IR 05000335/1994005
| ML17228A498 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1994 |
| From: | Elrod S, Johnson T, Mark Miller NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228A497 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-94-05, 50-335-94-5, 50-389-94-05, 50-389-94-5, NUDOCS 9403280210 | |
| Download: ML17228A498 (22) | |
Text
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,s UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report Nos.:
50-335/94-05 and 50-389/94-05 Licensee:
Florida Power
& Light Co 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16'nspection Conducted:
January 0 - February 26, 1994 Inspectors:
S.
A. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector D te Signed
M. S. Miller, esid t Inspector T.
P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, R.
P. Schin, Pro ect Engineer D
e S gned II" Da e Signed Dat Signed Approved by:
K. D.
Lan is, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations review, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, safety system inspection, review of special reports, review of nonroutine events, and followup of previous inspection findings.
Backshift inspection was performed on February 13, 16, 18, 19, and 22.
Results:
Plant Operations area:
Operations this period continued to be conducted in a safe and professional manner.
The unit 2 reactor shutdown was planned and performed well, with good support from Reactor Engineering and the Nuclear Fuels group (paragraph 3.b.l).
The licensee's actions in response to the mispositioning of a pressurizer auxiliary spray 9403280210 940317 PDR ADCICK 05000335 Q
isolation valve were timely in determination of root cause and corrective actions (paragraph 3.b.2).
One Non-Cited Violation was identified:
NCV 50-389/94-05-01, Hispositioned Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Isolati.on Valve, paragraph 3.b.2 Maintenance and Surveillance area:
Good coordination between maintenance, operations and health physics personnel was noted.
The Unit 2 reactor vessel head lift proceeded without incident (paragraph 5).
Engineering area:
Engineering support to operations was noted in the Unit 2 shutdown.
The creation of Nuclear Fuels guidelines for the shutdown indicated noteworthy involvement (paragraph 3.b. I).
Plant Support area:
Health physics support to, and control of, outage activities was strong.
A potentially nonconservative reduction in the level of
'ecurity applied to an area was noted (paragraph 3.d).
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie Persons Contacted REPORT-DETAILS
'icensee Employees D. Sager, St.
Lucie Plant Vice President
- C. Burton, St.
Lucie Plant General Manager K. Heffelfinger, Protection Services Supervisor H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor J. Scarola, Operations Manager R. Church, 'Independent Safety Engineering Group Chairman R. Dawson, Maintenance Manager W. Dean, Electrical Maintenance Department Head
- J. Dyer, Maintenance guality Control Supervisor W. Bladow, Site guality Manager H. Fagley, Construction Services Manager
.
P. Fincher,'raining Manager R. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor J. Holt, Plant Licensing Engineer J'.
Hosmer, Site Engineering Manager
- L. McLaughlin, Licensing Manager
- G. Madden, Plant Licensing Engineer A. Menocal, Mechanical Maintenance Department Head C. Pell, Site Services Manager L. Rogers, Instrument and Control Maintenance Department Head C. Scott, Outage Manager J,. Spodick, Operations Training Supervisor D. West, Technical Manager
- J.
West, Operations Supervisor
- W..White, Security Supervisor D. Wolf, Site Engineering Supervisor W. Parks, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Personnel S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, NRC Region II J. Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC Region II H. Berkow, Director, Project Directorate II-2, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. Miller, Resident Inspector R. Schin, Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region II T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, Turkey Point 3 5 4 J. Norris, Senior Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Plant Status and Activities a ~
Unit
b.
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
The unit ended the inspection period in day 45 of power operation since startup on January 10.
Unit 2 C.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 98 percent power, coasting down to the cycle 8 refueling outage..
On February 13, a unit shutdown was commenced and the unit was taken off-line at 0006 February 14 (see paragraph 3.b. 1).
During preparations for taking the pressurizer to solid water conditions and pressurizer cooldown, the licensee discovered a
mispositioned valve which had rendered auxiliary spray inoperable since Harch, 1993 (see paragraph 3.b.2).
After unisolating the subject valve, the cooldown progressed without incident.
On February 19, the unit was placed in reduced inventory to support outage work (see paragraph 3.b.3).
NRC Activity On February 1-3, Jan Norr'is, Senior Project Manager, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, visited the site.
His activities included an inspection of safety evaluations performed per
CFR 50.59.
Results are reported in paragraph 7.
E On February 7-11, Fred Wright, Senior Radiation Specialist, NRC Region II, and other NRC inspectors were on sight for assessment of the licensee's emergency drill conducted on February 9.
The results of that inspection are documented in inspection report 50-335,389/94-04.
On Februray 8 and 9, Kerry D. Landis, the NRC Region II Section Chief with responsibility for the St.
Lucie Plant, visited the site.
His activities included discussions with licensee management on recent activities and an overview of resident office activities.
During this period, Stewart Ebneter, Regional Administrator, NRC Region II; J. Philip Stohr, Director, Division of Radiological Safety and Safeguards, NRC Region II; and Herbert Berkow,'irector, NRR Project Directorate II-2, NRC office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, were on site for the NRC presentation of the St. Lucie SALP report on February 17.
A meeting summary for the SALP presentation was issued on February 22, 1994.
Following the SALP presentation on February 17, NRC management met with local officials.
Matters discussed included the importance of
emergency preparedness in the new SALP format and federal prioritization of evacuation routes for road funding.
Meeting attendees are listed in the Attachment to this inspection report.
3.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
a.
Plant Tours The inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspector s looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment. caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The frequency of plant tours and control room visits by site management was noted to be adequate.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF, ECCS, and support systems.
Valve, breaker, and switch lineups as well as equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
The following accessible-area ESF system and area walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory:
~
Unit 2 Component Cooling Mater
~
Unit 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System During routine compressed gas Operators were from falling.
equipment, but location as an December, 1993 tours, the inspectors observed an unsecured cylinder by the entrance into the Unit'I RAB.
notified, and they promptly restrained the cylinder This unsecured cylinder presented no hazard to safety was a potential personnel hazard.
It was in the same unsecured cylinder observed by the inspectors in (IR 50-335,389-93-24 paragraph 3.a).
b.
Plant Operations Review The inspectors periodically reviewed shift,logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs, and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
They observed and evaluated control room staffing, control room access, and
operator performance during routine operations.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections to ensure that operations and security performance remained at acceptable levels.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
Control room annunciator status was verified.
Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed.
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagout:
~
2-94-02-183 ICW Pump 2A The inspectors reviewed quality assurance activities and findings concerning control room operations to determine if the objectives were being met.
The following activities were reviewed:
~
guality Assurance Audit gSL-OPS-93-38
~
guality Assurance Audit gSL-OPS-93-34
~
guality Assurance Audit gSL-OPS-93-33 The inspector found that the audits detailed in these reports to be representative of a cross section of operational activities.
Areas audited included surveillance activities, Administrative controls of valves, locks and switches, chemistry activities, operating shift activities, jumper/lifted leads control, cleanliness, fire brigade performance, new fuel receipt and records control.
No major findings involving operations activities were identified.
(1)
Refueling Shutdown
- Unit 2 The inspector observed portions of the unit shutdown which commenced on February 13.
The inspector noted that, in addition to operations personnel, representatives from Reactor Engineering and the Juno Nuclear Fuels group were present for the evolution.
's a result of an ASI-related reactor trip experienced during the last refueling outage shutdown (see IR 92-07), the licensee developed a plan for reactivity management for the current shutdown.
The plan involved the use of all CEAs, inserted from their upper electrical limits (typically 136") to their TS-defined fully withdrawn values of 129", to aid in the control of ASI and to maintain the worth of regulating groups during the shutdown.
The inspector noted that the Nuclear Fuels group had prepared simulations for the shutdown and had synthesized their result into guidelines for operators.
The guidelines were promulgated by Night Order.
The inspector found the shutdown to be well controlled and executed.
Good communications between operators and support personnel was note (2)
The inspector considered the approach to reactivity management for the shutdown and the Nuclear Fuels guideline development as an innovative solution to the ASI difficulties experienced in the past.
Nuclear Fuels'nvolvement in the shutdown indicated good coordination across organizational lines.
Hispositioned Auxiliary Spray Isolation Val.ve - Unit 2 On February 17, operators attempting to take the pressurizer solid through the use 'of auxiliary pressurizer spray found that RCS pressure did not respond as expected to manual oper ation of the auxiliary spray valves.
Upon investigation, the operators discovered that the pressurizer auxiliary spray manual isolation valve, V2483, was locked closed.
They opened the valve and restored auxiliary spray.
V2483 is located inside the pressurizer cubicle in containment.
It provides isolation between the pressurizer and the two parallel auxiliary spray valves which are operated from the control room.
Operating procedures required V2483 to be locked open during Unit 2 operation.=
During the time it had been improperly locked closed, Unit 2 had operated at power with the auxiliary spray inoperative.
Auxiliary spray is safety-related and is not addressed by TS.
It provides a method of pressure control when normal spray is inoperative (e.g.
RCPs secured)
by directing safety-related charging flow to the pressurizer steam space.
Use of auxiliary spray would facilitate a timely RCS depressurization and cooldown to a condition of cold shutdown on shutdown cooling.
The licensee conducted an investigation of the circumstances and found that the valve had been locked closed on Harch 13, 1993, as part of a clearance supporting pressurizer instrument nozzle maintenance.
On Harch 27, 1993, the valve was released from the clearance and was initialed to have been locked open.
Additionally, the licensee's valve lineup following maintenance indicated that the valve had been verified locked open, as had a quarterly surveillance last performed in Harch, 1993 (no additional surveillance verifications were performed on the valve, as it was located in a high radiation/high temperature location during plant operations).
The licensee thus conservatively concluded that the valve had been mispositioned since Harch 27, 1993.
Unit 2 UFSAR, section 5.4.7.5, states that the reactor may be taken from normal operation to cold shutdown conditions using only safety-grade equipment, and that redundancy exists such that the cooldown may proceed assuming a single failure.
This section also includes options for the depressurization of the primary plant for conditions of no offsite power and the loss of one emergency power train.
These safety-related options include:
Charging pumps and auxiliary spray powered from the operable emergency power train Depressurization by alternately chargi.ng (to raise pressurizer level)
and cooldown with atmospheric dump valves (to lower pressurizer level)
Use of the PORVs in conjunction with charging flow to reduce primary pressure.
The mispositioning of V2483 rendered the first of these options inoperative from the time it was mispositioned.
The inspector reviewed 2-EOP-15,
"Functional Recovery,"
and found that the second option was embodied in section 5.5,
"RCS Pressure Control," in "Success Path 4:
Steam Generator Heat Removal."
In this procedure, steaming the steam generators was employed as a means to reduce RCS pressure, assuming natural circulation flow conditions were observed.
Step 2 of this success path required that pressurizer level be maintained between 10 and
percent during this evolution.
Although the charging pumps were not specified as the means of maintaining level, their use was later directed in subsequent steps to counteract lowered pressurizer level during RCP restart and to eliminate vessel head voiding.
Additionally, the charging pumps represented the normal method of inventory addition for pressurizer level maintenance.
The third option remained a viable alternative while V2483 was
'ispositioned, as the PORVs were safety grade and were powered from separate emergency power sources.
Further, this method of depressurization was explicitly described in 2-EOP-15, section 5.5,
"Success Path 5:
PORVs" The licensee's operating procedures also addressed alternative methods of RCS depressurization using non-safety equipment.
These included using charging and letdown (non-safety),
or using RCPs (non-safety)
and normal pressurizer spray.
The licensee promptly submitted a voluntary LER (LER 389/94-01)
as a result of this event.
In addition, the licensee counseled and disciplined the non-licensed operators involved with the valve mispositioning, determined by probabilistic risk analysis that there was no significant risk increase with the loss of auxiliary spray, determined that Unit 1 could not be similarly affected since it has no similar valve, performed a walkdown of accessible Unit 1 valves per the quarterly surveillance for valve position verification, and will complete a walkdown of Unit 2 valves before restart.
The inspector concluded that the ability to perform a cooldown from normal operating conditions using redundant, safety grade equipment was not lost due to the mispositioning of V2483.
Further, the inspector found that the licensee's investigation was thorough and initial corrective actions were adequate.
The
mispositioning of V2483 was a violation of NRC requirements and licensee procedures.
This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
This is a closed Non-Cited Violation, NCV 50-389/94-05-01, Mispositioned Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Isolation Valve.
(3)
Reduced Inventory Operations
- Unit 2 Unit 2 entered a reduced RCS inventory condition to support the Unit 2 refueling outage on February 19, 1994.
The following items were observed on February 18/19 in preparation for this evolution:
~
Containment Closure Capability - Instructions were issued, to accomplish this; men and tools were on station.
A dry run was performed prior to reducing water level.
~
RCS Temperature Indication - Four normal mode 1 CETs were available for indication (two required per procedure).
~
RCS Level Indication - Independent RCS wide and narrow range level instruments, which indicate in the. control room, were operable.
An additional Tygon tube loop level in the containment was manned for mid-loop operations and while changing levels.
The inspector witnessed portions of the venting of the tygon tube indicator and verified its path to be free of obvious kinks.
RCS Level Perturbations
- Applicable plant procedures required that, when RCS level is altered, additional operational controls were invoked.
RCS Inventory Volume Addition Capability - Applicable plant procedures required that two LPSI pumps be available and that either a HPSI pump or a charging pump be available as a backup.
The inspector found that two LPSI pumps were in operation (shutdown cooling mode)
and that the B HPSI and the B Charging pumps were both available as backup.
RCS Nozzle Dams - Due the early stage of the outage, the nozzle dams were not installed.
Vital Electrical Bus Availability - Operations would not release busses or alternate power sources for work during evolution and work being conducted in the switchyard is prohibited by procedure.
One EDG was available, as required by TSs, and the second EDG was operative, although it-was declared inoperable per TS due to low FO levels resulting from the recent integrated ESF testin C.
~
Pressurizer Vent Path - The inspector verified that the manway atop the pressurizer had been removed to provide a
vent path.
A screened barrier was installed to prevent personnel or debris entry.
Additionally, operators verified that the reactor had been subcritical for a minimum of 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> and that two containment fan coolers were in operation, as required by procedure.
The-inspector found operator knowledge of the upcoming evolution to be good.
In conclusion, operations this period continued to be conducted in a safe and professional manner.
The Unit 2 reactor shutdown was planned and performed well, with good support from Reactor Engineering and the Nuclear Fuels group.
The licensee's actions in response to the mispositioning of a pressurizer auxiliary spray isolation valve were timely in determination of root cause and corrective actions.
The submittal of a voluntary LER was a
noteworthy initiative.
Technical Specification Compliance Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified.
This included the review of selected surveillance test results.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, and switch positions, and by review of completed logs "and records.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed for abnormalities.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
The inspectors verified that related plant procedures in use were adequate, complete, and included the most recent revisions.
d.
Physical Protection The inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented as evidenced by:
proper display of picture badges; searching of packages and personnel at the plant entrance; and vital area portals being locked and alarmed.
While touring the RCA on February 16, the inspectors noted that a
normally locked door to an equipment area was open without a guard posted.
The equipment in the subject area was required to be operable per TS, and was the only TS-operable train for the function it performed.
The licensee had relaxed access controls to the area in question, as well as other normally locked areas, as a function of the refueling outage.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's safeguards plans and applicable implementing procedures and found that the licensee's actions were performed in accordance with these documents,
f
As the licensee's actions in this issue conformed to their approved safeguards plan, the inspector concluded that a programmatic deficiency did not exist.
However, the inspector referred the details of the occurrence to NRC regional personnel for consideration as a generic concern.
4.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of TS compliance for reactor coolant chemistry, RWT conditions, containment pressure, control room ventilation, and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal
. and restoration of the affected components were accomplished properly, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
Portions of the following surveillance tests were observed:
a.
OP 2-0400050, Periodic Test of the Engineered Safety Features The Periodic Test of the Engineered Safety Features was performed the week of February 14.
Specifically, the inspectors observed the performance of:
Section 8.2,
"Loss of Offsite Power/Safeguards Actuation with DGs in Standby Condition" Section 8.5,
"Diesel Generator 453 KW Load Rejection Test Section 8.9,
"Synchronize both DGs to the Grid."
Section 8. 10,
"Emergency Boration, Gravity-Feed Valve Test" The inspectors found the observed tests to be characterized by professional conduct on the part of operators and data takers.
Pre-test briefings were appropriate to the scope of the tests, and included input from both the ANPS conducting -the test and plant management.
Due to the broad scope of the tests, extensive coordination was required between operators, data takers, and support personnel.
Control of coordination functions was well maintained in the control room, with good communications between operators and test engineers.
Control room access
'and noise levels were also well controlled.
With respect to the SIAS/CSAS/CIS/LOOP integrated ESF test (section 8.2), plant equipment performed as designed, with the following exceptions:
F
~
The 2BB Battery Charger did not load onto the emergency bus during the integrated SIAS/CSAS/CIS/LOOP portion of the test.
During a subsequent LOOP test, the component loaded onto the
bus as designed.
The licensee is continuing to investigate the failure and the inspectors will follow the licensee's actions.
~
The 2B Charging Pump loaded onto the emergency bus immediately, as opposed to loading with components on the 5 second load block as per the design.
The licensee has hypothesized that the cause may be that the SIAS signal caused the pump to sequence onto the bus before the LOOP and that a malfunctioning relay may have prevented load shed, thus resulting in immediate pump restart upon reenergization of the emergency buses.
The inspectors will follow the licensee's actions to determine root cause for this occurrence.
HFIV HCV-09-IA was not included in the test, as the valve failed to reopen following the
'A HSIS actuation test.
The licensee was troubleshooting the failure at the end of the inspection period, and the valve is to be retested prior to resumption of operations.
The inspectors= will follow the licensee.'s actions.
b.
OP 1-0110050, Control Element Assembly Periodic Exercise This test was performed satisfactorily on February 24.
However, the inspector noted a procedural human factors weakness involving unclear procedural steps and notes in the return-to-normal portion of the procedure.
Operators showed appropriate caution in interpreting the procedure, and the licensee was preparing a
procedure revision at the close of the inspection period.
c.
OP 2-0700028, Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Hechanical and Electrical Overspeed Trip Tests d.
OP 2-0700050, Auxiliary Feedwater Periodic Test e.
GMP H-0705, Hain Steam Safety Valve Haintenance and Setpressure Testing The inspectors noted very good licensee control and coordination of OP 2-0700028, OP 2-0700050, and GHP H-0705.
During the latter, the licensee tested the setpressure of all 16 of the Unit 2 main steam safety valves.
The as-found setpressure for eight of the 16 valves did not meet the test acceptance criteria (each lifted at too high a
pressure).
After retesting and adjustment, the as-left setpressures were all within the specified ranges.
The inspectors will review the licensee's NCR and safety analysis of these test results.
In conclusion, licensee performance of surveillances this period showed good planning and coordination.
The success of the integrated ESF testing was noteworthy in both technical and command-and-control areas.
One procedural weakness was identified (involving CEA exercising),
and the licensee promptly took steps to improve the subject procedur,
Haintenance Observation (62703)
'
Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were.
conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
The inspector observed the following overhaul activity during the ongoing Unit 2 outage:
Reactor Vessel Head Lift
'
~
The inspector was present for the lift of the unit 2 reactor vessel head to support refueling.
Good coordination between maintenance, operations, and health physics personnel was noted.
The lift proceeded without incident.
Fire Protection Review (64704)
During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely examined facets of the Fire Protection Program.
During specific activity such as large scale test of fire protection systems, exercises, extensive repair or drills, the inspectors would observe.
Normally the inspectors would review transient fire loads, flammable materials storage, housekeeping, control hazardous chemicals, ignition source/fire risk reduction efforts, fire protection training, fire protection system surveillance program, fire barriers, fire brigade qualifications, and gA reviews of the program.
Review of 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations (37001)
The NRC Senior Project Hanager for St.
Lucie
& 2 performed an audit of several of PCHs reported by the licensee to the NRC by letter dated December 13, 1993.
The following PCHs were-audited:
PCH Number Title 055-193 255-192 254-192 219-192 450-191 252-191 Auto Stop RAB Hain Exhaust Fan HVE-10A/B SIAS Shutdown Cooling Relief Valve Setpoint Pressure Increase MOV Thrust Values
& Actuator Hodifications S/G Slowdown Containment Isolation Valve Replacement Diesel Generator Torsional Isolator Containment Spray Vent Valve Installation
The audit fo'und the PCHs files complete and comprehensive.
The Safety Evaluations were well written and followed "Guidance for Performing
CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations."
The audit found no violations or deviations.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 25, 1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary material is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number Status Descri tion and Reference 389/94-05-01 closed NCV -
Hispositioned Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Isolation, Valve, paragraph 3.b.2 Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms AC ANPS ASI ATTN CEA CET CFR CIS CSAS DC ECCS EDG EOP ESF FO HPSI ICW KW LCO LER LOOP LPSI HFIV HSIS NCR OP PCH PORV RAB RCS RWT SALP Alternating Current Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor Axial Shape Index Attention Control Element Assembly Core Exit Thermocouple Code of Federal.Regulations Containment Isolation Signal Containment Spray Actuation Signal Direct Current Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Operating Procedure Engineered Safety Feature Fuel Oil High Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Intake Cooling Water Ki,loWatt(s)
TS Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Loss of Offsite Power Low Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Hain Feed Isolation Valve Hain Steam Isolation Signal Non Conformance Report Operating Procedure Plant Change/Hodification Power Operated Relief Valve Reactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Coolant System Refueling Water Tank Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
SIAS Safety Injection Actuation System TS Technical Specification(s)
UFSAR Updated Final. Safety Analysis Report
ATTACHMENT Attendance List NRC MEETING WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS Febr uary 17, 1994 Nuclear Re ulator Commission:
S.
D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)
J.
P. Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, RII N.
N. Berkow, Director, Project Directorate 11-2, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation R.
P. Schin, Project Engineer.,
Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII H. S. Hiller, Resident Inspector
- St. Lucie, DRP, RII K. H. Clark, Public Affairs Officer, Office of the Administrator, RII l
Local Officials:
D.'Daniels, Emergency Management Coordinator, St. Lucie County J.
Kammel, Radiological Emergency Planning Administrator, Hartin County K. Holman, Public Safety, Hartin County N. HcCollum, Radiological Emergency Planning, Indian River =County R. Hinsky, Mayor, Port St. Lucie Licensee:
G. J. Boissy, Director
- Nuclear Services, FPL H. Gilmore, Emergency Preparedness, FPL R. Walker, Emergency Preparedness, St.
Lucie