IR 05000324/2007006
| ML080240313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/2008 |
| From: | Binoy Desai NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Waldrep B Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-07-006 | |
| Download: ML080240313 (35) | |
Text
January 23, 2008
SUBJECT:
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 05000325/2007006 AND 05000324/2007006
Dear Mr. Waldrep:
On December 14, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2 facilities. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on December 14, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, there were no findings of significance identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Binoy B. Desai, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-325, 50-324 License Nos: DPR-71, DPR-62
Enclosure:
(See page 2)
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000325, 324/2007006
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.:
50-325, 50-324
License Nos.:
Report No.:
05000325/2007006 and 05000324/2007006
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light (CP&L)
Facility:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location:
8470 River Road SE
Southport, NC 28461
Dates:
November 5, 2007 through December 14, 2007
Inspectors:
S. Rose, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)
S. Rutledge, Acting Resident Inspector
W. Lewis, Reactor Inspector
J. Hamman, Reactor Inspector, in training
G. Khouri, Reactor Inspector, in training
K. Miller, Reactor Inspector, in training
M. Shlyamberg, Contract Inspector
G. Skinner, Contract Inspector
Approved by:
Binoy B. Desai, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000325/2007006, 05000324/2007006; 11/05/07 - 12/14/07; Brunswick Steam
Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2; Component Design Basis Inspection.
This inspection was conducted by a team of five NRC inspectors, three NRC inspectors who were in training, one acting resident inspector, and two NRC contract inspectors.
There were no findings of significance identified by the activities covered in this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, (ROP) Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None
Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection
.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process
The team selected risk significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the licensees Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). In general, this included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than two or Birnbaum value greater than 1 X10-6. The components selected were located within the Service Water (SW) system, suppression pool cooling system, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)system, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) support and electrical subsystems, 125Vdc battery system, and Startup Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) system. The sample selection included 21 components, five operator actions, and five operating experience items.
Additionally, the team reviewed one modification by performing activities identified in IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a. and IP 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments.
The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design bases have been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modification, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included items such as failed performance test results, significant corrective action, repeated maintenance, maintenance rule (a)1 status, RIS 05-020 (formerly GL 91-18) conditions, NRC resident inspector input of problem equipment, system health reports, industry operating experience and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins. An overall summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified is included in the following sections of the report.
.2 Results of Detailed Reviews
.2.1 Service Water Outlet Valve, SW-V-442
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed Technical Specifications (TS), UFSAR, design drawings and calculations, vendor documentation, and plant procedures to verify the appropriateness of design assumptions, boundary conditions, and models, as well as the appropriateness of the licensees analysis methods. The team verified that design assumptions and limitations were translated to operational and testing procedures. Plant personnel were interviewed and a component/system walk down was conducted to verify that potential degradation was being monitored and prevented. The system walk down also verified that the observable material condition supports its design operation, and component configurations have been maintained consistent with design assumptions, the equipment was adequately protected from external events and relatively unaffected by recently installed security features. The team reviewed maintenance and corrective action history to verify that potential degradation was being monitored or prevented and that component replacement was consistent with qualification life. Modification installations were reviewed to ensure that design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the valve have not been degraded through alteration.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2 Nuclear Header to RHR Service Water Header Isolation Valve, SW-V104
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed TS, UFSAR, design drawings and calculations, vendor documentation, and plant procedures to verify the appropriateness of design assumptions, boundary conditions, and models, as well as the appropriateness of the licensees analysis methods. The team verified that design assumptions and limitations were translated to operational and testing procedures. Plant personnel were interviewed and a component/system walk down was conducted to verify that potential degradation was being monitored and prevented. The system walk down also verified that the observable material condition supports its design operation, and component configurations have been maintained consistent with design assumptions, the equipment was adequately protected from external events and relatively unaffected by recently installed security features. The team also reviewed maintenance and corrective action history to verify that potential degradation was being monitored or prevented and that component replacement was consistent with qualification life. Modification installations were reviewed to ensure that design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the valve have not been degraded through alteration.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.3 Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve, SW-V105
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed TS, UFSAR, design drawings and calculations, vendor documentation, and plant procedures to verify the appropriateness of design assumptions, boundary conditions, and models, as well as the appropriateness of the licensees analysis methods. The team verified that design assumptions and limitations were translated to operational and testing procedures. Plant personnel were interviewed and a component/system walk down was conducted to verify that potential degradation was being monitored and prevented. The system walk down also verified that the observable material condition supports its design operation, and component configurations have been maintained consistent with design assumptions, the equipment was adequately protected from external events and relatively unaffected by recently installed security features. The team also reviewed maintenance and corrective action history to verify that potential degradation was being monitored or prevented and that component replacement was consistent with qualification life. Modification installations were reviewed to ensure that design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the valve have not been degraded through alteration. The team reviewed control wiring diagrams to verify Motor Operated Valve (MOV) control logic was consistent with design bases. The team reviewed load flow and MOV voltage drop calculations to assess whether appropriate voltage values were used in thrust calculations. The team reviewed Motor Control Center (MCC) control circuit voltage drop calculations and related modifications to verify MOV control circuits had adequate voltage to operate when required.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.4 Outboard Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Valve, 1-CAC-V8
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) Design Basis Documents (DBD), UFSAR, TS, and applicable plant drawings to identify the design bases requirements of the equipment. Calculations and vendor documents were reviewed to verify that appropriate engineering limits were used as inputs to design and test acceptance criteria. The team examined the machinery history of the outboard suppression pool purge exhaust valves to verify that design bases have been maintained. The team examined records and test data for both corrective and preventative maintenance, Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT), Inservice Testing (IST), and applicable corrective actions to verify that potential degradation was being monitored, prevented, and corrected. The team verified the Preventative Maintenance (PM) history and schedule were consistent with vendor recommendations. The team also conducted a field walk down of the outboard suppression pool purge exhaust valves with the CAC system engineer to verify that the installed configuration was consistent with the design basis and plant drawings and assess the observable material condition.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.5 Inboard Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Valve, 1-CAC-V7
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the CAC DBD, UFSAR, TS, and applicable plant drawings to identify the design bases requirements of the equipment. Calculations and vendor documents were reviewed to verify that appropriate engineering limits were used as inputs to design and test acceptance criteria. The team examined the machinery history of the inboard suppression pool purge exhaust valves to verify that design bases have been maintained. The team examined records and test data for both corrective and preventative maintenance, Air Operated Valve (AOV) diagnostic testing, LLRT, IST, and applicable corrective actions to verify that potential degradation was being monitored, prevented, and corrected. The team verified the PM history and schedule were consistent with vendor recommendations. The team also conducted a field walk down of the inboard suppression pool purge exhaust valves with the CAC system engineer to verify that the installed configuration was consistent with the design basis and plant drawings and assess the observable material condition.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.6 Minimum Flow Bypass Valves to Suppression Pool, 1/2-E11-F007A and 1/2-E11-F007B
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) DBD, UFSAR, TS, and applicable plant drawings to identify the design bases requirements of the equipment. Calculations and vendor documents were reviewed to verify that appropriate engineering limits were used as inputs to design and test acceptance criteria. The team examined the machinery history of the minimum flow bypass valves to suppression pool to verify that design bases have been maintained. The team examined records and test data for both corrective and preventative maintenance, Motor Operated Valve (MOV) diagnostic testing, IST, and applicable corrective actions to verify that potential degradation was being monitored, prevented, and corrected. The team verified the PM history and schedule were consistent with vendor recommendations. The team also conducted a field walk down of the minimum flow bypass valves to suppression pool with the RHR system engineer to verify that the installed configuration was consistent with the design basis and plant drawings and assess the observable material condition. The team reviewed control wiring diagrams to verify MOV control logic was consistent with design bases. The team reviewed load flow and MOV voltage drop calculations to assess whether appropriate voltage values were used in thrust calculations. The team reviewed MCC control circuit voltage drop calculations and related modifications to verify MOV control circuits had adequate voltage to operate when required.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.7 Suppression Pool Cooling Isolation Valves, 1/2-E11-F024B
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the RHR DBD, UFSAR, TS, and applicable plant drawings to identify the design bases requirements of the equipment. Calculations and vendor documents were reviewed to verify that appropriate engineering limits were used as inputs to design and test acceptance criteria. The team examined the machinery history of the suppression pool cooling isolation valves to verify that design bases have been maintained. The team examined records and test data for both corrective and preventative maintenance, MOV diagnostic testing, IST, and applicable corrective actions to verify that potential degradation was being monitored, prevented, and corrected. The team verified the PM history and schedule were consistent with vendor recommendations. The team also conducted a field walk down of the suppression pool cooling isolation valves with the RHR system engineer to verify that the installed configuration was consistent with the design basis and plant drawings and assess the observable material condition. The team reviewed load flow and MOV voltage drop calculations to assess whether appropriate voltage values were used in thrust calculations. The team reviewed MCC control circuit voltage drop calculations and related modifications to verify MOV control circuits had adequate voltage to operate when required.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.8 Instrument Air Supply Isolation Valve, SA-V79
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed TS, UFSAR, design drawings and calculations, vendor documentation, and plant procedures to verify the appropriateness of design assumptions, boundary conditions, and models, as well as the appropriateness of the licensees analysis methods. The team verified that design assumptions and limitations were translated to operational and testing procedures. Plant personnel were interviewed and a component/system walk down was conducted to verify that potential degradation was being monitored and prevented. The system walk down also verified that the observable material condition supports its design operation, and component configurations have been maintained consistent with design assumptions, the equipment was adequately protected from external events and relatively unaffected by recently installed security features. The team also reviewed maintenance and corrective action history to verify that potential degradation was being monitored or prevented and that component replacement was consistent with qualification life.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.9 Service Air Compressor 1B, SA-1B-AIR-CMP
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed TS, UFSAR, design drawings and calculations, vendor documentation, and plant procedures to verify the appropriateness of design assumptions, boundary conditions, and models, as well as the appropriateness of the licensees analysis methods. This review also verified that the process medium would be available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions to the extent necessary to support the equipments safety functions. Electrical elementaries and wiring diagrams were reviewed to verify that energy sources, including those used for control functions, would be available and adequate during accident/event conditions to the extent necessary to support the equipments safety functions. The team verified that design assumptions and limitations were translated into operational and testing procedures.
Surveillance and testing data was reviewed to ensure the design basis was met by the installed and tested configuration and that acceptance criteria for tested parameters were supported by calculations or other engineering documents. Plant personnel were interviewed and a component/system walk down was conducted to verify that potential degradation was being monitored and prevented. The system walk down also verified that the observable material condition supports its design operation, and component configurations have been maintained consistent with design assumptions, the equipment was adequately protected from external events and relatively unaffected by recently installed security features. Plant use of the component was reviewed to verify that component operation and alignments were consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions. Select component modifications were reviewed to ensure that performance capability had not been degraded through such modifications. The team reviewed maintenance and corrective action history to verify that potential degradation was being monitored or prevented and that component replacement was consistent with qualification life.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.10 Steam Turbine Drive for High Pressure Coolant Injection Pumps, E41-C002
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed DBD, drawings, calculations, specifications, maintenance activities and surveillance procedures to verify the capability of the HPCI to perform its function during the events described in the UFSAR and in accordance with the requirements stated in the TS. Hydraulic calculations were reviewed to ensure design requirements for flow and pressure were translated as acceptance criteria for pump IST. HPCI cooling and lubrication were reviewed to verify that these sub-systems were adequately sized.
Design change history, related corrective actions, and IST results were reviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.11 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Turbine Drive, E51-C002
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed DBD, drawings, calculations, specifications, maintenance activities and surveillance procedures to verify the capability of the RCIC to perform its function during the events described in the UFSAR and in accordance with the requirements stated in the TS. Hydraulic calculations were reviewed to ensure design requirements for flow and pressure were translated as acceptance criteria for pump IST. RCIC cooling and lubrication were reviewed to verify that these sub-systems were adequately sized.
Design change history, related corrective actions, and IST results were reviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.12 Emergency Diesel Generators
- EDG-1, EDG-2, EDG-3, and EDG-4 Auxiliary Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed DBD, drawings, calculations, specifications, maintenance activities and surveillance procedures to verify the capability of the EDGs to supply onsite AC electrical power during design basis events. EDG cooling, lubrication, fuel consumption, and air start capabilities were reviewed to verify that these systems were adequately sized. Walk downs and interviews with plant personnel were performed to verify that the capability of the EDGs to perform their design basis function was being maintained.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.13 Emergency Diesel Generator Building Exhaust and Backdraft Dampers
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed DBD, drawings, calculations, specifications, maintenance activities and surveillance procedures to verify the capability of the EDG building ventilation system during design basis events. EDG building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) calculations for heat load and ventilation capabilities were reviewed to verify that the ventilation system was adequately sized. Walk downs and interviews with plant personnel were performed to verify that the capability of the EDG building HVAC to perform their design basis function was being maintained. Additionally, walk downs were performed to verify that the EDG building HVAC exhaust and backdraft dampers were capable of allowing pressure to equalize between the interior and atmosphere during a tornado event as credited for in the analysis.
b. Findings
The team identified an Unresolved Item (URI) for failure to translate a key analytical assumption related to operation of the back draft and check dampers into specifications and ultimately into the installed hardware. The teams review of design calculation 0VA-0033, Tornado Analysis of Diesel Generating Building, Rev. 1 identified the following concerns:
- Assumption 7 of this calculation stated that the back draft/check dampers are assumed open in the normal outward flow direction during an atmospheric depressurization event associated with a tornado. The assumption also states that during the subsequent atmospheric repressurization associated with a tornado, the back draft/check dampers would open in the reverse direction to allow reverse inward flow when the Differential Pressure (dP) across damper exceeds 80 psf.
There was no surveillance to verify the ability of the back draft/check dampers to open in reverse direction. Furthermore, the teams review of specification 226-002, Sheet Metal Work, Rev. 12; drawings SHW-D-10490, SHW P 2230 Backdraft Damper w/Extra Deep Frame, Rev. C and 9527-01-4283, Technocheck Valve, Rev.
0 (check damper); walk down observations; and interviews with plant personnel identified that the installed back draft and check dampers could not open in the reverse direction. Therefore, conclusions of the calculation 0VA-0033 about the maximum dPs for the structures and the ductwork were not valid or conservative.
- Additionally, this calculation and the design specification failed to address the effects of the high dP predicted in this calculation on the EDG building HVAC hardware other than the ductwork (e.g., in-line fans, recirculation dampers, etc).
Progress Energy had not verified that the specified assumptions were translated into the procured and installed HVAC hardware for the EDG building. The analysis for the EDG building HVAC system did not assure that the critical analytical assumption were implemented; thus making it undetermined that the EDG building HVAC system, that serviced all four
- (4) EDGs for both units of Brunswick Nuclear Plant, would function during and following the design basis tornado. This condition has existed since original plant licensing. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as NCR 00259088 with actions to evaluate the ability of the EDGs actual installed equipment to satisfy the intended safety function during and following the design basis tornado event. This issue is identified as URI 05000325/2007006,05000324/2007006-01, Capability of Emergency Diesel Generators to Meet Design and Licensing Requirements. This item is unresolved pending NRC review of the of the licensees analysis of the effects of the as-built configuration on the EDG building HVACs ability to satisfy the intended safety function during and following the design basis tornado event.
.2.14 125VDC Battery Chargers, 1-1A-1-125VDC-CHRGR, 1-1A-2-125VDC-CHRGR, 1-1B-1-
125VDC-CHRGR & 1-1B-2-125VDC-CHRGR
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the logic diagrams and control schematics to verify that the battery chargers satisfied the safety related application as delineated in the DBD. The control schematics were reviewed to verify operation and protection of the chargers under normal operating conditions. The team reviewed weekly, quarterly and yearly test procedures and results to verify that protective devices were appropriately sized and coordinated and to verify that the as found performance met the design basis requirements. The team reviewed battery charger voltage output, current output, and limitations to verify that the components were appropriately sized for system supply outputs. The team reviewed the degraded buss evaluation to verify that the components would respond appropriately. The team reviewed component replacement history to verify that replacement parts had been appropriately procured or dedicated for safety related use. The team reviewed system and component corrective action history, system updates and system health reports to verify appropriate actions have been taken for adverse conditions and to note any trending. The team reviewed vendor manuals to verify that recommendations have been incorporated into the testing program or that justification exists to the contrary. The team performed a field walk down of the charger system to verify that field conditions revealed no observable signs of neglect or degradation. The team reviewed the related SAMG modification package to verify that battery charger performance has not been adversely affected by the modification.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.15 Battery Charger 1A-1 AC Input Motor Control Center Compartment, 1-1CA-C05
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the logic diagrams and control schematics to verify that the feeder breaker satisfied the safety related application as delineated in the DBD. The control schematics were reviewed to verify operation and protection function of the chargers under normal operating conditions. The team reviewed the normal voltage and current feeds to verify the component rating met the design basis. The team reviewed component trip characteristics and interrupting capability to verify that the component met the design basis requirements. The team reviewed test procedures and results to verify that protective devices were appropriately sized and coordinated to meet design basis requirements. The team reviewed the degraded buss evaluation to verify that the components would respond appropriately. The team reviewed component replacement history to verify that replacement parts had been appropriately procured or dedicated for safety related use. The team reviewed system and component corrective action history, system updates and system health reports to verify appropriate actions have been taken for adverse conditions and to note any trending. The team reviewed vendor manuals to verify that recommendations have been incorporated into the testing program or that justification exists to the contrary. The team performed a field walk down of the feeder breakers to verify that field conditions revealed no observable signs of neglect or degradation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.16 Startup Auxiliary Transformer Undervoltage Relay 27SX, 27SX1
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed relay setting sheets to verify field settings were consistent with design bases. The review also was performed to establish whether the relay was subject to spurious tripping under accident or transient conditions, and verify it coordinated properly with other voltage and overcurrent relays. The team reviewed maintenance schedules and procedures to verify the relays were being properly maintained and calibrated. The team reviewed relay service conditions to determine whether the relay was applied within its specified environmental conditions. The team reviewed maintenance and corrective action records to determine whether the equipment had exhibited adverse performance trends.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.17 Startup Auxiliary Transformer, SAT-START-AUX-XFMR
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed Alternating Current (AC) load flow calculations and load management procedures to assess whether the transformer would have sufficient capacity to support its required loads under worst case accident loading and grid voltage conditions. The team reviewed bus transfer calculations to verify inrush currents would remain within the transformer capabilities. The team reviewed transformer protective relaying to assess whether it afforded adequate protection and whether there would be any adverse interactions that would reduce system reliability. The team reviewed maintenance procedures to verify tasks and acceptance criteria were consistent with vendor recommendations. In addition, the team reviewed maintenance records and corrective action documents to assess any adverse equipment operating trends. The team performed walk downs of the transformers to assess observable materiel condition and presence of hazards.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.18 Emergency Diesel Generators, 2-DG1-GEN & 2-DG2-GEN
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed diesel starting circuits to verify the diesels receive the proper signals to respond to accidents and bus undervoltage conditions. The team reviewed diesel output breaker logic and load sequencing circuits to determine whether loads would be available within the time assumed in the accident analysis. The team reviewed static loading calculations to determine whether the maximum loading during emergencies was within the diesel ratings. The team reviewed dynamic loading calculations to determine whether the response of the diesel generator governor and voltage regulator satisfied the requirements of NRC Safety Guide 9. The team reviewed protective relay setpoints, calculations and vendor data to determine whether the generator was adequately protected against overloads and faults, and was immune from spurious tripping. The team reviewed surveillance procedures and test results to determine whether testing was being performed in accordance with Technical Specification requirements, and whether any unaddressed anomalies had occurred. The team performed walkdowns of the Diesel to assess materiel condition and presence of hazards. In addition, the team reviewed maintenance records and corrective action documents to determine whether there were any adverse equipment operating trends. Various ARs relating to diesel failures were reviewed to determine whether root cause analyses were adequate and whether corrective actions were appropriately targeted at causes to prevent recurrence
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.19 High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow Transmitter, E41-FT-N008
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed instrument loop diagrams and elementary wiring diagrams to verify the instrument loop would function as described in the design bases. The team reviewed instrument setpoint specifications, procedures, and calibration results to verify the instrument signal was adequate to perform the control and indication functions required by the design bases. The team reviewed engineering change documents and related calculations regarding the revision of the qualified life for the transmitters to verfiy the changes were appropriate and properly evaluated. The team reviewed maintenance and corrective action records to assess whether the equipment has exhibited adverse performance trends. The team performed a walk down of the transmitter to assess observable materiel condition and presence of hazards.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.20 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Discharge Flow Switch, E51-FS-N002
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed instrument loop diagrams and elementary wiring diagrams to verify the instrument loop would function as described in the design bases. The team reviewed Instrument setpoint specifications, procedures, and calibration results to verify the instrument signal was adequate to perform the control and indication functions required by the design bases. The team reviewed switch electrical burdens and specifications to verify the switch was applied within its ratings. The team reviewed maintenance and corrective action documents to assess whether the equipment has exhibited adverse performance trends. The team performed a walk down of the switch to assess observable materiel condition and presence of hazards.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.21 ITE 230kV, 2000A,Type GA, Model B SF6 Circuit Breakers
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed TS, UFSAR, design drawings and calculations, vendor documentation, and plant procedures to verify the appropriateness of design assumptions, boundary conditions, and models, as well as the appropriateness of the licensees analysis methods. Electrical elementaries and wiring diagrams were reviewed to verify that energy sources, including those used for control functions, would be available and adequate during accident/event conditions to the extent necessary to support safety functions. Plant personnel were interviewed and a component/system walk down was conducted to verify that potential degradation was being monitored and prevented. The system walk down also verified that the observable material condition supports its design operation, and component configurations have been maintained consistent with design assumptions and the equipment was adequately protected from external events. The team also reviewed maintenance and corrective action history to verify that potential degradation was being monitored or prevented and that component replacement was consistent with qualification life.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Review of Low Margin Operator Actions
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of five risk significant and time critical operator actions. Where possible, margins were determined by the review of the assumed design basis and UFSAR response times and performance times documented by job performance measures (JPMs). For the selected components and operator actions, the team performed an assessment of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), Alarm Panel Procedures (APPs), and other operations procedures to determine the adequacy of the procedures and availability of equipment required to complete the actions. Operator actions were observed on the plant simulator and during plant walk downs.
The following operator actions were observed on the licensees operator training simulator:
- Loss of Offsite Power with recovery using the Unit Auxiliary Transformer backfeed:
0AOP-36.1, Loss of any 4160V Buses or 480V E-Buses
- Electrical ATWS: 1EOP-01-LPC, Level Power Control and EOP-01-LEP-02, Alternate Control Rod Insertion
Additionally, the team walked down, table-topped and investigated the following operational scenarios:
- Local/Manual actions to establish backfeed through the Unit Auxiliary Transformer, without the startup transformer available, on Units 1 and 2: 1OP-50 and 2OP-50, Plant Electrical System Operating Procedure
- Local/Manual actions to establish power to the battery chargers using the SAMG diesel generators: 0AOP-36.2, Station Blackout
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Review of Industry Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at domestic and foreign nuclear facilities for applicability at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. The team performed an independent applicability review for issues that were identified as applicable to the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant and were selected for a detailed review.
The issues that received a detailed review by the team included:
- IN 00-006, Offsite Power Voltage Inadequacies
- IN 91-046, Degredation of Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Delivery Systems
- IN 86-014, Overspeed Trips of HPCI, RCIC and AFW Turbines
- IN 06-022, New Ultra-Low-Sulfur Diesel Fuel Oil Could Adversely Impact Diesel Engine Performance
- IN 90-021, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction Was Underestimated
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Review of Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed one modifications related to the selected risk significant components in detail to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the components have not been degraded through modifications. The adequacy of design and post modification testing of these modifications was reviewed by performing activities identified in IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a. Additionally, the team reviewed the modifications in accordance with IP 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments, to verify the licensee had appropriately evaluated them for 10 CFR 50.59 applicability. The following modification was reviewed:
- Engineering Change 67877R7, Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines Diesel Generators for the 125 VDC Battery Chargers
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On December 14, 2007, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Scarola and other members of the licensee staff. The team returned all proprietary information examined to the licensee. No proprietary information is documented in the report.
ATTACHMENTS:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- J. Scarola, Vice President Brunswick Nuclear Plant
- B. Waldrep, Director Site Operations
- S. Howard, Operations Manager
- S. Rogers, Maintenance Manager
- T. Trask, Engineering Manager
- R. Ivey, Support Services Manager
- A. Pope, Licensing Supervisor
NRC
- J. Austin, Senior Resident Inspector, Brunswick Nuclear Plant
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED, AND REVIEWED
Opened
- 05000324/2007006-01 URI Capability of Emergency Diesel Generators to Meet Design and Licensing Requirements