IR 05000460/1979009
| ML19290C330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1979 |
| From: | Bishop T, Dodds R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290C328 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-460-79-09, 50-460-79-9, 50-513-79-09, 50-513-79-9, NUDOCS 8001100538 | |
| Download: ML19290C330 (7) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF IrlSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-460/79-09 50-513/79-09 Report No.
Docket No.
50-460, 50-513 Licensee No. CPPR-134, CPPR-174 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Washington Nuclear Project Nos. 1 and 4 (WNP-1 and 4)
Facility Name:
Inspection at:
WNP 1 and 4 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection Conducted: August 30-Sept. 2, Sect. 10-25, 1979 Inspectors:
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A.D.Toth,ResidentIhspector Date Signed Date Signed
// //[hf Approved by:
I R. T. Dodds, Section Chief, Reactor Construction Date' Signed and Engineering Support Branch Summa ry:
Insoection on Auaust 30-Sect. 2, Sect. 10-25, 1979 (Recort Nos. 50-460/79-09 and 50-513/79-09 Areas Insoected:
Routine inspections by regional and resident inspectors of construction activities including:
reactor vessel installation; conoliance to ASME certification system requirements; follow-up on previous inspection findings; and clant tour. The inspection involved 93 hours0.00108 days <br />0.0258 hours <br />1.537698e-4 weeks <br />3.53865e-5 months <br /> on site by one regional inspector and the site resident inspector.
.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
1727 128 80 011 00 I 38 RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Washington Public Power Supplv System (WPPSS)
F. D. McElwee, Assistant Director of Projects W. C. Bibb, Project Manager M. C. Carrigan, Construction Manager M. E. Witherspoon, Manager QA
- T. J. Houchins, Project QA Manager V. B. Mody, Civil Engineer B. F. Brockett, Field Surveillance QA--ASME J. L. Gilbert, Civil Engineer K. A. Blanchard, Quality Services P. D. Maqbool, QC Surveillance - Civil
- W. M. Lazaer, Project QA Specialist D. L. Renberger, Assistant Director - Technology J. R. Nickolas, lead Quality Assurance Engineer-Mechanical b.
United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C)
R. Bryans, Engineering Manager
- G. S. Korin, QA Manager D. L. Hausauer, Contract Supervisor
- E. C. Haren, Deputy QA Manager c.
Babcocks & Wilcox (B&W)
D. T. Larson, Sr. Site Consultant d.
Lamoson Universal Rigging B. R. Knight, Project Manager V. E. Durkin, QA Engineer e.
G. F. Atkinson - Wright /Schuchart/Harber (A-WSH)
M. D. Latch, Project QA Manager J. Ivora, QC Supervisor R. McCoy, Lead QC Inspector J. Ruppert, Lead QC Inspector f.
J. A. Jones (JAJ)
J. Boynton, Quality Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
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_E_
The inspectors also contacted various craft and quality control personnel during the inspection activities, including laborers, equipment operators, ironworkers and carpenters.
2.
Followup on Previous Insoection Findings a.
(Closed) Unresolved item (50-460/513/79-07/03) Concrete testing performed by Level I trainees.
The licensee has concluded a review of the use of Level I trainees in performing concrete testing. The review, documented in WPPSS memoranda of August 8, 1979 and August 31, 1979 identified that level I trainees were allowed only to cerform elementary con-crete tests (slump, air entrainment, temperature, and limited participation in preparation of concrete cylinders) and performed these tests in the company of a fully qualified Level I inspector.
The reports of all tests were examined and signed by a Level II inspector, who also provided supervisory surveillance of the Level I and Level I trainee activities. The review further included an analysis of f!CRs, CflCRs, CARS, and Surveillance Reports to de-termine if the use of trainees had resulted in any adverse trends in the inspection program. No adverse trends were identified.
The review concluded that the limited use of trainees in this case was con-sistent with ANSI f145.2.6 requirements.
The inspector concurs with this conclusion and has no further questions regarding this matter.
b.
(Closed) Follow up item (50-460/513/79-01/02) Contractors proce-dure for training and certification of flDE personnel allows
"open book" exams and does not require a sufficient number of questions in all cases.
The contractors procedure (Procedure flo. 3004 of Contract 9779-243) has been revised to be in strict accordance with the require-ments of SNT-TC-1A (1975). The revised procedure (Revision H)
was examined and found to be satisfactory.
This item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Follow up item (50-460/513/78-03/06) Fire protection of AWSH record storage.
The licensee has determined that the AWSH records storace facility is in compliance with the flRC staff's position contained in the pro-oosed NISI fl45.2.9, which requires a minimum of a 2 hr rated facility.
The existing facility is basically a 4 hr facility with a 3 hr fire door.
The inspector has no further questions on this item.
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-3-d.
(Closed) Followup item (50-460/79-08/01) Preparations for reactor vessel lift.
The licensees preparations for the reactor vessel lift were examined as noted in paragraph 4, below. The specific concern from the previous inspection regarding certification and actual weight of the Transi-Lift crane test load was resolved by re-weighing each weight independently.
Computation of the actual crane test load with the new weight values revealed that sufficient weight had been applied to certify the crane for the reactor vessel lift but that the weight was not sufficient to certify the crane for the heavier steam generator lifts.
Because of this, and questions of ground slope stability at the actual lift site, an additional load test was performed.
This test was wit-nessed and found to be incompliance with pertainent procedures and requirements.
This item is closed.
3.
Plant Tour (Units Nos.1 and 4)
The inspector performed a tour-inspection of the Unit #4 containment wall and reinforcing steel areas and the A-WSH quality control field office. He similarly inspected the Unit #1 containment building, general services building, and turbine building.
He observed reinforcing steel installation activities in-progress at both units containment structure, concrete pre-placement at the Unit #1 containment wall and concrete repair on an interior wall of the general services building. The inspector interviewed iron workers, laborers and quality control inspectors, in addition to engineering and construction supervision personnel in the work areas. The inspector took particular note of presence of quality control inspection personnel, nonconforming condition controls such as hold tags and checklists, measuring device calibration control and tagging, and craft and QC inspector performance.
No items of noncompliance were identified, however, the inspector identified the following items as unresolved:
a.
Quality control inspection criteria for concrete reoair.
The inspector observed that an interior wall of the general services building contained a small area where concrete had been chipped out in preparation for repair of an apparent rock pocket. There was an A-W5H hold tag properly posted adjacent to the area.
The area was covered with wet burlap in preparation for the repair.
The exposed reinforcing steeel had several points of danage from the 1727 131
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-4-chipping hamers.
Subsequent review showed that A-WSH quality control inspection procedures provide for DC inspection of the excavated concrete area prior to proceeding with the repair. A detailed inspection checklist is provided, however, it does not call for inspection of the reinforcing steel for damage, nor does it prescribe acceptance criteria for evaluating such damage.
This absence of criteria is evident in the OC procedures for repairs of the containment structure and other structures. The ANSH OC management and some QC inspectors stated that they pre-pare a nonconformance report if they see any damaged steel, and they offered examples of where this had been done in the past.
Such a report had not yet been prepared for the area observed by the NRC inspector. This item is unresob ed pending review of appropriate QC procedure revisions and documented interim policy guidance for AUSH QC inspectors relative to inspection of rein-forcing steel damage.
(460/513/79-09/01)
b.
Quality control inspection of concrete consolidation.
The inspector observed placement of concrete for the exterior wall of the containment structure.
The inspector observed slump testing at the truck discharge, which was being witnessed by various supervision and quality control and quality assurance personnel. The inspector observed activities of three A-WSH quality control inspectors outside of and at the top of the 10 foot high forms. The QC inspectors did not go inside the forms during the first 18-inches of placement, apparently on the basis that working conditions would be too crowded. The NRC inspector advised WPPSS management that it did not appear too crowded for performance by QC inspectors. This was verified by subsequent entry into the formwork and observing the unhanpered novements of concrete laborers.
Shortly thereafter, the A-WSH OC supervisor instructed two QC inspectors to enter the forms and closely observe concrete consolidation activities prescribed by procedure QCP-10. QC inspector entry into the formwork appears necessary in order to accomplish the concrete consolidation verification activities prescribed by the A-WSH quality control procedure OCP-10.
Subsequent discussions with A-WSH quality assurance and quality control supervision indicated that for future concrete placements, congested conditions may make close observation of concrete consolidation inpractical, and that management expects the QC inspectors to achieve the best they can in such cases.
There were no stated plans to amend the inspection checklists, provide special inspection techniques, or document such conditions in advance. The need for this and possibly the engineering evaluation of such difficulties was discussed with licensee management.
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-5-This matter is unresolved pending further review of quality controls associated with placing concrete in congested areas.
(460/513/79-09/02)
4.
Reactor Vessel Installation
,
The licensees preparations for, and installation of, the reactor vessel were examined as noted below, a.
Review of Quality Assurance Irplementina Procedures The following contractor procedures associated with the reactor vessel installation were. examined and found to be in compliance with PSAR and specification requirements:
(1) Lampson procedure LVR-WP-31, Rev 1, " Rough Set Reactor Pressure Vessel Procedure".
(2)
J. A. Jones procedure PCS-RPV-1, Rev OE (approved as noted),
" Installation of Reactor Pressure Vessel" Procedures for reactor vessel receiving inspection and crane and rigging testing were previously examined and found satisfactory.
b.
Observations of Work and Work Activities The reactor vessel reflective insulation installation, rigging, lifting and placement activities were observed. The observations included verification that proper equipment was utilized, adequate QC coverage was provided, and placement was performed in accordance with applicable UE&C and B&W drawings, specifications and proce-dures.
The adequacy of vessel protection was also verified. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
c.
Review of Quality Records The following quality records associated with reactor vessel installation were examined:
(1) Reactor Vessel Receiving Inspection Plan of August 31, 1979.
(2) Transi-Lift Crane Inspection and Load Test (in-process) of September 1, 1979.
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-6-(3) Transi-Lift Crane records of design reviews, wind load and hook load limitations, and boom certification analysis.
(4) Reactor Vessel Process Control Sheet (in-process) PCS-RPV-1 for installation preparation, support shinming and torquing, insulation installation, vessel handling, and placement.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
5.
Licensee Compliance to ASME Certification System Requirements The licensee's ASME Certificate of Authorization (nos. N-1594 and N-1982) for the WNP 1 and 4 projects were examined and found to be current. The authorizations allow WPPSS to complete ASME forn No.
N-3 (0wner's Data Report) for the WNP-1 and 4 projects.
6.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3a and 3b.
7.
Exit Interview The resident inspector met with licensee and architect-engineer senior quality assurance representatives at the site on September 25, 1979 to discuss the results of the inspection. Attendees at the meeting included those marked (*) in paragraph 1.
The inspector surraarized the findings discussed in the details of other paragraphs of this report.
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