IR 05000344/1982018
| ML20054J219 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1982 |
| From: | Malmros M, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054J216 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-82-18, NUDOCS 8206280311 | |
| Download: ML20054J219 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!?ilSSION s
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REGION V
Report No.
50-344/82-18 Docket No.
50-344 License No.
NPF-1 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Portland General Electric Comnany 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland. Orecon 97204 Facility Name:
Troian Inspection at:
Rainier. Oreaon Inspection conducted: Aoril 19 - May 28. 1982 Inspectors:
/Atp 7 /9/h MOH. (441mros6 de$ior Resident Inspector (/
Date' Signed
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Date Signed Approved by:
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G.$.Zwhtzig,(Chief y
Date/ Signed Reactor Operations Projects Section 1 Reactor Operations Projects Branch Inspection on April 19 - May 28, 1982 (Report 50-344/82-18)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of plant shutdown operations, surveillance testing, maintenance, refueling activities, security, and followup on Licensee Event Reports. The inspection involved 135 inspector-hours by the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8206280311 820611 RV Form 219 (2)
PDR ADOCK 05000344 O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- C. P. Yundt, General Manager
- R. P. Barkhurst, Manager, Operations & Maintenance C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Technical Services-
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J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services D. R. Keuter, Operations Supervisor D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor
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R. P. Schmitt, Engineering. Supervisor G. L. Rich, Che;nistry Supervisor T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor-R. E. Susee, Training Supervisor D. L. Bennett, Control & Electrical Supervisor P. A. Morton, Quality Assurance Supervisor R. W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance & Construction The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during.the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interviews.
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Operational Safety Verification - Refueling Shutdown During the inspection period, the inspector observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly, or biweekly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspector observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operations as prescribed in the facility technical specifications. Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operation r.ecords were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On the occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift.
During each week, the inspector toured the accessi.ble areas of the facility to observe the following items:
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General plant and equipment conditions.
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Maintenance requests and repairs.
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Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment, d.
Ignition sources and flammable material control.
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Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative
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controls and approved procedures, t
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Interiors of electrical and control panels,
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Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
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Radiation protection controls.
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
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Radioactive waste systems.
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The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspector to determine that the licensee complied with technical
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specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal of equipment from service. Verification was achieved by selecting one safety-related system or component weekly and verifying proper
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breaker, switch, and valve positions, both for removing the system or component from service and returning it to service.
During each week, the inspector conversed with operators in the control room, and other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involved.
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Three groups were the subject of observation during shif t turnover -
the control room operators, the refueling crew, and security personnel.
The inspector examined the licensee's nonconformance reports to confirm the deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspector. No jumpers or bypasses appeared to have been improperly
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installed or removed or to have conflicted with the techaical specifications.
Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used. Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration status.
The facility remains in a shutdown condition for the refueling outage
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Cycle IV-V.
The scheduled refueling outage completion date is July 9, 1982.
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s No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Refueling' Activities The inspector verified that reviewed and approved procedures were available for use during refueling activities which included-the following:
core unloading, fuel inspection (both visual and sipping) fuel bundle reconstitution with stainless steel rods and partial grid clips, and core reloading. The licensee has submitted License Change Application No. 88 to NRR which requests a change to the facility design technical specifications related to fuel assembly coniguration. This licease change will be required prior to facility startup. The reload safety analysis for the Cycle IV-V reload is scheduled for completion during June, 1982. During the inspection period, the inspector directly observed activities associated with the unloading of the reactor fuel to the spent fuel pool and the inspection of fuel to be reused during the next operating cycle. Prior to fuel handling activities, the inspector verified that applicable surveillance tests of fuel handling equipment had been completed. Technical specifications related to containment integrity and RCS refueling cavity and spent fuel pool boron concentrations were found to have been met. Housekeeping in the vicinity of the fuel handling activities was controlled by licensee personnel to preclude the inadvertent entry of unwanted material or debris'in the refueling. cavity. During all fuel handling activities, the fuel movement was directly supervised by a licensed Senior Reactor Operator with no other concurrent duties.
The reloading of the core and exchange of fuel assembly inserts (control rods / thimble plugs / sources) is scheduled to commence June 7, 1982, upon completion of the core reload design.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Surveillance The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspector. Observations by the inspector included verification that proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if required by W e test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance tests, tne inspector verified that the test results-met the acceptance criteria of the technical specifications and were reviewed by cognizant licensee personnel. The inspector also verified that corrective action was initiated, if required,-to determine the cause for any unacceptable test results and to restore the system or component to an operable status consistent with technical specification requirements.
Surveillance tests witnessed during the inspection period were associated with the following systems: nuclear instrumentation, eme. Nancy diesel
. electrical system, safety injection system, residual heat removal system, and the seismic monitoring instrumentation.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. _ _ _ __
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Maintenance Maintenance activities involving preventive and corrective maintenance were observed by the inspector during the inspection period. Observations by the inspector verified that proper approvals and system clearances were obtained and testing of redundant equipment was performed, as appropriate, prior to maintenance of safety-related systems or components.
The inspector verified that qualified personnel performed the maintenance using appropriate maintenance procedures. Replacement parts were examined to verify proper certification of materials, workmanship and testing. During the actual performance of the maintenance activity, the inspector checked for proper radiological controls and housekeeping, as appropriate. Upon completion of the maintenance activity, the inspector verified that the component or system was properly tested prior to returning the system or component to service. During the inspection period, maintenance activities observed were associated with the emergency diesel generators, limitorque valve operators, instruments electrical buses and inverters, and the rod drive m otor generator sets.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The circumstances and corrective actions described in LER Nos. 82-05 and 82-06 and Special Reports dated April 5, 1982 and May 7, 1982, were examined by the inspector. The inspector found that each report had been reviewed by the licensee and reported to the NRC within the proper reporting interval. The corrective actions for each event were as follows:
, LER 82-05 (Closed): The licensee's audit program identified a failure to perform a required surveillance which involved the cycling of component cooling water valves. The cause was attributed to a personnel error in scheduling the test following revision of the periodic operating test procedure. The scheduling of surveillance tests has been removed from the collateral duties assigned to various shift supervisors, and has been made the permanent responsibility of the Assistant Operations Supervisor. This change should provide for improved continuity of the scheduling process.
LER 82-06 (Closed): As a result of high fission product activity in the reactor coolant system during Cycle IV operation, the licensee inspected (visual and sipping) all fuel to be reused during Cycle V.
The results of the inspection revealed a serious degradation of fuel'
cladding in fuel assemblies located adjacent to the core baffle.
The failed fuel was attributed to a cross flow condition which occurred
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-5-as a result of excess clearance in the core baffle joint. The corrective; action to preclude fuel degradation during Cycle V has been-to strengthen the fuel assemblies in the baffle area' by replacing susceptible fuel rodlets with stainless steel rods and the inclusion of partial ~ grid clips in certain assemblies to provide additional strength against..
flow induced vibration and fretting failure. The details of this fuel assembly modification and safety evaluation have been submitted to the NRC as License Change Application Number 88, dated May 21, 1982.
NRR approval of this application will be required prior to the startup of the Cycle V core.
Special Report - Dated April 5, 1982 (Closed): The licensee provided descriptions of the-circumstances and total accumulated actuation cycles of the emergency core cooling system because of actuations which occurred on January 12 and 16, 1982. The information provided was consistent with technical specification requirements and all components of the emergency core cooling systems functioned as designed.
For the inadvertent actuation on January 12, 1982, plant procedures have been revised to include appropriate precautions regarding the possible actuation of the emergency core cooling system when shifting preferred instrument bus power supplies.
The inadvertent actuation on January 16, 1982, was caused by steam dump actuation when Preferred Instrument Bus No. 2 was lost with the plant at 100% of full power. ROC 82-36 has been initiated to prevent the arming and actuation of the steam dump system when power is interrupted i
to Preferred Instrument Bus No. 2 (82-18-01).
Special Report - Dated May 7, 1982 (Closed): The licensee identified a condition which resulted in the failure of an accelerograph which i
is part of the seismic monitoring system. The failure is attributed
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to moisture accumulation causing corrosion during plant operation.
A Plant Design Change, RDC 80-092, has been initiated to improve the
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seismic monitoring system and methods to preclude the moisture problem with Accelerograph No. 6340 will be included in the design change (82-18-02).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified by the inspector.
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Exit Interview l
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
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During these meetings the inspector j
sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection, l
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