IR 05000335/1994014
| ML17228A666 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1994 |
| From: | Elrod S, Landis K, Mark Miller NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228A665 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-94-14, 50-389-94-14, NUDOCS 9408090213 | |
| Download: ML17228A666 (15) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Report Nos.:
50-335/94-14 and 50-389/94-14 Licensee:
Florida Power 5 Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
Inspection Conducted:
Inspectors:
License Nos.:
A. Elrod, enior Resid t Inspector e Si ne Approved by:
M. S.
ilier, Resident In ector K. D. Landis, Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY D te S'gned Da e Signed Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations review, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, engineering, plant support, and followup of previous inspection items.
Backshift inspection was performed on June 8, 17, and 26.
Results:
Plant operations area:
Operations during the period continued to be performed well.
Operator response to the Unit 1 trip was considered good (paragraph 3.d).
The licensee's identification and treatment of the issue of Unit 2 Wide Range Gas Monitor inoperability was thor ough and resulted in a Non-Cited Violation (paragraph 3.e).
Maintenance and Surveillance area:
Maintenance and Surveillance activities observed this period were performed well.
Good troubleshooting methodolgy was noted in the repair of the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator diesel starting air compressor motor (paragraph 4.a.2).
9408090213 940729 PDR ADOCK 05000335 PDR
Engineering area:
The inspector concluded that the licensee has been effective in identifying and addressing recent issues of Vendor Technical Hanual revision control.
Facility Review Group subcommittee reviews, and the resolution of comments generated in those reviews, have resulted in a lack of timely issuance of some Vendor Technical Hanuals to the field (paragraph 5.a).
Within the areas inspected, the following Non-Cited Violation (NCV)
and Unresolved Item (URI) were identified:
URI 335) 389/94-14-01 NCV 335,389/94-14-02-Use of N/A by Operators in Procedural Steps, paragraph 3.b.
Inoperable WRGH Due to Haintenance Error, paragraph REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D.
C.
W.
H.
R.
R.
W.
D.
J.
H.
p.
R.
p.
K.
- J G.
L.
A.
W.
C.
L.
J.
C.
J.
D ~
J.
W.
rman ment Head Sager, St.
Lucie Plant Vice President Burton, St.
Lucie Plant General Manager Bladow, Site guality Manager Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor Church, Independent Safety Engineering Group Chai Dawson, Maintenance Manager Dean, Electrical Maintenance Department Head Denver, Site Engineering Manager Dyer, Maintenance guality Control Supervisor Fagley, Construction Services Manager Fincher, Training Manager Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor Fulford, Site Engineering Supervisor Heffelfinger, Protection Services Supervisor Holt, Plant Licensing Engineer Madden, Plant Licensing Engineer McLaughlin, Licensing Manager Menocal, Mechanical Maintenance Department Head Parks, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Pell, Site Services Manager Rogers, Instrument and Control Maintenance Depart Scarola, Operations Manager Scott, Outage Manager Spodick, Operations Training Supervisor West, Technical Manager West, Operations Supervisor White, Security Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Personnel D. Verrelli, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, NRC Region II K. Landis, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 28, NRC Region II S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. Miller, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Plant Status and Activities
'a ~
Unit
b.
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100% power.
On June 6, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by turbine and reactor trips, when winds from a severe thunderstorm blew a section of flashing off an adjacent building and across two output terminals of main transformer 1A (see paragraph 3.d).
Repairs to the transformer were affected and the reactor was taken critical on June 8 and was placed on-line on June 11.
The unit was in day 22 of power operation at the end of the inspection period.
Unit 2 C.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100% power and remained at power throughout; ending the inspection period in day 67 of power operation since startup in April.
On June 28, the licensee discovered disconnected sample lines to the WRGM which resulted in WRGM inoperability which had lasted, most probably, since April 6 (see paragraph 3.e).
NRC Activity David M. Verrelli, Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 2 and Kerry D.
Landis, Chief of Reactor Projects Section 2B, NRC Region II, visited the site on June 24.
Their activities included a site tour, discussions with licensee management, and an overview of resident office activities and issues.
3.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
'a ~
Plant Tours The inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspectors looked.for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The frequency of plant tours and control room visits by site management was noted.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF, ECCS, and support systems.
Valve, breaker, and switch lineups as well as
equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
The following accessible-area ESF system and area walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory:
~
Unit 2 Containment Spray Train B
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Unit 2 HPSI Train B
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Unit 1 Sodium Hydroxide Addition Subsystem
~
Unit 2 CCW Surge Tank and Associated Piping b.
Plant Operations Review The inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs, and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
They observed and evaluated control room staffing, control room access, and operator performance during routine operations.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections to ensure that operations and security performance remained at acceptable levels.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
Control room annunciator status was verified.
(I)
During a control room observation conducted June 26, the inspector reviewed the licensee's actions relating to Unit 2 Containment Spray Flow Control Valve FCV-07-1B.
The valve was declared inoperable and left in its open position following indications of stem binding.
In a Night Order dated June 9,
Operations Department management stated that a
TC should be generated to OP 2-0010125,
"Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks,
, and Calibrations," to remove the weekly requirement to cycle FCV-07-1A and B.
The weekly cycling of these valves was not required by TS and was considered a contributor to the conditions noted in FCV-07-1B.
The inspector questioned whether or not a
TC had been generated per the subject Night Order.
Operators stated that they believed a
TC had been generated; however, no record of a TC could be produced.
Consequently, operators prepared a
TC at that time.
When asked how, in the absence of a TC, the issue of not performing the procedurally-required surveillance had been handled, operators stated that the steps had been marked as "N/A," with the reason for not performing the step annotated.
The inspector reviewed ADM 0010120, Rev.
61,
"Conduct of Operations,"
and found that procedural compliance was discussed in Appendix M.
Step 3 of the Appendix stated that "If a
procedure in use can NOT be complied with due to technical inaccuracy, system status, inoperative components or other reasons, a temporary change shall be initiated..."
The inspector discussed the issue of marking steps as
"N/A" with the Operations Supervisor, who stated that the issue had been raised in the past and that guidance was promulgated via Night Order on the practice of "N/A-ing" procedure steps.
The Operations Supervisor stated that current guidance to operators was to annotate N/A'd steps with the reason for the N/A.
The inspector found that a conflict existed between the requirements delineated in ADM 0010120 and the guidance transmitted to operators via Night Order.
As the current inspection period ended prior to the resolution of this issue, the issue will be tracked as URI 335,389/94-14-01, Use of N/A by Operators in Procedural Steps.
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagouts (clearances):
2-94-05-0095
- FCV-07-1B Flow Control Valve for Containment Spray B Header 2-94-06-022
- HV-08-IA Motor Operated Equalizer Valve for HCV-08-1A (NSIV)
1-93-05-214
- Admin Controlled Equipment Inside Containment RCB The posting of required notices to workers was reviewed and found satisfactory.
c.
Technical Specification Compliance Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, and switch pos'itions, and by review of completed logs and records.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed for abnormalities.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
The inspectors verified that related plant procedures in use were adequate, complete, and included the most recent revisions.
d.
Unit 1 Reactor Trip On June 6, Unit 1 experienced a trip during a severe thunderstorm when the main transformer locked out the generator, causing a
The lockout occurred due to a phase differential on main generator transformer 1A.
This occurred as a result of an approximate 8'ength of aluminum flashing from an adjacent building which was blown across two phases of the 1A main transformer output insulators and connectors.
The inspector responded to the control room and found that the unit post-trip response was normal.
The
licensee conducted inspections and tests of the 1A and 1B main transformers and the main generator, and performed repairs to the 1A main transformer.
The inspectors were present as the reactor was taken critical on June 8.
The inspectors noted the presence of Reactor Engineering personnel during the startup, as well as the use of a new 1/H methodology.
Previous startups had employed 1/H graphs which plotted inverse multiplication ratios as a function of CEA position.
This practice resulted in misleading plots in a previous startup due to nonlinearities in reactivity addition as a function of CEA position.
Reactor Engineering responded to this with the issuance of 1/H sheets which linearized reactivity on the base axis of the sheets, resulting in a more linear 1/H plot.
This change in methodology resulted in non-generic 1/H sheets; that is, as the base axis of a given sheet reflected CEA reactivity (as opposed to position only), the sheets became unit and EFPH specific.
Reactor Engineering recognized this fact and planned to issue new 1/H sheets with each set of core physics curves issued to the control rooms.
The inspectors found the startup to be well-controlled.
Criticality was achieved on June 8 and the licensee had prepared procedures to bring the unit on-line with only the 1B transformer; however, the licensee chose to wait until the lA transformer repairs were completed.
Cited as factors in the decision were the fact that the lA transformer repairs were scheduled to be completed within 2 to 3 days and the unusual electric plant lineup that would have resulted.
The inspectors found the licensee's rationale for the decision to be conservative.
Wide Range Gas Honitor Found Inoperable On June 28, the licensee discovered a condition which rendered the
'nit 2 Reactor Auxiliary Building (unit vent stack)
wide range gas monitor, RS-26-90, inoperable.
During maintenance to calibrate the detector, ILC personnel found that the 2 instrument lines (sample tubing) which supply the instrument's low and high range detectors were disconnected at the instrument skid.
This resulted in an inability of the WRGH to perform its intended function of measuring vent stack gas activity.
The WRGH was required to be operable by TS LCO 3.3.3. 1, which specified that both the low and high range monitors be operable.
For cases of inoperability, TS required, in part, that the monitors be returned to an operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or that a preplanned alternate method of sampling be initiated.
The licensee promptly restored the monitor to an operable status by reconnecting the sample lines on June 28.
The licensee stated that the disconnection of the sample lines was normally performed in the course of calibrating the air flow instruments on the WRGH.
The licensee reviewed the maintenance history of the skid and found the last calibration to have been performed April 6.
The licensee interviewed the I&C specialists
involved in that calibration, who stated that they believed the sample lines were reconnected properly following the calibration.
In an attempt to establish the period of inoperablility more accurately, the licensee compared the output of two PIG monitors, which sampled the unit vent stack at approximately that same point, with that of the WRGM.
The licensee found that routine plant evolutions, such as venting and sampling the VCT, resulted in similar outputs when all detectors were sampling properly.
Employing this method, the licensee was able to bound the onset of WRGM inoperability between February 13 and April 29.
The licensee determined that one contributing factor to this incident was a lack of independent verification of the reconnection of sampling lines for the WRGM.
The maintenance effort of April 6 was conducted in accordance with IEC procedure 2-1400189, Rev.
0,
"Calibration of the Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring Sample Flow Meters,"
which did not require independent verification following the reconnection of the sample lines.
The inspector reviewed gI 5-PR/PSL-I Rev.
55, "Preparation, Revision, Review/Approval of Procedures,"
and found that independent verification was required for cases in which a "...Tech.
Spec.
system or component will be or has been altered..."
I&C engineers stated that, following the incident, a revision was prepared to the subject procedure to require independent verification following reconnection of the sampling lines.
Additionally, IKC engineers stated that similar IEC procedures were being reviewed to identify similar needs for independent verification.
The licensee also stated that consideration was being given to performing effluent monitor channel checks as a function of future planned releases.
The impact of the noted conditions on unit operations was minimal.
The WRGM was installed for wide range, post-accident monitoring over an approximate 12 decade response span.
During normal unit operations, effluents were monitored by both the WRGM and two PIG monitors which sampled the unit stack.
The inspector reviewed EPIP 3100033E, Rev 20, "Off-Site Dose Calculations,"
and found that, under emergency conditions, release rates were based upon a primary method of grab samples with a first alternate method of effluent monitors.
In the event that grab samples were not employed, the WRGM would have been accessed for data.
While the inoperable WRGM would not have indicated properly at that time, the licensee stated that attention would have been drawn to the inoperabilty by the fact that the PIGs would have been indicating true vent activity.
The inspector agreed with this assessment.
While reviewing the EPIP, the inspector noted that worksheet B2, provided for recording data from Unit 2 effluent monitors in the event grab samples were not employed, contained a typographical error which entitled the sheet as
"Release Rate Worksheet Bl" and
"Unit 1 Effluent Monitors."
The inspector notified the Chemistry Supervisor of the error, who stated that it would be correcte The inspector concluded that this event represented a violation of TS LCO 3.3.3. 1, Table 3.3.6, item 2.c.ii, which requires an operable plant vent high range monitor in modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, or the initiation of a preplanned alternate method of monitoring the noted parameter.
Although the inoperability of the WRGM also affected the low range detection capability of the instrument, the TS-required monitoring of this parameter was accomplished through the use of the PIGs, which monitor the parameter over the range specified in TS Table 3.3.6, item 2.c.i.
Due to the minor safety significance of this violation, the fact that the licensee identified the violation, and the licensee's prompt corrective actions, this violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and/or correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The failure to satisfy TS LCO 3.3.3. 1 is identified as NCV 50-389/94-14-02, Inoperable WRGM Due to Maintenance Error.
In conclusion, operations during the period continued to be performed well.
Operator response to the Unit 1 trip was considered good.
The
.licensee's identification and treatment of the issue of Unit 2 WRGM inoperability was thorough and resulted in an NCV.
4.
Maintenance and Surveillance (62703, 61726)
a
~
Maintenance Observations Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to. ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
(1)
PWO 62/0376 - Erect Scaffolding to Support Repair/Relamping of Lighting Fixtures in EDG Building The inspector observed portions of the construction of scaffolding, installed to support lighting fixture replacement and heat detector testing in the 2B EDG room.
The construction was accomplished in accordance with AP 0010724, Rev.
5,
"Use of Scaffolds, Ladders, Boatswain's Chair and Manbaskets,"
which was available at the work site.
The inspector noted that applicable procedural requirements, including vertical and horizontal member spacing, diagonal member use and the placement of a
"Do Not Use" tag during construction, were
(2)
satisfied.
Additionally, the crew performing the work was noted to employ good industrial safety practices.
PWO 62/0380
- 2B EDG Diesel-Powered Starting Air Compressor This PWO was initiated when operators found that the starting handcrank for the backup starting air compressor engine could not be turned while attempting a monthly surveillance test.
The PWO directed that a troubleshooting effort be undertaken to correct the condition.
In reviewing the work package, the inspector found that the journeyman's notes from the previous shift were well-written and provided a logical basis for subsequent work.
Naintenance persohnel had determined that the engine's inability to turn was due to painting performed on the engine, which bonded the exposed flywheel to the casing.
When the paint was removed, the engine turned as designed.
The licensee is reviewing the issue of control of painting.
The inspector plans to follow the licensee's actions.
(3)
The 2B EDG remained operable during this period because the reserve starting air pressure in the air tanks was sufficient and was maintained by the electric motor driven compresor.
The inspector witnessed portions of the resetting of the engine and the installation and tensioning of V-belts, which coupled the engine to the compressor.
The inspector found the work to be performed satisfactorily.
PWO 62/9009 Valve Leaking By Seat The inspector observed the performance of this PWO, which resulted from the Plant Manager's Inspection List.
Previous inspection noted boron buildup on drain lines downstream of fuel pool cooling heat exchanger 2A shell side drain isolation valves V-4825 and V-4816.
Haintenance personnel investigated for possible seat leakage by removing quick-connect fittings, cleaning away boron deposits, and visually inspecting the drain lines.
Good radiological control work practices were employed.
No active leakage was identified and it was concluded that the noted boron buildup was most likely the result of water which remained in the lines following a previous use of the drain lines.
The inspector found the conclusion plausible.
b.
Surveillance Observations Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of TS compliance for reactor coolant chemistry, RWT conditions, containment pressure, control room ventilation, and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with
adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished properly, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following surveillance tests were observed:
~
1-1200051, Rev 14, Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration
~
2-0700050, Rev 35, Auxiliary Feedwater Periodic Test In summary, Maintenance and Surveillance activities observed during this period were performed well.
Good troubleshooting methodolgy was noted in the repair of the 2B EDG diesel starting air compressor motor.
5.
Engineering (37550)
Followup of Vendor Technical Manual Issues IR 50-335,389/94-13 described preliminary findings relating to the control of VTH revision and issuance.
The inspector continued to assess the licensee's programs in this regard during this inspection period.
(1)
FRG Approval of VTMs IR 94-13 described instances of VTMs being revised by the engineering organization and subsequently being rejected by the site (as a result of FRG review), resulting in a difference between the active revisions held by the two organizations.
Further, the design organization continued to issue revisions to VTHs which had been rejected by FRG review, such that 4 VTMs had multiple revisions in the FRG review process.
They were:
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8770-5811,
"Refueling Equipment Volume 2," Revs 6, 7, and
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8770-5954,
"Hake-up Water Treatment System,"
Revs 7 and
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2998-2870,
"Station Valves 2 1/2" 8 Larger,"
Revs 6 and
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2998-4508,
"Henry Pratt Butterfly Valves,"
Revs 6, 7, 8, and
The licensee explained that the cause for the issuance of multiple revisions was a lack of awareness of the status of VTMs submitted for FRG review.
The inspector was provided with a copy of correspondence from the St. Lucie Engineering Hanager, dated March 9,
1994, which directed that engineering not issue VTH revisions for those VTHs still in FRG review.
Additionally, Engineering management began inserting special cover pages in VTHs held in engineering, identifying those VTMs in FRG review, to prevent revisions from being implemented prior to site approval of the previous revisio Rejections of VTHs in FRG also affected the timliness of VTM issuance to the field.
At the close of the inspection period, VTHs either rejected by FRG or under FRG review included:
2 dating from 1989 3 dating from 1991 6 dating from 1992 9 dating from 1993 33 received in 1994 The licensee stated that one of the causes for a lack of timliness in VTH approval at the site involved FRG subcommittee reviews that resulted in bases for rejection which were outside of the scope of the revision being reviewed.
The licensee produced correspondence dated January 27, 1994, from the St. Lucie Engineering Manager to the site Maintenance Manager, documenting an agreement between the organizations that FRG subcommittee review comments would be limited to the scope of the revision submitted for FRG review.
The letter went on to describe how comments outside the scope of the revision would be handled.
(2)
Given the length of time that had passed for some VTHs between JPN approval and site approval, the inspector questioned the licensee as to how site manual holders were notified of JPN revisions which had not yet been approved for site use.
The inspector was informed that, in accordance with site gI 6-PR/PSL-l,
'-'Document Control,"
site VTH holders were informed of Plant Changes/Modifications (PC/Ms)
and Design Change Notices (DCNs) by transmittal sheets which informed VTH holders of impending changes.
The inspector reviewed randomly selected VTHs held by the site Procurement Engineering group for proper incorporation of such notices and found them to be properly incorporated.
Engineering Control of VTM Revision IR 93-13 described cases in which VTH revision numbers were issued twice, describing different changes with each issuance.
The inspector discussed this issue with members of the engineering staff, who explained that this had occurred as a result of VTH revision work sent to EBASCO in late 1993.
The licensee stated that, of the VTMs sent to EBASCO for revision, approximately 6 were misplaced after being returned to JPN.
During that period FPL Engineering revised 3 of the misplaced revisions and.issued them under the next sequential revision number without recognizing that the same revision number was used by EBASCO.
When the misplaced VTHs were found, they were issued, resulting in the duplication of VTH revision numbers.
In all cases, the errors were identified by site document control prior to issuance of the VTMs.
The licensee stated that measures had been implemented to more closely control VTH revision.
A flow chart was presented which described checks which were made to ensure that revision numbers were correctly assigned
and that subsequent revisions were not issued for VTHs in FRG review.
The inspector questioned the degree to which the process was formalized, and it was explained that, while the process was in conformance with the requirements of JPN-gI 6.4,
"Control of Vendor Manuals," the process described on the flow chart was not fully proceduralized.
The licensee subsequently reported that a decision had been made to formalize the process and that a procedure was being prepared to that effect.
Prior to the conclusion of the inspection period, the inspector received a copy of PEG-ll, Rev 0, "St. Lucie Nuclear Plants Working Instructions for the VTM/Doc Pac Update Program."
The inspector reviewed the procedure and found that it appeared adequate to prevent problems similar to those described above.
In conclusion, the inspector found that the licensee has taken positive action to address identified problems in VTH revision control.
While a lack of timely issuance of some VTHs was identified, these appeared to be isolated occurrences, rather than indicative of programmatic deficiencies.
The inspector also noted that management had directed appropriate attention to areas of the program in which difficulties were experienced.
Within the scope to the VTH program review, no conditions adverse to safety were identified.
6.
Plant Support (71750)
a ~
Fire Protection During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely examined facets of the Fire Protection Program.
During specific activity such as large scale test of fire protection systems, exercises, extensive repair or drills, the inspectors would observe.
Normally the inspectors would review transient fire loads, flammable materials storage, housekeeping, control hazardous chemicals, ignition source/fire risk reduction efforts, fire protection training, fire protection system surveillance program, fire barriers, fire brigade qualifications, and gA reviews of the program.
The inspector witnessed an operability test of heat detector 22B6 in the 2B EDG room.
The test was performed in accordance with OP I-1800058, Semi-Annual Testing of "X" Type Heat Detection Instrumentation, Rev.
5.
The detector was a Honeywell non-reusable type and its output was indicated on a local area panel and in the control room.
The test was performed by placing a heat lamp in proximity to the detector to induce an alarm.
Following the test, the detector was replaced.
The test was performed satisfactorily, with appropriate local and control room alarms being received.
Good communications were noted between the personnel performing the test and the control roo b.
Physical Protection The inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented as evidenced by:
proper display of picture badges; searching of packages and personnel at the plant entrance; and vital area portals being locked and alarmed.
7.
Followup (Units 1 and 2)
(92701)
Followup of Unresolved Items
~
(Closed
- Units
& 2)
URI 94-13-01, VTM Control Weaknesses This item was opened during a cursory inspection of the licensee's engineering organization.
The details of followup inspections conducted during this inspection period are described in paragraph S.a, above.
This item is closed.
8.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 8, 1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1, above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary material is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number Status Description and Reference 335,389/94-14-01 open URI - Use of N/A by Operators in Procedural Steps, paragraph 3.b.
335,389/94-14-02 open NCV - Inoperable WRGM Due to Maintenance Error, paragraph 3.e.
335,389/94-13-01 closed URI -
VTM Control Weaknesses, paragraph 7.
9.
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms ADM CEA CCW DCN ECCS EDG EFPH EPIP ESF FCV FPL FRG HCV Administrative Procedure Control Element Assembly Component Cooling Water Design Change Notice Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator Effective Full Power Hours Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Engineered Safety Feature Flow Control Valve Florida Power and Light Company Facility Review Group Hydraulic Control Valve
IKC JPN LCO MSIV MV N/A NCV OP PIG PSL PWO QA QI RCB RWT T
Instrumentation and Control (Juno Beach)
Nuclear Engineering TS Limiting Condition for Operation Main Steam Isolation Valve Motorized Valve Not Applicable Non-Cited Violation (of NRC requirements)
Operating Procedure Particulate, Iodine, and Gaseous Plant St.
Lucie Plant Work Order Quality Assurance Quality Instruction Reactor Containment Building Refueling Water Tank Temperature Temporary Change Technical Specification
[NRC] Unresolved Item Volume Control Tank Vendor Technical Manual Wide Range Gas Monitor