IR 05000335/1994405
| ML17309A768 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1994 |
| From: | Gray E, Harris R, Peterson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17309A767 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-94-405, NUDOCS 9412280109 | |
| Download: ML17309A768 (12) | |
Text
Enclosure U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
DOCKET/REPORT NOS:
LICENSEE:
FACILITY:
DATES:
CONTRACTORS:
50-335/94-405 Florida Power 5 Light Miami, Florida, 33152 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit
St. Lucie, Florida October 31 through November 10, 1994 William Mingus, TET, Inc., Mobile, AL David Payne, Jr.,
TET, Inc., Mobile AL INSPECTORS:
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ns, ec nic)
n obile NDE Laboratory Division of Reactor Safety atric
.
et son, ec nician Mobile NDE Laboratory Division of Reactor Safety 1//> tracy
~ate APPROVED:
aro Gray, ie Mobile NDE Laboratory Division of Reactor Safety i'i/.-,]=; (.
Date Ins ection Summar
An announced inspection was conducted at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, October 31 through November 10, 1994, using the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Mobile Laboratory (ML) (Report No. 50-335/94-405).
The purpose of the NDE Mobile Laboratory is to perform independent nondestructive examinations and evaluations of components, systems and weldments to assure that examinations performed by the licensee are in compliance with codes, standards and regulatory requirements.
Areas Ins ected:
The inspection included performance of nondestructive examinations on safety-related piping welds, pipe hangers and supports selected from the pressurizer (PZR), safety injection (SI), feedwater (FW),
pressurizer surge line (RC),
and main steam (MS) systems.
Areas examined during this inspection included a review of the licensee's in-service inspection (ISI) program application.
Also included in this inspection, was a review of the flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) program for high energy piping, shutdown cooling valve replacement, and refueling water storage tank bottom repairs and inspection.
94i2280i09 94i2i4 PDR ADOCK OSOQ0335
Results:
Within the expected normal variations in examination techniques, the results of the NDE evaluations performed by the NRC essentially agreed with the results obtained by the licensee.
The NDE Mobile Laboratory inspection team concluded that the St. Lucie ISI and NDE programs are well planned, controlled, and executed, meeting the requirements of the ASME Code.
However, a weakness was identified in the ISI/NDE program application.
The weakness was the use of an ultrasonic test (UT) procedure for UT of cast stainless steel when the procedure stated that it was not applicable to cast stainless stee DETAILS 1.0 INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENTS NRC NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATIONAND QUALITY RECORDS REVIEW OF SAFETY-RELATED SYSTENS (73753)
During the period of October 31 through November 10, 1994, an on-site independent inspection was conducted at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit l.
The inspection was conducted by NRC inspectors and contractors.
The objective of this inspection was to assess the adequacy of the licensee's inservice inspection (ISI) program application and implementation of the flow, accelerated corrosion (FAC) program.
A part of the inspection was accomplished by duplicating a sample of those examinations performed by the licensee as required by regulations and codes, and evaluating the results.
The inspection included review of the ISI program and its implementation, the FAC program, and NDE procedures used to implement these programs.
Table 1 of this report contains a listing of the specific welds inspected.
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 10, Part 50.55a
{10 CFR 50.55a(g)),
requires ISI of safety-related equipment to identify, system degradation.
Before the licensee-generated program of inspection is'pplied to the equipment, it must be submitted for review and approval by the NRC under the authority embodied in 10 CFR 50.55a{g)(4){iv).
The required inspections are detailed in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
{ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, for Inservice Inspection per
CFR 50.55a(b).
The NRC inspection described in this report was made using the NDE Mobile Laboratory.
The NDE Mobile Laboratory is capable of independently performing the examinations required of the licensee.
This capability provides the NRC with unique insights into the licensee's inservice inspection program and on a sampling basis, the adequacy and accuracy of the licensee's specific NDE inspections.
In summary, the scope of this inspection was to review portions of the ISI/NDE program, assess its implementation and to perform NDE on portions of the plant systems.
Results:
The inspection team concluded the ISI program at St. Lucie is thoroughly planned, effectively controlled, well executed, and meets the requirements of the ASNE Code.
However, during the inspection, one weakness was noted in the area of not following or questioning procedural requirements as described in Section 2.0 of this report.
1.1 Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
Ins ection Han er Su ort 57050 Four (4) visual inspections of pipe hangers/supports, identified in Table 2, were performed per NRC Procedure NDE-10, Rev. 0, Appendix A and Appendix 8, in conjunction with St. Lucie Site Procedure NDE 4.3, Revision 5, quality control documents, and associated isometric/drawings.
The accessible surface area and adjacent base metal for a distance of one-half inch on either side of the weld was examined.
Component integrity was also examined, including proper installation, configuration or modification of supports, evidence of mechanical or structural damage, corrosion, bent, and missing or broken member Results:
The'nspections by the NRC closely matched those of the licensee.
The licensee documentation for their inspections was noted to be complete and comprehensive.
No deviations or findings were noted.
Visual Examination 57050 Twenty-four (24) safety-related pipe weldments and adjacent base material (1/2 inch on either side of the weld) were visually examined in accordance with NRC Procedure NDE-10, Rev. 0, Appendix A, St. Lucie Site Procedure NDE 4.3, Revision 5, quality control documents, isometrics and as-built drawings.
Examined during this inspection were ASME Class 1 and 2 pipe weldments selected from the FW, SI, PZR, and RC systems.
Inspections were performed specifically to identify any cracks or linear indications, gouges, leakage, arc strikes with craters, or corrosion, which may infringe upon the minimum pipe wall thickness and modifications to piping or components.
Mirrors, flashlights, and weld gauges were used to aid in the inspection and evaluation.
Table 1 lists the specific welds examined.
Results:
The welds that were visually examined had been ground for inservice inspection prior to surface and volumetric examinations.
The welding and overall workmanship inspected was acceptable.
The inspection reports. of the licensee reflected the as-found conditions.
No deviations were identified.
Li uid Penetrant Examination 57060 Nine (9) safety-related pipe weldments and adjacent base material (1/2 inch on either side of the weld) were examined using the visible dye, solvent removable method per NRC Procedure NDE-9, Rev.
1, in conjunction with St. Lucie Site Procedure NDE 3.3, Revision 6.
Included in this inspection were ASME Class 1 and 2 stainless steel pipe weldments selected from the RC and SI systems-.
Table 1 lists the specific welds examined.
Results:
The surface areas examined were adequately prepared for the examination.
The licensee recorded the same relevant indications noted by the NRC.
The licensees examinations matched closely to those of the NRC.
No rejectable indications were identified and no deviations were noted.
Ma netic Particle Examination 57070 Five (5) safety-related pipe weldments were examined with the magnetic particle method using NRC Procedure NDE-6, Rev.
1, St. Lucie Site Procedure NDE 2.2, Revision 5, associated quality control documents, and isometric drawings.
Included in this examination were ASME Class 2 pipe weldments from the FW system.
Table 1 lists the specific welds examined.
Results:
The surface areas examined were adequately prepared for the examinations.
There were no recordable indications found by the NRC.
The licensees examinations matched closely to those of the NR Ultrasonic Examination Hanual 57080 Nineteen (19) safety-related pipe weldments were ultrasonically examined using NRC Procedure NDE-1, Rev.
1, in conjunction with St. Lucie Site Procedures NDE 5. 1, Revision X, NDE 5.13, Revision X, NDE 5.4, Revision 10, and associated isometric drawings and ultrasonic inspection reports.
Included in this examination were ASHE Class 1 and 2 pipe weldments selected from the RC, PRZ, NS, SI, and FW systems.
To obtain the greatest possible repeatability in performing the NRC independent evaluations, the examinations were performed utilizing ultrasonic units, transducers and cables that matched, as closely as possible, those used by the licensee.
Distance amplitude correction (DAC)
curves were established utilizing St.
Lucie calibration standards.
Table
lists the specific welds examined.
Results:
The UT examinations of the licensee matched closely to those of the NRC.
The documentation of the examinations was mostly in the review cycle of the licensee but was noted to be accurate and comprehensive.
All of the data sheets had a St. Lucie UT Level III review, concurrence and acceptance.
No items of concern were noted except for the weakness discussed in Section 2.0 of this report.
1.2 NDE-Related Inspection Control of uglification and Certification of NDE Technicians.
The NDE support group reviews the qualification package for each NDE technician and signs the data package indicating acceptance to the contractor.
The NDE technician qualification packages are independently reviewed by the ASNE Code authorized nuclear inservice inspector (ANII).
The NRC inspector reviewed a sample of the NDE technician's data packages and the ANII log to confirm that qualification/certification documentation for NDE technicians performing examinations for the inservice inspection program is being properly reviewed.
Results:
The process of review and control of the qualifications and certifications for NDE technicians was found to be well controlled.
Refuelin Mater Tank RWT During this refueling outage, a weld repair was planned on the refueling water tank aluminum bottom due to a previous leak that had been stopped by a temporary repair.
A piece approximately 14" X 14" was cut and removed from the existing repair area of the RWT bottom.
The material that was cut out was evaluated by engineering and indicated that significant pitting had occurred to the underside of the tank bottom.
The planned repair process was revised to include coating the tank bottom to prevent leakage should underside pitting penetrate through the aluminum bottom material.
The repair process, as planned, includes an inspection of the oil sand under the removed plate, and an added filler plate level with the top of the existing bottom plate sealed to the tank bottom.
If added oil sand is necessary, the sand to be added will be manually mixed with the existing sand and oil layer beneath the removed section of the plate to create a relatively uniform sand-oil mixture in that
area.
A fillet welded aluminum plate is to be positioned over the cutout area.
Prior to any weld repair a surface area 6" on either side of the new weld will be cleaned with a 28X-30X solution of ammonium hydroxide.
The post-welding tests are a vacuum box.test leak on the weld in accordance with ASNE B96.1, and both visual and liquid penetrant examination of the welds.
At the conclusion of this inspection, the analysis of the existing condition and development of final repair plans were continuing.
The inspector had no concerns with the repair plans or the licensee process of evaluating the as-found conditions and revising the repair plans to suit these conditions.
Review of the welding procedure and welder qualification process indicated conformance to accepted practices for welding of aluminum.
Results:
The licensee was in the process of revising their pre-outage RWT repair plans to accommodate the finding of significant pitting on the underside of the aluminum tank bottom.
The inspector had no concern with the specifics of the repair or the licensee's process of evaluation of the RWT condition and development of corrective actions.
Valve 3480 re lacement and related radio ra h
The inspector reviewed modification package JAN-PULP-940492, which provides the details to implement the installation and inspection of Safety Injection System Valve V3480 and the supplemental revision JPN-PSLP-94-0671 to the modification package.
The revision to the modification package provides a design for a radiographic access port in the pup piece attachment to valve V3480.
The access port is a
reinforced sock-o-let fitting that will allow the radiographic examination (RT) of the field welds.
The inspector performed a visual examination of the welds and also evaluated the final radiographic film provided for the pup piece attachment identified as Weld Number SI-127-600.
A review of the radiographic film was done to verify a proper RT technique was used, including placement of penetrameters and film density to meet site procedures and the ASHE Code.
The licensee performed the radiographic and visual examination in accordance with the methods and acceptance criteria of Subsection NB-500 of the 1980, Winter 1980 Addenda of ASNE Section III.
The NRC had granted a
relief request from the hydrostatic test requirements; the relief request was based on
CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii), that allows for the use of alternatives to Code requirements.
Results:
The radiographs were found to be satisfactory to all aspects of the procedures and the Code.
The technicians had documented the exposure technique used, and were also on hand during this evaluation.
There were no recordable indications found by the NRC.
Steam Generator Tube Edd Current Examination ECT
Unit 1 has two steam generators with 8519 tubes, 3/4"diameter x 0.048" wall, in each.
The licensee is in the process of preparing to replace the steam generators in the next refuel outage due to the condition of the tubes and the high number of plugged tubes.
The ECT examination scope during the current outage is to examine 100X of the tubes full length with a bobbin coil, 100X with the rotating pancake (RPC) coil in the area of the tubesheet on the hot leg side and 3X sample of
the cold leg tube side in the tubesheet area with the RPC.
The inspector observed the process of. gathering ECT data, the secondary portion of data analysis, and resolution of differences between the primary and secondary analyses, being performed near the plant site.
The primary data analysis was being done by Zetec at Issaquah, WA, and was not observed during this.
inspection.
Significant preplanning for the ECT work had been done by the licensee and its ECT contractors as documented in the
"ECT Data Analysis Guidelines," dated November 1994, and the ECT Procedure NDE 1.3, Rev. 6, dated October 1994.
Results:
The inspector concluded the ECT examinations were being conducted in accordance with recommended industry practice under full control of the licensee using qualified procedures and personnel.
The areas of suspected tube degradation were examined by the appropriate ECT techniques.
No areas of concern were noted.
ualit Assurance Audits and Surveillances of NDE ISI:
The inspector interviewed the site quality manager, the quality supervisor responsible for audits/performance monitoring (Pmons)
and the gA auditor scheduled to do the majority of the performance monitoring (gA performance-based surveillances)
in the NDE/ISI area.
The portions of audit reports gAS-JPN-92-3, gAS-JPN-93-5, and OSL-OPS-93-39 applicable to NDE/ISI; the 1994 ISI Pmon (Surveillance)
schedule; and the audit checklist for the NDE Audit No.
Pmon 94-117 were reviewed.
Results:
The site and Juno Beach quality groups conduct meaningful performance-based audits and surveillances of the NDE/ISI activities.
Flow-Accelerated Corrosion 49001 Concerns regarding erosion/corrosion (E/C), currently known as flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC), in balance of plant piping systems has heightened as a result of the December 9,
1986, feedwater piping line rupture that occurred at Surry.
This event was the subject of NRC Information Notice 86-106, issued December 16, 1986, and its supplement issued on February 13, 1987.
The licensee's actions with regard to the detection of FAC in plant components were reviewed with respect to NUREG-1344,
"Erosion/
Corrosion Induced Pipe Wall Thinning in U. S. Nuclear Power Plants,"
dated April 1989, Generic Letter 89-08, issued Hay 2, 1989, and NUHARC Technical Subcommittee Working Group on Piping and Erosion/Corrosion Summary Report, dated June ll, 1987.
The St. Lucie Procedure NDE 5. 18, Rev. 3, for ultrasonic thickness measurements, provides the FAC program, plan and inspection summary.
This is applicable to components in the feedwater, extraction steam, cross-under piping, heater and main steam reheater drains.
The basis for the St. Lucie FAC program is the guidance of EPRI Report NP-3944, related EPRI reports, and industry input.
During this outage, 157 FAC inspections were scheduled by the licensee, including 20 large-bore pipe and 17 small-bore pipe
that were completed by the end of the NDE HL inspection and 21 baseline examinations.
The components were selected for examination using the EPRI CHECHATE program and engineering evaluations of susceptible systems.
The plant had replaced significant amount of pipe length with the less susceptible Cr-No material.
Procedure NDE 5.18 outlines the implementation of the FAC ultrasonic testing, including establishing NDE reference points for FAC examinations and analysis of data.
The areas reviewed by the NRC were selected from the heater drain discharge and reheater drain systems.
Reviewed were the basis for component selection, the ultrasonic inspection method, data evaluation and evaluation of areas found to have wall thinning.
In addition to this review, the NRC ultrasonically examined seven areas that had been previously examined by the licensee, included in this examination were the following component identifiers:
6HD104-P-8-20, 20HD44B-E-15-46, 20HD44-P-17-39, 6HD104-P-9-22, 6HD104-T-2-23M, 6HD104-T-2-23B and 6HD104-E-8-21.
Component 20HD44-P-17-39 had an area as examined by the licensee and confirmed by the NRC that required a St. Lucie action report (STAR).
The STAR identifies UT wall thickness readings below the erosion)corrosion program screening criteria for this component.
Since the heater drain system was out of service during the refueling outage for maintenance and repair, no immediate operability concern existed.
An evaluation was performed by the licensee to determine the acceptability of the component for continuing operation.
The results of this evaluation indicated that the allowable local wall thickness (0.412") is less than the expected worst case wall thickness (0.482") at the end of the next operating cycle.
Therefore, the pipe component 20HD44-P-17-39 is acceptable for another cycle.
The action summary is to "Use-as-is" and to reinspect the pipe component during the next refueling cycle.
An area on pipe component 20HD44-P-17-39 approximately 6" X
12" that has been calculated below minimum screening has a temporary repair (overlay).
As required, those areas identified being at or near the minimum thickness were recorded and reported to the licensee's engineering department for evaluation.
Results:
The thickness readings taken by the NRC closely matched those taken by the licensee.
The FAC program was found to be fully implemented.
2.0 REVIEW OF SITE NDE PROCEDURES AND MANUALS (73052)
St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant submitted their updated second interval inservice inspection program to the NRC on July 7, 1990.
The items and areas planned to be examined in this program are in accordance with the Plant Technical Specifications and the 1983 Edition of Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASHE) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code up to and including Winter, 1983 Addenda (83W83).
The following licensee procedures were reviewed for compliance to the applicable Code, standards and specification Florida Power 8 Li ht Procedures Procedure Title Number Rev.
Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure NDE 2.2,
NDE 3.3,
Eddy Current Examinations of NDE 1.3 Non Ferromagnetic Tubing Using Multi-Frequency Techniques MIZ-18/MIZ-30 Date 09/23/94 09/21/94 10/7/94 Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Similar and Dissimilar Metal welds in piping systems Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds Visual Examination, VT-3 Radiographic Interpretation NDE 5.11,
NDE 5.4,
NDE 4.3,
08/25/94 10/07/94 08/25/94 TS-9.3.3,
12/01/93 Results:
The procedures appeared complete and functional.
The following weakness was noted:
Procedure NDE 5.4, Rev.
10, "Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds
& < 2" Thick Vessels,"
Paragraph 2.3, states,
"This procedure is not applicable for cast stainless steel welds."
Contrary to the above, this procedure was used to ultrasonically examine welds RC-1-505-C and RC-108-.FW-2 on the pressurizer surge line.
The pipe and fitting material is cast stainless steel, SA-3561, CFH8.
The UT techniques identified in the procedure for flaw detection in cast stainless steel are those accepted by the nuclear industry and an applicable UT calibration test block was used as part of the examination such that the examination was found to be technically acceptable.
The noted weakness was the use of the UT procedure for an application where the procedure stated it was not applicable without questioning the statement or obtaining approval or procedural revision prior to doing the examination.
A weakness is a condition that without attention could develop into a safety or regulatory issue. It's presented'or licensee review and corrective action as applicable.
Nonconformance Report (NCR) No.94-001 identifies the above weakness and the initial intended disposition.
The licensee met after the exit meeting to discuss the issue.
This finding is considered closed by the NDE H.0 HANAGEHENT MEETINGS Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection at the entrance meeting on November 1,
1994.
The findings of the inspection were discussed with the licensee repre'sentatives during the course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the exit meeting on November 10, 1994.
The licensee did not indicate that proprietary information was involved within the scope of this inspection, nor did the licensee object to any of the findings of the inspection.
The following individuals were contacted:
Florida Power 8 Li ht
- H. Dryden
- F. Carr
- G. Alexander
- D, Denver
- C. Pell J.
Connor
- D. West
- R. Riha
- K. Hayhew
- H. Fagley
- K. Kortokrax
- K. Smart
- E. Anderson
- W. Bladow
- R.
Dawson
- C. Burton
- J.
Harchese D. Sager W. Heise J.
Faux Licensing Principal NDE, Level III Supervisor, Inspection, CSI Manager, Engineering Manager, Outage ISI/FAC Specialist Manager, Technical Plant Test and Code Supervisor ISI Senior Plant Supervisor Manager, Construction ISI Field Coordinator NDE Level III Senior Specialist, ISI guality Manager Licensing Manager Plant Manager Maintenance Manager Site Vice President ECT Level III ABB CE, ECT Supervisor U. S. Nuclear Re ulator Commission R. Prevatte H. Gareri J.
Blake SRI, St. Lucie Intern, NRR Chief, Materials Section, RII
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on ll/10/94.
The inspectors also contacted other administrative and technical personnel during the inspectio NRC NDE MOBILE LABORATORY TABLE No.
WELD ID. No.
OR ISO DRAWING SYS OR LIN CL RT PT NONDESTRUCTIVE TEST ACC REJ SHT.f I RC-109-SW-2 RC-1-505-C RC-108-FW-2 NS-28-I-SW-2 MS-52-FW-I SI-143-SW-2 SI-112-2-SW-2 SI-112-3-SW-1 SI-113-FW-1 SI-113-2-SW-2 SI-113-FW-3 PRZ-4-405 PRZ-3-415B PRZ-405-14 PRZ-3-415C PRZ-SV-B-IRS PRZ-RV-IRS PRZ-SV-C-IRS PRZ-SP-IRS BF-51-F W-1B BF-51-FW-2B BF-51-F W-3B SG-FW-NOZ-A SG-FW-NOZ-B RC
PRZ
PRZ
HS
HS
PRZ
PRZ
PRZ
PRZ
PRZ I
PRZ
PRZ
PRZ
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
NRC NDE NOBILE LABORATORY HANGER/SUPPORTS TABLE 2 IDENTIFICATION SPH-768 SPA-550 SPH-628 RC-5-471 SYS PRZ SPL SPL RC CL ACC REJ COMMENTS