IR 05000344/1982005
| ML20041F306 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1982 |
| From: | Johnston G, Malmros M, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041F295 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-82-05, 50-344-82-5, NUDOCS 8203160377 | |
| Download: ML20041F306 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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REGION V
Report No. 50-344/82-05 Docket No. 50-344 License No.
NPF-1 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S.
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Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204
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Facility Name:
Trojan Inspection at:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted:
January 4-29, 1982 Inspectors: Nf/MM h
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.2 M. 11. Malmros, Senior Resident Inspector D(te Signed
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GU W.(johndtoh! Resident Inspector Date' Signed Date Signed Approved By:
i GJ B. (2we t alig i Chief, Reactor Operations Date Signed Projects Section 1,
Reactor Operations Projects Branch
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Inspection on January 4-29, 1982 (Report 50-344/82-05)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations, surveillance testing, security activities, maintenance, refueling preparations, follow-up on Licensee Event Reports, and plant trips-safety system challenges.
The inspection involved 196 inspector-hours by the NRC Resident Inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified I
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PDR RV Fonn 219 (2)
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g DETAILS
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Persons Contacted s
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Yundt, General Manager g
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Barkhurst, Manager, Operations and Maintenance.
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A. Olmstead,. Manager, Technical Services J.
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Reid, Manager, Plant Services
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Keuter, Operations Supervisor
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Swan, Maintenance Supcrvisor
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Schmitt, Engineering Supervisor
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Rich, Chemistry Supervisor f
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Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor R.
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Susee, Training Supervisor D.
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Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor
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Morton, Quality Assurance Supervisor
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Ritschard, Security' Supervisor
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Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor
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Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear. Maintenance & Construction s
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The inspectors also interviewed and t'alked with other licenseei 7 '
employees during the course.of the. inspect. ion.
These included
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e shift supervisors,t reactor and2 auxiliary operatore, caintenance' ~ ~-T'
personnel, plant technicians.and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
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- Denotes those attending the exit interviews.
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2.
Operational Safety Verification During the mo' nth, the inspect $rs observed and examined activities the licenses' facility.
to verify the operational safety of e
The observations and examinations of those activities were con s ducted on a daily, weekly, or biweekly basis.
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On a daily basis, the inspectors observed' control' room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for
operations as prescribed'in'the facility techni' cal ppecifications'.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other ophration records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations.
On the occasions when
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a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information E ",'"
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on plant status was observed to determine that all pertinent l
information on plant status was observed to determine that al?
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pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift.
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During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:
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"Jeneral plant and equipment conditions.
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Maintenance requests and repairs.
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Fire hazards and fire fag.
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Ignition sources and flammable material control.
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Conduct of activities in accordance with'the licensee's
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Interiors of electrical and control panels.
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Implementation of the licensee's physica51 security' plan.
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Radiation protection controls.
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
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Radioactive waste systems.
The licensee's equipment clearance control was.egamined weekly by the inspectors to determine that the licensee homplied with technical specification limiting conditions for operation, with r'e s p e c t to removal of equipment from service
, Verification was achieved by selecting one safety-related sys' tem or pqnponent weekly and verifying proper breaker, switch, and val'v'e positions, both for removing the system or component from serv 3cc and re-turning it to service.
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During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and other plant personnel.
The discussions contered on plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics related to activities in progress.
Two groups were the subject of obsarvation during shift turnover -
the control room operators and security personnel at the main gate.
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sIhe inspectors examined the licensec',s nonconformance reports to confirp. the deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completioys of corrective action.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspectors.
yo jumpers or bypasses appeared to have been improperly installed or removed or to have conflicted with the
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-3-technical specifications.
Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.
Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration status.
Each week the inspectors verified the operability of a selected emergency safety features (ESP) train.
This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity, and general condition of the equipment.
ESF trains verified to be operable during the month included the auxiliary feedwater system, residual heat removal system, the containment spray system and the control room. emergency ventilation system.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Maintenance Maintenance activities involving preventive and corrective maintenance were observed by the inspectors during the month.
Observations by the inspectors verified that proper approvals, system clearances, and tests of redundant equipment were per-formed, as appropriate, prior to maintenance of safety-related systems or components.
The inspectors verified that qualified personnel performed the maintenance using appropriate maintenance procedures.
Replacement parts were examined to determine the proper certification of materials, workmanship, and tests.
During the a :tual performance of the maintenan'c'e activity, the inspectors checked for. proper radiological controls and house-keeping, as appropriate.
Upon completion of the maintenance
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l activity, the inspectors verified that the component or system was properly tested prior'to returning the system or component to service.
During the month, maintenance activities observed were associated with the electrical distribution system, main feedwater system and portable radiation measuring equipment.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspectors.
Observations by the inspectors included verification that proper procedures were used, that test in-strumentation was calibrated, and that the system or component
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-4-being tested was properly removed from service if required by the test procedure.
Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the acceptance criteria of the technical specifications and were reviewed by cognizant licensee personnel.
The inspectors also verified that corrective action was initiated, if required, to determine the cause for any unacceptable test results and to restore the system or component to an operable status con-sistent with the technical specification requirements.
Surveillance tests witnessed during the month were associated with the following systems:
reactor protection, steam gen-erator level, steam flow and nuclear instrumentation systems.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Plant Trips - Safety System Challenges The facility experienced three plant trips during the month.
Two of the trips involved Safety Injection (SI) actuation.
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One of the sis occurred during recovery from a trip caused by a failure of an inverter on January 12, 1982, which in turn caused a loss of Instrument Bus Y22.
Instrument Bus Y22 was being shifted from Bus YO2 to the No. 2 inverter after re-pair of the inverter.
At this time, T-ave was less than 553 degree F,
with the steam line high flow SI not blocked.
De-energizing Y22 during the transfer caused the steam flow bistables on each loop supplied from Y22 to be picked up.
The low T-ave, high steam flow SI logic was thereby satisfied, causing SI actuation.
On January 16, 1982, the plant tripped due to an SI again caused by loss of Instrument Bus Y22.
In this case Y22 was lost because the No. 2 inverter transformer failed.
The SI occurred due to the high steam flow coincident witn low steam line pressure logic.
As in the case of the previous SI act-uation, the high steam flow bistables come in from the loss of Y22.
PT-506, turbine first stage pressure, is also powered from Y22 and will fail low and arm the steam dump system.
The other turbine first stage pressure transmitter, PT-505, supplies a T-ref computer.
The transmitter is fed from Y11 ana the com-puter from Y22.
T-ref in this case fails low and the large deviation between T-ave and T-ref causes the steam dumps to open, lowering steam line pressure thereby satisfying the SI logic and actuating the SI system.
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-5-The third trip occurred January 9, 1982, when an extraction steam line to the No. 5B feedwater heater, ruptured in an elbow section.
The'line was unisolable and the plant was manually tripped for that reason.
The inspectors verified by examining logs and reactor trip reports, and by discussions with licensee personnel, that notification via the ENS was done as required, the root causal factors were evaluated, and that reportability was taken into account.
The corrective action,'as appropriate in each case, was done prior to the, resumption of power operation or mode change where required.
The facility operated in each case normally throughout each event, and actions taken by plant personnel were appropriate to the conditions of the plant.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Preparation For Refueling As part of the preparation for refueling of the facility, the inspectors observed the receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel received during the month.
The receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel was performed in accordance with Fuel Handling Procedure - FHP-1, New Fuel Receipt.
No deficiencies were identified during the inspection of the new fuel that require resolution with the fuel supplier.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-up The circumstances and corrective actions described in LER Nos. 81-28, 81-29, and 81-30 were examined by the inspectors.
The inspectors found that each LER had been reviewed by the licensee and reported to the NRC within the proper reporting interval.
The corrective actions fer each event were as follows:
LER 81-28 (Closed):
The licensee replaced the failed thermal overload relay and subsequently. satisfactorily tested the safety injection room fan cooler.
The original thermal overload relay failc4 to mechanically latch when reset due to tolerance problems in the latch mechanirs.
LER 81-29 (Closed): The licensee has limited the travel of the hydrogen vent system supply valves that are located outside the containment to 50 degrees.
The corresponding
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-6-valves inside the containment are administrative 1y.
controlled for opening only during plant modes 5-6 as appropriate.
The licensee plans to physically limit the opening of the.inside supply valves'to 50 degrees during the refueling outage scheduled.to-start May'1, 1982.
LER 81-30 (Closed):
Investigation by licensee personnel
.during research on a Plant Problem Report identified that
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the containment pressure indicators PI-10075 and PI-10076 were not reading the differential pressure between the containment and the atmosphere.
Transmitters PT-10075 and PT-10076 are inside the containment and'have sealed reference legs., Accordingly, they cannot reflect varia-tions in atmospheric pressure outside' containment.
As such, Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 requiring'contain-ment pressure to be kept between -1.1 to +1.6 psi, could not be assured.
The two transmitters provide signals only to indicators in the control room, and do'not supply any safety-related~
function.
The licensee does have accurate containment pressure indication via the plant process computer.
A separate transmitter provides a signal-to the computer for containment pressure differential.
The computer point will-also alarm if the pressure d dVia t e s beyond -0.2 to +1.0 psi, which is well within the Technical Specification limits.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with liensee representatives-(denoted in Paragraph 1) on January 15,'1982, and February 3, 1982.
During these meetings, the Senior Resident Inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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