IR 05000397/1999005
| ML17292B731 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17292B730 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-99-05, 50-397-99-5, NUDOCS 9907190184 | |
| Download: ML17292B731 (10) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
License No.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates Inspectors:
Approved By:
50-397 NPF-21 50-397/99-05 Washington Public Power Supply System Washington Nuclear Project-2 Richland, Washington June 7-11, 1999 T. O. McKernon, Senior Reactor Engineer, Operations Branch J. Spets, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch E
'ohn L. Pellet, Chief, Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
.
ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information 907i90i84 9907iS R
ADQCK OM00397 PDR
-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Washington Nuclear Project-2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-397/99-05 June 7 through 11, 1999 This special inspection reviewed the licensee's operations department's corrective action program related to operator control board awareness and critical parameter identification and trending. This resulted from regional concerns that operator's performance in these areas had declined since March 1998. The regional initiative inspection focused on program effectiveness and measurement as related to Inspection Procedure 40500 in the above area.
~Oerations Operators monitored critical parameters well and demonstrated good control board awareness (Section 04.1).
Some negative performance issues were identified indicating that personnel performance could be improved. The negative performance issues did not show overall inadequate crew performance, but reinforced the need for continued training focus.
This assessment was corroborated by operators performance during recent plant events (Section 04.1).
lA The licensee's self-assessment process identified worthwhile findings, tracked and corrected them in a timely manner.
However, operation's performance indicators outside those monitored by the licensed requalification program were primarily quantitative and provided limited trending data (Section 07.1).
-3-DETAILS Summa of Plant Statu's'uring the inspection period the plant was shutdown in a planned outage.
Operator Knowledge and Performance (Effectiveness of Program)
The licensee's monitoring of operations corrective action program effectiveness was performed through various methods.
During the inspection, the inspectors focused primarily on observation of performance-based activities of shift crews in the plant specific simulator.
04.1 0 erations Performance in Simulator Trainin
~Sco e
The inspectors observed two shift crews respond to simulator scenarios (e.g., station blackout, anticipated transient without scram, fuel pin leak, system grounds, etc.). One of the crews, in licensed operation requalification training week, participated in both training scenarios and evaluation scenarios.
Training scenarios differed from evaluated scenarios, in that, training scenarios could be halted temporarily to discuss success paths or reinforce operations management expectations.
Evaluated scenarios were not halted, but were critiqued after completion. The second crew participated in one evaluated scenario.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed records documenting corrective actions established and performed by the licensee to resolve human performance issues in operations.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed records regarding training of operations in critical parameters monitoring and board awareness.
b.
Observations and Findings The inspectors observed that operators monitored critical parameters and demonstrated good control board awareness.
Several positive performance attributes were observed.
For example, critical parameters were routinely identified by the control room supervisor and strongly relayed to operators.
Personnel quickly identified abnormal board conditions during panel walkdowns (e.g., high pressure coolant system meter select switch was not in the correct position, different units between front and back panel indications). The crews also conducted structured briefings and readily utilized a new technical specification computer-aided data base search tools.
In addition, one crew was successfully evaluated by the emergency response organization in their declaration of emergency classifications, practiced notifications and suggested protected action recommendations.
However, the inspectors also noted that individual performance in the simulator was mixed. The inspectors identified several instances of negative performance which were also recognized by the training staff and the operating crew. For example, an operator failed to maintain established pressure bands.
While not significant, it was apparent
that the operator overshot the designated pressure band by 50 psig.
In another instance, an operator set up to start a pump on a wrong train. Since this occurred during a training scenario, the training staff prevented the pump start. At other times, communications broke down when scenarios became more demanding.
In a number of instances, the shift manager halted the scenario to reinforce 3-way communications and plant trip results were not always communicated (e.g., all rods in, reactor pressure, vessel level trends, etc.). Other examples included an operator not monitoring important parameters when a safety relief valve was opened to control pressure; thereby, complicating the response because of a broken tail pipe. At times, alarm response was slow because of difficultyin locating and interpreting the correct alarm response procedure.
While the above examples were not significant in of themselves, collectively, they indicated that performance can be improved. While no critical parameters were missed during training scenarios, recent plant events corroborate the need for continued improvement (e.g., inadvertent draindown of spent fuel pool skimmer surge tank and reactor pressure vessel; see NRC Inspection Report 50-397/99-07).
The inspectors found that corrective actiops, identified by the training department regarding operations monitoring of critical parameters and board awareness, were being tracked and implemented.
Feedback from the training staff was critical, frequent, and timely.
c.
Conclusion Operators monitored critical parameters well and demonstrated good control board awareness.
Some negative performance issues were identified indicating that personnel performance could be improved. The negative performance issues did not show overall inadequate crew performance, but reinforced the need for continued training focus.
This assessment was corroborated by operators performance during recent plant events.
Quality Assurance in Operations (Program Measurements)
The licensee's operation corrective action program used varied metrics for program measurement, some formal and informal ~
07.1 Self-Assessment Activities and Trendin Pro rams a.
Ins ection Sco e
The inspectors reviewed records documenting corrective actions established and performed by the licensee to resolve human performance issues in operations.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed records related to monitoring of critical parameters
-5-and control board awareness.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed several mechanisms the licensee had in place to assess and improve human performance; specifically, 1) Operations Instruction (Ol)-23, "Human Performance Improvement Program";
2) OI-9, "Observation Program"; 3) "Journey to Excellence," Operations Improvement Plan; 4) training observations; 5) self-assessment program reports; and 6) training and operations performance indicators.
Observations and Findings The inspectors found that the licensee's self-assessment process identified worthwhile findings and that findings were. being tracked and corrected in a timely manner, given plant events of the last year.
For example, issues related to human errors were entered into the problem evaluation review program, corrective actions designated, and responsibility assigned and tracking of completion status performed.
However, the inspectors noted that several of operations'erformance indicators (e.g., number of Ol-9 observations performed, errors per month) were quantitative and provided limited trending data.
In addition, the inspectors noted that lower tier performance problems were not being effectively captured or trended; therefore, precursors to potentially more significant problems were not readily or clearly identifiable. The inspectors found that training indicators (e.g., quiz trending, simulator performance trending, etc.) were being developed to track and trend crew and individual performance and that development completion dates were established.
The licensed operator requalification training and evaluation of the operators and crews in the plant-specific simulator were a major contributor to monitoring operator performance.
Methods included periodic emergency preparedness evaluations, operation management observation of crews and individuals in training, annual licensed operators operating examination and others.
Additionally, the inspectors noted that the licensee's performance monitoring program had identified operator workarounds and equipment operator errors as areas for improvement.
The inspectors reviewed several self-assessment reports and operations'Journey to Excellence" and found them to be thorough, performed by competent individuals, and providing worthwhile findings and recommendations.
The inspectors also noted that findings and recommendation were entered into the plant tracking log system for closure.
In addition, the inspectors noted that most plant tracking log items were closed out in a timely manner while others of lesser significance remained open.
The inspectors also reviewed OI-23 and noted that the process credited OI-9 observations as a source of information by which operations human performance could be assessed.
The inspectors reviewed completed Ol-9 observations and discussed the process with the operations manager and shift manager.
The inspectors found that the process did not provide a significant amount of documented critical feedback on the performance of personnel in the areas of question.
Licensee management stated that nondocumented (verbal) critical feedback was present during the process.
In addition, licensee management stated, and was supported by self-assessment results, that the following benefits are realized from the Ol-9 process:
1) open communication, 2)
face-to-face interface, 3) performance improvement opportunities, and 4) immediate feedback.
The inspectors noted that the OI-9 process appeared to be used as more of a training tool on management expectations than an assessment or identification too c.
Conclusions The licensee's self-assessment process identified worthwhile findings, and tracked and corrected them in a timely manner.
However, operation's performance indicators outside those monitored by the licensed requalification program were primarily quantitative and provided limited trending data.
V. Mana ement Meetin s XI Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 10, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings and did not identify any information as proprietar ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee S. Boynton, Quality Manager D. Coleman, Manager, Regulatory Affairs R. Hayden, Operations Training Requalification Lead P. Ingersoll, Projects Manager, Engineering P. Inserra, Licensing Manager, Regulatory Affairs S. Jekow, Senior Operator J. Massey, Quality Engineering J. McDonald, Plant Manager T. Meade, Assistant to the PGM, Corrective Action S. Oxenford, Operations Manager C. Perino, Staff Senior Operator, Operations D. Rambo, Shift Manager, Operations F. Schill, Licensing Engineer, Regulatory Affairs W. Shaeffer, Manager, Nuclear Training P. Taylor, Operations Training Superintendent, Nuclear Training P. Taylor, Operations Training Superintendent R. Weibring, Vice President, Plant Services NRC R. Lantz, Acting Senior Resident Inspector J. Spets, Resident Inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 40500 Effectiveness of Licensee Process to Identify, Resolve, and Prevent Problems LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Licensed Operator/STA Requalification Training Scenarios LR001273 LR000110 LR001270 LR001272 LR001407 LR001410 LR001406 LR001411 LR001271 Operator Workaround, Closure Information; Training Performance Closure Information;
"Journey to Excellence," Revision
Plant Tracking Log; Corrective Actions Associated with New NCVs; No Response Violations
-2-Quality Department Audit Report AU298-037, Revision 1, September 3, 1998; Audit Report 298-004, March 10, 1998 Operations, "Journey to Excellence," Revision 2 Ol-9, "Expectation for Supervisory and Peer Oversight," August 19, 1998 Plant Tracking Log Items 146385 146565 146905 148001 148126 148388 148602 149747 150944 151165 151219 151266 151303 151347 151407 152330 152536 152753 153397 157133 157608 159030 Site-Wide Procedure SWP-CAP-01, "Corrective Action Program," January 18, 1999 Operator Workaround Self Assessment, April26, 1999 WNP-2 Operations Training Biennial Review, March 25, 1999 USA Operations Assessment Plant Report, October 16, 1998 Organizational Performance Improvement Report, August 1998 WNP-2 Performance Trend Reports, June, July, August, September, October, and November 1998 Plant Tracking Log Summary Report May 11-12, 1999