IR 05000352/1987001
| ML20211F870 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1987 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211F852 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-352-87-01, 50-352-87-1, NUDOCS 8702250222 | |
| Download: ML20211F870 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 50-352/87-01 Docket No.
50-352 License No.
DPR-44 Priority
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Category C
Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company
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2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 l
Facility Name:
Limerick Generating Station Inspection At:
Limerick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: January 14-16, 1937 Inspectors:
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1r'7 C. Z. Qs)rdon, Regional Team Leader d: ate
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NRC Team Members:
C. Amato, Emergency Preparedness Specialist C. Conklin, Emergency Preparedness Specialist J. McClellan, PNL S. Kucharski, Resident Inspector R. Urban, Resident Inspector, Peach Bottom W. V. Thomas, Emergency Preparedness Specialist H. Williams, Resident Inspector, Peach Bottom Approved by:
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- / 3 /f-7 W. J.clafarus( f11ef, Emergency
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Preparedness Section, DRSS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on January 14-16, 1987 (Report No. 50-352/87-01).
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's partial-scale annual emergency exercise conducted on January 15, 1987.
The inspection was performed by a team of eight NRC Region I and NRC contractor personnel.
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Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on January 16, 1987:
S. M. Danielson, NUTECH R. W. Dubiel, Senior Health Physicist G. D. Edwards, Engineer J. F. Franz, Plant Manager R. R. Gallagher, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation R. A. Kankus, Director, Emergency Preparedness W. E. Keller, NUTECH T. Krispenburg, NUTECH D. A. Landahl, TSC Evaluator F. J. Larkin, Nuclear Security Specialist G. M. Leitch, Manager, Nuclear Generating Department R. H. Logue, Assistant to Manager, Nuc. Supp. Department R. D. Mandik, Control Room controller R. J. Palazzo, NUTECH A. M. Pesarchik, Health Physicist M. J. Roache, Emergency Planning Coordinator D. M. Rembold, Physicist, Radiation Protection J. W. Sabados, Senior Chemist K. W. Schlecker, P. B. Emergency Preparedness Coordinator P. R. Supplee, Analyst, Nuclear Security J. J. Tucker, P. B. Emergency Preparedness C. Weik, Emergency Preparedness Training Coordinator In addition, the inspectors interviewed and observed the actions of numerous licensee emergency response personnel.
2.0 Emergency Exercise The Limerick partial-scale exercise was conducted on January 15, 1987 from 8:45 a.m. until 3:00 p.m.
a.
Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on October 31, 1986, were reviewed and, following revision, determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On December 1, 1986, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evalua-tion.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff and licensee's contractor to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario and :upporting data provided by
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the licensee. Missing information was also provided. The revised l
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scenario allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Ener-gency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those
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areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on January 14, 1987, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario.
Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in the areas of technical support and radiological data. These changes were also discussed during the briefing. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant opera-tions.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
loss of HPCI and reactor shutdown Malfunction of feedwater heater Turbine casing penetration by turbine blades loss of ECCS systems Reactor water level reduced below top of active fuel Release of radioactive material to environment Medical treatment and decontamination of injured personnel Declaration of unusual event, alert, and site area emergency classifications.
The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite emergency response facilities.
b.
Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of
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the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:
Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; Direction and coordination of the emergency response; Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies;
Communications /information flow, and record keeping; Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions;
Provisions for in plant radiation protection;
Performance of offsite and in plant radiological surveys;
Maintenance of site security and access control; Performance of technical support; Performanca of repair and corrective actions; Performance of search and rescue;
Performance of first aid and decontamination of injured personnel;
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Assembly and accountability of personnel; Provisions for communicating information to the public; and Management of recovery operations.
t c.
Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team j
also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response l
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organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plan conditions:
Site Emergency Coordinators and Emergency Directors demonstrated excellent command and control over major technical and adminis-trative aspects of the response;
Communications between emergency response facilities and among survey and monitoring teams provided good information flow; Control of offsite teams was effective and team placement was well coordinated with the release;
Based upon elevated iodine levels, a good decision was made by
Control Room staff to call for early activation of the TSC; Prudent use was observed of the Transient Response Implementing Procedure (TRIP) flow charts for inhibiting automatic depressur-ization system (ADS);
Briefings made by key personnel in each emergency response facility were complete and thorough; and
The health physics checkpoint was promptly established to effectively control contamination and limit reactor building entries.
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d.
Exercise Weaknesses The NRC identified the following areas which detracted from the licensee's performance and need to be evaluated for corrective action (the licensee conducted an adequate self-critique of the exercise which also identified some of these areas).
These items are unresolved:
1.
Emergency Action Levels (EAL) do not consider turbine casing penetration as an ALERT classification as identified by NUREG-0654 criteria (50-352/87-01-01).
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Operators had difficulty in classifying the Site Area Emergency since the EAL criteria contained in EP-101, Loss of Hot and Cold i
Shutdown Capability, are based upon general plant conditions
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(i.e., HPCI and RCIC unavailable, RHR unavailable) rather than specific instrument readings (50-352/87-01-02).
3.
Information provided on the message sheets for making immediate notifications did not receive official authorization from the Emergency Director (50-352/87-01-03).
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Projections based upon worst case scenarios and degrading plant conditions were not performed in the TSC until prompted by the ED. Once the assessment was initiated, delay.; were encountered in providing completed calculations back to key TSC staff (50-352/87-01-04).
5.
Independent assessment r(sults were not adequately cooroinated between the TSC and EOF (50-352/87-01-05).
6.
The Field Survey Display Map in the TSC was not used to identify either locations or radiation readings reported by offsite field teams (50-352/87-01-06).
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Press releases were delayed and did not contain adequate information on protective action recommendations, prognosis of the accident, or status of release (50-352/87-01-07).
8.
During the medical drill there was a significant delay in trans-
porting the victim to the ambulance (50-352/87-01-08). At the exit meeting the licensee stated that changes in approach to handling contaminated / injured individuals would be considered.
e.
Recurring Items During the previous emergency exercise, fourteen weaknesses were identified. Observations made during this exercise indicated that of these previously identified weaknesses, all were corrected with the following exceptions:
No means was established in the TSC to setup a Frisker station for contamination control per Procedure EP-330 (50-352/87-01-09).
Procedures EP-313 does not provide for field teams to obtain KI
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prior to offsite dispatch (50-352/87-01-10).
3.
Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on January 16, 1987 during which key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The critique was adequate in that licensee participants highlighted both areas for improvements (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken) and areas in which improvements have been made.
Specific improvement areas which were identified by the licensee related to:
lack of followup of critical actions within the control room, lack of mask qualified personnel to perform in plant repair and corrective actions, two-way radio communication problems, informal recordkeeping i
within the TSU, operability of Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
equipment, delays in EOF activation, and concerns with the medical drill.
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4.
Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader sum-marized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed with the exception of those identified in Section 2.e. and that no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limi-tations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be taken regarding the identified open items.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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