IR 05000335/1994001
| ML17228A452 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1994 |
| From: | Elrod S, Landis K, Mark Miller NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228A451 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-94-01, 50-335-94-1, 50-389-94-01, 50-389-94-1, NUDOCS 9402280111 | |
| Download: ML17228A452 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30m.0199 Report Nos.:
50-335/94-01 and 50-389/94-01 Licensee:
Florida Power
& Light Co
'9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
Inspection Conducted:
)
Inspectors:
S.
.
E rod,
'or R~s'nt Inspector rJ 4-H. -S. Hiller si ent In ector Approved by:
K. D. Landis, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects T
/
D te Signe c
D te Soigne/
Date Si ned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted onsite in the areas of plant operations review, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, safety system inspection, and review of nonroutine events.
Results:
Backshift inspection was performed on January 2, 5, 9, and 15.
Plant operations area (paragraph 3):
Operators were alert in tripping unit 1 in response to a loss of the 1B main feed pump (paragraph 3.b.2).
The core physics curves in use resulted in a failure to achieve criticality during restart.
Upon the failure to achieve criticality, operators took the appropriate immediate action returning the reactor plant to Mode 3 (para 3.b.4).
Maintenance and Surveillance area (paragraphs 4 and 5):
Surveillances continued to be performed in a professional manner.
Operations, Maintenance and Technical Staff personnel response to lA emergency diesel generator speed oscillations was timely and appropriate.
Observed maintenance activities were performed well.
9402280111 940218 PDR ADOCK 05000335 PDR
Engineering area:
Reactor Engineering support to Operations dur'ing the Unit I restart efforts was good.
The self-assessment performed in the wake of the failure to achieve criticality was thorough and technically sound (paragaphs 3.b.4).
Engineering support in response to the inadvertent load shed event and emergency diesel generator speed oscillations was good (paragraph 3.b.5).
Plant Support area:
Licensee activities in the areas of Health Physics, Security, and housekeeping continue to be carried out in a professional manner.
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- D. Sager, St.
Lucie Plant Vice, President
- C. Burton, St.
Lucie Plant General Manager K. Heffelfinger, Protection Services Supervisor H. Buchanan, Health Physics. Supervisor J. Scarola, Operations Manager
- R. Church, Independent Safety Engineering Group Chai R.
Dawson, Maintenance Manager W. Dean, Electrical Maintenance Department Head J.
Dyer, Maintenance guality Control Supervisor
- W. Bladow, Site guality Manager H. Fagley, Construction Services Manager P. Fincher, Training Manager R. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor J. Holt, Plant Licensing Engineer J.
Hosmer, Site Engineering Manager
- L. McLaughlin, Licensing Manager G. Madden, Plant Licensing Engineer A. Menocal, Mechanical Maintenance Department Head
- C. Pell, Site Services Manager L. Rogers, Instrument and Control Maintenance Depart C. Scott, Outage Manager J. Spodick, Operations Training Supervisor D. West, Technical Manager
- J.
West, Operations Supervisor W. White, Security Supervisor D. Wolf, Site Engineering Supervisor W. Parks, Reactor Engineering Supervisor rman ment Head Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Personnel S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. Miller, Resident Inspector
- R. Schin, Project Engineer, USNRC Region II J. Jaudon, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, USNRC Region II F.
Young, USNRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation K. Landis, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, USNRC Region II
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Plant Status and Activities a
~
Unit
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power.
On January 9, the unit was manually tripped in response to a loss of the 1B MFWP (see paragraph 3.b.2).
Safety systems responded normally, however difficulties were encountered with both 1A and 1B MFWP operation.
As a result, RCS temperature was maintained with the use of the 1A and 1B AFPs.
b.
C.
On January 10, a reactor startup was commenced, however criticality was not achieved upon reaching an ARO condition (see paragraph 3.b.3).
The unit was returned to Mode 3 and the licensee discovered that the core physics curves in use for the startup were inadequate to correctly predict criticality for the existing time in core life.
The error was conservative.
'\\
At 4:25 p.m.
on January 10, a reactor startup was commenced employing improved core physics data, and criticality was achieved at 6: 16 p.
m.
(see paragraph 3.b.4).
The balance of the startup occurred normally, and the unit was tied to the grid at 10:00 p.m.
Unit 2 Unit 2 began the 'inspection period at 100% and operated without major load changes for the entirety. of the inspection period.
NRC Activity Johns Jaudon, Deputy Director of the Division of Reactor Safety, NRC Region II, visited the site on January 5 and 6.
His activities included a site tour, discussions with licensee management, and an overview of-resident office activities and issues.
F. I. 'Young, of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safeguards Branch, toured the site on January 13 with representatives of the U.S.
Army Corp of Engineers.
The tour was one of several designed to study possible implementation schemes of the vehicle bomb rule.
Kerry D. Landis, the NRC Region II Section Chief with responsibility for the St.
Lucie Plant, visited the site on January 25.
His activities included discussions with licensee management on recent activities and an overview of resident office activities.
3.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
'a ~
Plant Tours The inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was
properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The frequency of plant tours and control room visits by site management was noted to be adequate.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF, ECCS, and support systems.
Valve, breaker, and switch lineups as well as equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
The following accessible-area ESF system and area walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment materi'al conditions were satisfactory:
1)
Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System 2)
Unit 2 Shield Building Ventilation System 3)
Unit 2 HPSI Train B
4)
Unit 2 LPSI Train B
5)
Unit 2 CS Train B
b.
Plant Operations Review I)
The inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs, and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
Th'ey observed and evaluated control room staffing, control room access, and operator performance during routine operations.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections to ensure that operations and security performance remained at acceptable levels.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
Control room annunciator status was verified.
Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed.
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagout (clearance):
~
2-94-01-009 2A Charging Pump Isolation for Maintenance
Unit 1 Hanual Trip At 7:40 p.m.
on January 9, unit 1 operators manually tripped the reactor when the 1B Hain Feed Pump tripped, leaving the unit with inadequate feedwater flow. Safety-related equipment operated properly.
The resident inspectors responded to the trip and confirmed satisfactory unit operation.
The licensee noted that the SOER recorded a
HFP low flow trip, but was unable to determine that a low flow condition had been present.
The low flow trip circuit involved the use of a flow switch and a time delay relay (10 seconds)
to cause a
pump trip.
As no obvious cause for a low flow condition could be identified (e.g.,
no condensate pump trip), the licensee suspected that an IKC problem may have been the cause of the HFP trip.
The licensee inspected and tested the flow switch and relay in question, but could not determine that they were the cause of the HFP trip.
As a precautionary measure, the licensee replaced the subject components and performed an "autopsy" on the removed componenets.
No failure mechanism was identified.
The licensee also performed continuity and ground checks of the 1B HFP circuit breaker and its control circuitry and monitored low flow trip circuitry during 1B HFP runs prior to unit restart.
These efforts did not reveal possible causes for the pump trip.
The inspectors concluded that operators were alert in responding to the HFP loss.
Additionally, the inspectors concluded that the licensee performed an adequate post-trip review.
Unit 1 Failure to Achieve Criticality On January 10, operators commenced a reactor startup of Unit 1.
Applicable procedures in effect at the time were:
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OP 1-0030122, revision 50,
"Reactor Startup"
~
OP 1-0030126, revision 13,
"Estimated Critical Conditions and Inverse Count Rate Ratio" The ECC woyksheet prepared for the startup determined the required boron concentration for a critical CEA position of 60 inches on *regulating group 7.
OP.1-0030126 specifies a 500 pcm reactivity tolerance for'criticality, and the CEA position selected ensured that an ARO condition would be experienced prior to exceeding 500 pcm above the estimated critical CEA position.
The reactor failed to achieve criticality at the estimated critical CEA position and, upon reaching ARO conditions, the reactor remained subcriti'cal.
Upon the failure I'
to achieve criticality, operators took the appropriate immediate action and returned the reactor plant to Node 3.
~
The licensee concluded that the failure to achieve criticality was the result of performing the ECC worksheet with core physics curves which were soon to be revised due to core burnup.
The curves in effect for the startup were calc'ulated based upon 200 EFPH core burnup.
The core burnup at the time of the ECC was 4601 EFPH.
The Reactor 'Engineering Supervisor
.
stated that it had been the practice of reactor engineering to issue physics curves at intervals of 200, 5000, 9000 and 11467 EFPH.
This periodicity was considered conservative from the standpoint of shutdown margin calculations, as core reactivity
'would be conservatively bounded by the curves.
Reactor Engineering subsequently submitted 5000 EFPH curves to the FRG for review.
Following FRG review, the curves were issued to the control room.
Reactor Engineering performed a self-assessment in light of the failure to achieve criticality.
The self assessment concluded that core physics curves should be issued on a more frequent basis.
In the short term, a 2500 EFPH periodicity was specified.
A longer term approach, involving establishing curves with periodicities based upon reactivity effects with burnup, was also described.
The self assessment also addressed the issue of timeliness in the issuing of curves.
The self assessment determined that a family of physics curves (vice a
single burnup set)
should, in the future, be submitted to the FRG for review to ensure timely dissemination.
The inspector concluded that Reactor Engineering's approach to resolving this issue was thorough and technically sound.
Unit 1 Restart The inspector observed portions of the Unit 1 reactor criticality achieved at 6: 16 p.m.
on January 10.
The ECC worksheet completed for this restart was based upon the 5000 EFPH core physics curves discussed above.
Criticality was achieved, without incident, within the 500 pcm reactivity tolerance required by the ECC worksheet.
The inspector noted that appropriate operator and management attention was directed toward the evolution and that a 1/H plot was being maintained and referenced, as required by procedure.
As criticality was achieved, the inspector noted an operator completing an ECC worksheet for an 6:00 p.m. criticality 'and that this ECC worksheet was employed in obtaining and recording criticality physics data.
After the startup, the inspector reviewed OP 1-0030126 and noted that step 4. 14 stated that an ECC worksheet should be considered valid for a period not to exceed one-half hour before or one-half hour after the time
entered on the worksheet for the planned criticality.
The inspector verified that ECC worksheets had been prepared for criticalities at 4:30 p.m.
(covering criticality from 4:00 to 5:00 p.m.),
5:30 p.m.
(covering criticality from 5:00 to 6:00 p.m.),
and 6:00 p.m.
(covering criticality from 5:30 to 6:30 p.m.), although the 6:00 p.m. data was not completed before the criticality at 6: 16 p.m..
The inspector concluded that a valid ECC worksheet did not exist for the 6: 16 p.m. criticality.
Additionally, the inspector noted that OP 1-0030126 did not specify actions to be taken in such an event.
The inspector discussed these observations with the Operations Supervisor, who stated that the ECC periods of validity represented guidelines and that the implementation of these guidelines were the responsibility of the Reactivity Hanager.
However, the Operations Supervisor stated that the procedure would be revised to clarify both the responsibilities of the Reactivity Nanager and the nature of restrictions on ECC validity.
The inspector concluded that the failure to prepare an ECC worksheet for the time of criticality represented insufficient planning on the part of the operators performing the approach to criticality.
Additionally, the inspector found that the lack of procedural guidance relating to such a situation indicated a weakness in OP 1-0030126.
The inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's actions on this issue.
Inadvertent Load Shed of IA3 4160 Volt Bus On January 13, operators performed a surveillance test on the 1A3 4160 V safety bus which resulted in an'nadvertent load shed of the bus and a starting and loading of the 1A EDG.
The surveillance in question was performed in accordance with AP 1-0010125A, Rev 32,- "Surveillance Data Sheets,"
Data Sheet 38,
"Functional Test of Degraded Grid Voltage."
For the bus in question, load shed and EDG start was initiated for conditions of low voltage by closing two series-wired contacts; one associated with the 2X-1 relay and one associated with the 2X-2 relay.
These relays were energized by contacts from two relays sensing low bus voltage.
For the surveillance test in question, an operator was to select a low voltage relay for testing by placing a switch in a position corresponding to the relay to be tested.
The operator was then to push a test button and observe a blue lamp to light and then extinguish.
This action would -indicate that the relay had performed satisfactorily.
'When the operator performed these actions for undervoltage relay 2X-I, the blue lamp did not light and the operator assumed that the relay had failed its surveillance tes TS 3.3.2. 1 requires that an inoperable undervoltage relay be placed in a tripped position within one hour.
The governing procedure specified that this may be accomplished by jumpering out the open contact associated with the 2X-1 relay by removing the leads on both sides of the contact 'and bolting them together.
As the leads were connected together, the load shed sequence began and the 1A EDG started and assumed loads.
The decision was then made to reland the lifted leads and employ a
conventional jumper across the subject contacts.
The leads were relanded, the jumper was installed, offsite power was aligned to the bus, the EDG was unloaded and the EDG output breaker was opened.
The bus immediately load shed and the EDG output breaker reclosed on the bus.
The licensee determined that the cause for the load shed events was a sticking contact from the 2X-2 relay.
This contact had remained closed following a previous relay actuation and, when combined with the jumpering of the series-wired contact from relay 2X-1, satisfied the two-out-of-two logic requirement for load shed and EDG start.
Additionally, the licensee discovered that relay 2X-1 had not failed its surveillance test; rather, the test circuit which should have energized the blue lamp was affected by the sticking which had taken place in the 2X-2 relay.
Following the second load shed, the 2X-2 relay reset and functioned normally.
The licensee attempted to recreate the sticking in the 2X-2 relay but could not.
Engineers from the licensee's Electrical Maintenance group explained that the procedure governing the performance of this test was to be revised to include direction to employ the test circuit so as to ascertain that no relays were stuck before, during, or after the test.
The inspectors examined the licensee's conclusions with regard to the events described and concluded that the licensee had correctly identified the component responsible for causing the inadvertent load shed.
The inspectors will follow licensee-proposed procedural changes.
c.
Technical Specification Compliance Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified. This included the review of selected surveillance test results.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, and switch positions, and by review of completed logs and records.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed for abnormalities.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
The inspectors verified that related plant procedures in use were adequate, complete, and included the most recent revision d.
Physical Protection The inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented as evidenced by:
proper display of picture badges; searching of packages and personnel at the plant entrance; and vital area portals being locked and alarmed.
In conclusion, operators were alert in responding to the loss of MFP 1B.
During restart, the core physics curves in use resulted in a failure to achieve criticality.
Upon the failure to achieve criticality, operators took the appropriate immediate action and returned the reactor plant to Mode 3.
Reactor Engineering support to Operations during the subsequent startups was good and corrective actions resulting from self assessment were thorough.
During the successful Unit 1 restart, the ECC period of validity was exceeded due to inadequate prior planning.
4.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were, confirmation of TS compl,iance for reactor coolant chemistry, RWT conditions, containment pressure, control room ventilation, and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished properly, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following surveillance tests were observed:
1)
OP 1-2200050A
"1A Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operating Instructions" The inspector observed the performance of this surveillance test, which included a semi-annual verification that the EDG, when started from the control room, achieved rated speed within 10 seconds.
The inspector noted that, while the EDG did reach rated speed within the required time, speed fluctuated about the 60 Hz (900 rpm) value for approximately 1 minute before settling out at the appropriate speed.
Operators felt that the oscillations were atypical of EDG performance and chose not to the load the EDG while the oscillations were in progress.
The operators communicated their concerns to Maintenance and Technical Staff engineers and discussed the issue with the Operations Supervisor, and during consultations noted that OP 1-2200050A includes a precaution that such oscillations may occur after a fast start.
The licensee stated that the noted behavior has been witne'ssed in past starts and that the cause may be due to cold governor oil temperature.
Once loaded, the EDG performed satisfactoril The inspector found the operators'erformance to be good during the surveillance, with appropriate concern directed toward the noted EDG performance.
Additionally, Maintenance and Technical Staff engineering support to the operators was timely.
2)
OP 2-0700050 "Auxiliary Feedwater Periodic Test" The inspector observed a surveillance.test of the 2C steam driven AFP, During the test, VOTES testing was performed on MOV-08-'13 per MP-0940080, Rev 0,
"VOTES Differential Pressure Testing on Motor Operated Valves".
The VOTES testing was part of an ongoing trending effort of the performance of MOV-08-13.
The valve has experienced high stroking forces in the past (see IR 93-18),
and the licensee initiated the trending as a part of their response to the issue.
The surveillance and VOTES tests were performed satisfactorily, with VOTES testing indicating slight increases in pullout and differential pressure forces over previous values.
These forces, however, remained well 'within MOV operational limit's.
The inspector found the testing to be controlled appropriately and noted that procedures were available locally and referred to frequently.
In conclusion, surveillances continued to be performed in a professional manner.
Operations, Maintenance and Technical Staff personnel response to IA EDG speed oscillations was timely and appropriate.
5.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
Portions of the maintenance activities were observed for the following:
PWO 8253/62 2A Charging Pump Repair On January 3, the 2A charging pump was declared out of service after operators noted a decrease in pump performance and a metallic banging sound.
The pump was disassembled and maintenance personnel discovered a
broken discharge valve for one cylinder.
The inspector observed portions of the repair effort and found conditions to be well-controlled.
Work was proceeding in accordance with the PWO and an approved procedure for pump disassembly/reassembly.
Radiological controls were applied appropriately and a well-defined parts layout area was employed.
Maintenance personnel identified an additional valve which
showed signs of cracking and the licensee elected to replace all cylinder suction and discharge valves.
P The inspector found the licensee's actions to be appropriate to the circumstances and to be implemented well.
The pump satisfactorily passed its post-work testing, an ASHE Code Section XI required run, verifying volumetric flow rate. at RCS discharge pressure.
The inspector reviewed the pump's code data sheet and noted that the baseline discharge head for the pump was recorded in psig, as opposed to feet-water, as required by the data sheet.
The inspector brought this discrepancy to the attention of the licensee's code test engineer, who corrected the error; On January 17, the 2C charging pump was removed from service after operators noted a decrease in pump performance.
Haintenance personnel
'isassembled the pump and found valve damage similar to that found in the 2A pump.
The pump's valves and valve seats were replaced.
On January 21, the 2C pump was removed from service when water was noted to be leaking from the pump head area.
Haintenance personnel disassembled the pump and discovered that the block had cracked.
The 2C charging pump was repaired and returned to service on January 24.
The inspector discussed the charging pump failures with the licensee's cognizant maintenance engineer, who stated that the noted failures were due to fatigue.
The maintenance engineer explained that the two pumps had been subjected to similar wear cycles (approximately 21,600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> for the 2A pump and approximately 19,900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> for the 2C pump)
and that the failure mechanisms present in the pumps had been experienced in the past.
In conclusion, maintenance activities continued to be performed well.
Fire Protection Review (64704)
During the course of their normal tours; the inspectors routinely examined facets of the Fire Protection Program.
During specific activity such as large scale test of fire protection systems,'xercises, extensive repair or drills, the inspectors would observe, Normally the inspectors would review transient fire loads, flammable materials storage, housekeeping, control of hazardous chemicals, ignition source/fire risk reduction efforts, fire protection training, fire protection system surveillance program, fire barriers, fire brigade qualifications, and gA reviews of the program.
Onsite Followup of Events (Units
and 2)(93702)
The trip of Unit 1, discussed in (3) above, was reviewed to determine the need for further or continued NRC response, to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate, and to determine that TS were being met and that the public health and safety received primary consideration.
Potential generic impact and trend detection were also considered.
Conclusions regarding this event are discussed in (3).
Exit Interview Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms Alternating Current Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Administrative Procedure All Rods Out E Code American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Attention Control Element Assembly Code of Federal Regulations Containment Spray (system)
Direct Current Demonstration Power Reactor (A type of operating license)
Estimated Critical Position Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator Effective Full Power Hours Engineered Safety Feature The Florida Power
& Light Company Facility Review Group High Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Hertz (cycle per second)
Instrumentation and Control
[NRC] Inspection Report TS Limiting Condition for Operation Low Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Main Feed Pump Main Feed Water Main Feed Water Pump Motor Operated Valve Number Nuclear Production Facility (a type of operating license)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operating Procedure PerCent Milli (0.00001)
Pounds per square inch (gage)
Plant Work Order Quality Assurance Reactor Coolant System Revision Region II - Atlanta, Georgia (NRC)
Revolutions per Minute AC AFP AP ARO ASM ATTN CEA CFR CS DC DPR ECC ECCS EDG EFPH ESF FPL FRG HPSI Hz IKC IR LCO LPSI MFP MFW MFWP MOV No.
NPF NRC OP PCM psig PWO QA RCS Rev RII rpm The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 16, 1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary material is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the license RWT SOER St.
TS USNRC V
Refueling Water Tank Sequence of Event Recorder Saint
'echnical Specification(s)
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Volt(s)
0'