IR 05000346/1973003
| ML19319C136 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1973 |
| From: | Dickerson M, Hayes D, Williams C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319C129 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-73-03, 50-346-73-3, NUDOCS 8001310494 | |
| Download: ML19319C136 (14) | |
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O U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY CC:SIISSION DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION III
Report of Construction Inspection RO Inspection Report No. 050-346/73-03 Licensce:
Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Davis-Beese Nuclear Power Station License No. CPPR-80 Oak llarbor, Ohio Category; A I
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l Type of Licensee:
PWR (E6W) - 872 Mwe
l Type of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced i
Dates of inspection:
July 10 - 11, 1973 i
Dates of Previous Inspection: April 24 - 27, 1973 i
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Principal Inspector:
M. W. Dickerson h~ / 'i 7
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Accompanying Inspector:
C.
Williams
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l Other Accompanying Personnel:
None
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Reviewed By:
D. W. ilayes', Senior' Reacfor Inspector (Acting)
ch[/f /77 Reactor Construction Branch (Date)
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O SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Enforcement Action A.
Violations 1.
Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and the Toledo Edison Company Quality Assurance Lbnual, design documents which were in use by a site contractor did not bear the required approval.
Moreover, apparent, unapproved changes had been made to those documents.
(Paragraph 8)
2.
Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and the Babcock & Wilcox Company quality control procedures, design documents (drawings) were not controlled as required.
(Paragraph 9)
B.
Safety Matters l
No safety matters were identified.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Ibtters O
Storage of Piping for Essential Systems (R0 Inspection Report a fo. 050-346/73-02)
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During the referenced inspection, provisions for the storage of piping for essential systems were determined to be inadequate.
During the current inspection, the steps taken by the licensee, as described in his letter dated June 29, 1973, to correct the item of noncompliance, were observed to have been accomplished and were considered acceptable.
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a result, this matter is considered closed.
Design Changes No new design changes were identified.
Unusual Occurrences No unusual occurrences were identified.
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s Other Significant Findings A.
Current Findings The licensee indicated that as of July 1, 1973; (1) construction was 53% complete, and (2) engineering was 91% complete.
B.
Unresolved Matters 1.
Cleanliness - Construction Areas Cleanliness of the construction areas within the reactor building, except for the reactor containment area, was considered to be inadequate.
This matter was brought to the attention of the licensee who indicated that steps would be taken to improve the housekeeping by the various contractors within their areas of reapansibility.
(Paragraph 5)
2.
CRD Preaker Undervoltage Trip Assembly Deficiency Sufficient evidence that the subject deficiencies (encountered at another site) had been corrected was not available during the current inspection. As a result, the licensee is pursuing this
'h matter and is to provide documentary evidence of satisfactory
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resolution of this problem.
(Paragraph 7)
3.
Apparent Corrosion of Stainless steel Connonents and Stainless Comy nents in Contact with Carbon Stcel IIangers and Connecters Red oxide was observed on the entire weld, heat affected zone, and adjacent base material of various welds on the containment spray system.
Carbon steel bolts used to connect stainless components were observed to have a coating of light rust.
Furthermore, carbon steel hangers and supports (some were wrapped with tape) were observed to be in direct contact with stainless components, and red oxide was apparent at the areas of contact.
(Paragraph 10)
C.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Matters 1.
Procedures for Documentation, NSS System Components (R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/72-03)
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During the referenced inspection, there was an apparent lack of procedural information prescribing the documentation required to
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be available at the site to justify q'uality acceptance of USSS components by Babcock and Wilcox Company (B&W).
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4, (a During this inspection, it was established that acceptable procedures are available.
This matter is considered closed.
(Paragraph 1)
2.
Reactor Coolant Piping (R0 Inspection Reports No. 050-346/72-06 and No. 050-346/73-02)
A manufacturer's data report is now available for all reactor coolant piping with the exception of spool No. A33-1.
A stress analysis report for this spo*ol is yet to be obtained and this matter remains open.
(Paragraph 2)
3.
Storage Protection Procedures (R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/72-03)
During the referenced inspection, storage requirements for critical items did not appear to be well established.
Ilowever, during this inspection, it was established that B&W field specifications were available which provide acceptable requirements for critical equipment storage.
This matter is considered closed.
(Paragraph 3)
4.
Approval of Procurement Document Revisions (R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/73-02)
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established that TECO had approved the latest revisions of purchase specifications or deletions to these specifications which were in the possession of site contractors.
During this inspection, the Bechtel QA representative stated that an investigation established that these specifications had been issued to the contractors for information and comment only.
To alleviate this problem the Bechtel Engineering Procedures Manual, Section 5.9.2, has now been revised to include a provision which stipulates that all such specifications (issued for review and comment) shall be accounted for, and that they shall be stamped conspicuously,
"For Information Only."
This matter is considered resolved.
5.
Review of Electrical Test Data (R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/73-02)
Evidence that technical data and test results for purchased material and equipment are checked against the codes and standards or specifi-cation was observed to be in the Bechtel Corporation (Bechtel) files.
These documents (production certification and production checklist)
were signed by both engineering and quality assurance.
This matter
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is considered closed.
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Protection of Electrical Switchgear (R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/73-02)
Inspection of the 4 KV switchgear room indicated that adequate measures had been established to control the entry of water.
In addition, adequate protection (covering) of 480-volt switchgear and associated transformers was observed to be in place.
This matter is considered closed.
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7.
Quarantine of Nanconforming Cable (R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/73-02)
Observation of the storage of Class IE nonconforming cable established that it had been adequately segregated from acceptable Class IE cable and that segregation was maintained by use of a separate, roped-off area for storage of this nonconforming cable.
This matter is considered closed.
8.
Containment Spray Valve - Apnlicable Specification (R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/73-02)
The applicable specification for a ten-inch Velan gate valve, No. S/N0017, questioned during a previous inspection, was determined ('~'g)
to be No. 7749-M-212, Revision 2.
Revisions to specifications are (
now more closely controlled in that unapproved copies, distributed
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for information or review, are stamped "For Information Only."
This matter is considered closed.
(Paragraph 4)
hhnagement Intervieu A.
The following persons attended the management intervicu at the conclusion of the inspection.
Toledo Edison Company (TECC)
G. J. Sampson, Vice President - Power L. E. Roe, Chief Mechanical Engineer J. D. Lenardson, Quality Assurance Engineer G. W. Eichenauer, Field Quality Assurance Representative E. C. Novak, Nuclear Project Engineer Bechtel Corporation (Eechtel)
H. A. Ablondi, Project Quality Assurance Engineer b)
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B.
Matters discussed and comments, on the part of management personnel, were as follous:
1.
The inspector reviewed the status of previously unresolved matters described in the summary section of this report.
During this review, the satisfactory resolution of the previous violation for storage of piping for essential systems was also discussed.
2.
The inspector stated that a tour of the facility had established that housekeeping, particularly in the reactor building, was unsatisfactory and that additional effort was necessary by the site contractors to clean up the debris.
The inspector added that the protection of equipment (from dirt, water, etc.) stored in place in these areas, appeared, in some cases, to be marginally acceptable.
The licensee indicated that positive steps would be taken to improve the housekeeping and protection of equipment.
3.
The inspector discussed the quality assurance program with regard to design control (field changes) and indicated that an apparent violation of AEC regulations was observed during this review in that B&W had failed to follow established procedures for the ("'%
control and disposition of design drawings.
Furthermore, the inspector stated that the Bechtel QA organication's implementation
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of the document control provisions for field change notices was marginal in that untimely record keeping made it very difficult to determine the history (status) of a field change notice.
The licensce's representative indicated that corrective action would be initiated immediately.
4.
The inspector discussed his review of the installation of reactor pressure vessel supports by A. L. Bently & Sons Company (Bently)
and indicated that an apparent violation of AEC regulations was observed in that Bently was unable to produce, for review, approved design documents used in their construction activities for the RPV supports.
5.
The inspector stated that during a tour in the area of the con-tainment spray pump, stainless steel spray system piping welds on three separate pipe lines were observed to have conspicuous red oxide in the area of the weld, heat affected nones, and adjacent base material.
In addition, the inspector said that carbon steel nuts and bolts connecting stainless components were covered with a medium coating of red oxide.
The inspector also stated that hangers and supports for Class I stainless steel p)
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piping were made of carbon steel and were in direct contact with
the stainless piping except, in several instances, wherein the
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carbon steel hangers and supports had been wrapped with tape to prevent contact between the carbon and stainless steel.
This measure, the inspector commented, did not appear to be effective and red oxide from the carbon hanger was evident on pipe and the l
hangers.
The licensee vas informed that a licensee representative at the site had indicated earlier that the observed conditio*
(red oxide on stainless welds and pipe) was not an uncommon condition at this site an ' that no documented QC activity r lative e
to these observations was available.
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investigation would be made and that the results would be j
documented. The inspector stated that the problem areas discussed
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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The following persons, in addition to individuals listed under the l
Management Interview Section of this report, were contacted during l
the inspection.
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Toledo Edison Company (TECO)
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l W. G. Moring, Quality Assurance Engineer l
E. M. Wilcox, Quality Assurance Engineer l
K. M. Cantrell, Quality Assurance Engineer
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Bechtel Corporation (Bechtel)
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W. C. Lowery, Quality Assurance Engineer - Electrical E. V. Kapp, Assistant Project Field Quality Control Engineer G. L. Aller, Documentation Engineer J. E. Banchich, Engineering Assistant Babcock & Wilcox Comoany (BSW)
J. W. Marshall, Field Quality Control Supervisor l
ITT - G-innell Company (Grinnell)
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J. J. dafferty, Site Project Manager
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D. (hMI) Giguerre, Quality Control Manager i
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A. L. Bently & Sons Company (Bently)
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l D. (NMI) Sanders, Quality Control Engineer
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Results of Int,ection i
1.
Procedures for Documentation, NSS System Components f
(R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/72-03)
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The referenced inspection indicated that there was an apparent lack r
of procedural information prescr'.oing the documentation required to i
be at the site to justify acceptance of B&W NSSS components.
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l During the current inspection, 16 was established that acceptable procedures are new available at the site. Acceptability was determined
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(V by review of B&W procedure No. 9A-107-1, Revision 6, titled " Receipt Inspection and Procedure for Tagging." The procedure states both the receipt inspection requirements and the documentation required for acceptance. The latter includes:
(1) the purchase order identifying the equipment specification or drauing to which manufactured (including all change notices), (2) the equipment specification or drawing identifying the required code or standard (including revisions),
(3) a quality assurance release stating that the requirements of the original purchase order and associated changes have been met and identifying any contingencies and/or waivers (defines the requirements and states the basis for acceptancM, and (4) a letter or other documents from the licensee, or his agent, indicating that the documentation has been found acceptable.
2.
Reactor Coolant Piping (R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/73-02)
A B&W 1etter of conformance (dated !by 15, 1973) for the 36-inch reactor coolant piping has been received at the site which certifies that the stress analysis has been completed for pipe spool Nos. A32-1, A24-1, and A24-2.
However, the release indicates that the required stress analysis is still not complete for spool No. A33-1.
This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
3.
Storage Protection Procedures (RO Inspection Report No. 050-346/72-03)
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The referenced inspection indicated that storage requirements for critical items did not appear to be well established and failed to adequately cefine long-term storage protection requirements.
During this inspection, it was established that B&W field specifications (FS) provide the necessary instructions for storage of critical items and define the long-term storage protection requirements.
The field specifications specifically reviewed were:
(1) FS-III-3, " Receipt,
, Inspection, Handling, Storage, and Installation of Reactor Coolant Piping and Reactor Coolant Pump Casings," dated August 1, 1970; (2) FS-II-1, " Storage Requirements for Nuclear Steam Supply Components, and Equipment," dated January 16, 1970; and (3) FS-III-Sa, " Receipt Inspection, Handling, Storage, and Installation of the Pressuricer,"
dated December 10, 1971. All three documents were contained in the B&W Construction Company manual titled, " Standard Nuclear Procurement Specification Manual No. 2A 64-N, Revised March 28, 1973.
This matter is considered closed.
4.
Containment Sprav Valve - Applicable Specification (R0 Inspection Report No. 050-346/73-02)
During the referenced inspection, the cpplicable revision to specification No. 7749-M-212 for the purchase of containment spray valve No. S/N 0017 i
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%d (ten-inch gate valve supplied by Velan) could not be established.
However, during this inspection, it was established that Revision 2 to the specification was applicable in that:
(1) Revision 2 to Specification No. 7749-M-212 was transmitted to Velan by TECO letter dated November 1, 1972; (2) Bechtel Inspection Report No. 5 (conducted at the vendor plant) confirms that valve No. S/N 0017 was inspected and accepted to Revision 2 on January 12, 1973; (3) the shipping papers from Volan, dated January 15, 1973; indicate that Revision 2 applies, and (4) a TECO letter, dated January 5, 1973, transmits Revision 3 to the specification which applies to valves yet to be manufactured.
This matter is considered closed 5.
Cleanliness - Construction Areas During a tour of the facility, it was observed that certain construc tion areas, particularly those within the reactor building (exclusive of the reactor containment area) were extremely dirty, and debris (cables, ropes, tin cans, paper, plastic, wood, etc.) was strewn about.
This matter was discussed with the licensee, who stated that maintaining cleanliness of these areas was a problem, that letters had been written to the various contractors concerning housekeeping, and that additional steps would be taken to correct this problem.
This matter will be reviewed during the next routine inspection.
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Protection of Installed Equipment During the tour of construction areas, it was also observed that protec-tion for installed equipment (piping, valves, pumps, and coolers) located on the 545-foot elevation of the reactor building, could be considered marginally acceptable. Concrete drilling had occurred in the area
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above a containment spray pump and, although an effort was made to i
protect the pump from the drilling sludge, some sludge was splattered on the pump and piping.
In addition, the floor and walls in this
' area as well as hangers, piping, and ventilation ducting were covered in part with either red oxide and/or a red residue from a previous unidentified overhead water leak.
7.
CRD Breaker Undervoltage Trip Assembly Generic deficiencies in the CRD breaker undervoltage trip assembly which had been discovered at another facility were discussed with the licensee to determine what corrective measures had been taken to assure that the deficiencies had been corrected. As a result of this discussion, the licensee has requested B&W to document the replacement of the previously inadequate coils (Part No. 75081G26S)
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with coil No. 75081C26 and to provide assurance that the undervoltage (j
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coil circuit has been modified to provide the circuit with suitable overcurrent protection (five ampere fuse).
This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
8.
Design Documents Did Not Have the Required Approvals (Bently)
A review of the installation of reactor pressure vessel supports by A. L. Bently and Sons Company (Bently) disclosed that Bently was unable to produce approved documents used in their construction activities for the RPV supports.
The QC engineer (Bently) produced a records package which contained various construction procedures, a " Procedure for Inspection of Installation of Miscellaneous Iron,"
and a letter used to transmit this procedure.
All of the above documents were associated with Contracts No. 7749/6 and No. 7747/8.
The transmittal letter, dated December 13, 1971, was not signed by the originator, had penciled-in references to submitted construction procedures, and the revision number to Construction Procedure No. ABSP-10 had been changed by pencil, with no evidence relating to the individual who made these changes.
Additionally, there was no evidence of the required project engineer / owner approvals, i.e.,
the signature line of the specifying document had not been signed.
The licensee representative stated that, although Bently could not produce a set of conforming documents relative to this matter, Bechtel's QA Department maintained duplicate copies of all of the
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referenced docucents, each of which had been properly approved.
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The inspector stated that the contractor responsible for implementing the work is required by the Davis-Desse QA Manual to have appropriate, properly approved, documents in his possession.
Revice of the records possessed by Bechtel's QA group indicated that duplicate documents had been properly reviewed and approved.
The inspector asked TECO and Bechtel representatives if Bently had been recently audited by the respective QA groups and if this deficiency had been identified.
Both indicated that audits had occurred, but that this deficiency had not been idcntified.
9.
Failure to Control Design Documents as Required The B&W procedure, No. 9A-332, Revision 7, with reference to Document Control Form PDS32192-2, requires that all design drawings be controlled to the entent that each copy received is logged to indicate receiet and disposition.
B&W routinely receives three copies of each drawing issued to them by Bechtel. However, only two of these copies are controlled in accordance with the procedure. According to B&W, one copy of each set of drawings issued by Bechtel (at the site) is
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transmitted by B&W to the B&W offsite engineering offices and this apparently accounts for the third copy.
However, records at the
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site were not available to account for the third copy.
As a specific
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example of this generic problem, the documentation for con' trol of l
Q listed drawing No. C-241 (Auniliary Building, Elevation 565, Blockouts and Equipment Pads, Anchor Bolts and Drainage - Pumps l
P-37-1 and P-37-2, Feedwater !!akeup System) was examined.
As indicated previously, no records were available at the site to
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j account for the third copy.
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10. A_pparent Corrosion of Stainless Steel convonents and stainless
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Comronents in Contact uith Carbon Steel Haneers and Connectors I
During the site tour, the following conditions were observed in the area of containment spray pump No. P56-2, and associated piping, located at elevation 545 feet:
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Observation of pipe spool No. TE-33A-32 (connecting the piping to the j
suction side of the pump No. P56-2) disclosed that:
a.
Stainless (SA-312/304) weld No. C had a light coating of red oxide over the entire weld heat af fected ::ene and up to 1/2 inch of the adjacent base material.
Several stainless welds within this same general area were observed to be similar in appearance.
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b.
The bolts and nuts (AST1 A193 and A-194, respectively) connecting I
l the spool identified above to the containment spray pump j
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The design documents allow direct contact between carbon steel l
hangers and stainless piping.
Observation of installed piping indicated that carbon steel hangers and supports vere in direct
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I contact with stainless steel piping of all Class 1 systems.
l Several of the hangers and supports in the area of containment l
l spray pump, No. P-56-2, displayed depcsits of red oxide at the
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interface between the carbon hangers and the stainless piping.
l A number of the hangers supporting stainless piping were observed to have been wrapped with tape to prevent contact with the stainless piping.
In several observed instances, this j
tape protection had failed along the edges of the hanger, and red oxide was observed at the interface between the carbon steel j
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l hanger and the stainless piping.
The Grinnell project manager
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stated that the addition of the tape between the carbon steel
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I hanger and the stainless steel piping was not required by the
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design documents.
Therefore, he said, this activity was
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discontinued, and existing tape will be removed.
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However, the tape had not been removed from the observed areas and there appears to be a potential for the tape to act as a
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I collection site for dirt and moisture, thereby contributing to
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j the acceleration of the corrosion of the carbon hangers as uas f
i observed in some instances.
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l-The TECO QC engineer indicated that the conditions reported above l
were not uncommon at this site, and questions regarding these j
matters have been raised by various site inspection personnel.
l However, except for the tape removal, documentary evidence related l
to the above reported conditions and corrective actions, if
required, appeared not to have been generated.
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As a result of the observed condition and discussion with the licensee, j
l an investigation into both the conditions and their cause will be i
l undertaken by TECO. The results of this investigation will be reviewed l
l during a subsequent inspection l
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11. Structures and Supports - Containment Proof Test
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Review of QC System
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Review of the document relating to this activity (Davis-Besse Nuclear l
Power Station Construction Document No. 7749-5, Section 10.3, I
' " Pneumatic Testing") indicated that quality control procedures, work
performance procedures, and record keeping requirements have been i
satisfactorily established.
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UNITED STATES
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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DIVIC10N OF COMPLI Af 40C
D)
REGION 811 f
793 ItOOSEVELT ROAD TELEPH ON E GLEN ELLYN. lLLINOls G0137 (312) ste-2000
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RO Inspection Report No.
050-346/73-03
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Transmittal Date
- August 17, 1973
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Distribution:
Dis tribu tion :
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RO Chief, FS&EB RO Chicf, FS&ED
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RO: LIQ (5)
RO: LIQ (4)
DR Central Files L:D/D for Fuel & Materials Regulatory Standards (3)
DR Central Files l
Licensing (13)
RO Files I
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l RO Files
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B.
RO Inquiry Report No.
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Transmittal Date
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Distribution:
Distribution:
R0 Chie f, FS6EB R0 Ch ie f, FS&EB RO:HQ (5)
RO:HQ DR Central Files DR Central Files
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Regulatory Standards (3)
RO Files
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Licensing (13)
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l RO Files
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Incident Notification From:
(Licensee & Docket No. (or License No.)
Transmittal Date
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Distribution:
Distribution:
RO Chicf, FS&EB RO chie f, FS&EB RO:llQ (4)
RO: LIQ (4)
Licensing (4)
L:D/D for Fuel & Materials DR Central Files DR Central Files R0 Files
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RO Files O
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