IR 05000344/1982006
| ML20070F570 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1982 |
| From: | Book H, Fish R, Hanchett J, Scown K, Wenslawski F NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070F561 | List: |
| References | |
| NRC-2022-000198, TAC 46275 50-344-82-06, NUDOCS 8212210185 | |
| Download: ML20070F570 (43) | |
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. , U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No. 50-344/82-06 Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted: February 22 - March 4, 1982 ///3O[f.A Inspectors: L R. F. Fish, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, Date Signed NRC Tea, i.eader A/T271YI UNkA K. ~ Scown,' Emergency Prep & redness Coordinator, Date Signed RC Il '30bT3- /Y , m J. G. H(nchett, Public Affairs Officer Datb S14ned - Other Team embers: J. R. Sears, Emergency Planner, NRC E. F. Bates, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, NRC B. Zalcman, Staff Meteorologist, NRC A. E. Desroesiers, Senior Research Scientist, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories G. A. Stoetzel, Re earch Scientist, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories ' // f30 /fL ' Approved By: - u v F.' A. Wenslawski, Chief, Reactor Radiation Da te' Sign'ed Prote tion Se ion II!30 ffl Approved By: - . H. E. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Date Signed Branch ! 8212210185 821202 DR ADOCK 05000344 PDR _ _
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' .. i t Appraisal Summary: -2- '
Appraisal on February 22 to March 4,1982 (Report No. 50-344/82-06) . Areas Inspected: Special announced appraisal of the emergency preparedness
program, including administration of emergency preparedness, emergency organization,
training and retraining, facilities and equipment, emergency plan implementing procedures, coordination with offsite groups, and drills and exercises.
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The appraisal involved approximately 445 inspector hours onsite by eight ] (8) NRC inspectors.
Results: No significant deficiencies were identified in the seven areas covered j by the appraisal.
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. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ___ ___ _ _ _ _ _ - . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No.
1.0 Administration of Emergency Preparedness...........................
2.0 Emergency Organization.............................................. I 2.1 Onsite Emergency Organization.................................. l 2.2 Augmentati on Organi zati on.....................................
2.3 Conclusions: Emergency Organizati on..........................
3.0 Emergency Plan Traini ng and Retraining.............................
3.1 Program.......................................................
3.1.1 Troj an Si te T ra i ni ng................................
3.1.2 Headquarters Trai ning............................... 5 3.2 Program Implementation........................................
3.3 Conclusions: Emergency Plan Training and Retraining..........
4.0 Emergency Facil i ti es and Equi pment.................................
4.1 Emergency Facilities..........................................
I 4.1.1 As s e s sment Fa ci l i ti e s...............................
4.1.1.1 Co n t rol Room...................................
4.1.1. 2 Technical Support Center.......................
4.1.1.3 Operations Support Center......................
4.1.1.4 Emergency Operations Facili ty..................
4.1.1.5 Post-Accident Coolant Sampling and Analysis....
4.1.1.6 Post-Accident Containment Air Sampling and Analysis.......................................
1 4.1.1.7 Post-Accident Effluent Sampling and Analysis...
4.1.1.8 Offsite Laboratory Support.....................
4.1.2 Protective Facilities...............................
4.1.2.1 Assembly / Reassembly Areas......................
4.1.2.2 Medical Treatment Facili ties...................
4.1.2.3 Decontamination Facilities.....................
4.1.3 Other Facilities....................................
4.1. 3.1 News Center....................................
4.1.3.2 Expanded Support Facilities....................
4.1.4 Conclusions: Emergency Facilities..................
, 4.2 Emergency Equipment...........................................
4.2.1 Assessment..........................................
4.2.1.1 Emergency Kits and Emergency Survey Instrumentation................................
4.2.1.2 Area and Process Radiation Monitors............
4.2.1.3 Ncn-Radiation Process Monitors.................
4.2.1.4 Meteorological Instrumentation.................
4.2.2 P ro tec ti ve Eq u i pme nt................................
4.2.2.1 Respi ratory Protection.........................
4.2.2.2 Protective Clothing............................
4.2.3 Emergency Coninunications Equipment..................
4.2.4 Other Equipment.....................................
4.2.4.1 Damage Control / Corrective Action and Maintenance Equipment and Supplies.............
4.2.4.2 Reserve Emergency Supplies and Equipment.......
4.2.4.3 Transportation.................................
4.2.5 Conclusions: Emergency Equipment...................
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. Table of Contents-2-Page No.
5.0 Emergency Plan Impl ementing Procedures............................ 28 5.1 Ge n e ra l Co n te n t a n d Fo rma t................................... 2 8 5.2 EIP Review...................................................
5.3 Evacuation and Accountabili ty................................
5.4 As s e s s me n t Ac t i o n s...........................................
5.5 Conclusions: Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures......... 31 6.0 Coordination wi th Offsi te Groups.................................. 32 6.1 Offsite Agencies.............................................
6.2 Ge n e ral Pub l i c............................................... 3 3 6.3 News Media...................................................
6.4 Conclusions: Coordination with Offsite Groups...............
7.0 D ri l l s and Exe rc i se s..............................................
j 7.1 P ro g r a m...................................................... 3 4 j 7.2 Walk-Through Observation.....................................
7.3 Conclusions: Drills and Exercises...........................
8.0 Exit Interview....................................................
Appendix A - Individuals Contacted Appendix B - Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures , ! O . - - _. _ _ - -. - - - -.. ---
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. DETAILS l 1.
Administration of Emergency Preparedness Section 5 of Chapter 1 of the Trojan Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency - Plan (EP) assigns the overall responsibility for emergency response planning, development and updating to the Manager of the Generation Licensing and Analysis Department (GLAD). The Manager of Radiological Engineering (RE), who reports to the Manager of GLAD, has been given the responsibility for administering the emergency preparedness program.
Two staff members provide the Manager of RE wii.ii support for fulfilling this responsibility.
The job description, as well as the EP, describe the responsibilities and authority of the Manager of RE in the area of emergency preparedness.
He is responsible for the liaison between the licensee and offsite organizations.
Evidence of coordination with offsite authorities has been demonstrated by the fact that the Manager-RE, and his staff, wrote the first drafts of educational materials used by these authorities.
The Manager-RE, because he formerly supervised the radiation protection program at Trojan, facilitates the interaction and coordination between the plant personnel responsible to implement the program and the Headquarters emergency planners. The Manager-RE has access to top level management and ensures that there is adequate budget to support the program.
Personnel at corporate level and at the plant qualify for their responsibilities under the criteria of ANSI N18.1.
Such personnel maintain state of the art knowledge of the field of emergency preparedness via attendance at American Nuclear Society and Health Physics Society meetings, through participation in NOTE PAD and the Western Kegion Emergency Preparedness Group.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
2.0 Emergency Organization 2.1 Onsite Energency Organization The licensee has established an organization for coping with emergencies at the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant.
This organization is headed by the Emergency Coordinator (EC) whose authority, responsibilities and duties have been delineated in Emergency Implementing Procedure (EIP) No. 6, Command Classification /EC.
Initially the Shift Supervisor assumes the EC position. The nomal, back shift and weekend crew consists of a shift supervisor, a control operator, an assistant control operator, three auxiliary operators, three helper operators a radiation control technician and a Shift Technical Advisor.
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~ . -2-In addition two of the security personnel have been assigned to the fire brigade.
This exceeds the total of ten shown on Table B-1 in Planning Standard II B.5 of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
According to the licensee an assistant shift supervisor is expected to be added to each shift by March 15, 1982 and a second radiation control technician will be added to each shift by July 1, 1982. Table 2:5.2-1 in the EP lists crew members emergency assignments which correspond for the most part to the normal duties. The appraisal disclosed that the auxiliary operators and helpers will perfonn any repair or corrective actions rather than an onshift maintenance technician as shown in Table 2:5.2-1.
According to EIP-6 the EC is the person onsite who is designated to take charge of all emergency control measures and has ultimate authority over all onsite activities and personnel. This procedure also states that the EC may not delegate his authority to another member of the Plant Staff or PGE headquarters staff unless he is physically or otherwise unable to exercise his authority.
However, the EC is pennitted to delegate some of his duties to subordinates to improve tha efficiency of the emergency organization.
The procedure does not specifically identify the duties which cannot be delegated to subordinates.
EIP-6 provides for the Plant General Manager or his alternate (Duty Plant General Manager) to relieve the shift supervisor of his EC responsibilities when the former notifies the latter that he has arrived on site. There is also a provision for the transfer of the EC responsibility to the Emergency Response Manager (ERM). The ERM is part of the augmented onsite emergency organization described in Section 2.2.
Walk-through interviews were held with four (4) of the five (5) shift supervisors and an assistant shift supervisor who was acting as a shift supervisor. The walk-throughs confirmed that the shift supervisors operate in confonnance with the EIP's and understand the meaning of the procedures.
Emergency detection using " emergency action levels" (EAL's), emergency classification, initial dose assessment, notifications to offsite agencies and recomendations for protective actions were covered by the walk-throughs conducted.
2.2 A_ugmentation of Onsite Emergency Organization u The EP provides for augmenting the shift crew during an emergency.
EIP-5, Emergency Notification, assures that additional off duty plant personnel will be contacted and augment the shift crew in a timely manner.
Four, 4 wheel drive vehicles have been purchased and assigned to key personnel (e.g. Plant General Manager, Manager of Operations and Maintenance and Manager of Technical Services) to assure their ability to reach the plant under almost all conditions.
The licensee's augmented organization includes the designation _ .. _. - _ -_ _ _ .__
_ _ _ _ _ ___ __ _ ' . -3-of' alternate personnel. The licennee had requested personnel expected to respond to an emergency to time their travel times from home to work. The results, examined during this appraisal, showed that j (1) four.of the five top level site nanagement have times of 30 i minutes or less, (2) four of the five Health Physics Supervisors i and Radiological Engineers and 14 of the Radiation Control Technicians live 30 minutes or less from the plant, (3) eight of the 10 persons assigned to the Operations Support Center and (4) three of the seven engineers are within 30 minutes of the plant. The licensee appears to be able to meet or exceed the shift augmentation goa.'s of Table B-1 in NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
As provided for in the EP, Headquarters personnel augment the plant staff in responding to an emergency. This augmentation is headed by the Vice President Nuclear, or his alternate, who assumes the position of ERM. The ERM, and certain of his personnel, report to the Emergency Operations Facility where they assume their designated positions.
In some cases, e.g. Dose Assessment Director, they will be relieving plant staff who initially were assigned to the positions. The ERM is also supported by additional Headquarters personnel who are stationed at the Company Support Center in Portland, Oregon. The EP provides for the ERM to assume the EC responsibilities at the appropriate time. The duties and responsibilities of all positions occupied by Headquarters personnel during an emergency have been described in the EP and EIP's.
The EP describes the provisions for support by local and industry organizations. The licensee has made arrangements with two hospitals and consulting physicians for medica' care of injured persons.
Provisions have also been made for upplying ambulance service.
The licensee has an agreement with the Rainier Rural Fire Protection District for fire protection support. A mutual aid agreement between PGE and the Washington Public Power Supply System exists covering personnel and equipment resources available to respond to an emergency at Trojan. The EP also addresses the support to be supplied by Westinghouse and Bechtel Power Corporation.
2.3 Conclusions: Emergency Organization Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
3.0 Emergency Plant Training and Retraining 3.1 Program For most employee tasks related to emergency response, the licensee has a formally documented and approved Energency Plan Training and Retraining Program as demonstrated by procedures and training l l i _ __
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Employee training on emergencies begins with new employee orientation. The qualification criteria for employees is related to the responsibilities the individual would have for responding to an emergency event, should one occur.
The licensee's Training and Retraining Program is essentially separated into three sections: (1) Trojan plant personnel, (2) PGE headquarters support personnel, and (3) Offsite organizations.
The responsibility for initial trair.ing and periodic retraining is subsequently separated into several departments / divisions of the licensee's organization, e.g., the Trojan Training Department is responsible for training the directors and coordinators of the plant emergency organization, whereas, GLAD is responsible for the initial training and retraining of the PGE headquarters support personnel with some exceptions, i.e., the training of telephone operators is the responsibility of the Office Services Departments.
- 3.1.1 Trojan Plant (Site) Training The licensee's Site Training and Retraining Program is outlined in Radiological EIP No. EP-28 "0nsite Training." Table 28-1 of this procedure identifies the organizations or individuals responsible for conducting the specified training. The Trojan Training Department is responsible for training the individuals identified in Table 28-1 as having training responsibilities.
A record of each individual's training record is filed with the Trojan Training Department. Training documentation is in accordance with Table 28-2 of EIP-28. The scope and content of the training and retraining appears to be consistent with Planning Standard "0" to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and FGE's Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures.
Emergency implementing procedures are in most cases, used as the lesson plan for presenting the material for a specific area of training.
The content of material presented appears to be appropriate as documented in training records; however, the time allocated , for presentations of some materials may be insufficient.
This was reflected in the walk-throughs and interviews conducted by various appraisal team members. Areas that could benefit from additional training time included classification of emergencies, application of emergency action levels, and an overview of the Emergency Preparedness Program.
The training program provides for hands-on-training through demonstrations and drills. Training deficiencies identified by the instructor are placed in a tracking system requiring retraining and testing on an individual basis to determine performance acceptabilit _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
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. -5-c The First Aid Program is a multi-media first aid course with 2 to 3 hcurs additional Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) training.
It is taught by an industrial nurse and a safety f coordinator. The latter individual has just been certified f as a CPR instructor. A short version (2 to 3 hours) of first aid treatment is taught to all employees annually. An eight p hour, more detailed version of the multi-media course is given to C&RP techs annually. The C&RP techs provide first aid I treatment to injured persons at the site. Their CPR training is about 2-3 hours with emphasis placed on " hands on" experience { performing CPR on a training dumy.
The C&RP techs interviewed appeared to be competent and understood actions to be taken for injured persons at a level just above multi-media first air treatment.
However, during the interviews and walk-throughs, it was evident that the C&RP techs were not properly trained in CPR. Various explanations were given by the C&RP techs when they were asked to explain how CPR is performed on a heart attack victim.
The licensee has a fire brigade training manual, and conducts an initial two-day course for fire brigade personnel that includes classroom lectures and tests, practice at extinguishing small oil
- and wood fires, and use of self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) in a darkened smokehouse. Annually, fire brigade members
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are to participate in actual simulated fire fighting sessions.
a Other training and drills are conducted for each shift on a quarterly basis.
All fire brigade members need more experience in hose handling while wearing full turnouts and at extinguishing actual, not simulated, fires. They should all receive experience, over a period of three to four years, in extinguishing fires within a building. All fire brigade members interviewed felt this was what they needed most in order to perform more efficiently.
Training of and with the Rainier Rural Fire District (RRFD) should be enhanced.
In light of the heavy dependence upon RRFD for extinguishing large fires at the site, it is very important that RRFD be provided considerable pre-fire planning tours. Joint licensee and RRFD hose drills should be conducted often. A run card should be developed, with RRFD assistance, and maintained by them for response.
3.1.2 Headquarters Training l The Training and Retraining Program for PGE Headquarters personnel who have emergency response responsibilities for the Trojan l f I l L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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-6 - t ~ Plant is described in EIP No. EP-27," Headquarters Training."
' + - GLAD is responsible for the training of Headquarters personnel.
Additionally, they are responsible for the routing of significant changes to the emergency procedures that occur between the
' annual retraining sessions to all affected personnel within three months of issuance of the emergency procedure revision.
A routing form for documenting that personnel have read and understood the revisions accompanies the procedure to insure that all affected personnel are current with emergency planning responsibilities and practices.
The Headquarters training program differs slightly from the site training program in that lesson plans are r2 quired for er:h lecture / discussion session. Lesson plans are updated to reflect revisions to the emergency plan and/or emergency procedures, and copies of updated lesson plans are filed with the Headquarters personnel training records maintained by GLAD.
- The training program for Headquarters personnel appears to be adequate as determined from training records and walk-throughs to demonstrate the performace of individuals assigned emergency plan tasks.
The licensee has provided training for offsite fire, ambulance, and medical services and state and local agencies. Some hospital staff members have been trained at Oak Ridge in Radiological Emergency Treatment and others are being scheduled. Training has also been provided through drills and exercises and periodic interfaces between the licensee and each group that would be affected in the course of an emergency event.
3.2 Program Implementation Training records indicate that all required training has been completed in accordance with requirements.
Discussions with employees during walk-throughs indicated that the training provided did take place as prescribed. All employees questioned demonstrated an understanding of their duties.
3.3 Conclusions: Emergency Plan Training and Retraining Based on the above findings, this portion of the li:ensees's program appears to be adequate.
However, the following itens should be considered for improving the program.
(a) Lesson plans should be prepared and used for those site courses where they do not presently exist.
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_. _ _ - _ _ - _ - ' . -7- _ ' (b) The C&RP technicians should be given sufficient training to ~ be certified in CPR.
> ., (c) Provide fire brigade members with experience in extinguishing ' fires within a building. Also provide the fire brigade members with additional opportunities to extinguish live' fires and i handle hoses in full turnouts.
(d) Provide for joint licensee and RRFD hose drills.
' 4.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment ~ s ' 4.1 Emergency Facilities , 4.1.1 Assessment Facilities 4.1.1.1 Control Room (CR) The CR has been provided with current copies of the EP and EIPs. The CR uses a work sheet method for making dose assessments (EIP No. EP-10, Accident Dose Assessment Work Sheet Method).
EIP No. EP-23 provides the CR with specific guidance on making recommendations for general public protective actions. The CR was provided with adequate primary and backup canmunications capabilities i for use during an emergency. The EP describes the additional { emergency equipment that is stored in the Hagen Rack > area (designated an Operational Support Center) and available to the CR. Section 4.2.1.1 describes this equipment.
4.1.1.2 Technical Support Center (TSC) The Interim TSC is located in the Conference Room of the Plant Administration Building until the permanent TSC is established in the Technicai Support Center Building.
The Administration Building structure housing the interim TSC is habitable for the early phase of potential radiological accidents, in particular during the diagnostic period prior to significant releases of radioactive materials.
, ! The Control Room and/or the Emergency Operation Center located in the Visitor's Center serve as backup facilities for the TSC in the event the interim TSC is evacuated for any reason. The interim TSC is approximately a 3-4 minute walk from the CR and the permanent TSC will be a 2-3 minute walk from the CR.
The permanent TSC is scheduled for completion by October,1982.
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. -8- . In the event the emergency organization is activated during an alert, or more severe emergency classification, the TSC will be staffed in accordance with the Trojan Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
, Both TSCs (interim and pemanent) provide ample space for personnel and the required communication systems.
The permanent-TSC facility will contain controlled personnel traffic flow patterns, personnel decontamination facilities, an equipped kitchen facility and sleeping quarters for long term emergencies.
These facilities are presently in place and could be used in support of the interim TSC.
4.1.1.3 Operations Support Centers (CSC) i There are two designated Operations Support Centers at the Trojan Plant.
These centers are located in the Hagan Rack area (located behind the console in the CR) at the 93' elevation of the Control Building and at the access control area (Chemistry and Radiation Protection) at the 45' elevation of the Control Building.
These OSCs provide a location where emergency team members who provide operations, maintenance, and chemistry and radiation protection assistance to the shift supervisor in an emergency event can assemble. The staffing of these OSCs is in accordance with Section 5.2.2.3 of the Emergene.y Plan.
In the event that additional personnel are needed at the OSCs, they will be provided from the Emergency Operation Facility.
Portable radiation detection instruments and emergency equipment and supplies stored in these facilities have been described in Section 4.2.1.1 Communications between the OSCs and the TSC, and other in-plant areas is provided as described in Section 7.2 of the Emergency Plan.
4.1.1.4 Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) The Visitor's Infomation Center, located approximately 0.5 miles west of the Trojan Plant is designated as the primary EOF. The E0F is activated in the event an alert or more severe class of emergency is declared.
There is sufficient space to accommodate the licensee's emergency response organi ation having E0F responsibilities z and assigned functions as well as representatives from the Federal, State, and local authorities.
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' ' The functions of the EOF as described in the EP are as f follows:
1.
Providing protective action recommendations made by the TSC or E0F to affected state and local agencies.
' 2.
Receiving, reducing, and interpreting all Plant and offsite monitoring data and transmitting data summaries and protective action recommendations " to emergency teams and/or the Oregon E0C, Washington E0C, and Cowlitz and Columbia County E0Cs.
3.
The E0F has computerized dose assessment capability ' l for Loth short-term and long-term dose projections.
l The E0F receives meteorological and effluent release ' data from the TSC via telephone, with an Executone backup. Results of dose assessment calculations and protective action reconnendations will be transmitted to the E0F Communications Center by messenger for transmittal to the State E0Cs via a dedicated telephone system.
4.
Coordinating exclusion area evacuation and access control.
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Accounting for all Plant and contractor personnel evacuated to the E0F. A portion of the Visitor's I Information Center adjacent to the E0F is designated as an assembly area in the event the Plant site is evacuated.
6.
Pnividing frequent updates of Plant status and meteorological and effluent data to the State and local emergency centers.
7.
Serving as an assembly point for essential Plant personnel not assigned to the OSC or TSC.
The E0F will be activated within 30 minutes of the declaration of an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency on the day shift and within 60 minutes on the off-hours . shifts. The E0F is equipped with the following facilities and emergency equipment and supplies: f - -_- _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _. - _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - _ - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Communications facilities as described in Section 7.2 of the Emergency Plan.
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Copies of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
3.
Portable radiation monitorirg instruments.
4.
Maps and status boards.
5.
Office space for State and Federal agency personnel.
6.
Appropriate Plant drawings and technical manuals.
7.
Computer facilities for perfoming dose assessments.
Additionally, the E0F is equipped with an emergency power '- generator which supplies power to essential emergency i equipment, including computer facilities for dose assessment and personnel decontamination facilities, when normal power is lost.
The structure of the Visitor's Center, which is designated as the primary EOF, does not meet the habitability criteria specified in Table 2 of NUREG-0696. The structure does not provide a shielding protection factor of 5 for the attenuation of 0.7 MEV gamma radiation, and the ventilation-system does not provide for isolation with HEPA filters.
, The crimary EOF is located in the direction of the least frequent wind direction from the Trojan Nuclear Plant.
The low wind frequency of 0.1% (as determined from site meteorological data) toward the primary E0F provides reasonable assurance of habitability without shielding protection factors or HEPA filters.
The licensee has established a backup E0F at the PGE office in St. Helens, Oregon, approximately 13 miles . south of the Trojan site.
In the event the primary E0F becomes uninhibitable for any reason, the backup E0F will be activated. The criteria for evacuation of the primary E0F to the backup E0F is specified in Section 7.1.3 of Volume 1, Book 1, of the Trojan Plant Radiological Emergency Plan. The licensee has submitted supplemental information on the primary E0F habitability to the NRC for review and evaluation (see memorandum with attachments, Bart D. Withers to Darrell G. Eisenhut, dated July 2, 1981).
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. -11- - t 4.1.1.5 Post-Accident Primary Coolant Sampling and Analysis The inspectors examined the facilities and equipment available for' post-accident primary coolant sampling, observed demonstrations of the implementing procedures, and discussed the licensee's capabilities with the plant chemists and chemistry technicians. The present facilities and equipment for obtaining a post-accident primary coolant
sample are considered interim.
. . At present, the location for post-accident primary coolant sampling is the routine sampling sink. The sink is enclosed in a hood in the sampling room, adjacent to the. radio-
. chemistry laboratory on the 45' elevation of the auxiliary building.
Following a severe accident which involved damage to the core, this sampling area would be accessible - so long as the sampling lines remained isolated.
Because sampling lines run overhead and behind panels in the , sampling room, the user would have to traverse and work i in high radiation fields if RCS (Reactor Coolant System) coolant had been circulated through the sampling lines.
The present procedures assume that initial valve lineups
are performed on the isolated system.
' The licensee has made minor modifications to the pre-i TMI sampling manifold in order to reduce radiation doses,
but no appreciable shielding has been added to the sampling sink. A temporary shield surrounds the H sampling bomb,
but a larger, 2" Pb shield is assumed in the DBA (design - basis accident) dose estimates. The present room has a labyrinth entrance to reduce external radiation doses
in the other areas of the auxiliary building.
Circulating ' . RCS coolant through the sampling lines would also require , i surveying and posting of other areas of the auxiliary " building where the sampling lines are exposed. Thus the interim sampling practice relies on efficient use of time and control of RCS line isolation in order to L reduce doses in the area of the sampling sink and the sampling lines.
i e The sampling room is monitored by ARM-3 (0.1 to 1.0 E7 mR/hr) and a temporary RM-16 (1-1.0 E4 mR/hr) that has an ionization chamber mounted on the face of the sampling
sink hood. The RM-16 readout faces the entrance and ' is readable from the entrance door. A CAM monitors airborne - ' i gases, iodine and particulates. The range of each channel ! is 10 to 1.0E6 cpm. The readings observed during the ! appraisal were in the range of 10 to 1000 cpm.
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' . -12-The licensee has provided 2" Pb :. 'elded liquid sample containers, sample holders, a 2 foot remote handling tecl for operating valves and a 4 foot remote manipulator for handling samples.
The licensee's DBA analysis (REB-100 Rev. I 2/19/82) indicates that radiation doses for sampling will not exceed normal quarterly limits under severe accident conditions, if at least 24 hours is allowed for decay of short-ltwd radionuclides in the coolant. The estimated doses are 2.3 rem to the whole body and 2.6 rem to the hands. The procedure directs technicians to abort the sampling if ARM-3 reacher.8 R/hr or the RM-16 reaches 50 R/hr.
The licensee has recently modified the HVAC for the radio-chemistry laboratory and the counting room, which are located in the Control Building.
The exhaust flow from the hoods is now compensated by increased ventilation to the laboratory and the counting room both of which are maintained at a positive pressure compared to adjacent spaces. Thus, the analysis facility would be accessible and functional so long as the auxiliary and control building ventilation systems are operating.
The inspectors examined the facility and instrumentation used for post-accident sample analysis.
Equipment, tools, supplies, and instruments were available and operational.
Although a small volume of the 5 ml RCS sample would be drained from a dead leg at least 80% of the sample should be representative of the RCS coolant at the location of the RCS tap. Under accident conditions, this situation is adequate.
The licensee's staff indicated that fabrication of the final post accident sampling apparatus has been delayed by the equipment vendor. The licensee has supplied consultants and engineering staff to assist the vendor in maintaining the schedule.
Final design drawings have been approved, a mockup has been built and tested.
However, actual fabrication has not yet begun.
4.1.1.6 Post-Accident Containment Air Sampling and Analysis The inspectors examined the interim post-accident containment air sampling and analysis facilities and eouipment, observed a demonstration of the procedures, and discussed the accessibility of the sampling point and the status of the final sampling and analysis system with the licensee's staff.
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_. - _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _. _. _ - _ _ - . -13-The interim sampling point is located at the containment atmosphere hydrogen monitoring panel on the 93' elevation of the auxiliary building. The degree of accessibility is expected to depend on the degree of isolation of secondary circulating and filtration systems in the post-accident environment. The licensee's DBA analysis (REB-100 Rev. 1 2/19/82) indicates that external exposure rates would not exceed 10 R/hr. The sampling procedure incorporates a 15 R/hr action level for aborting the sampling procedure.
The expected doses resulting from sampling activities at 1 hr post DBA are 1 man-rem to the whole body and 3 rem to i the hands. Observing this action level will maintain radiation doses at or below normal quarterly limits.
The major contributor to whole body dose is expected to be the dose rate from the containment atmosphere sampling lines, which run over the location where technicians would be working during the samole collection procedure. These lines are not shielded. The routing and shielding of the lines is limited by the location of the hydrogen analysis panel and other adjacent equipment. The dose to the hands is due.
primarily to the high dose rate (up to 750 R/hr) on the sample cartridge.
The sampling location is not monitored by permanent or temporary area radiation monitors.
Rernote handling tools are not practicable for the sample removal portion of the interin procedure.
Extremity radiation doses are limited by continuously monitoring the gamma radiation level at contact on the sample cartridge so as to tenninate sampling of highly active atmospheres. This procedure will limit radiation doses and reduce the problem of analyzing highly active samples.
Remote handling tools would not reduce whole body dose because the radiation field from the sample lines (above the technicians' heads) is critical in this respect.
Shielded containers are available for transporting gaseous, filter, and cartridge samples.
The sample analysis facility is described in Section 4.1.1.5.
Needed equipment and supplies were observed to be available and operational.
The sampling facility provides for drawing a representative sample because there are four sampling locations within containment which can be remotely selected from the control room. The sampling lines are not insulated or heat traced.
The inspectors observed demonstrations of RCS sampling and containment atmosphere sampling on two shifts.
The C&RP technicians appeared to be well trained in the procedures ) e - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _.
' - _ , - _ , <. . , ,. , ' , -14- , , , - and completed each sampling exercise in a timely and ' efficient manner, however, there were some differences between the radiation protection stipulations of the procedures and the approach taken by the C&RP technicians, who generally preferred to access isolated sampling points , ' using standard RP precautions, and then to wait for RP surveys and RWPs prior to sampling during containment atmosphere and RSC recirculation.
4.1.1.7 Post-Accident Effluent Sampling and Analysis The licensee has identified the following gaseous discharge locations as sites for post-accident gas and particulate effluent sampling: auxiliary building exhaust, condenser off-gas, and containment purge exhaust. The licensee intends to use existing routine sample locations for post-accident sampling with necessary deviations from normal sampling and analysis procedures addressed by specific procedures (Chemistry Manual Procedures - CMP-32 and CMP-34).
Interim measures for post-accident gas effluent sampling include on-line monitoring of containment purge exhaust and condenser off-gas (CMP-34). Permanent high range noble gas monitors with control room readout will be installed for the containment purge exhaust and condenser off-gas by August 1,1982 (see Section 4.2.1.2).
An intermediate level noble gas monitor for the auxiliary building exhaust is installed and operable (Section 4.2.1.2).
NUREG-0737 (II.F.1.2) requires the licensee to have a capability to collect and analyze or measure representative samples of radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents during accident conditions.
The licensee has an interim method to collect iodine on silver zeolite cartridges and count them in-place using a R0-2A survey instrument (CMP-32). CMP-32 includes radiation protection precautions that need to be considered in obtaining the iodine measurement.
If isotopic analysis is required, the iodine cartridge can be transported to the hot chemistry lab for analysis on the plant GeLi system. The licensee has no specific interim procedure for particulate detennination.
CMP-32 considers activity on particulate filters to be radiciodine.
The licensee is scheduled to have a new high-range iodine / , particulate system installed on all potential release points by August 1, 1982. ine system designed by Victoreen will consist of two skias, one for mounting the normal range noble gas and iodine / particulate monitor, and one for mounting the high range iodine / particulate grab sampling _ and noble gas monitor.
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. -15-system are expected to address radiation protection precautions associated with retrieving samples and handling of potentially highly radioactive particulate and iodine cartridges (perhaps containing a number of curies of activity).
In addition, specific sample transport devices are to be identified in the procedures.
The licensee has an adequate GeLi counting system in a separate rooin near the hot chemistry lab (see Section 4.1.1.5).
A backup counting method has been identified, should the main counting system be affected by high background levels.
The licensee will rely on routine sampling and analysis procedures (Chemistry Manual - Volume 11 of Plant Operating Manual - Section VIII.A) for post-accident liquid effluent
- ampling.
Potential radwaste/ effluent sampling points would include liquid radioactive waste discharge, containment sump discharge, and reactor coolant drain tank discharge.
The licensee appeared to have adequate facilities for , storage of contaminated water which would. preclude discharging l radioactive liquid waste during an accident.
However, if a sample was required, the licensee has no procedure which discusses accessibility of sampling points, radiatior: , protection precautions associated with sample collection j and transport, and special equipment which would be ! necessary for handling high activity liquid samples in an accident situation.
Analytical capabilities appear to be adequate, however, the licensee has no procedure describing sample dilution methods, should they be necessary.
4.1.1.8 Offsite Laboratory Support The licensee has provided for offsite laboratory support.
Environmental samples, obtained during an emergency, would be analyzed by Eterline Instrument Corporation on an expedited basis under a currently existing contract.
Environmental samples can also be sent to the laboratories of either the Oregon State Health Division or the Washington Department of Social and Health Services for analysis.
The laboratory capabilities of Oregon State University are also available to Portland General Electric Company (PGE) through the State of Oregon.
By agreement, USD0E contractor laboratories in Richland, Washington are available to PGE for the analysis of highly radioactive samples.
I l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. _. _
',3 .- > "' t . -16- , , 4.1.2 Protective Facilities 4.1.2.1 Assembly / Reassembly Facilities The licensee has designated the Visitors Information Center as the assembly area for evacuated nonessential personnel. The exhibit hall and the maintenance room are the specific locations where these activities are to take place. The alternate E0F in St. Helens also serves as the backup assembly area. The emergency equipment, supplies and protective clothing stored in the assembly area are described in Sections 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2.2.
The associated decontamination capability is described in Section 4.1.2.3.
Since the Visitors Infonnation Center houses the E0F, the habitability of the assembly area is the same as the E0F.
4.1.2.2 Medical Treatment Facilities During the appraisal,.the inspector reviewed applicable parts of the EP and EIPs, interviewed personnel trained and designated to provide inanediate first aid treatment, spot checked first aid supplies and equipment throughout the plant, visited hospitals listed in the plan and checked radiation detecting ir.struments and other supplies provided by the licensee for radiological emergencies, and reviewed the first aid training programs for all employees and for C&RP technicians.
The EP does not address a medical treatment facility , at the site. However, EIP No. EP-17 (Medical) does state that injured persons are to be taken to the Radiation Protection Office on the 45 foot level for treatment.
The first aid supplies at this office are adequate for treatment of minor injuries-lacerations, avulsions, burns, and fractures.
Also, there is a supply of medical oxygen with a regulator and blood pressure cuffs. The cuffs can be used to monitor an injured person's physical condition.
However, the Radiation Protection Office is the center for several activities essential to plant operations (e.g.
issuance of PIC's and respirators, access control area entrance and office space for C&RP technicians). This office is also used by the supervisor of the C&PR techs.
Therefore, it is questionable and unlikely that this office could be considered an area in which medical
treatment could be rendered in a proper manner.
EP-17 states that "Any injury or overexposure will be reported to the Control Room and the Shift Supervisor will notify the Radiation Protection Supervisor."
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. ' 'This notification procedure may result in a delay in first aid response because such response is usually from the Radiation Protection Office and the Radiation , Protection Supervisor may not be at that location when
!' contacted.
' ' 4.1.2.3 Decontamination Facilities The primary decontamination facility is located at the l health physics access control point on the 45 foot level ! of the Control Building. This facility consists of one large shower, two sinks and a cabinet of supplies. The l decontamination facility is located in a relatively crowded f area adjacent to the portal monitors at the exit of the control point. Liquids from this facility go to the liquid radwaste system.
Additional decontamination facilities are located at the EOF, alternate E0F and the permanent TSC that is under construction. The E0F has a single shower and sink in the maintenance area. The alternate EOF has a locker room with a sink and shower that could be used i for decontamination purposes.
Because neither _of these i facilities has provisions for isolating effluents l from the shower drains, the contaminated liquids will be disposed via the sanitary sewer. The permanent TSC decontamination facility was not examined during this appraisal because it had not been completed.
Decontamination materials and related procedures were examined. The decontamination procedure specifies that soap, shampoo, foam cleansers and abrasive cleaners will be provided for removing contamination. These procedures, including EIP No. EP-13, do not provide specific instructions for accomplishing decontamination.
Discussions with some of the C&RP Technicians disclosed that such personnel are required to read the decontamination procedures and discuss them with a supervisor prior to being assigned to the plant as a qualified technician.
Section II.B.5 of the Radiation Protection Manual discusses personnel decontamination. The inspector noted that adequate survey instruments were available in close proximity to each of the decontamination facilities.
4.1.3 Other Facilities 4.1.3.1 News Center The licensee has entered into a contract with St. Fredrick's Parish in St. Helens, OR, for the use of a large church hall as an Emergency News Center. The licensee has a five-year contract with the parish, with a renewal option.
The contract gives the licensee first-call on the use of the hall when needed for emergencies. The church , e - _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
. -18-hall,~ called Buccini Hall, is located about 12 miles south of the plant.
Buccini Hall has a gymnasium suitable for large press - conferences or briefings, as well as restroom facilities, ' ample parking, a kitchen and adjacent classrooms for use as offices.
A dedicated telephone.line, which connects the E0F, the various E0Cs and the company support center, is permanently installed in the News Center. Equipment to supply 25 local telephone lines for use of the media and PI0s also is installed in the building. The local telephone company office is across the street from the News Center.
Photocopying, facsimile transmission and audio-visual equipment are available nearby at the licensee's St.
Helens office, which also serves as the back-up EOF.
The licensee's plan callt, for two Emergency News Center Assistants to place road direction signs to the News Center, open the facility and provide badging and crowd control. The licensee maintains in storage at the News Center about 50 press packets, maps of the site area and diagrams of the plant.
~ The licensee plans to activate the News Center for the use of the NRC, FEMA, State of Washington and Cowlitz County public information officers, as well as its own staff. The State of Oregon has declined to participate in the News Center, preferring to release information through the Governor's office in Salem. However, in the event that the Governor visits the plant vicinity, his Assistant for Communications (press secretary) would then transfer information operations to the Emergency News Center.
4.1.3.2 Expanded Support Facilities
Section 7.1.7 of the emergency plan states that the ERM has the responsibility to initiate the establishment of a expanded response center. This expanded center would support the needs of the ERM, administration and logistics, planning and scheduling, industrial advisory group, technical support, waste management, and plant modifications functions, using between 9 and 30 trailers.
These functions would include the activities that would be carried out by the NRC, consultants, and PGE staff.
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. cm - < \\ ' .. \\ _g ' . . - . -19- 'G - - ' >w , , The plansEand proceduli s indicate the number and size \\,i e of trailers for. each grep,' both for initial and long - ' s term support rerjuirements. / EIPj~d ht all emergencies oE EP-5 directs that - the telephone company be notifie \\, of alert level and higher in order to Qrepare for the - - ' ' u communication needs of the Emergency News Cer,ter and ' - t the expanded responEe facility.
Secticn 5.3'2.1.1.3.11._ ?, of the EP directs the,offsite' power supply advisor to - ' ' provide temporary 0.ffsite power connections for the exper,.ded support facility.
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' , -- The emergency plan (page 2:7.1-9) stiths_thats ' power feeders will be preplanned." This prepla yet been carried out According to the PGE,qning. has not s tar.
Because ' the licensee possesses the capability to rapidly install power connectors, prepositioningwower connectoFs does not appear necessary as part of the preplannng 'offort.
t 4.1.4 Conclusions: Emergency Facilities , Based on the above findings, thf s ipcetiof of the lidensee's program appears to be adequate.
However, the folloyins items should be considered for iraproving tib program.
. s , (a) Review the post accident samplhng ' procedures "for teactor ' coolantandcontainmentairwit'1theC&RPTechnic{ansto , assure consistency between written procedures and implemen.totian., ' . , t ' (b) Evaluate the need for an area inonitbr at or rea6 theN' ' > post accident sampling lines on the 93 foot level of the ' , Auxiliary Building with a readout nmar the elevator.
, , (c) Reevaluate the adequacy of the medicd treatment f acility (Radiation Protection Office) considering the other type 9 ~ o of activities occurring in' this area during routine andm ' " emergency situations.
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t , 4.2 Emergency Equipment 'y \\ ' 4.2.1 Assessment > . , , . T - 4.2.1.1 Emergency Kits and Emergercy Survey InstrumentatiGS ' s i , - Ths inspectors examined the e.ncrgency Hts and emergency - . survey instrumentit>on that ure pyspccitioned for use by emergency teams and emergericy response personnel.
The licensee has prepositioned supplies and sarvey instrumentatioris in the OSC, the TSC, the. E0F and the Alternate EOF.
Since the OSC occQi,;;. a space behind , ,1 ' the main control panels of the CR, tue equipment that ' - is set aside for the OSC is also available for performing s a.. surveys of the CR.
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., - -- g The inspectors found that the kits, equipment, and supplies ' ' ! located in these areas were as specified in the EP and L EIPs. The inspectors compared the contents'of these l . y.. kits to Table 2:7.3-6, Table 2:7.3-5 and Appendix 20 'y ~/ .of the EP and the lists of kit inventories found in EIP ~ No. EP-15. The inspectors verified that each of the 1. '. listed items was present in the prepositioned equipment " t.
kits.
' , Each emergency team would have ready access to all of this equipment because the equipment cabinets are outfitted
with breakaway locks.
In addition tne technicians and staff appeared to be well acquainted with the locations of the keys for these locks.
e 't The inspectors performed checks of the emergency survey ,( instrumentation and found them operable.
Each instrument m - was labelled with a calibration sticker showing a current
. - date. The contents of these equipment kits are inventoried '-s monthly and operability checks are performed as a part of l h quarterly instrument calibrations.
The inspectors performed detailed operability checks of the SAM-2 instruments. These tests included verification
of the calibration of the instruments against the calibrated
check sources that are located in the SAM-2 equipment cases.
l - The SAM-2 instruments were found to have efficiencies 'k that were within 5% of the labelled values. These detail i checks were carried out because the health physics l ' appraisal report indicated that errors had been made ! , in the initial calibrations of these instruments. The l 'g present audit verified that this deficiency had been ' . 'I corrected.
N The instrument kit in the OSC is equipped with a teletector, s O which can be used for extremity dose rate surveys in ,. L~ s.N high exposure rate fields.
In addition, the licensee ' has extremity TLDs in the form of finger rings; however', L,- ' } f 's: - these finger rings are not part of the prepositioned kits.
Survey instruments for measuring beta and gamma ? ' _\\, radiation fields are present in the form of R02A and N, E530 survey instruments.
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. . - - _. _ - ' . _ -21- - - E The instrumentation used for emergency environmental surveys (SAM-2) has the capability to detect and measure _ airborne radioiodine concentrations of at least IE-7 _ uCi/cc of Iodine-131 and airborne particulate activity of IE-09 uCi/cc of Cesium-137. The licensee indicated , E that Trojan has not performed a complete environmental test of this instrumentation, but it has been used during exercises that were conducted in rain storms and no adverse , nerformance was noted. The survey teams have not been y y supplied with lead for shielding the SAM-2 instruments.
. Therefore, high background radiation would require - monitoring teams to travel to a low background area [ in order to perform sensitive measurements.
The inspectors determined that the emergency kits contained _ sufficient numbers of instruments and supplies to equip _ the number of teams that Trojan intends to utilize for initial emergency response.
The nature and number of E supplies were foun ' to be in excess of the minimum required.
. The monitoring kits are equipped with silver zeolite - cartridges for monitoring radiciodine in the presence - of noble gases.
4.2.1.2 Area and Process Radiation Monitors Most of the area and process radiation monitors described - P in the licensee's EP and EIPs as being used for emergency [ detection, classification, and assessment are in-place E and operable. All 25 area radiation monitors (ARMS) are installed; however, four (ARM-17, ARM-18, ARM-19, = ARM-21) are not operable and calibrated.
The licensee - has had recurrent problems with these four monitors and < has not formally accepted them from Victoreen, the vendor.
r All ARMS have readouts in the CR and all except the containment high range monitors (ARM-15A, ISB) have local readouts.
' ARMS are calibrated annually except for the containmont - high range monitors whose detectors are calibrated every 5 years and electronically checked annually.
Calibration procedures (MP-2-22) for ARMS appears adequate.
Operability
checks on ARMS are performed according to Periodic Operating m
Test Procedure P0T-26-1. All area and process radiation [ monitors have a dependable backup power supply.
m _.
Several new process radiation monitors (PRMs) are not ' yet installed. These include the high range noble gas channels of PRM-1 (Containment Monitoring System), PRM-6 - (Condenser Air Discharge Monitoring System), and PRM-16 - (Main Steam Line Monitors).
The licensee has indicated
that these high-range noble gas monitors will be operational i I w P b _ - . _ _ _ _. _.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ' . -22-by August 1, 1982 (see October 21, 1981, letter Bart Withers to Darrell Eisenhut).
In the interim, the licensee will use the grab sampling and analysis procedure described in Item 2.1.8.b of PGE's letter to the NRC dated January 2, 1980. The present intennediate level noble gas channel on PRM-2 (Auxiliary Building Exhaust Monitor) with a range up to 300 uCi/cc was determined by the NRC.to be acceptable (December 23, 1981, letter from NRC to Bart Withers).
PRM-17 (Oily Water Separator Tank Discharge Monitor) is also scheduled to be operational by August 1, 1982.
All presently operable PRMs have readouts in the CR and several (PRM-4A & 4B, PRM-5, and PRM-9) have local readouts.
l PRMs are calibrated quarterly according to Maintenance Procedure, MP-2-21.
The calibration procedures appear adequate.
In addition, operability checks are performed monthly according to Periodic Operating Test Procedure P0T-26-2.
Calibration factors have been determined for i all operating PRMs to convert cpm to concentration (uCi/cc).
4.2.1.3 Non-Radiation Process Monitors Non-radiation process monitors described in the EP and EIPs as being relied upon for emergency detection, classification and assessment are in-place and operable.
All monitor readouts are located in the CR and are readily observable.
Two monitors required by NUREG-0737, Containment Hydrogen Monitor (Section II.F.1.6) and Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling (Section II.F.2), are not yet installed and operable. The licensee anticipates that the containment hydrogen monitor will be completed by August 1, 1982 and the instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling will be operable after the 1982 refueling outage (see October 21, 1981 letter Bart Withers to Darrell Eisenhut).
4.2.1.4 Meteorological Instrumentation The basis for the inspector's review of the licensee's meteorological measurements program included Regulatory Guides 1.23 and 1.97, and the criteria set forth in NUREGS-0654, -0696, and -0737.
The description of the licensee's meteorological measurements program was outlined in the Trojan FSAR Appendix 2.3.3.
The inspector reviewed elements of the licensee's preventative maintenance program outlined in the ASI 6000 series instructions.
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' . -23- - The licensee's meteorological capabilities address the requirements of NUREG-0737, Tap III.A.2 with the adoption of interim compensating measures.
, Instrumentation on the primary (500') tower and backup (33') mast provide the basic parameters necessary to perform the dose assessment function. The location of the primary system precludes the measurement of 10 meter wind conditions with an unobstructed exposure.
A procedure to deduce 10 meter winds from other parameters of the ' primary system should be devised. All systems appeared to be in operation.
Strip chart records for all primary and backup system data are located in the CR with provisions to transfer data to the TSC and E0F in place.
The licensee maintains an extensive graded preventative maintenance program. Operability checks and surveillance activities are performed at a scope and frequency sufficient to assure that inoperable equipment is promptly detected and restored.
Calibrations are performed at a frequency sufficient to maintain a high degree of data availability ' and system reliability.
Control room personnel are advised of severe weather conditions in the plant vicinity by the PGE Load Dispatcher.
It was not apparent that a formalized procedure exists to assure that such notifications would be made consistently.
Several factors warrant consideration in the Trojan site area that are characteristic of complex terrane environments.
Within the interim E0F capability for performing dose projections (EIP No. EP-29), " Terrane Factors" are included in the transport and diffusion assessment. The interim methodology (EIP No. EP-10) used in the CR and TSC, and perhaps in the E0F, is not necessarily consistent with EIP No. EP-29.
Potential uncertainties in plume behavior, transport, and concentration are not clearly identified for accomodation by the decision-makers in making recommendations and directives.
For the long-term improvements in providing a realistic dose assessment in real-time, the licensee should resolve the necessary data requirements that would deal with the spatial and temporal variations in transport and diffusion within the plume exposure EPZ.
4.2.2 Protective Equipment 4.2.2.1 Respiratory Protection The Respiratory Protection Program was reviewed with respect to how it functions to support emergency personnel.
Interviews were held with personnel responsible for developing . . -_ . .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - ' . -24-and implementing the program. Also, walk-throughs were conducted with fire brigade members and personnel responsible for servicing the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
There are 19 SCBA's with spare bottles located throughout the site. They are serviced monthly by C&RP techs.
Some of the SCBA's are reserved for use during emergencies, while others may be used routinely.
The licensee has an oil-less air compressor and bottle storage system that is used to refill SCBA bottles.
The system is mounted on a trailer and can be moved to a suitable location for refilling the bottles. The compressor is driven electrically or by a gasoline engine.
Surveys of the ambient atmosphere for oxygen levels, hydrocarbons, I carbon monoxide, particulate radioactive material, odors, fumes, and carbon dioxide are made by the Chemistry Department before the compressor is started.
Also, the charging system has inline carbon monoxide and moisture content monitoring devices which automatically shutdown the ccmpressor on high levels of C0 or moisture in the compressed air.
Maintenance personnel operate the air compressor as needed for filling bottles and performing maintenance on the unit; however, the need for a maintenance man during an extended emergency requiring SCBA bottle refilling is not i identified in the EP Procedures.
l Annual retraining is required for personnel who use i respirators and SCBA's. Medical screening and refit l testing are done initially and at three year intervals.
The licensee intends to change their present SCBA's from Scott to MSA. This is to occur in the near future.
The licensee is expected to ensure that all personnel have received training on the MSA unit prior to distribution throughout the plant.
The procedures covering respiratory protection do not contain a strong policy statement indicating the licensee's position with regard to the wearing of such equipment. Also, they do not indicate the type of personnel required to be trained, medically evaluated, and f!t tested.
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4.2.2.2 Protective Clothing The licensee has an adequate supply of protective-clothing dedicated for emergency (use.An inventory of these supplies at emergency locations E0F, alternate E0F, CR/0SC, security
building) is found in EIP No. EP-15.
In addition to dedicated supplies, routine supplies of protective clothing (i.e. at the control access point and locations in the Auxiliary Building) would be available for use in an emergency. Utility workers are responsible for maintaining routine supplies on a daily basis which should assure an adequate emergency supply.
( 4.2.3 Emergency Comunications Equipment - The licensee has an elaborate communications capability that i connects the CR, emergency response facilities and the offsite organizations during an emergency. Section 7.2 of Chapter II - in the EP describes the various systems which include an inplant (including the EOF) Executone telephone system, an inplant public address system, a comercial telephone system, dedicated telephone circuits, a base radio station and access to the company mic*owave system. The base radio station system is
the primary means for notifying the two counties (Columbia
andCowlitz). The base radios are battery operated with connections to trickle chargers. This audit disclosed that the equipment was operable and provided a 24-hour per day capability to notify the State and local governmental agencies of an emergency at Trojan.
! There are two comunications systems for contacting and providing l information to the NRC. One system with automatic ringing connects the licensee (CR, TSC and EOF) directly with the NRC Incident Response Center in Bethesda, Maryland. The Region V office of the NRC can also be connected to this system. The ! other system, designated HPN, provides a capability for the i transmission of pertinent data and information from the licensee to the NRC's Region V Office and Headquarters.
Two way radios are also used by licensee personnel working in the plant or performing offsite environmental monitoring.
The ability of the two way radios to function in areas where they may be used was verified.
Some problem areas were identified; . however, appropriate corrective actions have been taken.
The examination of the communications capability included a check of the related EIP No. EP-5, Emergency Notification to assure that the telephone numbers were current.
No inaccuracies were noted.
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. , . -26- , 4.2.4 Ot.her Equipment 4.2.4.1 Damage Control / Corrective Action and Maintenance Equipment and Supplies l The licensee appears to have adequate equipment and supplies ! for damage control and corrective actions. The main supply-of equipment and supplies is located in the maintenance building, a separate building north of the reactor building.
Additional equipinent and supplies, which could be used in an emergency if radiological conditions permit, are available in the hot tool area of the fuel handling building.
In addition, limited equipment is available in the operations's ' tool boxes located throughout the plant.
. 4.2.4.2 Reserve Emergency Supplies and Equipment The inspectors reviewed the normal onsite supplies and equipment that would be required to handle a radiological emergency. This review included survey instruments, personnel and environmental dosimetry, and protective clothing and equipment.
( The licensee maintains emergency kits which contain survey ' instrumentation and other supplies and equipment that would be required to operate the Emergency Response Facilities
and to equip emerger.cy survey teams.
In addition to this emergency equipment, the licensee maintains reserve supplies ,
of normal (unassigned) equipment.
The reserve supplies of survey instruments at the health physics checkpoint were examined. The Chemistry and Radiation Protection Unit Supervisor indicated that it was his responsibility to maintain an adequate reserve
supply. The inspectors examined the responsibilities
of the unit supervisor in the Radiation Protection Manual and found that, although the job description mentions responsibilities for calibration and maintenance I of equipment, it does not specifically assign the maintenance
of reserve inventories to him. However, discussions { with the technicians, the unit supervisor, and the radiation protection supervisor indicated that the need for the maintenance of adequate instrumentation reserves was i recognized.
The existing supplies of instrumentation were examined and it was determined that these would be adequate for the number of radiation protection survey teams performing general inplant surveys following an emergency.
For example, it was determined that there were approximately 10 R02A and approximately 20 E520 ' or E530 survey instruments available as reserve equipment.
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QT- ,7 " y,r . e . - . , i , ' ' , , +~ _ -27-j , . ' , There were additional reserve instruments of other types, including 3 teletectors. There were 6 PIC-6 instruments in the calibration shop, although these instruments had not yet been placed in use.
The Trojan Nuclear Power Station maintains its own dosimetry (TLD) facility. The Station presently maintains a supply
of 2,000 dosimeters with an additional 1,600 on order.
This stock is intended to support outage needs.
This stock would also be adequate to support the immediate requirements during an. emergency.
In addition, the Trojan Nuclear Power Station has a mutual assistance agreement with the WPPSS that would allow additional survey instruments and dosimetry sarvices to be made available.
The procedures for maintaining minimum stock levels of anti-C clothing and supplies were examined. These stock levels are maintained at the warehouse on the -Trojan site. The records indicated that the warehouse maintains minimum stock levels of 3,000 pairs of large coveralls, 1,500 pairs of extra large. coveralls, and 4,000 pairs of rubber gloves. At the time of the audit, there were approximately 8,000 pairs of coveralls and 13,000 pairs of rubber gloves in stock in the warehouse. Additional supplies are available in the Auxiliary Building and Control Building. The storeroom clerks are responsible for ensuring that the minimum stock levels are maintained.
The licensee's staff also indicated that additional protective clothing was available from supply companies in the Portland area. The inspectors verified that these reserve supplies, and equipment, were readily available in the event of an emergency.
4.2.4.3 Transportation The licensee has a station wagon set aside for use by the offsite radiological monitoring team.
It is kept at the Visitor's Information Center as are the keys.
It is not a four-wheel drive, but three of the four-wheel drive vehicles are available during the work days and after activation of the E0F during off hours.
4.2.5 Conclusions: Emergency Equipment Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be adequate.
However the following items should be considered for improving the program.
- . a s
, _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - - - -. .. .... .... . ..
. , -28-I (a) The licensee should compensate for the uncertainties associated with the use of alternate meteorological data in the dose projections, e.g. using wind data from alternate sensor heights, using wind sigma rather than delta T (especially under stable, low wind speed, meandering conditions).
(b) The licensee should provide the decision making process with information regarding conditions under which the transport and diffusion assessment may , be a poor characterization of actual plume behavior.
(c) The licensee should formalize the procedure for notifying plant personnel of severe weather conditions that may impact the site area.
5.0 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures 5.1 General Information The appraisal included a review of the 30 principal procedures that have been generated to implement the EP.
Some of these procedures have subsections which are in themselves a procedure. As an example EP-8, Operation of the E0F, has subsections EP-8.1 through EP-8.20 which describe the responsibilities and provide instructions for each of the positions assigned to work at the E0F. All of the procedures include a description of the purpose.
Procedures developed for an emergency organization position describe the related authorities and responsibilities for that position.
References to other plant and emergency procedures are incorporated into the procedural section.
The licensee considers these procedures to be safety related.
Emergency Procedure (EIP) No. EP-1, Emergency Classification, provides for classifying emergencies into one of four categories.
Each category , has a list of initiating conditions and emergency action levels.
{
The action levels are identified by measurable or observable parameters, l such as meter readings and alarm signals. The examination of this procedure disclosed that the examples contained in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, had been addressed.
The EIPs are controlled by Administrative Procedures (AP).
The AP's address the assigned responsibility, issuance, review, changes and audits. There are provisions for temporary changes within established limits. The EIPs and their modifications are reviewed by the Plant Review Board and approved by the Plant General Manager.
EIP No. EP-6, Comand Classification / Emergency Coordinator, has also been approved by the Vice President Nuclear.
_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _. _ _ __________J
..... _ _ _ _ . - -29- _ 5.2 EIP Review The review of the EIPs disclosed they were in an acceptable form.
Also, they appeared to be clearly and logically written and to provide specific instructions to the persons using them.
During this review the following items were identified as needing reevaluation ~ and possible corrective action.
(a) EIP No. EP-13, Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination, does not reference Radiation Protection Procedure No. RP-112, Personnel and Clothing Contamination Reports. This latter procedure contains guidance on methods for accomplishing decontamination.
Also forms, included with EIP-13 and RP-112, used for recording the extent of contaminat' and success of decontamination efforts {{ do not provide a record of the survey instrument used.
(b) Some of the inventory check lists, completed in connection - with the quarterly inventory required by E'P No. EP-15 (Emergency - Supply Lists), were not fully completed ano some of the more recent lists could not be located. Also, a shelf life should be established for spare batteries stored in the emergency supply cabinets.
(c) The equipment list in Procedure CMP-28 (Chapter X of the Chemistry Manual) did not include 1.0 cc syringes, two R0-2A survey meters and two stop watches that are req' aired by certain steps in the procedure.
Instruction II.D.5 of Procedure CMP-28 should specify a desired flowrate that will be consistent with the 5 minute time limit. There appears to be a conflict between Instructions II.D.7 and II.D.12 because a gas sample cannot be obtained after the iodine cartridge has been removed.
Section III, Samole Analysis, does not reference Procedure CMP-32, Determination of Iodine Concentration in Exhaust Gas by Gross Gamma Measurement. The procedure does not include - a caution concerning the need to open the sample line loop drain valve under conditions where condensation might collect in that area.
(d) Instructions II.A.2 and II.B.2 of Procedure CMP-32 (Chapter X of the Chemistry Manual) should provide guidance on the location to be used for measuring the background radiation.
Section - II. A does not provide for the recording of sampling times (start, stop and elapsed).
Instruction III.A references Appendix A - to the procedure; however, there is no such appendix.
2: (e) Procedure CMP-34 refers to an Appendix A; however, there is no such appendix to this procedure.
. _ _ m - a m e -.i
' l i . -30- ' (f) The emergency event classifications used in the security procedures (TSP-901) were not consistent with those in the EP and EIPs.
, ' Also, there did not appear to be a mechanism to assure that changes to the EP and EIPs were being evaluated in terms of their effect on the security program.
(g) At present the fire fighting procedure, EIP-18, requires that two of the operations fire brigade members bring SCBAs to the fire scene. This appears to be an insufficient number of SCBAs because there are five members in the brigade and each should have an apparatus.
5.3 Evacuation and Accountability The evacuation and accountability of personnel during an emergency has been assigned to the Security organization. The EC is responsible for initiating such actions. The Security organization has generated procedures for accomplishing these tasks. Verification of owner controlled area evacuation has been described in detail. The evacuation route described in the EP and EIPs is via the main entrance road which is in the least likely wind direction.
There are other evacuation routes and, according to the Security Director, these could be used; however, they have not been described in these documents.
Evacuation from locations within the plant will be announced over the public address system. The content of these announcements has not been prepared in advance. All employees receive training on evacuation as part of their indoctrination training and during the annual refresher training.
There are no evacuation signs, instructions or other emergency markings posted around the site.
The current accountability procedure is ambiguous, and it appears doubtful that accountability of all day shift personnel could be performed in a timely manner. At present, the system is to have personnel evacuate through the main gate to the protected area, keeping their badges with them until they arrive at the VIC (Visitors Infonnation Center) holding area. Once there, they turn the badge over to security personnel.
Security then places the badges in the badge holders (slots) that have been moved from the security building to the VIC/ EOF. This system is very time consuming and collecting badges once the people have existed the gate may be a problem. The inspector was shown a draft of a revision for accountability procedures.
5.4 Assessment Actions The inspectors reviewed the applicable EIPs, discussed assessment actions with the licensee's staff, and observed demonstrations of the assessment actions in the CR, TSC, and EOF.
l
. _ _ _ _ _. - _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ' . - 31 - l The overall dose assessment actions are guided by EIP Nos. EP-8 and EP-8.8, the latter written for the PGE Dose Assessment Director, and EP-8.20, written for State agency representatives.
Procedure EP-10, which describes the dose assessment worksheet method, also provides infonnation which directs assessment actions and establishes priorities for information. Taken together, these procedures adequately assign responsibilities and direct the dose assessment staff to prioritize information needs and uses in order to determine radioactive material source terms, magnitude and duration of release, and l estimates and measurements of contamination.
' Procedures EP-8, EP-19, EP-29, and EP-30 provide additional instructions for communications, computer codes, and protective action reconsnendations.
These procedures contained well-organized and extremely detailed guidance for obtaining information, calculating doses, and preparing protective action guidance. The protective action guidance includes
a thorough analysis of evacuation times, transport times, protection factors, and action levels.
The auditors observed preparation of protective action guidance by CR, TSC and E0F staff.
In all cases, correct assessments were derived from CR instrumentation (including effluent monitors and area monitors), inplant sampling and measurements, and offsite monitoring. The assessment personnel identified instances where prompt notifications would be required.
Trend analysis was conducted by scanning successive data sheets and by performing periodic updates of assessments. The licensee has developed procedures for estimating high level releases based on grab samples and measurements with portable instruments.
5.5 Conclusions: Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
However, the following items should be considered for improving the program.
(a) Examine Section 5.2 of this report and make appropriate changes to the EIPs.
(b) Consider the need for establishment of an interim procedure for detennining particulate activity during post accident condi+. ions (see Section 4.1.1.7).
(c) Consider the need for a precautionary statement in the gross iodine analysis procedure (CMP-32), or other procedures, to - avoid bringing highly active iodine / particulate samples into the radiochemistry laboratory that might adversely effect the area (see Section 4.1.1.7).
- , - ' ' ...mm .
. - 'J , . -32-(d) Review the notification portion of LIP No. EP-17 to assure that it provides for initiating first aid response on an immediate basis (see Section 4.1.2.2).
(e) Provide in an appropriate procedure the requirement for assuring that a qualified maintenance person is available to operate the oil-less air compressor used to fill the SCBA . bottles (see Section 4.2.2.1).
, (f) Review the accountability procedure in terms of efficiency and consider the use of designated individuals in the emergency response facilities to reduce the time to accomplish this activity. Also consider the advisability of collecting the badges as personnel leave the protected area.
(g) Examine the evacuation procedure and consider the need to incorporate actions to be taken in response to local radiation alanns. Also consider the need for including a discussion and description of alternate evacuation routes.
6.0 Coordination With Offsite Groups 6.1 Offsite Agencies The inspector verified through interviews with officials that adequate coordination exists with those offsite groups responsible for immediate response. The principal item confirmed by the interviews was that
the responsible local authorities, Ben Bena of Cowlitz County and John DeFrance of Columbia County, had complete confidence in the
operating staff at Trojan and stated that they would not hesitate to activate the Early Warning System on the recommendation of the Shift Supervisor at Trojan.
At Cowlitz County, the initial call from Trojan would be received at the Dispatcher's console who would immediately call the Sheriff, Deputy Bena (who is also Head of Emergency Services) and the Communications Supervisor. All three have pagers that can be contacted by the dispatcher.
Each has authority to order the dispatcher to activate the Early Warning System.
The key to the lock on the siren system encoder is kept in a cabinet in the dispatch center. There is a book of clearly written procedures for operation of the encoder.
, The local radio station, KBAM, used for the Emergency Broadcast System messages is not a 24 hour station. When the station goes off the air, a light on a control panel in the Cowlitz County Dispatch Center is illuminated.
From this control panel, the dispatcher can put the station back on the air and can transmit directly either , ! _ - - _ -. . _. , _, _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ .. ....... . - . . . . . . -. .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . -
. , -33-thru a microphone or from pretaped messages. Through a patch panel t on the control console, it is possible to transmit directly over
KBAM, at any time, messages from mobile units, from the Cowlitz-County Dispatch Center or thru a telephone patch from Columbia i County as described in the following paragraph.
Ben Bena stated I that this complete system has been tested during off hours and { found to operate properly. Bena also stated that the paging < system is demonstrated regularly since he is paged by the dispatcher about 3 times per week.
The inspector's interview with John DeFrance demonstrated that a system, similar to that described above for Cowlitz County, also exists for Columbia County. The call from Trojan would come to the St. Helen's Dispatch Center. John DeFrance, the Director of Emergency Services, his Deputy, and the Police Chief all hase pagers and all have authority to order the activation of the Early Warning System.
DeFrance stated that the only delay he would tolerate would be to insure that KBAM is ready to transmit.
His office is equipped with a direct line phone to the Cowlitz County Dispatch Center through which he can transmit messages over KBAM.
6.2 General Public Columbia and Cowlitz Counties, assisted by the licensee, have developed a system fo. distributing emergency information throughout the plume exposure EPZ. The program includes mailing of emergency brochures, public meetings and an on-going public education program.
A coordinated public education program and brochure is used in both counties.
Emergency information brochures, which describe how nearby residents would be notified of an emergency at Trojan, have been distributed to about 35-40,000 residents within the 10-mile EPZ. The first mailing was done in December 1980, a second done in February 1982.
The brochure, issued in the name of both counties, describes categories of accidents and what they mean, how people would be notified, what they should do in the event they hear a siren warning, what to do if evacuation is ordered, procedures for evacuating school children and a simple description of radiation. At the insistence of the counties, there is no description of the Trojan plant or how it operates.
The brochure is designed to fit inside a telephone directory.
Copies of the brochures have been provided to special populations, including schools and day care centers, Lspitals and nursing homes, motels and hotels and large industries. There are no highway signs or other postings of emergency information in public places.
=_ _
-._ . .. . , - . -34-The continuing public ' education program consists of a slide show, developed by the licensee and provided to the County Emergency Services Directors for-use with civic, school and other organizations'. Public meetings were held in Rainier, OR, and Longview, WA, to explain the emergency plan to the public. The meetings were publicized through paid newspaper ads, press releases and public service announcements.
6.3 News Media Press briefings involving the licensee, state and county officials ~ have been held in Portland and Salem, OR, and Longview, WA, for the purpose 'of ' explaining the Trojan emergency response plan to the news media. The licensee plans to hold such briefings at least annually. The briefings involve state, county and licensee officials.
Topics covered included the emergency response plan, background information on the Trojan plant, effects of radiation exposure, and the emergency public information plan.
. 6.4 Conclusions: Coordination with Offsite Groups Based upon the above findings, this portion'of the licensee's program l appears to be acceptable.
7.0 Drills and Exergises-7.1 Program Sections 8.1 and 8.1.2 of Chapters 1 and 2 of the EP respectively
describe the requirements and frequency of emergency drills and exercises.
EIP No. EP-16, Drills and Exercises, provides for the implementation of these requirements. The listed drills and exercises meet the essential requirements of Planning Standards N2.a-e and 3 i of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
The Site and Headquarters share the responsibility for conducting the drills and exercises.
Headquarters personnel are responsible for the exercises, including development of the scenario and arranging for controllers / observers.
Site personnel are responsible for all drills. The last exercise was performed on March 4, 1981.
The required drills have been held since that time. The person / organization responsible for the drills / exercises is also responsible for related documentation and corrective actions.
The records associated with the exercise (s) are complete. The j records of the drills need to be improved.
Drill records are to be maintained by the site Training Department; however, the appraisal disclosed that the Training Department did not have records for all drills. The last exercise was observed by both NRC and FEMA observers with each Federal Agency preparing a report of their findings.
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_ -
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . '- . , ' , . , , ... ,- , - " ' --35- , 7.2 Walk-Through' Observations The appraisal: effort included evaluating the response of selected _ individuals to emergency situations postulated by various NRC team members. The responses were primarily evaluated by comparing them to the~EP, EIPs and applicable plant procedures. CR, dose assessment, ~ post accident sampling, offsite and inplant monitoring, and Fire l Brigade personnel were included in this evaluation effort. The results of these walk-throughs have been incorporated into the ' previous paragraphs of this report.
7.3 Conclusions: Drills and Exercises Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appears to be acceptable.
8.0 Exit Interview On March 4, 1982, an exit interview was held with the licensee for the purpose of discussing the preliminary findings of the appraisal. Those licensee personnel who attended the meeting have been identified in Attachment A to this report. The following NRC and Appraisal Team Members were present: F. G. Pagano, Chief, Emergency Preparednn s Licensing Branch; F. A. Wenslawski, Chief, Reactor Radiation Protection Section, Region V; R. F. Fish, Region V Emergency Preparedness Analyst and Team Leader; J. R. Sears, Emergency Planner; E. F. Bates, Emergency Preparedness Analyst; K. Scown, Region V Emergency Preparedness Coordinator and Team Member; A. E. Desrosiers, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories Senior Research Scientist and Team Member; and G. A. Stoetzel, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories Research Scientist. The findings were discussed in terms of the seven (7) major areas of the appraisal. The licensee was infomed that no significant deficiencies had been identified.
Ten items that should be considered for improving the emergency preparedness program were identified.
. e a _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _. _ _. -. _ - - - _ _. _ _ - - - - - _ - _ _ _. _ _ - _ - - _. _ - _ - _. - - - _ _. -. _ _. - _ _ _ _ _.. _. - - _ _ - - - - - _. -
. .___ ______ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i , . APPENDIX A " Individuals Contacted I.
Licensee Personnel - Trojan
- C. P. Yundt, Plant General Manager
- R. P. Barkhurst, Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Technical Services
- J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services R. P. Schmitt, Manager, Engineering Branch
- R. E. Susee, Training Supervisor
- T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- G. L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor D. R. Keuter, Operations Supervisor
- D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor A. S. Cohlmeyer, Supervising Engineer M. Q. Huey, Acting Assistant Radiation Protection (Unit) Supervisor T. Andone, Assistant Operations Supervisor L. D. Larson, Radwaste Supervisor D. L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor J. C. Perry, Instrument and Control (I&C) Supervisor R.
H.~ Budzeck, Shift Supervisor D. T. Cottingham, Shift Supervisor D. R. Pearson, Shift Supervisor R. L. Russell, Shift Supervisor G. C. Perri.. Assistant Shift Supervisor C. A. Sprain, Chemist.
J. N. Pickett, Training Assistant S. B. Nichols, Training Assistant D. B. Somerville, Radiation Protection Specialist T. L. Moore, Chemical and Radiological Protection (C&RP) Technician W. C. Van Dusen, C&RP Technician G. L. Timme, C&RP Technician F. E. Dyson, C&RP Technician R. M. Crafton, C&RP Technician D. Carter, C&RP Technician G. Davis, C&RP Technician L. L. Nofziger, I&C Technician D. Hill, Control Operator T. R. Lawson, Assistant Control Operator T. C. Park, Auxiliary Operator W. J. Reeve, Auxiliary Operator l D. Pugh, Storeroom Clerk ,
- H. Caballero, Safety Coordinator i
W. J. Burke, Security Watch Engineer J. A. Sinibaldie, Security Watch Engineer . . __ . ,,- . ___- _. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' -
-l s' J .i . ;1] ~ . ,
,c + )
PGE Hamdanarters l
- T. Walt, Manager, Radiological Engineering M. Bell, Engineering Supervisor N. Dyer, Supervising Health Physicist
- S. Gillespie, Senior Nuclear Engineer J. Thale, Senior Radiological Engineer
- G. Craven, Nuclear Engineer T. Worrell, Meteorologist J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance and Construction
- B. T. Landrey, Public Relations Department
- W. Babcock, Public Relations Department
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on March 4,1981.
II. Other Personnel J. DeFrance, Director, Office of Emergency Services, Columbia County B. Bena, Deputy Sheriff and Communications Supervisor, Cowlitz County Lt. D. Calhoun, Smith Security Company III. Personnel Present at March 4,1982 Exit Interview Only . PGE D. Broehl, Assistant Vice President W. S. Orser, Manager, Technical Functions J. Lentsch, Manager, Generation Licensing and Analysis R. Wilson, Manager, Risk Financing and Asset Protection G. H. Culp, Manager, Nuclear Security M. G. Gatlin, Security Specialist R. Ritschard, Security Supervisor R. A. Magnuson, Security Administration, Trojan P. A. Morton, QA Supervisor J. Dervdorff, Loss Control Others W. Dixon, Nuclear Engineer, Oregon Department of Energy , , l < __
.______ ___ ---- ___--. , < .. APPENDIX B Emergency Plan Implanenting Procedures Procedure No.
Title EP-1 Unusual Event EP-5 Emergency Notification EP-6 Command Classification EP-7 Operation of the Technical Support Center EP-8 Operation of Emergency Control Center > EP-8.1 ECC Director EP-8.2 Security Director EP-8.4 Technical Sopport Center Communicator EP-8.5 General Communicator i EP-8.6 Communications Staff EP-8.7 Instrumentation and Control EOF Team EP-8.8 Dose Assessment Director EP-8.12 Radiation Protection E0F Team EP-8.13 Office Director l EP-8.14 E0F Clerical Staff ' EP-8.15 VIC Staff EP-8.16 Security Staff i EP-8.17 Radiation Protection Field Team l EP-8.18 E0F State Agency Representatives EP-8.19 E0F Federal Agency Representatives EP-8.20 EOF Dose Assessment State Agency Representatives EP-9 Operation of the Operational Support Center EP-10 Accident Dose Assessment Work Sheet Method EP-10.1 Accident Dose Assessment Computer Analysis Method EP-10.2 Instructions for Use of Computer Terminal ' EP-10.3 Use of the Subin Computer Code EP-10.4 Use of the Ingest Computer Code EP-10.5 Use of the Liquid Computer Code EF-11 Onsite Radiological Surveys EP-12 Offsite Radiological Surveys EP-13 Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination EP-14 Potassium Iodide (KI) Administration EP-15 Emergency Supply List EP-16 Drills and Exercises EP-17 Medical EP-18 Fire Fighting EP-19 Communications EP-19.1 Operation of Ground Radio System EP-19.2 Operation of Dedicated Telephone System EP-19.3 Operation of Trojan Commercial Phone System EP-19.4 Emergency Notification S Health Physics Network (ystem (ENS) EP-19.5 HPN) EP-19.6 Operation of Aerial Radio System (ARS) EP-20.
Site Security EP-21 Reentry / Search and Rescue EP-22 Public Relations Department ... . _ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _.
. Procedure No.
Title EP-23 Control' Room Protective Action Recommendations EP-23.1 Protective Action Implementation EP-24 Long-Term Emergency Organization EP-24.1 Emergency Response Manager EP-24.2 Radiological Manager EP-24.3 Emergency Response Manager's Support Group - EP-24.4 Procedure Support Supervisor EP-24.5 Data Facility Supervisor EP-24.6 Construction Manager EP-24.7 Planning and Scheduling Manager EP-24.8 Purchasing Manager EP-24.9 QA Manager EP-24.10 Radiation Control and Shielding Group EP-24.ll Radwaste Systems Group EP-24.12 Systems Group EP-24.13 Analysis Group EP-24.14 Licensing Group EP-24.15 Environmental Monitoring / Dosimetry Group EP-24.16 Design Team EP-24.17 Advisory Support Group EP-24.18 Legal Advisor EP-24.19 Insurance Advisor EP-24.20 Technical Representative at Oregon E0C EP-24.21 Westinghouse Emergency Team EP-25 Operation of Company Support Center ' EP-25.2 Public Information Advisor EP-25.6 Communications Advisor EP-25.ll Plant Modifications Director EP-25.12 Technical Support Director
EP-25.13 Administrative and Logistics Director '] EP-25.14 Accident Analysis Manager EP-25.15 Licensing Manager EP-25.16 Design Manager EP-25.17 Off-Site Power Supply Advisor j EP-25.18 Bechtel Emergency Team Leader ' EP-25.19 CSC Assistants j EP-26 Medical Health Physicist ' EP-27 Headquarters Training i EP-28 Onsite Training EP-29 E0F Offsite Dose Assessment Computer Analysis Method EP-29.1 Instructions for Use of Computer Terminal EP-29.2 Use of the Subin Computer Code EP-29.3 Use of the Ingest Computer Code EP-29.4 Use of the Liquid Computer Code EP-30 E0F Offsite Protective Action Recommendations
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