IR 05000445/1987003

Insp Repts 50-445/87-03 & 50-446/87-03 on 870101-0228.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Electrical Penetration Assembly Replacement,Plant Tours & Fire Prevention/Protection Insp

ML20214M422
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	05/22/1987
From:	Barnes I, Kelly D, Spessard R, Wagner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214M396	List: IR 05000445/1987003 ML20214M394
References
50-445-87-03, 50-445-87-3, 50-446-87-03, 50-446-87-3, NUDOCS 8706010302
Download: ML20214M422 (13)

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APPENDIX CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION REPORT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/87-03 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/87-03 CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2 50-446 Construction Permit Expiration Dates:

Unit 1: August 1, 1988 Unit 2: August 1, 1987 Applicant: TU Electric Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name: ' Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 & 2-Inspection-At: Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted: January 1 through February 28, 1987

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D. L. Ke'lley,'AdCi6gTS~enior ' Resident Reactor Date Inspector, Construction, legion IV CPSES Group (

(paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7)

b VIam P. C. Wagner, Reactor Inspector, Region IV 5/n/87 Date CPSES Group (paragraphs 1, 2 and 3)

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Reviewed By: -[ -

5/2'E/87 R.L.SpesqXrd,DeputyDirector,jDivisionof Date Inspection Programs, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Approved: 8e #/n/#'7 I. Barnes, Chief, Region IV CPSES Group Date Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted: January 1 through February 28, 1987 (Report 50-445/87-03)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of (1) electrical penetration assembly replacement; (2) plant tours; and (3) 6.9kv switchgear removal and rewor Results: Within the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were icentifie Inspection Conducted: January 1 through February 28, 1987 (Report 50-446/87-03)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of (1) electrical penetration assembly replacement; (2) plant tours; (3) 6.9kv switchgear removal and rework; and (4) fire prevention / protection inspectio Results: Within the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

. Persons Contacted

• • J. M. Ayres, Quality Engineering Supervisor, TV Electric (TVE)

• • • R. P. Baker, Regulatory Compliance, Manager, TUE_

t ***J. L. Barker, Engineering Assurance Manager, TUE-

! **J. W. Beck, Vice President, TUE

• T. Braudt, Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT), TUE R. Chambers, Lead Quality Control (QC) Inspector, Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) Replacement, TUE

• • • W. G. Counsil, Executive Vice President, NE0, TUE

• • • R. D. Delano, Licensing Engineer, TUE

• • J. Guibert, CPRT, Senior Review Team (SRT)

• • • P. Halstead, QC Manager, TUE

• T. L. Heatherly, Regulatory Compliance Engineer, TUE L. Hull,, Electrical Foreman, EPALReplacement, TUE

• • • J. E. Krechting, Director of Engineering, TUE

• D. McAfee, Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, TUE

• J. W. Muffett, Executive Assistant, Engineering and Construction, TUE

• • • L. D. Nace, Vice President, Engineering and Construction, TUE

• • • D. M. Reynerson, Project Manager, Unit 2, TUE

• • • C. E. Scott, Startup Manager, TUE

• • • M. R. Steelman, CPRT Support, TUE

• • J. F. Streeter, QA Director, TUE T. Watson, Electrical Foreman, EPA Replacement, TUE

'D. R. Woodlan, Licensing Supervisor, TUE

• • • J. E. Wren, QC Services Supervisor, TUE The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during this inspection perio * Denotes personnel present at the February 10, 1987, exit intervie ** Denotes personnel present at March 3, 1987, exit intervie *** Denotes personnel present at both exit interviews, Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) Replacement The NRC inspector performed the following reviews and physical inspections

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related to the replacement of the EPA feed through modules in Units 1 and 2.

Procedure Review Construction Procedure EEI-22, " Installation of Conax Feedthrough/ Adapter Module Assemblies into Amphenol Sams Penetrations," was revised (Revision 2) on January 12, 1987. The QC inspection Procedure QI-QP-11.3-57, Revision 1, " Inspection of

Electrical Penetration Assembly, Installation and Testing," was

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updated by incorporating three Document Change Notices (DCNs) dated December 18, 1986, and January 5 and 12,1987. The most significant change to the earlier reviewed versions cf these two procedures was in the area of inspection and repair / rework of the EPA seal area The earlier QC instructions required the QC inspector to verify the finish of the sealing surfaces, on both the feedthrough module and the header plate, but provided little guidanc The two procedures were revised to incorporate Design Change Authorization (DCA) 31794, Revision 1, which was approved on January 12, 1987. This DCA provided guidance on polishing the surface areas to remove scratches / marks and guidance for determining an acceptable finish; i.e., a scratch / mark is considered acceptable when resistance to motion is not detectable to the human hand by the following sequence:

" 1. Drawing tip of fingernail across the effected surface at right angle or 2. A sharp pointed instrument (example: AWL) drawn across the effected surface using consistent pressure taking care not to mar the surfac . Compare above " Feel" with microfinish comparator scale (*Model #S-22), use finish denoted as 32S NOTE: There may be other scratches or nicks present, but to impair the seal integrity it MUST be within the

[following] areas noted as SEAL AREAS."

The inspection and evaluation of the seal areas is to be performed by a Conax representative or an engineer trained by Conax; any required repair or rework on the seals areas is to be done under the direction of the above representative or engineer. A Seal Area Evaluation Form (SAEF) is required to be complete and acceptable following each of the inspection The NRC inspector verified that the latest versions of these procedures were being implemented by both craft and QC personnol during those installation activities as discussed belo No violations or deviations were identifie b. Work Observations - Unit 1 EPA 1E-28, Module B, In-core Thermocouples On January 7,1987, the NRC inspector witnessed a scratch removal from the inboard seal surface area of this feedthrough assembl The

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repair work was accomplished by polishing the area with a motorized cratex wheel in accordance with the disposition of nonconformance report (NCR) CE-86-27 dated December 29, 1986. The NCR disposition referenced DCA 31,794 (see above). The SAEF was properly completed and described the repair by polishing the surface to an acceptable finish as verified by the Conax representativ Additional review of the documentation package (each module and each penetration has a separate document package) disclosed an additional NCR (CE-87-32 dated January 8,1987) which described cracks in the end sealant in both the inboard and outboard sides of the modul The NCR was dispositioned "use-as-is" based on the Conax representative. review which determined the cracks to be " cosmetic in nature and to have no effect on function or qualification."

Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) 87-358EC dated January 8, 1987, was also written for the above condition to comply with changes to the applicable procedures which require a CDR be written in lieu of a NC In addition, DCA 31,794, Revision 1, incorporated guidance on acceptable levels of cracking in the end sealant The NRC inspector witnessed the installation of this module on January 14, 198 The module, inside its cardboard container, was hand carried by three craft personnel from the laydown area in the Unit 1 electrical equipment room (Room 94, elevation 832') to the incore thermocouple room inside the Unit 1 Reactor Building (elevation 860'). The module was removed from its container, inspected, and installed in accordance with the procedures. The NRC inspector noted that extreme care was used to protect the module during transit and installatio The NRC inspector observed the connections of both inside and outside feedthrough module pigtail conductors to field cables on February 4, 1987. The NRC inspector also reviewed the penetration document packag The package contained NCR E86-105388, Revision 1, which was dispositioned on December 19, 1986. The disposition consisted of a temporary waiver for scratches located on the ports for modules A, B, C, and E based on a Conax representative evaluation. The evaluation concluded that the marks were " negligible and had a high probability of not degrading seal integrity." Also included in the package was IR-1-0101015 which indicated the results of the 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> leak rate l

test conducted on January 29 and 30, 198 The pressure drop during i this test was 0.8 psig (50.3-49.5) which was well below the pressure drop of 3.1 psig allowed by Procedure QI-QP-11.3-57, for this EP EPA 1E-09, Module E, Reactor Process, Protective Channel IV The NRC inspector observed the preparation for installing this module from the outboard side on January 14, 1987. Installation from the l outboard side was required because of obstructions (a steam line) on l the inboard side and necessitated the removal of the ferrules which l

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were compressed onto the feedthrough subassembl Ferrule removal, in accordance with procedure, required grinding two slots normal to the ferrule and 180 degrees apart and then twisting a screwdriver in each slot to break the ferrules in hal (The three ferrules form a seal to the feedthrough subassembly similar to a tubing compression fitting.) During the ferrule slot grinding with a small hobby-type electric grinder / polisher, a question was raised by QC personnel concerning the existence of a fire permi (Any spark or flame producing activity requires the issuance of a permit in accordance with facility procedures.) While awaiting the issuance of the required permit, and since two of the ferrules had been removed, the NRC inspector observed no damage to the subassembly but noted that metal filings from the grinding activi.ty had entered the pressure monitoring hole. An NCR was written to address this condition and the module was returned to temporary storage in the laydown area while awaiting the disposition of the NC The NRC inspector reviewed NCR CE-87-156 on January 30, 1987, and noted that the "use-as-is" disposition was based on information contained in a Conax letter dated January 15, 1987. This letter stated, in part, that " metal chips or abrasive dust entering the pressure monitoring hole during ferrule removal by grinding are not detrimental to the module integrity". The module was installed on January 21, 1987. The NRC inspector verified that the appropriate Inspection Report (IR), 1-0101708 dated January 21, 1987, and SAEFs were completed and in the document packag On January 30, 1987, the NRC inspector witnessed the insulation resistance testing of the conductor pigtails from this module. The NRC inspector also noted the connecting of the pigtails to the field cables during plant tours on February 3 and 4, 198 EPA 1E-17, Module E, Instrumentation and Thermocouples On January 30, 1987, the NRC inspector witnessed the preparation for connecting penetration module pigtail conductors to the field run electrical cable on the inside of the Ur.it 1 Reactor Buildin A review of the module documentation package disclosed acceptably completed documentation for the installation of the feedthrough subassembly module in the E port of penetration 1E-17. The documentation reviewed included irs for transferring the module from the warehouse to the laydewn area, from there into the Reactor Building, and for the actual installation into the E por Appropriate SAEFs were completed and signed as was the insulation resistance measurement test data. The conductors the inspector witnessed being prepared were pigtail leads D-13, -14, -15 and -16 and field cable EG136311Z. The pigtails were #16AWG-TQ solid conductors and EG136311Z was a 3 conductor, #16AWG with shield wire, cabl .. .

(The penetration module pigtails are connected to the appropriate field cables by means of crimped splice connectors. These splices are insulated with heat shrinkable insulation (HSI) that is provided in kit form specifically for the installation. The HSI kit includes a shim sleeve for the outer jacket of the field cable and for each pigtail conductor, except shield conductors, a splice sealing sleeve for each conductor, a conductor sealing breakout which is a boot type assembly with 2, 3 or 4 legs depending on the number of conductors including the shield, and an outer sealing sleeve. The completed splice assemblies are then placed in the associated cable tray.)

The NRC inspector verified that the appropriate craft (EEI-8) and QC inspection (QI-QP-11.3-28) procedures were followed during the preparation for making the connections. The retention of both pigtail and field cable identification was observed and the HSI kit number (Raychem Type NPKS-3-21K) and lot number were verified to be documented on the I On February 3,1987, the NRC inspector observed the completed splice and other splices connecting the IE-17, module E pigtails to field cables. All of the splices appeared to be acceptable; however, the outer sleeve of the HSI kit, while not forming a tight seal around either end, precluded the inspection of the individual splice HSI installation The NRC inspector also observed that the splices were trained in the cable tray (T14GRDE38) so that they were not resting one atop another. (The requirement for the instrumentation and control cable splices is that they not be made in the same area in numbers that would result in splices being above the cable tray side rails.) The ends of the unused pigtails were observed to be sealed with electrical tap EPA 1E-40, Modules A and E, Reactor, Protective Channel I On January 16, 1987, the NRC inspector witnessed the removal of these replaced modules and the blank modules in locations C and D. These modules were pulled back for reinspection to evaluate unsatisfactory leak rate test results in accordance with CDR 87-44EC. Module B was acceptable and was not removed. The Conax representative determined that a small scratch on the inboard side of the A module sealing surface was not acceptable; all other sealing surfaces were found to be acceptable by the Conax representative and by both the NRC and QC inspectors. Module A was removed in accordance with CDR 87-725EC and taken to the laydown area for rewor NRC inspector review of the document package on February 3, 1987, disclosed that module A was reworked by polishing with a cratex wheel, reinspected by the Conax representative, found to be acceptable, and was reinstalled on January 29, 1987. The NRC inspector review also showed that the leak rate test was conducted on

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8-January 29 and'30, 1987, with acceptable results and that the insulation measurement tests were conducted acceptably on January 31, 198 The NRC inspector witnessed the connection of three module A pigtails to the field cable on February 4, 1987. The pigtails, designated A-48, -49 and -50, were one of the #16AWG TT from the module. The field ~ cable, ER128125, was a #16AWG TP with shield. The following actions were observed:

. proper wire strippers used

. proper splice kit HSI used

. cable and pigtail identification preserved

. cable jacket and conductor insulation removal t

. cable jacket and pigtail diameter measurements performed with properly calibrated caliper

. crimping of splice connectors with calibrated crimper

. proper installation of HSI kit including shims, splice sleeves, breakout and outer sleeve The NRC inspector observed that the appropriate craft and QC procedures were followe No violations or deviations'were identifie Work Observations - Unit 2 EPA 2E-11, Modules A and B - Low Voltage Power On February 11, 1987, the NRC inspector accompanied the QC inspector and two craft personnel as they transferred the A module, in its cardboard container, from the warehouse to the laydown area in the electrical equipment room (Room 96, elevation 832'). Two craft personnel were sufficient because the low voltage (480VAC) power modules, containing 3-250MCM solid conductors, do not include long pigtail The solid conductors were threaded to allow lugs to be screwed onto them for bolting to mating lugs on the field cable When the A module was delivered to the laydown area, the cardboard container was opened, the splice kit removed and returned to the warehouse, and the module placed on the inspection stand for seal area evaluation. The Stone and Webster Engineering Company (SWEC)

engineer determined that a small scratch on the outboard surface sealing area was unacceptable; therefore, the module was returned to the container and placed in temporary storage. The NRC inspector

noted that the appropriate irs and SAEFs were completed and included

in the document packag A review of the document package showed that a combined package for the penetration assembly was used in Unit 2 instead of individual module packages as used in Unit The package for 2E-11 also

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contained appropriate irs and SAEFs for the header plate and module The replacement of module A was authorized by Startup Work Authorization (SWA) 34677 dated January 12, 1987, in accordance with CAR-55 and NCR E86-20084 The NRC inspector also witnessed the seal area evaluation of modules 2E11-8 and 2E13-B (both 3c-250MCM) on February 11, 1987. Both of these modules were also returned to temporary storage while awaiting repair / rework to remove scratches / marks determined to be unacceptable by the SWEC enginee On February 24, 1987, the NRC inspector witnessed the installation of modules A and B into penetration 2E-11. The NRC inspector noted that the modules were installed in accordance with procedures and witnessed the seal area inspections performed by the QC inspecto The NRC inspector also verified that the retaining ring bolts were tightened with a calibrated torque wrenc A review of the document package during the installation of the B module disclosed completed SAEFs (259 for B and 260 for A) indicating that the seal areas had been reworked to an acceptable finish on February 23, 1987. The NRC inspector also observed that the IR checklists for the installation of the modules (2-0104023 for B and 2-0103245 for A) were not being documented as the tasks were performed but he verified that these were filled in after the installation was complete EPA 2E-39, Module A, Reactor Protective Channel III On February 11, 1987, the NRC inspector witnessed the insulation resistance measurement of this module. A review of the document package showed that the SAEFs for the module and port were acceptable and that the installation was documented on IR 2-0103816 dated February 4, 1987. A review of IR 2-0103117 disclosed that an acceptable 23 hour2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> leak rate test was conducted on February 6 and 7, 1987, with a pressure drop of only 0.5 psig as compared to a drop of 3.6 psig allowed by Procedure QI-QP-11.3-57. The document package also contained a copy of NCR E86-200655, Revision 3, which provided clarification of the minimum bend radius for the #16AWG-TQ pigtails of the modules inserted in this penetratio No violations or deviations were identified during the inspections of the Unit 2 work activitie d. Status of EPA Replacements The NRC inspector was informed that 69 of the 250 EPA feedthrough modules for Unit 1 and 35 of the 211 for Unit 2 had been replaced as of February 28, 1987. The connections to the field cables were completed for 582 of the 2540 Unit 1 module pigtails; no Unit 2 modules had been connected to the field cables.

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The NRC inspector was also informed that all of the NIS modules

, (triaxial cable) had been returned to Conax for rework to shorten the length of conductor '

3. Plant Tours In conjunction with inspecting the EPA replacements, the NRC inspector made frequent tours of the Unit 1, Unit 2 and Common plant areas. During these tours, the inspector noted the following conditions which were brought to the attention of the applicant: Pull Ropes in Conduits The NRC inspector noted the existence of plastic pull ropes in two stainless steel conduits to cable tray T23GRCL11 in the lower level of the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The inspector's assumption that planned cable pulling activities were complete for these conduits was verified by applicant personnel. The NRC inspector was also informed by applicant personnel that the post construction inspection procedure (QI-QP-11.3-40) requires verification that all pulling aids (including pull ropes) have been removed from the raceways. The NRC inspector reviewed the procedure and verified this requiremen No violations or deviations were identifie Containment Hydrogen Monitor The NRC inspector noted dust and metal filings on the Unit 1 Reactor Building hydrogen monitor (1-AE5506C) located on elevation 860'.

Applicant engineering personnel inspected the monitor and determined that the existence of the small amount of dust and filling was not detrimental to the monitor operabilit Subsequent NRC inspection disclosed that the normal housekeeping activities had removed the majority of dust and filings from the monito The NRC inspector observed that normal housekeeping activities in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 were very goo No violations or deviations were identifie Cable Reel Labeling The NRC inspector observed an Okonite Triplexed, 4/0 AWG, green with white markings jacketed, electrical cable being installed at the 860'

level of the Unit 1 Reactor Buildin The cable was running from a reel located on the grating above the equipment hatch to cable tray T12GRBM60 at elevation approximately 875'. The NRC inspector noted that the green with white markings designated the cable to be on associated Train B cable which was being installed in a Train B cable tra Upon examination of the cable reel, the inspector noted the i reel was tagged W-150, 5404' 3c #12AW _ _ _ _ _

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The NRC inspector was informed that the cable was being installed in accordance with Work Order C860005475 and that the cable was placed on the reel in question as a means of transporting the required length of Triplex 4/0 AWG cable into the installation locatio NRC inspector review of IR EC1-0098580 disclosed that the cable had been removed from cable reel W-812-4 on January 26, 1987. This information resolved the NRC inspector's questions on the acceptability of the cabl No violations or deviations were identifie Conduit to Cable Tray Separation Three Train A conduits were observed to be less than 3' above a nonsafety related cable tray (T24KRDP08) in the incore thermocouple room in the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The conduits were connected to junction box JB2C4790 which was opened and had a number of electrical cables removed, coiled and stored in place. Since rework could have been in progress, as evidenced by the removed cables, the NRC inspector checked the comparable installation in Unit The NRC inspector found the conduits leaving JBIC4790 to be routed around rather than over T14KRDP07. However, he noted that two of the conduits were still within 3' of the cable tra The NRC inspector also observed that neither the cover that had been installed over the cable tray nor the SBM over the conduits were in place in the area where the conduits and tray were in closest proximit The NRC inspector discussed these findings with applicant personnel and was provided a copy of DCA 25487 dated January 22, 1987. This DCA provided revised electrical separation criteria for all control, instrumentation, and NIS signal electrical cables and raceways. The revised criteria specifies a one inch separation for all redundant raceway / cable combinations except for conduit (including Servicair and Sealtite) which may touch each othe . Class IE 6.9kv Swithchgear Removal and Rework During a tour of the upper electrical equipment area in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building (Room 103, elevation 852') on February 13, 1987, the NRC inspector observed that Train B, Engineered Safety Features, 6.9kv switchgear cubicles had been removed from their mounted locations. The NRC inspector was informed that the cubicles were removed to correct a floor slope problem which made it difficult to rack in the 6.9kv circuit breakers. The rework has been conducted in response to NCR CE-87-008 initiated on January 5, 198 Further NRC inspection disclosed that the rack-in problem was originally reported on November 27, 1985, in NCR E85-2016 This NCR was dispositioned on January 5,1987, by transferring the nonconformance to CDR-87-106E CDR-87-106EC was then dispositioned on the same day to

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12 transfer the nonconformance to NCR CE-87-008. These transfers from NCR to CDR to a new NCR were performed as part of the applicant's review of old NCRs for reportability under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.55(e).

The later NCR was dispositioned on February 13, 1987, to remove the switchgear cubicles, level the mounting surface and reinstall the cubicle On February 13, 1987, the applicant notified the NRC of a reportable deficiency under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) paragraphs (I) and (IV). The deficiency, as reported, addressed non-level structural embedments and gaps between the concrete foundation and the switchgear floor. As a result of these findings, the applicant concluded that the operability of the switchgear during normal and accident conditions was in questio During discussions of the switchgear problems with an applicant engineer, the NRC inspector became aware of a letter from the switchgear vendor, Brown Boveri, to the applicant indicating that due to the downward set of the switchgear floor, a seismic event could cause malfunction of the breakers. The letter is the documentation of an inspection performed by Brown Boveri personnel and sent to the applicant on September 5, 1986. In addition, the letter describes several other problems that could arise due to the gaps and misalignment of the switchgea It appears to the NRC inspector that sufficient information was transmitted to the applicant to indicate a condition that was reportable to the NRC under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e). However, the notification did not take place until February 13, 198 Due to a lack of time at the end of this reporting period, the inspector was unable to pursue with the applicant what the reasons for the delay in reporting were. Therefore, until more information can be acquired by the inspector, this item will be considered unresolved (445/8703-U-01; 446/8703-U-01).

During discussions concerning 6.9kv switchgear, the NRC inspector learned that in some cases work orders were written in lieu of NCRs before the work orders themselves were completed. There is a procedural requirement to review completed work orders for nonconforming conditions; however, if an obvious nonconforming condition exist, it appears that an NCR would immediately be written. It would also appear that a work order to correct the NCR would be in order. In order to ascertain the full details surrounding the NCR/ work order connection, the NRC inspector will review the NCR and work order procedures that are now in place to determine their adequacy. This item will remain unresolved pending this review by the NRC inspector (445/8703-U-02; 446/8703-U-02).

5. Fire Prevention / Protection The NRC inspector began a fire prevention / protection inspection of the construction activities of Unit 2. The inspection activities completed to date were verification by visual inspection that the fire extinguishers had been periodically inspected and area housekeeping activities for

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13- l control of flammable and combustible material. To date, Unit 2 Reactor Building and Train B switchgear room have been inspecte The following observed conditions were noted and transmitted to the applicant: During the inspection of the Unit 2 containment, the inspector noted that only four extinguishers were in evidence on the basement level and three were in evidence on the personnel hatch level. Based on previous fire inspections by the NRC inspector, the number of extinguishers for the area covered appears to be marginal, There were several compressed gas bottles improperly secure There was a large pile of wood in the area of the steam line pipe whip restraint The fire prevention / protection inspection will be continued and documented in subsequent NRC report No violations or deviations were identifie . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. Two such items, disclosed during the inspection, are discussed in paragraph 4 abov . Exit Interview Exit interviews were conducted on February 10 and March 3, 1987, with the applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this appendi During these interviews, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The applicant acknowledged the finding !