IR 05000335/2016004

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NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2016004 and 05000389/2016004
ML17019A217
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/18/2017
From: Ladonna Suggs
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3
To: Nazar M
Florida Power & Light Co
References
IR 2016004
Download: ML17019A217 (31)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES January 18, 2017

SUBJECT:

ST. LUCIE PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000335/2016004 AND 05000389/2016004

Dear Mr. Nazar:

On December 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Plant Units 1 and 2. On January 12, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Tom Summers, Regional Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

LaDonna B. Suggs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16

Enclosure:

IR 05000335/2016004 and 05000389/2016004, w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos: 50-335, 50-389 License Nos: DPR-67, NPF-16 Report Nos: 05000335/2016004, 05000389/2016004 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L)

Facility: St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6501 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 Dates: October 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016 Inspectors: T. Morrissey, Senior Resident Inspector S. Roberts, Resident Inspector A. Butcavage, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R01 and 1R08)

R. Carrion, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)

S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparednes Inspector, (Sections 1R01, 1R11 and 1R20)

P. Capehart, Senior Operations Engineer, (Section 1R11)

Approved by: LaDonna B. Suggs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000335/2016004, 05000389/2016004; 10/01/2016 - 12/31/2016; St. Lucie Nuclear Plant,

Units 1 & 2, Integrated Inspection Report.

The report covered the three-month period of inspection from October 1, 2016, to December 31, 2016. The inspection activities were performed by the resident inspectors and specialist inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6. No findings or violations of greater than minor significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

On September 26, 2016, Unit 1 was shutdown for a planned refueling outage (RFO). The unit was in Mode 6 with the reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurized at the beginning of the inspection period. Unit 1 was restarted on November 8, 2016 and reached 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) on November 12, 2016. The unit was at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP. On October 6, 2016, the unit was shutdown to Mode 4 (<325 oF) in preparation of forecast hurricane force winds onsite due to Hurricane Matthew. On October 8, 2016, the unit was cooled down to Mode 5 (<200 oF) in order to replace upper gripper coils for control element assemblies (CEAs) 54 and 56. On October 13, 2016, the unit was restarted and reached 100 percent RTP on October 15, 2016.

The unit was at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (IP 71111.01)

.1 Impending Adverse Weather Conditions - Hurricane Matthew

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees overall preparations and protective actions prior to and during the onset of tropical force winds experienced onsite that were associated with Hurricane Matthew that approached the site on October 6-7, 2016. The inspectors independently reviewed and verified the status of licensee actions in accordance with procedure AP-0005753, Severe Weather Preparations. The inspectors also toured the protected area and exterior plant grounds for loose debris and unsecured material, supplies, and equipment which could pose a hazard to important plant systems, structures, and components (SSCs) during high winds. Additional areas toured are listed below.

  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 intake cooling water (ICW) system areas
  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 component cooling water (CCW) areas
  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine buildings
  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 startup transformer (SUT), auxiliary transformer and main transformer areas During the approach, onset and passing of Hurricane Matthew, the inspectors continuously monitored control room activities, including the shutdown and cooldown of Unit 2. The inspectors routinely attended hurricane preparation status and progress meetings in the outage control center (OCC). The inspectors also reviewed and discussed with management the provisions for staffing, relieving, and supplying plant operators, security guards, health physics, maintenance, and emergency response organization (ERO) personnel included in the station lock-down. On October 6 and 7, 2016, the inspectors observed licensee ERO personnel in the technical support center (TSC) while they monitored storm conditions, unit status, and implemented necessary corrective actions and compensatory measures. Furthermore, significant aspects of the licensees planning and conduct of post-hurricane plant damage assessment and recovery were also observed and examined by the inspectors. The inspectors reviewed action requests (ARs) generated by the licensee to verify that adverse weather related problems were being identified and resolved. This inspection constitutes one inspection sample for an impending adverse weather condition.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Site Readiness for Seasonal Cold Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the stations cold weather preparations as described in procedure 0-NOP-99.06, Cold Weather Preparations.

The inspectors verified the cold weather seasonal preparations were completed as specified by the procedure. ARs were checked to ensure that the licensee was identifying and resolving weather-related issues and that corrective actions from the previous cold weather season had been satisfactorily resolved. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following safety-related equipment on both units that are exposed to the outside weather conditions to identify any potential adverse conditions.

This inspection constitutes one sample.

  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDG rooms
  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 main feedwater isolation valve (MFIV) areas
  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling water tank (RWT) areas

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (IP 71111.04)

.1 Partial Equipment Walkdowns (IP 71111.04Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted partial alignment verifications of the systems listed below.

These inspections included reviews using plant lineup procedures, operating procedures, and piping and instrumentation drawings, which were compared with observed equipment configurations to verify that the critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned to support operability. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and that those issues were documented in the corrective action program (CAP). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection constitutes three samples.

  • 2A SUT, 2A2 and 2A3 switchgear, and 2A EDG with 2B SUT out of service (OOS)for planned maintenance
  • Unit 1 shut down cooling (SDC) Trains A and B prior to starting core onload
  • Unit 1 1B train high pressure safety injection (HPSI) with 1A train HPSI OOS for a planned motor inspection

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Complete System Walkdown (IP 71111.04S)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a detailed walkdown and review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 1 CCW system to verify its capability to meet its design basis function. The inspectors utilized the licensee procedures listed in the Attachment, as well as other licensing and design documents, to verify the system alignment was correct. During the walkdown, the inspectors verified that:

(1) valves were correctly positioned and did not exhibit leakage that would impact their function;
(2) electrical power was available as required;
(3) major portions of the system and components were correctly labeled, cooled, and ventilated;
(4) hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional;
(5) essential support systems were operational;
(6) ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with system performance;
(7) tagging clearances were appropriate; and
(8) valves were locked as required by the licensees locked valve program. Pending design and equipment issues were reviewed to determine if the identified deficiencies significantly impacted the systems functions. Items included in this review were the operator workaround list, the temporary modification list, system health reports, system description, and outstanding maintenance work requests/work orders (WOs). In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP to ensure that the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment problems. This inspection constitutes one sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdowns (IP 71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed walkdowns of plant areas during this inspection period to evaluate conditions related to control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition and operational status of fire protection systems including fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. The inspectors reviewed these activities against provisions in the licensees procedure AP-1800022, Fire Protection Plan, The licensees fire impairment lists, updated on an as-needed basis, were routinely reviewed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the CAP database to verify that fire protection problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection constitutes six samples as noted below.

  • Unit 1, reactor containmant building (RCB) 62 elevation
  • Unit 2, fuel handling building
  • Unit 2, cable spreading room
  • Unit 1, EDG oil storage tank area
  • Unit 2, EDG oil storage tanks 2A and 2B

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities

Main article: IP 71111.08P

From October 3, 2016, through October 18, 2016, the inspectors conducted a review of the implementation of the licensees ISI Program for monitoring degradation of the RCS steam generator tubes, boric acid corrosion control program, risk-significant piping and components, corrective action reports, and a sample of the containment system moisture barrier seals.

The inspections described in Sections 1R08.1, 1R08.2, 1R08.3, 1R08.4 and 1R08.5 below constitutes one ISI sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.08.

.1 Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) Activities and Welding Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and later reviewed records of the following NDEs mandated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section XI to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code Section XI and Section V requirements and, if any indications and defects were detected, to evaluate if they were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code or an NRC-approved alternative requirement.

  • PT examination of Unit 1 SE-07-2B; solenoid valve (Target Rock) containment spray body-to-bonnet weld, ASME Class 2 The licensee confirmed that during non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any recordable indications that were accepted for continued service. Therefore, no NRC review was completed for this inspection procedure attribute.

The inspectors observed the following pressure boundary welds completed for risk-significant systems during the outage to evaluate if the licensee applied the preservice NDEs and acceptance criteria required by ASME Code Section XI. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specification, welder qualifications, welding material certification and supporting weld procedure qualification records, to evaluate if the weld procedure was qualified in accordance with the requirements of Construction Code and the ASME Code Section IX.

  • Unit 1 SE-07-2B; solenoid valve (Target Rock) containment spray body-to-bonnet weld, ASME Class 2 In addition, the inspectors independently walked down the moisture barrier seal between the containment inner shell plate and floor at elevation 18 for signs of degradation and reviewed the associated evaluation generated by the licensee via AR 02161956 for compliance with paragraph IWE-3510 of Section XI of the ASME 2001 Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

For the Unit 1 reactor vessel head, a bare metal visual examination and volumetric examination were not required this outage pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and St. Lucie Unit-1, Relief Request No. 8, Alternative from Performing Volumetric /Surface Examinations of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Components and the associated NRC safety evaluation. Relief Request No. 8 noted that the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 for visual inspection of the upper surface of the reactor closure head, would continue at the required frequency. Therefore, the inspectors reviewed the final report records of the last visual examination conducted during the 2015 refuel outage on the Unit 1 reactor vessel head penetrations, to evaluate if the activities were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code Case and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D). Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the following documentation and/or observed the following activities:

  • Evaluated if the required visual examination scope was achieved and limitations (if applicable) were recorded in accordance with the licensee procedures.
  • Evaluated if the licensees criteria for visual examination quality and instructions for resolving interference and masking issues were adequate.
  • Evaluated if the licensee implemented corrective actions and were entered into their corrective action system, if required.
  • Reviewed the results of the follow-up visual examination of in-core instrumentation nozzle 70 and head vent area performed during the current 2016 outage.
  • Evaluated if the next scheduled visual examination of the reactor vessel closure head surface met the frequency requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an independent walkdown of portions of the RCS which recently received a licensee boric acid walkdown and evaluated if the licensees BACC visual examinations emphasized locations where boric acid leaks could cause degradation of safety-significant components.

The inspectors also reviewed the following licensee evaluations of RCS components with boric acid deposits to evaluate if degraded components were documented in the corrective action program. The inspectors also evaluated the corrective actions for any degraded RCS components against the component ASME Code Section XI requirements and/or NRC-approved alternatives.

  • AR 2037694, Unit 1, in-core instrumentation nozzle No. 70
  • AR 2163854, Unit 1, reactor under vessel examination due to cavity seal leakage The inspectors reviewed the following corrective actions related to evidence of boric acid leakage to evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the requirements of the ASME Code Section XI and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
  • AR 02159434-01, brownish colored boric acid residue observed at the Unit 1 V2516 valve gland packing
  • AR 02159582-01, brown colored boric acid residue observed at the Unit 1 V3481 packing gland and yoke

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 eddy current (EC) examination activities in SGs A and B to evaluate the inspection activities against the licensees Technical Specifications; NRC commitments; ASME Section XI; and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines. The inspectors reviewed the scope of the EC examinations to verify it included the applicable potential areas of tube degradation.

The inspectors also verified that appropriate inspection scope expansion criteria were planned based on inspection results. In addition, the inspectors reviewed EC examination status reports to ensure that all tubes with relevant indications were appropriately screened for in-situ pressure testing. Based on the EC examination results, no new degradation mechanisms were identified, no EC scope expansion was required, and none of the SG tubes examined met the criteria for in-situ pressure testing.

The inspectors reviewed the last condition monitoring and operational assessment report to assess the licensees prediction capability for maximum tube degradation. The inspectors review also included the licensees repair criteria and repair process to ensure they were consistent with plant Technical Specifications and industry guidelines.

This included direct observation of tube plugging activities in SG B (location 108/91).

The inspectors also reviewed the primary-to-secondary leakage (e.g., SG tube leakage)history for the last operating cycle. The inspectors noted that primary-to-secondary leakage was below the detection threshold during the previous operating cycle; none had been detected.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed documentation to ensure that data analysts, EC probes, and equipment configurations were qualified to detect the existing and potential SG tube degradation mechanisms. The inspectors review included a sample of site-specific Examination Technique Specification Sheets to ensure that their qualification was consistent with Appendix H or I of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 7. The inspectors also directly observed a sample of EC data acquisition in SGs A and B (Cold Leg and Hot Leg sides).

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of ISI/SG related problems entered into the licensees corrective action program and conducted interviews with licensee staff to determine if:

  • the licensee had established an appropriate threshold for identifying ISI/SG related problems;
  • the licensee had performed a root cause (if applicable) and taken appropriate corrective actions; and
  • the licensee had evaluated operating experience and industry generic issues related to ISI and pressure boundary integrity.

The inspectors performed these reviews to evaluate compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requirements. The corrective action documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

.1 Control Room Observations (IP 71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator performance in the plant and main control room, particularly during periods of heightened activity or risk and where the activities could affect plant safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Specifically, the inspectors observed activities in the control room during the following evolution:

  • October 6, 2016, Unit 2 shutdown due to Hurricane Matthew The inspectors focused on the following conduct of operations attributes as appropriate:
  • Operator compliance and use of procedures
  • Control board manipulations
  • Communication between crew members
  • Use and interpretation of plant instruments, indications and alarms
  • Use of human error prevention techniques
  • Documentation of activities, including initials and sign-offs in procedures
  • Supervision of activities, including risk and reactivity management This inspection completes one sample of control room observations under this inspection procedure.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Licensed Operator Requalification (IP 71111.11A)

a. Inspection Scope

Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results: On December 20, 2016, the licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations, and also completed the comprehensive biennial requalification written examinations, which are required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). The inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual written and operating examinations and the crew simulator operating examinations in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process.

This inspection completes one sample of an annual review of requalification results under this inspection procedure.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (IP 71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the performance data and the associated AR for an equipment issue to verify that the licensees maintenance efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants) and licensee administrative procedure ADM-17-08, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.65, The Maintenance Rule (MR). The inspectors efforts focused on maintenance rule scoping, characterization of maintenance problems and failed components, risk significance, determination of MR a(1) and a(2) classification, corrective actions, and the appropriateness of established performance goals and monitoring criteria. The inspectors also interviewed responsible engineers and observed some of the corrective maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the associated system health report.

The inspectors verified that equipment problems were being identified and entered into the licensees CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection constitutes one sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (IP 71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed in-office reviews, plant walkdowns, and control room inspections of the licensees on-line and shutdown risk assessment of emergent or planned maintenance activities. The inspectors verified the licensees risk assessment and risk management activities using the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4); the recommendations of Nuclear Management and Resource Council, 93-01, Industry Guidelines for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants; and licensee administrative procedure ADM-17.16, Implementation of the Configuration Risk Management Program. The inspectors also reviewed the effectiveness of the licensees contingency actions to mitigate increased risk resulting from the degraded equipment. The inspectors interviewed responsible senior reactor operators on-shift, verified actual system configurations, and specifically evaluated results from the online risk monitor (OLRM) or shutdown safety assessment (SSA) for the combinations of OOS risk significant SSCs listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

This inspection constitutes four samples.

  • Unit 2, Yellow OLRM assessment with 2B SUT OOS for planned maintenance
  • Unit 1, Yellow SSA with the unit in Mode 6 and the RCS depressurized and drained to a lowered inventory condition to support reactor head installation
  • Unit 1, Yellow OLRM assessment with 1A HPSI pump OOS for a planned motor inspection
  • Unit 2, Yellow OLRM assessment due to 2B ICW header being technical specification inoperable due to a through-wall piping leak

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (IP 71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed ARs interim dispositions and operability determinations or functionality assessments to ensure that they were properly supported and the affected SSCs remained available to perform their safety function with no increase in risk. The inspectors reviewed the applicable Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and associated supporting documents and procedures, and interviewed plant personnel to assess the adequacy of the interim disposition. This inspection constitutes four samples.

  • AR 2167688, 1C AFW pump outboard seal leakage (failed post-maintenance test (PMT) for seal replacement)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (IP 71111.18)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the engineering change (EC) documentation for the permanent modifications listed below. The inspectors reviewed the modification to verify it was implemented as described in procedure EN-AA-205-1100, Design Change Packages.

The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screening and evaluation review to verify that the modification had not affected system operability and availability. The inspectors reviewed associated plant drawings and UFSAR documents impacted by these modifications and discussed the changes with licensee personnel to verify the installations were consistent with the modification documents. The inspectors observed portions of each modification installation. Additionally, the inspectors verified that any issues associated with the modifications were identified and entered into the licensees CAP. This inspection constitutes two samples.

  • EC 286953, Unit 2 PIA-3320 reverse logic for boundary valve V3527
  • EC 282961, Unit 1 cable spreading room electrical raceway cover installation

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (IP 71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

For maintenance WOs, the inspectors reviewed the test procedures and either witnessed the testing or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope of testing adequately verified that the work performed was completed correctly and demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable. The inspectors verified that the requirements of licensee procedure ADM-78.01, Post Maintenance Testing, were incorporated into test requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

This inspection constitutes five samples.

  • WO 40493189, Unit 1 ICW valve HCV-21-7, actuator bolts missing/damaged
  • WO 40372021, Unit 2, troubleshoot and repair control element assembly CEA-83

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (IP 71111.20)

.1 Unit 1 Refueling Outage SL1-27

a. Inspection Scope

The Unit 1 planned RFO started on September 26, 2016. Inspection activities previously completed were documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2016003, 05000389/2016003 (ML16315A206).

Outage Planning, Control and Risk Assessment The inspectors reviewed the risk reduction methodology employed by the licensee during various daily RFO SL1-27 meetings, including the OCC morning meetings, operations team meetings, and schedule performance update meetings. The inspectors examined the licensee implementation of SSAs during RFO SL1-27 in accordance with licensee procedure OM-AA-101-1000, Shutdown Risk Management, to verify whether a defense-in-depth concept was in place to ensure safe operations and avoid unnecessary risk. In addition, the inspectors regularly monitored OCC activities and interviewed responsible OCC management to ensure system, structure, and component configurations and work scope were consistent with Technical Specification (TS)requirements, site procedures, and outage risk controls. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Outage Activities The inspectors examined outage activities to verify that they were conducted in accordance with TS, licensee procedures, and the licensees outage risk control plan.

Some of the more significant inspection activities accomplished by the inspectors were as follows:

  • Walked down selected safety-related equipment clearance orders
  • Verified operability of RCS pressure, level, flow, and temperature instruments during various modes of operation
  • Verified electrical systems availability and alignment
  • Evaluated implementation of reactivity controls
  • Reviewed control of containment penetrations

around the refueling cavity, near sensitive equipment and RCS breaches)

Fatigue Management Activities The inspectors verified the licensee had scheduled covered personnel such that the minimum days off for individuals working on outage activities were in compliance with 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4) and (5). There were no waiver requests, self-declarations or fatigue assessments completed during the outage.

Refueling Activities and Containment Closure The inspectors witnessed selected fuel handling operations being performed according to TS and applicable operating procedures from the main control room, the SFP, and the refueling cavity inside containment. The inspectors also examined licensee activities to control and track the position of each fuel assembly. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to close the containment equipment, personnel, and emergency hatches in a timely manner per procedure 1-GMM-68.02, Emergency Closure of Containment Penetrations, Personnel Hatch, and Equipment Hatches.

Lowered Inventory Condition The inspectors reviewed the planned activities associated with a period of lowered RCS inventory established in order to reinstall the reactor vessel head. The inspectors verified the licensee had controls in place to govern lower inventory conditions. The inspectors verified that the necessary instrumentation and means of adding inventory to the RCS were available.

Heat-up, Mode Transition, and Reactor Startup Activities The inspectors examined selected TS, license conditions, and license commitments, and verified administrative prerequisites were being met prior to Mode changes. The inspectors also reviewed measured RCS leakage rates, and verified containment integrity was properly established. The inspectors performed a containment sump closeout inspection prior to reactor plant startup and conducted a containment walkdown prior to restarting the unit. The results of low power physics testing were discussed with reactor engineering and operations personnel to ensure that the core operating limit parameters were consistent with the design. The inspectors witnessed portions of the RCS heat up, reactor startup, and power ascension in accordance with the following plant procedures:

  • 1-PTP-81, Reload Startup Physics Testing
  • 1-PTP-91, Unit 1 Initial Criticality Following Refueling
  • 1-GOP-302, Reactor Startup Mode 3 to Mode 2
  • 1-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1 Corrective Action Program The inspectors reviewed ARs generated during SL1-27 to evaluate the licensees threshold for initiating ARs.

Inspections completed during this inspection period along with the inspections completed as documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2016003, 05000389/2016003 (ML16315A206) constitutes one refueling activity inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Unit 2 Forced Outage Due to Hurricane Matthew and Subsequant Replacement of

Upper Gripper Coils for CEAs 54 and 56

a. Inspection Scope

On October 6, 2016, the licensee shutdown Unit 2 prior to forecasted onsite winds reaching hurricane force due to the approach of Hurricane Matthew. The unit was cooled down to approximately 210 oF (Mode 4 < 325 oF) prior to the storm arrival.

Subsequent to the passing of the storm, the unit was cooled down to Mode 5 (< 200 oF)in order to replace the upper gripper coils for CEA-54 and CEA-56. The unit was restarted on October 13, 2016 and reached 100 percent RTP on October 14, 2016.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Outage Planning, Control and Risk Assessment The inspectors reviewed the licensees forced outage schedule to verify that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience and previous site specific problems.

Monitoring of Shutdown Activities The inspectors observed portions of the cooldown process to verify that TS cooldown restrictions were followed. The inspectors conducted a containment walkdown after the shutdown to assess the condition of the systems within containment that are inaccessible with the unit at power. The inspectors performed walkdowns of important systems and components used for decay heat removal from the reactor core during the shutdown period including the ICW and the CCW systems.

Outage Activities The inspectors examined outage activities to verify that they were conducted in accordance with TSs, licensee procedures, and the licensees outage risk control plan.

Some of the more significant inspection activities accomplished by the inspectors were as follows:

  • Verified operability of RCS pressure, level, flow, and temperature instruments during various modes of operation
  • Verified electrical systems availability and alignment
  • Evaluated implementation of reactivity controls
  • Examined containment foreign material exclusion controls put in place for the limited work inside containment Heat-up, Mode Transition, and Reactor Startup Activities The inspectors examined selected TSs, license conditions, license commitments and verified administrative prerequisites were being met prior to mode changes. The inspectors also verified containment integrity was properly established. The inspectors performed a containment closeout inspection prior to reactor plant startup. The inspectors witnessed portions of the RCS heat up, reactor startup, and power ascension.

On October 13, 2016, the inspectors verified that startup activities were performed in accordance with licensee general operating procedure 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 to Mode 1.

This inspection constitutes one outage activity inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (IP 71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either reviewed or witnessed surveillance tests to verify that the tests met TS, the UFSAR, the licensees procedural requirements, and demonstrated the systems were capable of performing their intended safety functions and their operational readiness. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the effect of the testing activities on the plant to ensure that conditions were adequately addressed by the licensee staff and that after completion of the testing activities, equipment was returned to standby alignment required for the system to perform its safety function. The inspectors verified that surveillance issues were documented in the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the

. This inspection constitutes six samples as noted below.

In-Service Tests:

  • 1-OSP-03.16A, 1A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Comprehensive Test
  • 1-OSP-07.02A, 1A Containment Spray Pump Safeguards Full Flow Test Surveillance Tests:
  • 1-OSP-69.13B, ESF - 18 Month Surveillance for SIAS/CIS/CSAS - Train B
  • 1-PTP-81, Reload Startup Physics Testing RCS Leakage Detection Surveillance:
  • 1-OSP-68.02, Local Leak Rate (Penetration 44 RCP Controled Bleedoff)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (IP 71151)

.1 Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors checked licensee submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating system performance indicators (PIs) listed below for the period October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2016, to verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period.

Performance Indicator definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures ADM-25.02, NRC Performance Indicators, were used to check the reporting for each data element. The inspectors checked operator logs, plant status reports, condition reports, system health reports, and PI data sheets to verify that the licensee had identified the required data, as applicable. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel associated with performance indicator data collection, evaluation, and distribution. PIs reviewed are listed below:

  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency AC power system
  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 Heat removal system
  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 High pressure injection system
  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cooling water system This inspection constitutes five samples for each unit for a total of 10 samples.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (IP 71152)

.1 Daily Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, and to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a screening of items entered daily into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily printed summaries of action requests and by reviewing the licensees electronic AR database. Additionally, RCS unidentified leakage was checked on a daily basis to verify the licensee was properly trending leakage data and taking appropriate corrective actions as necessary.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review:

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, and also considered the results of daily inspector CAP items screening discussed in section 4OA2.1, plant status reviews, plant tours, and licensee trending efforts. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period of June 2016 through December 2016, although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the issue warranted. The inspectors evaluated the licensees administration of the ARs in accordance with the CAP, as specified in licensee procedure PI-AA-104-1000, Corrective Action.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection constitutes one sample.

b. Observations No findings were identified. The inspectors identified a negative trend associated with the configuration control of electrical jumpers and lifted leads. Over the last year, the licensee documented several issues associated with jumper and lifted lead configuration control. The inspectors determined that all the deficiencies associated with the configuration control of the electrical jumpers and leads that have been fully evaluated were determined to be minor since they did not adversely affect the associated cornerstone objective and were placed in the CAP. ARs associated with these issues are listed in the Attachment. This trend was also identified by the licensee and was being evaluated under the licensees CAP as AR 2169352.

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000335, 389/2016-001-00, Inadequate Legacy Evaluation for Containment High Range Radiation Monitor Nonconformance with Design Accuracy Requirements Resulted in Latent Inoperability and Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications On June 2, 2016, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 100 percent RTP, the licensee declared the containment high range radiation monitors (CHRRMs) inoperable for both units. The licensee determined that the accuracy of the CHRRMs could not be assured due to thermal induced generated currents and water intrusion/blistering of the detector cabling during some postulated design basis accidents. The inspectors reviewed the apparent cause evaluation report (AR 2135780) to verify the accuracy of the LER and the appropriateness of the corrective actions. An NRC-identified NCV associated with the inoperable CHRRMs was previously documented in NRC Design Bases Inspection (Programs) Report 05000335/2016010, 05000389/2016010 (ADAMS Accession Number ML16161A205). The LER was reviewed. No additional findings or violations of NRC requirements were identified. This LER is closed.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The resident inspectors presented their inspection results to Mr. Tom Summers, Regional Vice President and other members of licensee management on January 12, 2017.

The ISI specialist inspectors presented their inspection results via a telephone call to Mr.

Chris Costanzo, Site Vice-President, and other members of the licensee staff on December 19, 2016.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary information. The licensee did not identify any proprietary information.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

G. Alexander, Fleet Programs Supervisor
R. Baird, Training Site Manager
M. Blew, ISI Program
J. Brady, Nuclear Assessment Project Manager
C. Costanzo, Site Vice President
D. Cecchett, Licensing Engineer
J. Francis, Radiation Protection Manager
K. Frehafer, Licensing Engineer
R. Gil, Steam Generator Program Manager
M. Haskin, Projects Site Manager
M. Jones, Engineering Director
L. Kestenbaum, Repair and Replacement Program
W. Parks, Operations Director
D. Pitts, Maintenance Director
R. Sciscente, Licensing Engineer
M. Snyder, Licensing Manager
C. Spenser, Chemistry Manager
K. Stone, Performance Improvement Manager
K. Thompson, Steam Generator Engineer
C. Workman, Security Manager
R. Wright, Plant General Manager
T. Summers, Regional Vice President

NRC personnel

LaDonna

B. Suggs, Chief, Branch 3, Division of Reactor Projects

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

05000335,389/2016-001-00 LER Inadequate Legacy Evaluation for Containment High Range Radiation Monitor Nonconformance with Design Accuracy Requirements Resulted in Latent Inoperability and Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Section 4OA3)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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