IR 05000336/1978037
| ML19281A444 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1979 |
| From: | Mccabe E, Raymond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19281A435 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-336-78-37, NUDOCS 7903130241 | |
| Download: ML19281A444 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-336/78-37 Docket No.
50-336 License No.
OPR-65 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Enerav Comoany P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name:
Millstone Nuclear Dwer W+ inn, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Waterford, Connecticut Inspection conducted:
December 20-22, 1978 Inspectors:
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W. J. Raymond, fdactor/ Inspector ddte' signed date signed date signed Approved by:
N i I9 h 9 E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Insoection Summary:
Inspection on December 20-22, 1978 (Inspection Report No. 50-336/78-37)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of conformance of facility operation to Technical Specification Safety Limits, Limiting Safety System Settings, and Limiting Conditions for Operation. The inspection involved 24 inspector-hours on site by one i1RC regional based inspector.
Results:
One apparent item of noncompliance was identified in the area inspected (Deficiency - failure to conduct surveillance testing per ~
4.6.1.3.b, Paragraph 5.a).
Region I Form 12 700313 0 AV/
(Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- Mr. E. Farrell, Unit 2 Superintendent Mr. C. Ferrell, Supervising Control Operator Mr. H. Haynes, I&C Supervisor Mr. J. Kelly, Operations Supervisor Mr. D. Kross, I&C Foreman Mr. J. Moffatt, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- Mr. J. Opeka, Station Superintendent
- Mr. J. Shedioski, NRC Resident Inspector Mr. S. Sudigala, Assistant Reactor Engineer Mr. S. Tugwell, Chemistry Technician The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the inspection, including members of the operations and general office staff.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
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2.
Insoection Purcose An entrance interview was held with the Station Superintendent on December 20, 1978 to discuss the purpose of the inspection. The inspection was conducted to review overall plant operations; facility logs and records; and co, 7nt plant status to confirm operation in compliance with Technicai ;pecificatic, Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSSs) and Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs).
The licensee acknowledged this information.
3.
Insoection Scoce a.
The inspector toured various plant areas and observed plant system status from the control room between 5 p.m. to 8 p.m.
on December 20, 1978 to ascertain conformance with LSSSs and LCOs.
Items examined during this part of the inspection included:
reactor power, cold leg temperature, RCS pressure and axial shape index; RCS loops in operation (total core flow), operating SW and RBCCW pumps; SIT level, pressure and outlet isolation valve position; operability of LPSI, HPSI, CS and charging pumps; RWST level, temperature and baron concentration;
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BAST levels and boron concentration; operability of containment air recirculation fans; containment pressure and temperature; condensate storage tank volume; operability of emergency diesel generators; vital AC electrical distribution system breaker alignment; proper positioning fcr plant system valves SI-617, 627, 637, 647, 412, 654, 656, 411, 412 and CS-13.lB and 13.lA; and, annunicators in alarm on the control room verticle board, b.
Facility logs, records and surveillance test results were reviewed for the period frca April 1,1978 to December 20, 1978 to verify plant operation in conformance with the following Technical Specifications:
TECH SPEC DESCRIPTION / ITEM 3.1.1.
+ shutdown margin verification CEA group insertion limits overall core reactivity balance 3.1.2.2
+ baron injection flow paths 3.1.2.4
+ operable charging pumps 3.1.2.8
+ borated water sources 3.2.1
+ linear heat rate and axial shape index from excore/incore monitors 3.2.2
+ Fxy - planar radial peaking factor 3.2.2
+ Fr - total radial peaking factor 3.2.6
+ DNB margin - RCS temperature, pressure, flow and ASI Tables 3.3-1
+ RPS trip setpoints and channel response 3.3-2 times for Table items 3,4,5,7,8,9 and 4.3-1
Tables 3.3-3
+ ESAS channel operability and trip setpoints 3.3-4 for Table items 1.b, 6.b and 8.a 3.3-5 4.2-2 3.3.3.2
+ operable incore detectors 3.3.3.7
+ fire protection system - heat and smoke detectors in the diesel generator compartments and the cable spreading areas 3.4.1
+ total RCS loops operating (flow dependent selector switch)
3.4.7
+ RCS chemistry 3.4.11
+ core barrel movement monitors - amplitude probability distribution (APD) and spectral analyses (SA)
3.5.1
+ operable safety injection tanks (SITS)
3.5.2
+ HPSI, LPSI operability MOV alignment verification containment sump isolation valve operability emergency bus alignment 3.6.1.3
+ containment air lock operability 3.6.1.5
+ containment air temperature 3.6.2.1
+ containment (CTMT) spray system 3.6.2.2
+ CTMT air recirculation and cooling units 3.7.1.3
+ condensate storace tank 3.7.3.1
+ RBCCW loop operability 3.7.4.1
+ SW loop operability emergency bus alignment MOV position verification 3.8.1.1
+ AC electrical distribution offsite AC source breaker alignment diesel generator operability 3.8.2.1
+ Vital AC buses 3.8.2.3
+ Station battery operability 4.
References The following facility records were reviewed during this inspection for the periods indicated.
- SP 2403A, ESAS Bistable Trip and Auto Test, Rev. 5, monthly 4/19/78 to 12/13/78;
- SP 24038, ESAS Undervoltage Calibration, Rev. O, monthly 4/17/78 to 12/13/78.
- SP 2401D, RPS Matrix logic and Trip Path Relay Test, Rev. 2, monthly 4/20/78 to 12/11/78;
- SP 2401I, Local Power Density Test, Rev. 3, monthly 4/12/78 to 12/11/78;
- SP 240lN, RPS Response Time test, Rev. O, 6/17/77;
- SP 2618C, Fire Protection System Sn.oke Detector Test, Rev. O, 11/15/78;
- PIR 78-153,12/5/78;
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- PIR 78-125,10/4/78; and LER 78-24/03L,11/2/78;
- PIR 78-95, 10/4/78; and LER 78-18/03L, 8/31/78;
- PIR 78-85, 7/10/78;
- PIR 78-43, 4/17/78;
- PIR 78-42, 4/19/78;
- SP 2619A, Control Room Shift Checks, Rev.11, daily 9/28/78 to 12/17/78,
- Engineering itemorandum 2-ENG CALC-022, 6/22/78;
- SP 2402A, RCS Flow Bistable Calibration Procedure, Rev.11
- SP 2601A, Borated Water Sources and Flow Path Verification and Boric Acid Pump Operability test, Rev. 3, weekly 3/28/78 to 12/12/78;
- SP 2601B, Borated Water Source Flow Path Verification, Rev. 3, monthly 4/8/78 to 12/9/78;
- SP 260lG, Facility I Charging Pump Operability Test, Rev.1, monthly 3/26/78 to 12/1/78;
- SP 260lN, Facility II Charging Pump Operability Test, Rev. 1, monthly 4/3/78 to 12/16/78;
- RE Form 21018-2, 5/24/78, Critical Boron Concentration versus burnup, AR0, HFP, Eq. Xenon;
- INCA print files, monthly 5/1/78 to 12/1/78;
- INCA printouts - Incore Alarm Update Surveillance, monthly 5/1/78 to 12/1/78;
- Spectral Analysis Surveillance 1978, monthly 4/29/78 to 11/6/78;
- APD Surveillance 1978, weekly 4/28/78 to 11/30/78;
- Internal Memorandum GTS-78-A-167, dated 5/23/78 for Alert Level at 0.168% and Action Level at 0.335%;
- SP 26190, Startup Surveillance Checklist, Rev. O, 4/21/78 and 8/1/78;
- MPS Unit 2 RCS Daily Chemistry Analysis Shects, 4/18/78 to 12/15/78;
- MPS Unit 2 Miscellaneous Chemistry Analysis Sheets, 3/78 to 10/78;
- MPS Unit 2 Monthly Chemistry Analysis Sheets, 3/78 to 10/78;
- SP 2618E, Control Room Monthly Checks, Pev. 2, 4/18/78 to 12/3/78;
- SP 2604A(B), HPSI Pump Operability Test - Facility I(II),
Rev. 2(2), monthly 4/7/78 to 12/2/78 (4/7/78 to 12/16/78);
- SP 2604C(D), LPSI Pump Operability Test - Facility I(II),
Rev. 2(1). monthly 4/17/78 to 12/8/78 (4/17/78 to 11/24/78);
- SP ?.604 G(H), CTMT Sump Outlet Isolation Value Operability Test - Facility I(II), Rev. 1(1), monthly 4/14/78 to 12/12/78 (4/14/78 to 11/24/78);
- SP 2604L(M), LPSI System Alignment Check - Facility I(II) Rev. 1(1),
monthly 4/17/78 to 12/8/78 (4/17/78 to 11/24/78);
- SP 2605E, CTMT Personnel Air Lock Test, Rev. 1, 6/19/77, 4/10/78 and 12/21/78;
- SP 2605F, Leak Test of CTMT Personnel Access Door gaskets, Rev.1, 4/10/78 to 12/15/78;
- SP 2606A(B), CS Pump Operability Test - Facility I(II), Rev. 2(2),
monthly 4/7/78 to 12/8/78 (4/7/78 to 11/24/78);
- SP 2607A(B), Facility I(II) CTMT Air Recirculation and Cooling Unit Operability Test, Rev. '?(2), monthly 4/14/78 to 12/1/78 (4/14/78 to 12/16/h);
- SP 2611A(B), RBCCW Pump Operability Test - Facility I(II),
Rev. 1(1), monthly 3/3/78 to 12/1/73 (1/17/78 to 12/16/78);
- SP 2611C(D), Facility I(II) RBCCW Alignment and Operability Test, Rev. 1(1), monthly 3/2/73 to 12/2/78 (1/18/78 to 12/16/78);
- SP ?bl2A(B), Facility I(II) SW Pump Operability Test, Rev. 2(2),
monthly 3/1/78 to 12/9/78 (2/14/78 to 11/24/78);
- SP 2612C(0), SW System Lineup and Operability, Rev. 1(2),
3/1/78 to 12/9/78 (1/17/78 to 11/24/78);
- SP 2613A(B), Facility I(II) Diesel Generator Operability Test, Rev. 3(3), monthly 3/3/78 to 12/12/78 (1/18/78 to 12/5/78);
- Facility I Diesei Fuel Lab Report, 11/15/78;
- Facility II Diesel Fue:1 Lab Report, 11/28/78;
- SP 2619C, Control Room Weekly Checks, Rev. O, 4/8/78 to 12/12/78;
- SP 2736A, Battery Weekly Surveillance, Rev. 1, 4/14/78 to 12/15/78; and,
- SP 27368, Battery Quarterly Surveillance, Rev.1,1/6/78 to 10/5/78.
5.
Findings Within the scope of the above, and except as noted below, no inadequacies were noted during this review.
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a.
Containment Air Lock Leak Test Technical Specification 4.6.1.3.b requires that the containment air lock be leak tested at pressure Pa at least once per six months. The inspector noted that, as of 12/20/78, no leak mce test had been conducted on the air lock since 4/10/78.
This constituted an item of noncompliance with Tech Spec 4.6.1.3.b. (336/78-37-01).
The licensee declared the air lock inoperable at 1400 hrs. on 12/21/78 and entered the TS 3.6.1.3 Action Statement.
The inspector reviewed procedure SP 2605E, completed on 12/?_1/78 to test the personnel hatch inner and outer doors at 59 psig.
The test was successfully completed with a measured leakage rate (preliminary) of 0.0238 % per day.
The inspector stated that the licensee's immediate corrective actions were acceptable and that only subsequent actions to prevent recurrence need to be addressed.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
b.
RPS Core Flow Bistable Drift The inspector noted during the review of surveillance tests, PIRs and LERs referenced above, that problems have been exper-ienced in bistable setpoint drift for the RPS reactor coolant flow trip functions.
It was noted that in one instance (PIR 78-95), 3 of 4 channels had drifted in the non-conservative direction, but only channel C was found during surveillance with a setpoint less than the Tech Spec required value of 91.7%.
Licensee investigation of this incident indicated that all channels had been set to new values on 7/6/78 due to updated engineering calculations and that during this process, the bistacles had been placed on extender cards and adjusted outside of their normal environment.
An I&C Technical Bulletin was issued to instruct personnel to make bistable adjustments only with the units in the normal position.
Further, the licensee has changed surveillance procedures to require that the bistables be reset to specified values each time the monthly surveillance test is completed. And finally, work is being done in conjection with the NSSS vendor to ascertain whether the setpoint drift problem could be further alleviated through an improved bistable module desig.
The inspector stated that the licensee's actions in this area appeared to be acceptable and had no further coments at this time.
However, this item will be reviewed further by the NRC to follow the licensee's long term resolution of bistable setpoint drifi..
c.
Operable Incore Detectors The inspector noted through discussions with licensee represent-atives that as many as 21 out of 180 incore detectors have been removed from scan in the plant computer (and thus, deleted from core power distribution monitoring) for several reasons, among which include:
loss of electrical continuity in some incore circuits; and, loss of signal due to the presence of insulation leakage in the inco/e strings.
To date, no more that one detector in an incore string has been removed from scan due to insulation leakage. The inspector noted that appropriate measures had been taken to use substitute values for the affected detectors and that the minimum incore detector operability requirements of the Technical Specifications were still met.
In that the incore detector system is important for monitoring core performance and the margins to thermal limits, this item will be followed by the NRC to determine the licensee's long term resolution to incore detector degradation.
6.
Exit Interview A management meeting was held with iicensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 22, 1978. The purpose, scope and findings of this inspection were discussed as they appear in the details of this report. The licensee noted the inspector's comments in regard to the item of noncompliance.