IR 05000329/1979025

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IE Insp Repts 50-329/79-25 & 50-330/79-25 on 791119-21 & 28-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Reportable Deficiencies & IE Bulletins,Electric Raceway Loading Review & Storage of Electrical Equipment
ML19260D466
Person / Time
Site: Midland
Issue date: 12/31/1979
From: Barrett P, Knop R, Vandel T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19260D461 List:
References
50-329-79-25, 50-330-79-25, NUDOCS 8002110094
Download: ML19260D466 (12)


Text

s U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

O M

' Report No. 50-329/79-25; 50-330/79-25

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bocketNo. 50-329; 50-330 License No. CPPR-81; CPPR-82 Licensee:

Consumers Power Company 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:

Midland, Units 1 & 2 Inspection At:

Midland Construction Site Inspection Conducted: November 19-21, and 28-30, 1979 d(' Y,y Lu~

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Inspectors:

T. E. Vandel 76.x 6

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P-A. Barrett

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Accompanyino, Personnel:

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[ 2 / 2-7i Approved By:

R. C. Knop, Chief Projects Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on November 19-21 and 28-30, 1979 (Report Nos. 50-329/79-25; 50-330/79-25)

Areas Inspected: Follow-up of unresolved matters and previous noncompliance items; review of 10 CFR 50.55(e) reportable deficiencies and I-E Bulletins; observation of RPV internals trial fitup; electrical raceway loading review; review of storage of electrical equipment and missile protection for electri-cal equipment.

The inspection involved a total of 111 inspector-hours by four NRC inspectors.

Results:

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees Q

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M*T. C. Cooke, PM0 Manager

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    • J.

L. Corley, Section Head, IE & TV

  • D. R. Keating, QA Group Supervisor
    • E.

L. Jones, Electrical QA Engineer

  • B.

W. Marguglio, QA Director

  • D.

B. Miller, Site Manager

  • D. J. Vokal, PMO, Field Staff (Mechanical)
  • R.

M.

Jheeler, PMG

    • R.

G. U llnav. C4 Engineer W. R. B1.0, Section Head QE D. Karjala, PM0 Engineer

      • P. K. Kyner, QA Group Supervisor R. Ostrowski, QA Engineer Other Personnel
  • A.

J. Boos, Bechtel Project Field Engineer

  • P.

Corcoran, Bechtel Resident Engineer

  • L.

E. Davis, Bechtel Site Manager

  • L.

A. Dreisbach, Bechtel Project QA Engineer

    • R.

C. Hollar, Bechtel LQAE

    • E. D. Newman, Bechtel QC Engineer
    • W.

H. Nielscu, Bechtel Assistant Project Field Engineer

  • J.

Russel, Bechtel Assistant Project Field QC Engineer

  • R.

F. Schulman, Bechtel Resident Inspector

  • E. Smith, Bechtel LQAE
  • T. L. Supplee, Bechtel Resident Engineer
  • W.

A. Aillman, B & W QC Engineer R. Bane, Bechtel Termination Department P. Mehra, Bechtel Electrical Field Engineer J. Quayle, Bechtel Electrical Terminations Field Engineer J. Gay, B & W Superintendent Internals Fitup J. Reinhardt, B & W QC Representative Internals Fitup W. Wilman, B & W QC Assistant Manager

  • Denotes those present at the exit interview 2 eld at the conclusion of the inspection on November 30, 1979.
    • Denotes those present at the exit interview on November 21, 1979 and November 30, 1979.
      • Denotes those present at the exit interview on November 21, 1979 only.

t i 939 169-2-

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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items

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(Closed) Noncompliance Item (329/78-03-02; 330/78-03-02):

Inadequate control of welding voltage and amperage as required by AWS. The inspector's e

concern regarding welding machine numerical identity control wa$ reviewed

~ during this inspection. A Bechtel letter dated November 12, 1979 was reviewed that committed to a system of unique identifiers for all machines.

-Results of welding machine surveillance tests were reviewed that established

'the identification system is in use.

A walk through survey of the auxiliary

' building wes conducted where a number of welding machines were observed which est 'lished that machines appeared to be under proper control.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (329/78-04-01; 330/78-04-01): Electrical raceway system not included on the 'Q'

list.

Bechtel site QA in a 'att'er dated August 21, 1979, and NRR in a letter dated August 21, 1979 determined that cable raceways and raceway supports to be considered safety related and as such must be designed, procured, fabricated, and installed under the re-quirements of the Midland QA program. The inspector observed that on November 15, 1979, CPCo and Bechtel developed a plan of action and target dates for completion of the study concerning the upgrading of cable raceway system that was not procured as 'Q'

It appears that the results of ties

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study will be completed in early 1980 (February).

This item remains open.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (329/78-06-01; 330/78-06-01): The use of G-321-D forms relative to electrical class 1E equipment.

Licensee to audit Bechtel Ann Arbor on three items. The inspector observed that CPCo QA has conducted an audit of the use of G-321-D forms relative to class 1E equipment, refer-ence CPCo Audit Report M-01-109-0 dated November 6, 1979.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (329/79-18-03; 330/79-18-03): Mis-identification of class IE cable. The inspector reviewed the applicable procedure (Bechtel procedure FPE7.000) and observed that the procedure has been revised to include a specific inspection point for assuring that class IE cables have the correct color code markers attached by their numerical identifiers.

This item is closed.

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(Closed) Items of Noncompliance (329/78-07-03; 330/78-08-03; 329/78-07-03A; 330/78-07-03A; 329/79-12-01; 330/79-12-01):

Out-dated drawings not being properly controlled and corrective action failing to preclude recurrence of out-dated drawings not being properly controlled. The inspector obser-ved:

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1.

Zack (the site HVAC contractor) has revised their procedures, con-cerning drawing control, requiring more stringent controls of their field drawings (reference Zack QA Manual Section 7, Amendment 1; Zack procedure numbered M-B-QCP-12, Revision 1).

2.

Bechtel has revised procedures FPD-1.000 and FPD-1.100 to restrict the locations of " void" drawings and the distribution of werk

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3.

CPCo has conducted two extensive audits of the control of drawings at

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the site. The audits indicate that there has been much improvement in controlling drawings; since May, 1979 (reference CPCo Audit Reports numbered M01-16-9 and M01-25-9).

On November 27, 1979 theinspector,accompaniedbyCPCopersonnkk, toured several work locations throughout the site (including Zack's work area).

'Ihe inspector randomly selected 20 drawings (total) from four work loc-ations. The drawings were found to be controlled in accordance with the

' applicable procedures; the inspector did not observe any in process work that was being done with out-dated drawings. These items are closed.

(Closed) Noncompliance Item (329/78-15-02; 330/78-15-02):

Inadequate welds on main steam isolation valve restraints structure. The following listed records, reviewed during this inspection, established the comple-tion of corrective action and repair as was required.

1.

For the three excessive fit-ups, the FER (Field Engineers Report)

C 304-947W and the REM (Resident Engineers Memo) C-1845 provided disposition to use full penetration welds instead of fillet welds.

The related QC Inspection Records reflected the sign off by the QC Inspector of these welds on November 27, 1978.

2.

For the nine oversized fillet welds, a Discrepancy Report (DR) number C304-947 and the FER disposition to accept as it was signed off by the QC Engineer on January 3, 1979.

3.

For the two undersized fillet welds, NCR 1624 dispositioned rework to requirements which were completed and signed off on January 19, 1979.

In addition, CAR (Corrective Action Report) listed additional training sessions (held on January 12, 1979) to cover fillet welds acceptance criteria.

Inspection of the welds determined that the specific welds had been com-pleted satisfactorily.

It appeared to the NRC inspector that adequate and timely inspection coverage of this item could have prevented this citation item and that the acceptance criteria should be common knowledge to the WQCE personnel (0 pen) Noncompliance Item (329/78-17-01; 330/78-17-01): Repair welds on personnel airlocks failed to follow procedures. Welding of the cracked welds, some including a doubler used where excessive gap existed, is partially completed. Other informations regarding seismic analysis of the altered welding configuration was not available.

(0 pen) Noncompliance Item (329/78-03-03; 330/78-03-03):

Inadequate inspection of tray support welds. This item has been identified as a 10 CFR 50.55(e) reportable deficiency by the licensee with interim report dated August 4, 1978 and final report dated September 8, 1978 submitted by the licensee.

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Inspector reviewed the following information provided regarding evalua-

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tion, corrective action, and close out repair.

1.

Bechtel Nonconformance Reports numbered NCR 1287, NCR 1306, and NCR 1360

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Bechtel Management Corrective Action Report number MCAR-23

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Specification Change Notices number SCN-C-304-8002 (March 30, 1978)

and SCM-C-304-8003 (August 8, 1978)

In response to questions regarding acceptance - rejection ratio of welds inspected under the above listed NCR's, the inspector was informed that the rationale for acceptance sign off would be provided by Bechtel during a future inspection.

Other Inspection Areas 10 CFR Part 50 Section 50.55(e) Reportable Deficiencies 1.

B & W Prototype testing originally reported by Consumers Power Company in a letter dated January 28, 1974 to the Director of Regulatory Operations which outlined a Consumers Power Company audit identified concern regarding an apparent B & W deficiency regarding prototype testing procedure for procured material. This letter was followed up by another letter dated March 1, 1974 in which it was explained that the concern had been closed out based on further evaluation that the procedure was unnecessary since the B & W pro-curement documents included requirements for the vendors involved to provide their own design verification programs.

Since this item had been essentially removed as a reportable item, no further action was performed by the NRC then, nor is any considered required at this time. This item is considered to be in a resolved status.

2.

Unit 2 Containment liner plate bulge repair. The completion of re-pair and the repair records were reviewed during this inspection and are reported in the DetailsSection II Paragraph I of this report.

However, completion of the NRC review of the design report of the causes and proposed repair has not been completed therefore, this item remains as an open item for further review.

3.

Personnel Airlocks cracked welds. This item is also a noncompliance item and the review conducted has been reported under an earlier section of this report.

The item continues to be an open item sub-ject to further review in the future.

4.

Unit I reactor pressure vessel broken anchor bolt. This item con-tinues in an open status and the review conducted during this inspec-tion is reported in the DetailsSection II paragraph 4 of t.his report.

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IE Bulletins

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Bulletin 79-15 Deep Draf t Pump Deficiencies Licensee response letter dated August 30, 1979 (Howe 239-79) war-reviewed with licensee personnel during this inspection.

It was learnedIEhat no

' pumps of the type described in the bulletin are used at Midland? ' The five ipumps used for the service water pumps are similar in design although only single stage rather than multi-stage.

These are Goulds Pumps, Inc. Model

'VIT-30X60 DHC-single stage pumps. The onsite package was reviewed by the inspector with the following information available in the package.

1.

Technical Specification 7220-M-75 (Q) Service Water Pump 2.

Goulds Pumps, Inc. Type I Manual 3.

Pump Chatacteristic Curves 4.

Maintenance; QA Program, and Welding Specs for assembly In discussion with licensee personnel, it was learned operation tests will be conducted as part of the pre-operation tests (including vibration testing) in the near future. The licensee has adequately responded to this bulletin.

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Section I

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Prepared by:

P. A. Barrett G. F. Maxwell

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Reviewed by:

D. W. Hayes, Chief

Engineering Support Section -1

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'1.

Missile Effects on Raceway The RIII inspector observed the following redundant division conduits in two of the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms:

a.

Turbine driven auxiliary fee water pump 1P-05B (1) Conduit 1AC112 containing cables 1AB5528L and 1AB5528R (2) Conduit 1BC072 containing cables IBFW0088AT, 1BFW0088AU, IBFWO89P, and IBFWO96C.

(3) Conduit 1BJA079 containing cables 1BFWO88AJ, IBFWO88AK, 1BFWO88AL, IBFWO88AM, IBFWO88AN, IBFWO88AP, IBFWO88AS, and IBFWO89N.

b.

Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 1P-05A (1) Conduit 1AC039 containing cables 1AB5525A, 1ABP0307A, IABP0310A, 1ABP0313A, and 1ABP0314A (2) Conduit 1BJA059 containing cable BB2406D (3) Conduit IEC026 containing cable IEA001A (4) Conduit IEC033 containing cable IEB008A (5) Conduit 1AC077 containing cables 1AIO27A and 1AI056A (6) Conduit 1AC114 containing cable 1AB2306D.

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At least one other pump room was also observed containing redundant conduits.

The licensee researched the functions of each of the above cables.

The RIII inspector discussed the functions with the licensee during a phone conversation on December 11, 1979. Each of the cables feed, control, or in some way support the respective pumps to which they are adjacently located. Therefore, there does not appear to be any conflict with the single failure criterion of IEEE 279-197b.

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No items of noncompliance were identified.

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2.

Cable Raceway Modification and Loading a.

The licensee stated that, prior to and during this inspection period, essentially all cable installation and termination activities had been haltcd because of raceway modifications.

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Themodificationsinvolvedreplacingapproximately90(]feetof wireway for which the majority extended vertically adjacent to stacked trays. Approximately 2400 safety related cables were

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affected. The causes for the modifications were identified as the geometric design of the wireway and the cable installation methods, when combined limited the capacity of the wireways.

The licensee stated that thermal and deadweight loading were not contributing factors to the cause of the modifications. Dis-cussions with various individuals involved in the modifications (including rework of installed cables) indicated that the entire scope of the modifications had been defined and identified, and were being controlled.

b.

The RIII inspector discussed the affects of associated (non-safety related) cables on raceway loading (thermal and dead-weight). The licensee stated that associated cables were identified with safety related numbers.

Therefore, the quality control inspectors will treat all associated cables as safety related. Thus, all associated circuits will receive QC routing verification which will provide control for raceway loading.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

3.

Observation of Electrical Equipment, Stored In-Place a.

The RIII inspector observed the limit switch contacts on three installed motor operated valve actuators and the gear lubrica-tions at the motor on two of the three actuators. The actuators, contacts, and lubrication appeared to be in very good condition.

The licensee indicated that requirements are in the process of being written to assure proper lubrication of the brass gears within the limit switches of the valve actuators. This action was being taken in response to IE Information Notice 79-0 b.

The RIII inspector observed several installed electrical pent-rations. All of the observed penetrations were adequately pressurized and had no apparent physical damage.

Four of the penetrations (2Z-111,22-112, 2Z-113, and 2Z-115) did not have their protective covers over the electrical contacts and terminals. There were no construction activities or other apparent detrimental factors (i.e., moisture, high dust concentration, etc.)

in the immediate area. There was a layer of accumulated di,rt on the

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lower section of the termination area. The dirt did not appear to be directly on the terminals. The licensee stated that the penetra-tions would be thoroughly cleaned.

The quality control surveillance program for the penetratiqqs did not require verification that the protective covers be inses11ed.

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The licensee could not establish how long the penetrations'had been uncovered. A speed memo dated September 22, 1979 and reissued

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November 2, 1979 identified concerns about penetration covers not installed. The memo did not indicate specific penetrations.

No apparent corrective action had been taken as a result of the memo.

The licensee stated that the two following programmatic concerns will be performed:

(1) Training will be conducted to assure that all personnel will document identified nonconforming situations (i.e., missing penetration covers, etc.) on controlled documents (not speed memos) and that corrective action will be taken in a timely manner.

(2) The penetration maintenance checklist, F-10-52, will be modified to require a QC verification and documentation of penetration protective conditions (i.e., controlled environment, covers, etc.).

Also, sufficient criteria will be defined to allow the QC inspector to determine if adequate protective measures are being accomplished.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

4.

Personnel Attitudes During this inspection, the RIII inspector talked with personnel of varying responsibilities (i.e. supervisors, foreman, QC inspectors, and electrician). All of the personnel interviewed expressed an attitude of satisfaction concerning the quality of the plant. No adverse concerns were expressed.

5.

Other Areas Inspected - Units 1 and 2 On November 29, 1979, the inspector toured the Service Water Building and observed:

a.

An effort is being made to clean up work areas and provide more suitable protection for class IE electrical equipment.

b.

Both MCC OB65 and OB66 had internal electrical wiring which

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violat d ae minimum 6" separation requirement that is speci-fied in 2-chtel drawing (E47(Q) revision 1 paragraph 5 6.2.

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The inspector discussed this condition with CPCo personnel who indicated that the specific electrical cables involved OEV040A, 0AB6501L, OEV040B, and OBB60lL had not yet been " termination" inspected by either Bechtel QC or CPCo personnel. To, assure that the separation condition does not go uncorrected CPCo QA required Bechtel QA/QC personnel to document it on Beg,tel Nonconformance Report numbered 2765 and BEchtel Quality Action

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Request numbered SD-293. This matter will be further evaluated by NRC personnel during subsequent inspections - with attention paid to the " action verified" by Bechtel QA prior to closing SD-293.

During the exit interview, on November 30, 1979, the CPCo QA personnel indicated that the separation condition observed by the NRC inspector would have been found by the Bechtel QC electrical inspection personnel during their termination in-spections of the above listed cables. CPCo QA personnel stated that they do not rely upon the workers to identify unsatisfactory conditions such as those concerning violations of separation requirements; that Bechtel QC is/will be required to 100% inspect all class IE terminations and one of the inspec-tion points includes assuring compliance with the minimum separa-tion requirements of Bechtel drawing E47(Q).

This will be further evaluated by RIII inspection personnel during subsequent inspection.

This is an unresolved matter. (329/79-25-01; 330/79-25-01)

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i939 177

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Section II

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Prepared by:

C. M. Erb Reviewed by:

D. H. Danielson, Chief

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Engineering Support Sectigg 2

?e 71.

Records of Repair on Containment Liner, Unit No. 2

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The subject liner bulged inward away from the concrete, AZ250 -

270 EL593' - 696' over an area of approximately 2,000 square feet, when a small water line froze and burst. The repair consisted of replacing damaged concrete 4" - 10" maximum depth and steel plate in four foot lifts. The original concrete is 42" thick and most of the liner plate is 1/4" thick with some at bottom 1/2" thick.

Material certifications, welding fabrication procedures were examined and found to be acceptable to ASME Section VIII 1971 edition, para-graphs VW-26 and VW-38.

This structure was not stamped with an N stamp, but all welding was done to ASME Section IX and Bechtel WQ-1.

The liner plate was supplied by Southern Boiler and Tank Works and manufactured by U.S. Steel and Beth!.ehem Steel to SA285 Grade A.

Charpy results were available as well as chemical and physical.

Qualified weld procedure P1-A-LH was used to weld the material and qualified vacuum box, PT, and MT procedures were used.

2.

Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals Fit Up Unit 2 Observation of preparation for and activities during the trial fit up was performed.

Procedure No. 135 Revision 5 was properly signed off and a clean room set up over the vessel. Lanyards were in use for pencils and pockets were taped over to prevent foreign material from entering the vessel. Measurements to adjustments were being made to level the internals and also to determine dimensions in the bottom area of the vessel by means of a T.V. camera.

3.

Flux Monitoring Tubes Unit 1 and 2 The flux monitoring tubes for Unit 2 at the bottom of the reactor vessel were all welded except one. The tubes protruding from the bottom of the vessel are inconel 600 and a dissimilar butt weld is made between inconel and the continuing tubing which is stainless steel. None of the flux tubes in Unit I were welded at the botton of the vessel and tubing open ends were capped in an acceptable ma,

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1939 178

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4.

Reactor Vessel Anchor Bolt Failure (50.55(e)) Unit _1

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One of the 2" bolts in the inner circle of holddowns in the reactor skirt was found to be broken about two months after tensioning, when the locking nut was to be attached. The licensee has forwa,y,ded the broken bolt to a laboratory where extensive tests will be mede to determine the cause of failure.

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IUnresolved Items

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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncom-pliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspections are discussed in Section I, Item 5 of this report.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at the conclusion of the inspections on November 21, 1979 and November 30, 1979. The inspector summarized the purpose and findings of the inspection.

The licensee acknowledged the findings reported herein.

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