IR 05000460/1979012

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IE Insp Repts 50-460/79-12 & 50-513/79-12 on 791101-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas inspected:safety-related Piping Matl,General Welder Qualification,Reactor Vessel in-place Storage & Fire Prevention/Protection
ML19296B148
Person / Time
Site: Washington Public Power Supply System
Issue date: 01/08/1980
From: Dodds R, Toth A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML19296B146 List:
References
50-460-79-12, 50-513-79-12, NUDOCS 8002200162
Download: ML19296B148 (11)


Text

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O U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

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50-460/79-12 Report No.

cq-M 3/79-12 50-460, 50-513 ticen3, go,CPPR-134, CPPR-174 Safeguards Group Docket No.

Licensee:

Washington Public Power Supply System P. O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352

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Washington fluclear Projects Nos. I and 4 (W'lP 1 & 4)

Facility Name:

WNP 1 & 4 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection at:

November 1-30, 1979 Inspection conducted:

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Inspectors:

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/ D' ate Signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:

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/ Me Signed R. T. Dodds, Chief, Engineering Support Section D

Suc=ary:

Inscection during the ceriod November 1-30, 1979 (Recort Nos. 50-460/79-12 and 50-513/79-12)

Areas Insoected:

Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities relating to: safety related piping material, general welder aualification, reactor vessel in-place storage, safety related piping instai tion, safety related piping welding, fire prevention / protection during construction, electrical cable trays and supports, safety related component protection after installation and safety related component installation. The inspection involved 84 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Resul ts :

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted The inspector interviewed various engineering, management, inspection, supervision, and craft personnel of the organizations listed below.

Key personnel, including those who attended the weekly nanagerrent meetings, are specifically identified below.

Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)

(1)

A. D. Kohler, Project Manager (2)

M. C. Carrigan, Construction fianager (1,2)T. J. Houchins, Project QA Manager (1,2)W. f t. Lazaer, Project 0A Specialist (2)

M. E. Witherspocn, Manager of Quality Assurance R. A. Fisher, Fire Marshall United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C)

(1,2)E. C. Hares, Deputy Project QA Manager (2)

G. E. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Project flanager (1)

C. H. Butler, QA Engineer (I)

D. C. Leonard, Construction Supervisor (ASf1E III-2)

(2)

R. H. Bryans, Field Project Engineer Manager (1) Denotes attendees at management meeting on !!ovember 19, 1979.

(2) Denotes attendees at ranagenent meeting on flovember 30, 1979.

J. A. Jones Construction Company (JAJ)

B. Roe, Project QA Manager D. Higginbotham, QC Supervisor (acting)

Y. Lyman, Office Engineer D. King,LeadQCInspector(PipeandHangers)

S. Wellenbrock, Lead QC Inspector (Equipment)

J. Vigue, Field Engineering Survey Foley, Uismer and Becker Company (FWB)

C. W. f!eedham, Project Quality Director J. Collins, QC Manager L. Lint, Quality Inspection Supervisor

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-2-K. Kent, QC Inspector J. Barger, QC Inspector Pittsburgh Des Moines Steel Comoany C. Bauer, Site CA Manager f1 and M Service Cornoration M. Fournier, Vice President Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Comoany Z. Zizak, Authorized Nuclear Inspector Washinoton State Energy Facility Site Evaluatinn Council G. H. Hansen, Senior Projects Engineer 2.

Plant Tours - Units 1 and 4 The inspector made plant tour-inspections during day shift and swing shift at various times each week during this reporting period.

He interviewed craft eersonnel, supervisors, and quality control inspectors as they were encountered in the various work areas, and examined in-process records such as work control forms, inspector logs, calibration tags, quality release tags, and equipment identification tags.

The tours included ob-servations relative to compliance with general and specific codes and stan-dards, regulatory guides and requirements, and implemertation of quality assurance program requirements.

P.esults of more detai ned audit of work activities are described in other paragraphs of this report.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (open) Unresolved Item (50-460/79-10-06) - Uncontrolled water in the stored-in-place reactor pressure vessel.

On November 26, 1979 the inspector inspected the weather protection access-control enclosure over the reactor vessel. The wooden.tructure appeared to effectively cover the vessel opening. The access hatch was equipped with a simple slide bolt.

Water has been renoved from the inside of the vessel, except for small annunts in some of the instrument guide tube Foreign material was evident in most of the tubes, adhering to their inner surfaces.

Following discussion with JAJ personnel and licensee managerent, a locked access door was installed, and instrument tubes cleaned and capped and verified by UE&C quality assurance surveillance.

The original non-conformance report number 1-NCR-211-07 issued for this condition has not yet been dispositioned. This item continues to be unresolved relative to results of swipe tests.

4.

Safety Related Pioina Material-Unit #1 The inspector audited work activities for material control for piping supplied by the B. F. Shaw Ccnipany. This involved inspection of questions relating to shop-weld quality rair. 4 by an employee of one of the site contractors.

Applicable codes, stawards, and other special requirements are described in SAR sections 17 and 3.2, and contract specification number 137. The following aspects of the work were considered:

physical sur-face appearance of welds on ASME III class 3 pipe spools, provisions for vendor shop surveillance and inspections, provisions for receipt inspec-tions, and the on-site program for nondestructive testing of shop welds and field welds.

The WPSS contract specifications require radiography of all class 1 and 2 shop welds, in accordance with ASME Code Section III.

Additionally, WPPSS has required that all class 3 welds which are subject to the ASME Code Section XI inservice inspection (ISI) requirements are to be volumetrically examined. All such welds are required to be ground to profile and surface finish criteria of the WPPSS contract specifications.

Main steam and feedwater system piping shop welds are to be 100% radio-graphed. WPPSS nanageme.nt reports that two UE&C inspectors are assigned full time resident inspection duties at the vendor shops to assure con-fornance to quality requirements.

The NRC inspector examined several pipe spools in a laydown area south of the Unit #1 general service building, and observed no aspects reject-able under.he ASME criteria for visual inspection.

The inspector also interviewed a site employee, who had approached the inspector and expressed quality concerns regarding the appearance of the pipe welds mentioned above.

The individual expressed general impressions regarding grinding of welds on stainless steel and use of more than one welding process on welds on one pipe spool.

The individual identified no specific case of nonconfornance with criteria of the ASME Code, nor did he identify an instance where he considered weld defects exist.

The inspettcr advised the employee of the quality controls and specification requirements and acceptance criteria for the shop furnished pipe, especially ASME Class 1 and 2 material.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.

General '.s' elder Oualifications - Unit #1 On November 19, 1979 the inspector interviewed an individual who stated that he had concerns regarding welder qualifications.

The Region V in-vestigation specialist participated.

The individual stated that 67% of welders tested fail.

He also stated that 30% of the field welds are de-fective.

The individual declined to identify any specific welders who may have been assigned to production welding without having successfully passed their test.

He also declined tc identify any defective production weld which has been left uncorrected; he stated that he was not claiming that such welds failed to be identified and corrected through the QA pro-gram, but rather that he felt that better qualification of welders might reduce the number of defects requiring repair.

The inspa. tor had no data at the interview to afford evaluation of the purported ran of defects.

(Note: A simplistic " percent defect" rate can be nisleading in that a very ex-tensive weld can be rejected as a result of a small defect identified during quality control inspection of the weld, and repair may be very local and minor.

Such rejects / defects / repairs are common and within require-ments of applicable codes, standards and work criteria).

The inspector subsequently reviewed welder qualification test facilities and records and interviewed craft and quality control personnel for one prin-cical contractor at the site (J.A. Jones, piping and pioe suports).

Test booth records indicate that approximately 50% of 200 personnel who took the welding tests since February 1979 failed the test the first time, and were not assigned welder symbols. A symbol is prerequisite to perfornance of production welds, and is checked by quality control inspec-tors and various auditors. Quality control staff identified 155 pipe welds that had been radiographed up to November 20, 1979 with 20 of these rejected.

For the 30 day period to November 20, 1979 there were 19 welds radiographed with 11 rejects.

Five of the rejects were attributed to a single welder, and retraining / retest action has reportedly been taken with that welder. Three of the rejects were associated with WPPSS require-ments associated with inservice inspection and did not represent integ-rity defects contrary to the ASME Code.

The defects were each identified clearly, and were being tracked by quality centrol for reinspection follow-ing repairs.

The above activities appeared to be consistent with ASME and quality assurance requirements.

The inspector also examined records and interviewed the quality control manager for another principal contractor (Pittsburgh-Des Moines, contain-ment liner). Only limited data was available relative to welders who failed their welding tests, although records were available of welders who did pass and were assigned a welding symbol for production welding. Statis-tics were not available regarding reject rates for production welds, al-

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-5-though logs and records clearly showed where spot radiography and re-radio-graphy after repairs was performed. The inspector found no cause to believe that defects vere not corrected in accordance with ASitE requirements.

No items of nonccmpliance or deviations were identified.

6.

Reactor Pressure Vessel Protection after Installation - Unit *1 The inspector audited work activities for the protection of the insulled vessel at Unit #1. This involved inspection of covers and access controls.

Applicable codes, standards, and other special requirements are described in PSAR Sections 17, 5.2.5, and 3.12 (Regulatory Guides 1.38 and 1.39),

contract specification number 257 part 150, and contractor procedures numbered FS-II-2 and III-la. The following aspects of the work were con-sidered: presence of protective covers at nozzles, cover structures and hatches for access at the top of the vessel, interior cleanliness, and access control.

The status of corrective ection relative to previous water entry is discussed in paragraph 3 of this report.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7.

Safety Related Pipina Installation - Unit #1 The inspector audited work activities for five typical areas of piping installation relating to the makeup and purification system and the ccm-ponent cooling water system. This involved inspection of installatica of valves l'US-V-141B and MUS-V-148B, piping rigging to these valves, in-stallation of pipe hanger CCW-54-103, and tie-in fitup at pumps 1-MUS-PMP-1A, 2B and 3C. Applicable codes, standards, and other special requirements are described in PSAR Sections 17, 6.3.2.3, and 9.2.2, contract specifica-tion number 257, and contractor procedures numbered (JAJ) WI-006 and WI-16.1.

The following aspects of the work were considered: method of pipe /

valve support, piping cold spring, direction of flow for installed valves, withdrawal of valve discs from seats during welding, protection of piping from damage and contamination, torquing of anchor bolts for pipe hangers, and QC inspection activity and records.

The inspector found that a motor operated valve (MUS-V-141B) did not have a flow direction marked on the valve; this was also the case for check-valve FWA-V40C. The pipe NDE/

Weld Record contained no indication that the orientation of the valve had been verified, nor did any associated document in the quality control record package indicate that verification of orientation was made during valve installation. The contract specification 257 part 5.4.2 and contractor procedure UI-016.1 part 4.4.14.1 require assurance that the valves are oriented properly, 2-d two quality control inspectors interviewed by the NRC in-

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-6-spector stated that they do verify this.

However the contractor Pipe /

fide Record does not provide instruction or checkoff space for this inspec-tion parameter.

The licensee representative stated that the JAJ proce-dure will be revised to clarify this aspect of the OC inspector's respon-sibility.

This iten is unresolved pending review of valve l'US-141B install-ation and procedure revisions (50-460/79-12-02).

The inspector identified several stainless steel pipe spools on wood dunnage in the reactor containment and general services buildings.

The wood appeared to be treated with fire retardant paint, as is JAJ practice for all wood which is to be brought into these buildings. However, JAJ quality control and procurement staff could not identify the acceptability of this material (Dri-one; Desert Research Institute) relative to leachable chloride content.

This iten is unresolved pending JAJ determination of chloride content of the material (50-460/79-12-04).

8.

Safety Related Piping Welding - Unit #1 The inspector audited work activities for two pipe welds on the makeup and purification system in the general services building elevation 399.

This involved inspection of field welds numbered F411500-FW-7 and F411501-FW-10.

Applicable codes, standards, and other special requirements are described in PSAR Sections 17 and 3.12 (Regulatory Guide #1.44), contract specification r. umber 257, and contractor procedure number (JAJ) WP-P8. The following aspects of the work were considered; identifica-tion of veeld joints on drawings and weld data sheets, availability of weld procedures, qualification of welders, use of purge gases, fitup of weld joints, definition of interpass temperature for the welders, joint clean-liness and protection, performance cf required radiography and QC inspec-tion records preparation, and QC inspection personnel performance.

The inspector interviewed two QC inspectors who inspect piping at this time, relative to their current workloads and their inspection criteria. They were aware that joint 411501-FW10 had been rejected based upon radiographic tests, and they were cognizant of required reinspection and radiography.

The inspector also verified items appearing on the QC inspectors check-lists, including gap, bevel, tack-weld appearance, cleanliness, lifting of the valve disc off of its seat for welding, and joint alignment.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9.

Fire Prevention / Protection Durina Construction - Units 1 & 4 The inspector audited work activities for fire prevention and protection at the construction site.

This involved interview of the WPPSS fire mar-

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-7-shall and plant tour inspection of work. Applicable codes, standards, and other special requirements are described in PSAR Sections 17 and 9.5.1, con-tract specifications numbered 211, 257, 253 and 254, and contractor pro-cedures numbered PMP-8-108 and QAP-12. The following aspects of the work were considered:

control of combustibles, control of ignition sources, maintenance of fire suppresion equipment, general housekeeping, coordin-ation with local fire department, control of fire protection system alarm and valve status, and fire brigade training.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10.

Electrical Cable Trays and Supoorts - Unit #1 The inspector audited work activities for the Unit #1 on-site fabrication and installation of two cable tray supports (#1T4-3413-3308 and 1T12-3395-103). The inspector also generally examined several other completed supports for weld size and appearance and evidence of QC bolt torque inspection.

Applicable codes, standards and quality requirements are described in PSAR Sections 17 and 8.3.3.3, job specification nunber 218, and contractor procedures numbered (FWB) QCP-5 and QCP-9.

Observations, examination of records, and interviews of personnel were conducted relative to:

configuration conft mance to drawings, material type and size, dimensions, bolting, welding, qualification of welders, weld and bolt OC inspection, location of the support, anchorage (if applicable), and general QC inspection performance and records.

The audit included the FWB facilities and the welder testing contractor (M and M Service Corp-oration) fccilities.

Several anchorage pieces (Mark #AP-263) include fillet welds at the T-joints, of a size less than the 3/16" leg prescribed in the UE&C fabri-cation detail. This is a vendor furnished item procured as qual-ity class 2, as were other fittings and strut materials for cable tray supports.

The FWB quality control supervisor stated that the problem will be documented and investigated with the vendor (Midland-Ross/Superstrut Corporation).

This matter is unresolved pending further review of program controls to assure that purchased materials conform to precurement re-quirements (50-460/513-79-12-01).

During review of two welder qualification records (#E36 and E41) the in-spector noted that the contractor QA program did not provide regular re-view of the qualified welder list to assure the removal from the list of welders who had not welded for six months (ref. FWB-0CP-5 para. 5.1).

The contractor QC supervisor acknowledged the finding, and stated that

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-8-an appropriate review system will be established.

The inspector checked several welder personnel files against the list and ascertained that these were in conformance with the 6 month criteria.

f!o items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11.

Safety Related Comconent Protection After Installatinn - Unit #1 The inspector audited work activities for preventive maintenance of en-capsulation vessels e Unit #1 containment sump containment penetration extensions (vessels nos. 1 CSS-VSL-2B and 1 DHR-VSL-2B). The inspector also examined laydown area storage of core flood tank 1 CFS-TK-2B, and enclosed storage of pressure relief valves.

Applicable codes, standards and quality requirements are described in PSAR Sections 17 and 3.12, and job specification number 257-15 Appendix C, and contractor procedures numbered FGCP-16 and FQS-13.4.

Observations, examination of records, and interviews of personnel were conducted relative to:

prevention of damage from water / debris, control of dessicants, and licensee / contractor surveillance activities.

The inspector selected the above identified components for a detailed review while perfoming plant tour inspections.

These compenents showed expired humidity indicators.

However, licensee records showed that rou-tine preventive maintenance has been perforned and special monitoring (daily) had recently been performed on the core flood tanks relative to dessicant performance.

Corrective action work orders had been properly issued to replace the dessicant, based upon results of the licensee findings.

The inspector had no further questions on this item.

flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

12.

Safety Related Components Installation - Unit #1 The inspector audited work activities for installation of the west-side steam generator for Unit #1, (IA). This involved inspection of prepara-tions for the installation, but not the actual lift itself, which was scheduled for a later date. Applicable codes, standards, and other special requirements are described in SAR Sections 17 and 3.12 (Regulatory Guide 1.38), contract specification number 211, contractor procedures numbered (JAJ) WI-33, WI-1, and process control sheet T-211-046B. The following aspects of the work were considered:

lifting and placement, mounting /

support structure, alignment, and QC inspection.

Records of alignment

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-9-and grouting of the lower suoport plate were considered, as was designa-tion and signoff of OC inspection hold points on the process control sheet.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

13.

Installation of Potatina Eauinrent - Units al and #4 The inspector audited work activities for installation of rotating equip-ment. This involved inspe. :en of record; of installation of makeuo and purification system pump /notor set MUS-PUMP-1A. Applicable codes, stan-dards, and other special requirements are described in PSAR Sections 17.1.2 and 17.2.2.1, contract specification number 257, and contractor orocedures numbered (JAJ) 111-006 and 11I-001. The following aspects of the work were considered:

identification, orientation, leveling, aliqnment, physical integrity, cleanliness, welding / cold spring at nozzles, housekeeping, quality control inspection and completeness of documentation.

The inspector found that the orocedure for alignment of rotating equipment does not include inspection acceptance criteria incorporating manufacturer's specifications for thernal expansion effects.

In the absence of manufacturers instruc-tions, for preliminary alignment prior to grouting, a base equipnent align-ment criteria of 0.005 inches appears in procedure WI-006.

The equipment alignnent record for MUS-PUMP-1A showed gearbox-to-driver face readings of.012 inches and.013 inches, which did not appear to meet the.005 inches base criteria, for preliminary alignment. Also, revision 1 of the JAJ Equionent Alignment Record provides for a) preliminary, and b) final align-ment, but in so doing appears to eliminate space for preliminary a'ignment of motor-to-gearbox and final alignment of pump-to-gearbox.

This matter is unresolved rending clarification of the above discrepancies and eval-uation of final alignment procedures (50-460/79-12-03).

Unresolved Items Unresolved itens are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncom-pliance, or deviations.

Unresolved items identified during this inspec-tion are discussed in paragraphs 7,10 and 13.

15.

Exit Interviews The resident inspector met with licensee management representatives, and others invited by the licensee representatives approximately weekly to discuss the inspectors findings (November 19 and 30,1979). Attendees at these sessions are designated in paragraph 1 of this report. The in-spector sunmarized the scope of his activities and reviewed his findings, discussed in nore detail in this report.

Concerning unresolved items,

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-10-the licensee lead representative responded as follows:

79-12-01 The licensee had no comment on improving receipt inspection for non-Q-list material precured for Q-list cable tray supports.

79-12-02 J. A. Jones QC inspectors clain that they have been verifyinc proper valve orientation. The governing procedures are planned to be revised to clarify this as an inspection requirement.

79-12-03 A meeting was in progress with J. A. Jones, concurrent with the exit meeting, to address rotating equipment alignment inspection cri teria.

79-12-04 The licensee had no comment on the inspector's understanding that J. A. Jones plans to obtain data on leachable chlorides in fire retardant paint used for stainless ; teel pipe dunnage.