IR 05000454/1993010
| ML20046A190 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1993 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046A185 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-454-93-10, 50-455-93-10, NUDOCS 9307270069 | |
| Download: ML20046A190 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report Nos. 50-454/93010(DRP); 50-455/93010(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III 1400 Opus Place i
Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, Illinois
Inspection Conducted: June 2, 1993 through July 6, 1993 r
Inspectors:
H. Peterson C. H. Brown D. E. Jones Approved By:
Martin J. Farber, Chief Date
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Reactor Projects Section lA Inspection Summary Inspection from June 2.1993 throuah July 6.1993 (Report Nos. 50-l 454/93010(DRP): 50-455/93010(DRP)).
Areas Insnected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of operational safety verification, current material condition, housekeeping and plant cleanliness, radiological controls, security, safety assessment / quality verification, maintenance activities, surveillance activities, engineering and technical support.
Results: Of the nine areas inspected, one unresolved item, and two inspector
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followup items were identified. The unresolved item pertained to an apparent discrepancy associated with the administrative process of controlling and distributing plant procedures (paragraph 6).
The' inspection followup items-pertained to the classification of emergency action levels (paragraph 2)- and the other for an inadvertent circulating water makeup isolation valve closure (paragraph 2). The following is a summary of the licensee's performance during this inspection period:
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-t Plant Operations Performance in this area continues to be very good with the operators
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performing.their assigned tasks in a professional manner. _ In particular, during a tornado warning the operators entered BOA ENV-1, " Adverse Weather Conditions," and after the required actions were completed the Shift Engineer, rather than exiting the procedure, conscientiously remained in the B0A until the tornado warning was lifted.
Safety Assessment /0uality Verification The licensee's performance in this area remains good.
Maintenance and Surveillance The licensee's performance in this area continues to be' good.
The cooperation between operations and maintenance continues to maintain a " dark board" on the control room annunciator panels.
Security Performance in this area continues to be excellent.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
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- K. Schwartz, Station Manager M. Burgess, Technical Service Superintendent
- T. Tulon, Operations Manager M. Snow, Support Services Director i
- T. Gierich, Assistant Superintendent, Work. Planning
- D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- P. Johnson, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Colglazier, Compliance Engineer P. Enge, NRC Coordinator
- R. Wegner, Shift Operations Supervisor
- D. St. Clair, Site Engineering Construction Manager
- W. Grundman, On-Site Quality Verification Superintendent A. Javorik, Technical Staff Supervisor W. Kouba, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 E. Zittle, Security Administrator
- B. Jacobs, MIS Supervisor
- J. Barrett, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on July-6,1993.
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The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspection.
2.
Plant Operations (71707. 93702)
Unit 1 operated at power levels up to 100% in the load following mode throughout the entire reporting period.
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Unit 2 operated at power levels up to 100% throughout the entire reporting period. Unit 2 is approaching end of core life and has entered coastdown. The. fueling outage (B2R04) is scheduled to begin on September 3, 1993.
a.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
During the week of June 7,1993, licensed operator requalification examinations were administered by the NRC. During the course of the simulator portion of the requalification exam, the Region III examiner raised a question with the inspector concerning the licensee's philosophy towards the Generating Station Emergency.
Plan (GSEF) emergency action level (EAL) classification.
During validation of the operating examination, one simulator scenario resulted in challenging two fission product barriers:
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the reactor coolant system by virtue of the loss of coolant accident; and 2) primary containment, due to containment
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temperatures 2 250 F, as read by running reactor containment fan cooler outlet temperatures. Byron Emergency Action Level Procedure, BZP 200-A1, requires a declaration of a Site Area Emergency when, " Challenge to two of the three Fission Product Barriers," occurs.
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Operations and training department representatives indicated that even though simulated containment temperatures exceeded 250 F, it was not sustained long enough to be considered a challenge to the containment. These representatives asserted that it was station
policy that the operators would not be expected to declare a Site Area Emergency when the criteria was satisfied for only a brief period of time.
Following discussions with station management, it was decided that whenever a legitimate EAL condition exists, there would be no subjective time duration before the emergency classification would be declared.
This issue will be tracked as an inspector followup item (454/455-93010-01(DRP)).
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b.
Onsite Event Follow-uo (93702)
On June 17, 1993, the nuclear station operator (NS0) noted that the circulating water (CW) makeup flow had dropped to zero on flow meter 0FT-CWO40. Although the CW makeup pumps were running, the CW makeup isolation valve (OCW-220) was closed.
The 1450 immediately re-opened OCW-220 and normal makeup flow was restored within 5 minutes. The cooling tower flume level dropped slightly, but recovered immediately. No safety concern was noted.
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The licensee's investigation found that the cause of the inadvertent closure of the OCW 220 valve was inconclusive.
The operations department will monitor the system for recurrence.
This event will be monitored as an inspector follow up item (454/455-93010-02(DRP)).
c.
Current Material Condition The inspectors performed general plant as well as selected system and component walkdowns to assess the general and specific material condition of the plant, to verify that Nuclear Work Requests (NWRs) had been initiated for identified equipment problems, and to evaluate housekeeping. Walkdowns included an assessment of the buildings, co.ponents, and systems for proper identification and tagging, accessibility, fire and security door integrity, scaffolding, radiological controls, and any unusual conditions.
Unusual conditions included but were not limited to water, oil, or other liquids on the floor or equipment; indications of leakage through ceiling, walls or floors; loose insulation; corrosion; excessive noise; unusual temperatures; and
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abnormal ventilation and lighting. Material condition for both
units continue to be relatively good; however, there are a few components / systems awaiting parts for repairs.
These include the Unit I containment chillers, and the Unit 1 steam generator IC power operated relief valve. The licensee continues to improve in
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this area.
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d.
Housekeepina and Plant Cleanliness
The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant ~
cleanliness for fire protection and protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter.
Housekeeping was overall considered satisfactory; however, on an intermittent basis, there are still a few areas which require some cleaning.
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e.
Radioloaical Controls
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The inspectors verified that personnel were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking,
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posting, etc. and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, operability, and calibration.
f.
Security Each week during routine activities or tours, the inspectors
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monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were being. implemented according to the approved security-plan. The inspectors noted that persons within the protected area displayed proper photo-identification badges and'those individuals requiring escorts were properly escorted. The inspectors also verified that checked vital areas were locked and alarmed.
Additionally, the inspectors also observed that personnel and
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packages' entering the protected _ area were searched by appropriate equipment or by hand.
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g.
Refuelino Activities The licensee has received the first three shipments of new fuel assemblies for the Unit 2 refueling outage (B2R04). The receipt
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inspection of two fuel assemblies was observed by the inspectors.
The fuel handling personnel followed the procedures and no items of concern were identified. Scheduled activities for B2R04 include the Unit 2 containment integrated leak rate test, and major preventive maintenance of the station auxiliary transformers.
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Two inspector follow up items were identified.
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Reaional Reauest:
Bulletin 93-02. ?abris Pluaaina of Emeroency Core Coolina Suction Strainers (92701)
OnJune7,1993,thelicenseesubmitthdaresponsetoNRCBulletin93-q 02. A description of the licensee's activity associated with this
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bulletin is in inspection report 454/455-93008'(DRP).
In brief, the licensee performed the requested actions of Bulletin 93-02, and -
identified that there are no fibrous air filters or other temporary sources of fibrous material, not; designed to withstand a loss of coolant accident, within Unit 1 and Unit 2 containments.
The requirements of the Bulletin were verified by a combination of visual examination and'
review of administrative controls.
The actions by the licensee are determined to be adequate; therefore, this Bulletin is considered closed.
4.
Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification (40500. 90712. 927001 During this inspection period, the inspector observed a quality assurance field monitoring activity associated with a technical specification surveillance. The surveillance involved the visual inspection of the residual heat removal (RHR) piping system following the ASME RHR pump run. The inspector briefly followed the observation activity by the quality assurance (QA) inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance / Surveillance (62703 & 61726)
a.
Maintenance Activities (62703)
Routinely, station maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.
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The following items were also considered during this review:
approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; functional'
testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
Portions of the following maintenance activity was observed and
reviewed:
- B93303 2SA181D Valve Replacement - 2B Diesel Generator Air Receiver Tank "D" Check Valve.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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b.
Surveillance Activities (61726)
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During the inspection period, the inspectors observed technical specification required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly resolved.
The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following surveillances:
- RCP-400-T47A Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release -
Containment Release
- BAP-1400-T5 Unit 2 Containment Noble Gases and H3 Gaseous Effluent Sample Prior to each release.
- 280S 8.1.1.2.a-1 2A DG Monthly Surveillance
- 2BVS.4.10-4(RH-2-3)
Scheduled Visual Examination (VT-2) of Class 2 and 3 Components at Normal Operating Pressures - Residual Heat Removal system.
c.
Diesel Generator 2A
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On July 6, 1993, during the 2A emergency diesel generator technical specification monthly surveillance, a metallic noise was noted by the operator. The operator immediately initiated a manual
" emergency trip" of the diesel generator.
The diesel generator was declared inoperable and all of the appropriate limiting condition for operation action requirements were completed. Operations and maintenance immediately inspected the diesel for damage. No abnormalities or problems were identified. An operability surveillance was performed and satisfactorily completed.
During diesel operation a high pitched noise was intermittently heard coming from the diesel generator room ventilation ducting.
This was considered to be the possible source of the noise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
[poineerina & Technical Sunnort (37700)
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i The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities.
This was accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine
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events, outage-related activities, and assigned technical specification surveillances. Further evaluation was conducted, as necessary, by
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observing technical staff involvement. associated with on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting, and reviewing deviation investigations and root cause analysis.
a.
Plant Process Computer (PPC)
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During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the problem / failure history of the Plant Process Computer (PPC).
Byron has conservatively addressed the issue of losing the PPC as a 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(v) non-emergency NRC notification event.
Administratively, the loss of the PPC for more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
i Both Byron and Braidwood have similar PPCs which contain outdated components; both facilities are in the progress of significantly upgradino the PPCs. The extent of the upgrade is similar at bcth plants The upgrade involves three separate phases: phase 1, replat.s the data acquisition system; phase 2, replace the processing function with a solid state. emulator; and phase 3, replace the graphics' display system. At Byron, phase 1 was completed en Unit I during the last refueling outage. Unit 2 is scheduled for the phase 1-upgrade during the upcoming Fall
refueling outage.
Statistics indicate a reduction in PPC failures following the installation of the phase I system. The licensee plans completion of all phases by 1995.
b.
Secondary System Chemistry Control
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The engineering and technical support organizations continue to investigate and evaluate methods to. increase the' reliability and
reduce corrosion failure mechanisms for secondary plant systems.
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Recently, after extensive review, the licensee began the addition of ethanolamine (ETA) to the secondary coolant system.
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response to the new industry recommendation for feedwater iron to be less than 5 ppb, the licensee chose ETA for its ability to reduce iron transport economically. _ There are only a few plants that are or planning to utilize ETA chemistry control. : 0f these
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plants, Byron and Braidwood are expected to initiate this
chemistry control in July 1993, with Zion scheduled for October 1993.
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Bus 211 DC Ground Investiaatign An intermittent.DC ground on Unit 2 bus 211 has occurred during the past few months. During this inspection period, the licensee, with some outside assistance, was able to trace the DC ground to two sources. The bus 211 ground has been tentatively identified to come from the OC SX fan circuitry and 2PA19J power supply
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relay.
Electrical maintenance replaced the power supply relay for 2PA19J. While performing troubleshooting activity on the OC SX fan circuitry, water was discovered in the limit switches of valve OSX163C, a part of the OC SX fan circuit. At the end of this inspection period, the licensee has begun repairs to the valve.
No bus 211 grounds have been noted since the two sources were
isolated.
d.
Special Plant Procedure (SPP) and Limitina Condition for Operation Action Reouirement (LCOAR) surveillance procedure misfilina On June 25, 1993, during the transfer of old procedures for microfilming, it was discovered that approximately seventy (70)
LC0AR surveillance procedures and sixty-six (66) SPPs were improperly filed. The majority of the deficiencies were administrative in nature.
The licensee reviewed all 70 LC0AR procedures and informed the inspector that there were no operability concerns. The licensee has established a root cause analysis team and is continuing to
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investigate the problem. Pending results of further investigation, the inspector will continue to follow this item as an Unresolved Item (454/455-93010-03 (DRP)).
One unresolved item was identified.
7.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Status Report for May 1993. The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Inspector Follow Un Items Inspector follow up i;.?ms are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed by the inspector and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Two inspector follow up items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 2.
9.
Unresolved items j
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether.they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.
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10.
Exit Interview (30703.1 The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in
paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 6, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the infornation disclosed during the' inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
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