his TLD had remained in the guardhouse for the entire month.
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Based on the initial assessment, the licensee did not believe overexposures had occurred. The inspectors agree with this initial assessment.
The licensee is sending a team to the vendor to review i
this event and the vendor's quality control procedures..This event will be reviewed in a subsequent report by Region III radiation specialists.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance / Surveillance (61726 & 62703)
Station maintenance and surveillance activities of the safety-related I
systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
016548 Repair of Division III SX Pump The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
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conditions for operation were met while affected components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating work or testing; quality control records were maintained;
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parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological and fire i
prevention controls were accomplished in accordance with approved
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procedures; maintenance and testing were accomplished by qualified personnel; test instrumentation was within its calibration interval; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or. systems to service; test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedural requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; any deficiencies identified
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a during the testing were properly documented, reviewed, and resolved by appropriate management personnel; work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure tha6 priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance,
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a.
Division III Shutdown Service Water (SX) Pump On August 17, 1990, the Division III SX Pump failed to start during a quarterly surveillance test.
The supply breaker tripped on thermal overload when the pump would not rotate.
The licensee loosened the pump's packing and turned the shaft by hand with a strap wrench, The pump was then successfully started and all pressure, flow, and vibration parameters were normal. This same i
series of events had occurred the last time the pump was started on j
May 24,-1990. This pump is only run once a quarter to perform an inservice (IST) surveillance test.
The licensee contacted the vendor who suggested that the length of time it takes the shaft to
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stop rotating after the pump is secured be timed.
The result was
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approximately 1.5 seconds.
Based on this result the licensee decided'to keep the pump running until replacement parts could be obtained and then the pump would be removed and disassembled.
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I Upon disassembly, the following conditions were noted:
(1) The inner shaft tube had a considerable amount of silt and small pieces of clam shells inside of it.
This foreign material settled on and inside of rubber bearings and impeller wear rings.
(2) The rubber bearings were worn. The first stage impeller bearing had a 1/4" X 3/4" piece of rubber missing.
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(3) The pump shafts were scored at the bearing locations.
(4) The bottom bearing lantern ring was partially obstructed by rust.
(5) The upper bearing flush line was partially restricted by rust.
The licensee rebuilt the pump with new parts and reinstalled it.
The coastdown time for the pump was now measured at 10 seconds.
The cause of the rust and silt buildup between the inner pipe and the pump shaf t is a function of the pump's design. As interim corrective actions the licensee increased the run time of this
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pump from. quarterly to weekly and the coastdown time was being recorded and trended.
The inspectors expressed a concern with the adequacy of the root a
cause analysis performed in May 1990, when the pump failed the first time.
The pump.was not started between the May and August surveillance test. -The last time the punip had started on its first
try was in February 1990.
The inspectors were concerned that the pump may have been inoperable for a significant portion of the time between May 24, and August 17, 1990.- The inspectors' concerns will be followed as an unresolved item (461/90019-02(DRP)).
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b.
_ Preventative Maintenance on Micro-Switches On September 21, 1990, the licensee identified that a wire inside an t
environmentally qualified (EQ) micro-switch in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System was not replaced on a timely basis
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during routine preventative maintenance in July 1990.
The micro-switch's qualified life of 2.33 years ended in August 1990..
The licensee subsequently performed an analysis of the switch and extended its service life until October 15, 1990.
This wire was part of a larger EQ package, which had a longer life. The inspectors were concerned that even though the EQ life of this component was correctly' entered into the-system, the component was not replaced on a timely basis.
Other examples of failures to perform EQ preventative maintenance within required time intervals were discussed in Inspection Report 461/90016.
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c.
Chemical Treatment of Shutdown Service Water System As part of the long term corrective actions for problems experienced with microbiclogically influenced corrosion (MIC) in the shutdown service water (SX) system, the licensee initiated a chemical treatment program. The program contained three chemicals:
hypoclorite, a microbicide containing sodium bromide, and a
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penetrating agent. The active chemical compound that was formed was a hypobromous acid.
These chemicals are injected for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The concentration of chemicals at selected points in the SX system was measured during the treatment. Additionally, just before the water leaves the plant and enters C11rdon lake, a detoxification agent of sodium sulfite was added, to redse concentrations of the active agent to acceptable levels.
This treatment was scheduled to be performed twice on all three
divisions of SX and ns to be repeated quarterly.
The licensee performed a 10 CFR 50.59 review on the affect of the chemicals i
on components in the SX system. The review concluded that the affect was less deleterious than the normal chemicals used in the SX system. The inspectors reviewed the 50.59 evaluation and did not have any concerns.
No violations Jr deviations were identified.
One unresolved item was identifie1 6.
EmergencyPreparedness(82301)
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On September 13, 1990, an accountability drill was held at the Clinton site, partially in response to the findings in the July 1990 evaluated emergency exercise and the NRC concerns discussed in Inspection Report 461/90016(DRP).
This was an " integrated Emergency Response (ERF) drill" utilizing scenario 90-15. The Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) were activated to support the drill.
Plant personnel were previov41y advised that a protected area evacuation
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of all non-essential personael would be performed in. conjunction with the drill. An " exemption list" was developed for a small number (49 people)
of plant personnel performing critical tasks within.the protected ai,ta.
These personnel were exempt from the drill evacuation.
At 9:51 a.m. (CDT), a' Site Area Emergency was declared, consistent with the drill scenario.
The plant-evacuation alarm was sounded approximately one minute later.
Plant personnel immediately began evacuating the plant in an orderly and professional manner. All of the egress equipment at the main gate house was used.
Processing out of the Gamma-10 portal monitors and turnstiles delayed exiting personnel.
Plant personnel were delayed to the point that a line extended from the gate house to the plant
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entrance for several minutes. However, this did not have an affect on the drill as approximately 300 people evacuated through the gate house in 15 minutes.
Identification badges of exiting personnel were collected
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I by security guards and returned to the badge racks.
The evacuation
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process proceeded expeditiously, with the last evacuating individual passing through the turnstiles at 10:08 a.m.
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Th'e security computer system then printed a list of all those people
remaining in the protected area.
The printout was completed at approximately 10:13 a.m.
Security personnel then manually deleted personnel in zones 5, 6, 7, and 8, as individuals in those areas would be in the CR, TSC, or OSC performing emergency response tasks. At 10:21 a.m., the TSC was informed that 49 people were unaccounted for.
The TSC requested that the list be carried to the TSC, as the TSC was concerned over the large number of missing persons.
However, unbeknownst to the TSC personnel, the controllers in the gate house had introduced a tirne stop and gave the list of exempt personnel to security personnel so that they could be manually deleted from the computer listing.
This resulted in a list of six missing individuals being given to the TSC at approximately 10:34 a.m., an acceptable number, considering the
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number of plant personnel who participated in the drill.
Four of the individuals were working on critical jobs and their names had been omitted from the exempt list.
The remaining two individuals were in the OSC.
They had entered the OSC after the printout had started and consequently were considered in an unknown. location by the computer.
This gave an adjusted total of zero persons missing by 10:38 a.m.
The drill was considered fully successful, with accountability acceptably completed within the goal timeframe, and with a considerable improvement in performance over the previously observed evacuation / accountability drill.
Discussions were held with licensee personnel after the exercise regarding the need to improve the transparency of the controllers actions and of the controllers communicating to controllers in other locations of entry into time stops, and the need to provide for the capability to account for onsite personnel without evacuation. Adding such capability would probably require physical changes to the security computer such as adding " accountability readers" to assembly areas.
Upgrades to the plant security system are currently-being considered for other reasons, and licensee personnel agreed to evaluate the appropriateness
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of adding assembly / accountability capability to the security system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-up (90712 & 92700)
Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following LERs were reviewed to determine that the reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
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action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had
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been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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these reviews, these LERs are considered closed.
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I LER No.
Title 461/88025-01 Loss of Feedwater Heating Causes Transient Outside Design Basis 461/89005 Personnel Error causes Short Circuit and Loss of Shutdown Cooling 461/89011 Water Level Above Reactor Vessel Less than 23 Feet Without Both Trains of RHR Operable 461/90001-01 Failure to Remove Preservative from Valve Seat Results in Failure to Meet Local Leakage Testing Rate With regard to LER 461/90001-01, this LER detailed the failure of containment penetration 1MC-102 (Drywell Purge System) to pass its Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) on February 12, 1990.
The leak rate determined by the LLRT exceeded the total Secondary Containment bypass leakage limits as specified in Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.2.d.
This also resulted in the TS 3.6.1.1 requirements for Primary Containment Integrity (PCI) not being met. The action statement for 3.6.1.1 required restoration of PCI within one hour or shutdown of the plant. PCI could not be restored within one hour therefore an orderly plant shutdown was performed.
The cause of the event was a large amount of dirt or atmospheric dust entrained onto the valve seat and disk seating surface of valve IVQ004B causing the valve to fail its LLRT.
The valve had been stroked three times since its last LLRT.
The root cause of the event was the failure to remove the preservative, "Cosmolene", from the valve prior to its installation during initial construction.
The valve had passed several LLRTs, the last one in November 1989.
However, the dirt had built up over a period of time to an amnunt which caused the valve to fail the February 1990 test. As corrective action both valves IVQ004A and IVQ004B of penetration IMC-102 were replaced.
The licensee identified two other valves, IVQ001A and IVQ001B, that were of the same type and used on penetration IMC-101.
Valves IVR001B and IVQ004A failed their initial LLRT prior to plant startup. They were cleaned and reworked prior to initial plant operation.
However, valves IVR001A and IVQ004B were not checked at that time to determine if they had the same cleanliness problems, Since valves IVQ004A and IVQ004B were replaced as the result of the February 1990 LLRT failure and valve IVR001B had been worked on previously, the licensee removed, cleaned, and inspected valve IVR001A, The affected penetrations passed their LLRT after the valve work was completed.
The failure of containment penetration 1MC-102 to pass the LLRT requirements was a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.d.
Since this violation met the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G 1, a Notice of Violation was not issued and this issue is considered closed (NCV 461/90019-03(DRP)).
No deviations were identified. One violation was identified; however, a notice of violation was not issued.
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Items For Which A " Notice Of Violation" Will Not Be Issued The NRC uses the Notice of Violation as a standard method for form. lizing
.the existence of a violation of a legally binding requirement.
Hrwever, because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee initiathe in the self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not generally issue a Notice of Violation for an issue that meets the tests of 10 CFR 2,
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Appendix C,Section V.G.I.
These tests are:
(1) the issue was identified by the licensee; (2) the issue would be categorized as Severity Level IV
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or V violation; (3) the issue was reported to the NRC, if required; (4) the issue will be corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time period; and (5) it was not a issue that could
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reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation. An issue involving the failure to meet regulatory requirements, identified during the inspection, for which a Notice of Violation will not be issued is discussed in paragraph 7.
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are-discussed in paragraphs 3 b(1) and 5.a.
9.
Meetings a.
ManagementMeetings(30702)
On October 3, 1990, Messrs. C. J. Paperiello, Deputy Regional
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Administrator, J. N. Hannon, Director, Project Directorate III-3,
NRR, R. C. Knop, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, R. D. Lanksbury,
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Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B, and the NRC resident inspectors met with the licensee managers and supervisors denoted in paragraph 1 of this report.
This meeting was held tu discuss recent" licensee performance and operating events and preparations for the upcoming refueling, l'
On August 29, 1990 Messrs. W.-Shafer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, R. Barrett, Director, Project Directorate III-2, NRR, and members of their respective staffs toured the Clinton plant.
The inspectors found the plant material condition to be comparable to
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other plants but noted that the balance of plant areas appeared aged
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relative to the short service life of the plant.
The inspectors'
findings were presented at an exit meeting.
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Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on October 3,1990.
The inspectors. summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection
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i-and the findings.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report, with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
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