IR 05000413/1984036

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IE Insp Repts 50-413/84-36 & 50-414/84-20 on 840403-06. Deviation Noted:Hydrogen Piping in Reactor Coolant Pump Drain Tank Not Designed to Maintain Pressure Boundaries During Design Seismic Event
ML20140C620
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/18/1984
From: Conlon T, Miller W, Wiseman G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140C515 List:
References
50-413-84-36, 50-414-84-20, NUDOCS 8406190392
Download: ML20140C620 (6)


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. UNITED STATES

  1. g M49'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMis5lON g

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REGION ll o.

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101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.

' ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 4.....

Report Nos.: 50-413/84-36 and 50-414/84-20 Licensee: Duke Power Company

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422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: CPPR-116 and CPPR-117

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Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

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Inspection at Catawba site near Rock Hill, South Carolina Inspectors:

  1. M

/-/8-W W. H. Miller, Jr.

Date Signed 8. WM V-/r-Py G. R. Wiseman Date Signed

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' Approved by:

e N - / P- #4 T. E. Conlon, Section Chief Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY-Inspection on April 3-6, 1984

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Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 56 inspector-hours on site in the areas of fire protection / prevention.

Results Of ~ the areas inspected, no violations were identified.

One apparent deviation was found, (Hydrogen Gas Piping System for Reactor Coolant Drain Tank paragraph 5.F).

E406190392 040611 PDR ADOCK 05000413

PDR U.

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • R. L. Dick, Vice President-Construction
  • E. M. Couch, Project Administrator
  • H. H. Wallace, Construction Engineer
  • L. R. Davison, Project QA Engineer
  • R. A. Morgan, Senior QA Engineer
  • P. G. LeRoy, Licensing
  • J. R. Hendricks, Design Engineer
  • H. D. Brandes, Design Engineering
  • J. M. Rucci, 9esign Engineering
  • L. E. Vincent, Office Engineer N. Osburn, Mechanical Engineer S. P. Chandle, Mechanical Technician

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D. James, QA-Civil

  • D. P. Hensley, QA Technician NRC Resident Inspector
  • P. H. Skinner
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 6,1984, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the following inspection findings:

a.

Inspector Followup Item (413/84-36-01), Inadequate Number of 8 Hour Emergency Lighting Units - paragraph 5.b.

b.

Inspector Followup Item (413/84-36-02), Verification of Orifice Size in Water Supply Connections to Auxiliary Buildings - paragraph 5.d.

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Inspector Followup Item (413/84-36-03), Reevaluation of Fire Protec-tion / Detection Systems for Ventilation Systems - paragraph 5.e.

d.

Deviation (413/84-36-04), Hydrogen Gas Piping System for Reactor Coolant Drain Tank - paragraph 5.f.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters a.

(0 pen)UnresolvedItem(413/84-11-02and414/84-07-01), Fire Protection Piping Systems Over Safety-Related Equipment Are Not Seismically Supported:

Fire protection piping is located above safety-related i:

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equipment in a number of areas and is not yet seismically supported.

Records were not available on site to verify that vendor designed fire protection systems had been reviewed to assure that the systems are seismically supported.

Also, documentation was not available on site for review to determine how construction type hangers were reclassified as seismic supports.

Therefore, this item remains open and will be further evaluated during a subsequent NRC inspection.

b.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (413/84-11-03), Verification of QC Welding Inspection for Fire Protection System IRF-7:

A Nonconformance Report (NCR 18053) has been issued by the licensee for the craf t to inspect this piping system and to notify QC of any welds that do not have an inspection sign off. This inspection has not been completed.

c.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (413/84-11-04), Verification of QC Inspection of Underground Piping for the Diesel Generator Carbon Dioxide System:

The licensee is to inspect sample sections of the underground piping to l

verify that the piping is provided with an adequate protective coating as required by the construction drawings.

This item remains open pending completion of the inspection and followup corrective action.

d.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (413/84-11-05), Unapproved Hardware on Locking Type Fire Doors:

Fire doors have been modified to pennit the hardware to positive latch when the door is unlocked.

However, this item remains open since the hardware will not be adjusted until fuel load.

e.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (413/84-16-06 and 414/84-07-02), Inadequate Fire Protection QA Program:

The QA program provided for fire protec-tion features apparently meets the commitments in the licensee's fire protection review of July 1983. Therefore, this item is closed.

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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Permanent Plant Fire Protection / Prevention Features The inspectors reviewed the following permanent plant fire protection features:

a.

Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pumps (Module TI 2515/61)

~ The oil collection system for the reactor coolant pumps was reviewed.

Potential oil leakage points for each pump have been provided with a Westinghouse designed and furnished spray catchment enclosure.

These enclosures are provided for the lubrication oil lift pumps, oil heat exchangers and lower drip pans and are connected to drain piping which discharges into a 385 gallon tank.

A separate tank is provided for each pump.

The entire oil collection system is designed and installed to function following a design base seismic event.

This system was

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installed under the licensee's seismic quality assurance (QA) program as verified by a review of the following records:

(1) Pipe Configuration Date of Design Isometric Drawing Final QC Inspection CN-1491-NC078 3/26/84 CN-1491-NC080 5/26/83 CN-1491-NC082 3/23/83-(2) Weld Inspection Date of Weld Number Final QC Inspection INC211-1 3/26/84

.INC211-10 11/11/82 INC213-9 1/14/80 INC213-17 1/10/80

'INC215-14 1/12/83 INC215-22 1/12/83 (3)' Hanger Inspection Date of Hanger Number Final QC Inspection 1-R-NC-2062 2/16/84 1-R-NC-2070 3/17/84 1-R-NC-2077 2/18/84 The inspectors inspected the oil collection system-for reactor coolant pump nos.1A and 1B and verified that these systems were in conformance to the general design requirements.

A review of the licensee's surveillance procedures on this system will be made during a subsequent NRC inspection.

b.

Emergency Lighting Units (Module TI 2515/61)

A review was made of the 8-hour emergency lighting units for the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, essential switchgear rooms A and B, access to Standby Shutdown Facility and Control Room.

These areas contained.the ' lighting units required by the construction drawings, except lighting units had not been provided for the control panel area of the control room.

The licensee is to investigate why these units have not been installed and initiate appropriate corrective action.

This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (413/84-36-01),

Inadequate Number of 8-Hour Emergency Lighting Units, and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection. The construction drawings L

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f require;only one lighting unit in the auxiliary feedwater pump area.

This appears inadequate. = Also, the' drawings do not require a lighting

- unit in the -Train B disconnect enclosure in the Train A Essential Switchgear. Room. -These areas are to be further evaluated by-the licensee to. assure that adequate emergency lighting is provided. = These

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discrepancies are also part of Inspector Followup Item (413/84-36-01).

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.During future NRC inspections,-the licensee's surveillance procedures will be reviewed and the rating of ti' battery units will be' evaluated.

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c.

Fire Pumps Fire Barrier Wall

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The inspectors -verified that the fire ' rated masonry wall. had been

- provided -to separate. fire pump 'B' from pumps A and C as required by

.NRC; letter to Duke of Ja'nuary 20,1984. The power cables to' pump 'B'

beneath the intake structure deck are to be enclosed within a fire rated enclosure.

This feature is scheduled to be completed prior to

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fuel load and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC. inspection.

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Yard Fire Protection Piping System

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The water supply conr.ections to the auxiliary buildings were reviewed.

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-Records _'were not located to indicate the size of the orifice plate which had been installed :in ' these connections. -The licensee is to

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11nvestigate this problem and take the necessary action required to

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verify that-the correct orifice' plates are installed in' these connec-tions...This is identified as Inspector Followup Item (413/84-36-02),

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Verification of Orifice Size in Water Supply Connections to Auxiliary Buildings,-and will be reviewed during-a subsequent NRC inspection.

e.

Fire Protection for Charcoal Filter Type Ventilation Units A review was made off the fire detection and suppression system for the charcoal filter type ventilation units for auxiliary building Unit'1B, annulus. systems 1A and '18, and fuel pool -system.

These ventilation units are manufacturer by Mine Safety ' Appliance (MSA) and have' a

' thermister type fire detection system on the supply and exhaust side of

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the charcoal filter units which is not connected to.the fire protection alarm system, but actuates on the ventilation ' systems control panel.

The water spray fire suppression system within each unit is designed

,and ' installed as part-of the ventilation unit.

The water to these

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systems.are supplied from the fire protection water system and manually

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-activated by opening a.normally closed valve. The electrical installa-tion work to the fire detection system was ' installed under the safety -

related QA program.

However, during this ' inspection, information on the' type pre-operational tests and' future surveillance and maintenance

. inspections ~ and tests to.be ' conducted on these systems were not obtained.

This item will be further evaluated during a subsequent NRC inspection and is identified as Inspector Followup Item (413/84-36-03),

Reevaluation of' Fire Protection / Detection Systems for Ventilation Systems.

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f.

Hydrogen Piping Systems A review was made of the hydrogen gas piping system to the volume control tank, waste gas decay tanks and reactor coolant pumps drain tank.

The attachment to Duke's letter of April 14, 1983, to the NRC states that all hydrogen piping within the auxiliary and reactor buildings would be Duke Class F which is designed to maintain pressure boundaries during design basis seismic events.

The hydrogen for the volume control tank and waste gas decay tanks is supplied from the bulk gas storage located in the plant yard.

Piping inside the auxiliary

. building from the bulk gas supply to these tanks is designed and installed as Duke Class F (ANSI B31.1 - Seismic Loading).

The following hanger supports were reviewed to verify that the system was seismically supported in accordance with the construction drawings:

Date of QC Hanger No.

Inspection 1-A-NV-3109 10/5/81 1-A-NV-3503 9/24/83 1-A-GS-3136 6/3/82 1-A-WG-8396 7/27/82 The original design for the hydrogen system to the reactor coolant pump drain tanks required this system to be supplied from two cylinders located within each reactor building. The piping between the cylinders-and tank ~was to be Duke Class F (seismic type).

This system has been modified by relocating the cylinders to the bulk gas storage building outside the plant structures. The gas piping now extends from the yard supply through the auxiliary and reactor buildings to the drain tank.

The piping at the entrance to the auxiliary building in the mechanical penetration room is Class G (ANSI B31.1 - not designed for seismic loading) and the piping within the reactor building to the drain tank is Duke Class E (ANSI 31.1 - not designed for seismic loading).

Relocating the cylinders to a location outside the plant structure was a fire safety improvement.

However, the installation of the non-seismic type piping within the auxiliary building and reactor building creates a potential fire hazard and does not conform to the commitments to the NRC.

This discrepancy is identified as Deviation (413/84-36-04), Hydrogen Gas Piping System for Reactor Coolant Pump Drain Tank not installed for seismic loading.

Other than noted above, within the areas examined, no additional deviations and no violations Were identified.

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