IR 05000324/1978025
| ML20062F473 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1978 |
| From: | Dance H, Hinckley D, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062F471 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-78-25, 50-325-78-25, NUDOCS 7812180345 | |
| Download: ML20062F473 (12) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_.
, f UNITE D ST ATEs t * "%g'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h ' + , ,,, mEcioN is 7,g l y ,# 101 M ARIETT A STREET, N W " / E-l g [ ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 l o, %, *' / .... Report Nos.: 50-325/78-25 and 50-32t./78-25 Docket Nos.. 50-325 and 50-324 l License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62 l Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company i 366 Fayetteville Street ! Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 ' Facility Name: Brunswick I and 2 l Inspection at: Southport, North Carolina Inspection conducted: September 26-29, 1978 Inspectors: D. G. Hinckley, H. L. Whitener, E. H. Brooks Accompanying Personnel: E. J. Ford, Reactor Inspector Trainee b( M * n v " !i / *' i ! . i Approved by: $I (n . Date H. C. Bance, Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch i l l
Inspection Summary l Inspection on September 26-29, 1978 (Report Nos.
50-325/78-25 j and 50-324/78-25) Areas Inspec @ Routine, unannounced inspection of records, plant tour, l f follow-up on headquarters requests, IE Circular follow-up, and surveillance l of pipe support and restraint systems. The inspection involved 72 inspector-hours on-site by three NRC inspectors.
Results: In the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or
deviations were identified.
i l .. y8121gy3y5 . _ -.
.
RII. Report Nos.- 50-325/78-25 and 50-324/78-25-2-DETAILS I Prepared by: / f ff;- b' /,# /?( , D. G. Hinckley, Reacton' inspector Date Reactor Projects Sectio'g No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear , Support Branc h i Dates of Inspection: September 26-29, 1978 Y
'; : _ c.- _ Reviewed by: - H. C. Dance, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support branch i 1.
Persons Contacted
- A. C. Tollison, Plant Manager D. N. Allen, QA Supervisor
- L. V. Wagoner, Maintenance Supervisor W. L. Triplett, Engineering Supervisor
- S. E. Thorndyke, Operating Supervisor E. H. Norwood, Training Coordinator R. P. Cross, Engineer G. R. Peeler, Operating Engineer Shif t Foreman and Control Room Operators
- Denotes those present at the Exit Interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
3.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about wr..ch more information is required - in orde; to ascertain shether they are acceptable items. Items of - noncompliance or deviations. One unresolved : tem disclosed during the inspection is disc ussed in paragraph 6.
4.
Exit Interview i The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the-conclusion of the inspection on September 29, 1975.
The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed. The licensee acknowledged the unresolved item conc erning collection of water in the Unit 2 RHR pump and HPCI r,ooms.
, .. -__ - -
. . RII. Report Nos.: 50-325/78-25 and 50-324/78-25-3-5.
Print Files An inspector determined that as-built drawings and drawing revisions are being maintained in accordance with Administrative Inst ruc tion ' Al-2, Collection, Maintenance Control and Storage of Plant kreords.
Several drawings were requested from the Library file; the drawings were promptly made available.
Selected drawings were chosen, at random, from the control room file and verified to be the most recent revisions as compared to a recent drawing index printout. No problems were identi fied.
i 6.
Site Tour The inspectors made a tour of the Unit I and 2 control room, turbine area, reactor buildings, A0G building, and general outside areas.
During the tour, an unsecured nitrogen bottle was observed between one of the Unit 2 CRD hydraulic unit banks. General housekeeping behind roped of f contaminated areas was observed as being very poor. These items were discussed with the licensee.
On September 28, the inspectors observed approximately 6 inches of water in the Unit 2 HPCI room and approximately 12 inches of water in the Unit 2 north RER pump room.
Accumulations of water in these safety related areas has been a chronic problem. There has also been an apparent history of problems with the sump pumps in these areas.
On September 29, the water level in the RHR pump room was approximately 10 inches deep and was being processed through the radiation liquid waste system.
A problem that exists as the result of this frequent accumulation of water in these areas is the potential flooding of various instruments; particularly, the RHR pump discharge high pressure switch ( ADS permissive) y which is mounted about 20 inches above the floor on an instrument rack in the RHR pump room. A recent licensee event report (LER 2-75-o0) addressed failure of one RHR pump discharge high pressure switch (Ell-PS-N016D) during periodic testing. The cause was stated as being due to corrosion which possibly resulted f rom moisture due to past accumulation of water on the floor of the RHR pump room.
Accumulation of water in these safety related areas could be detri-mental to the reliability of the safety system., The inspector is i concerned as to the cause of the frequent accumulation of water in these areas and actions being taken to correct the problem. This is an unresolved item (324/325-78/25-01). The licensee has committed te respond, in writing, to this item.
. '.a.
. j .-. t , ..
. . . . I RIl. Report Nos.: 50-325/78-25 and 50-324/78-25-4-7.
Off-Gas System The inspector familiarized himself with the off-gas system by reviewing system drawings, touring the related facilities, and holding discussions with cognizant engineers. The off-gas explosion history of the Brunswick facility was also reviewed.
The augmented of f-gas (A0G) portion of the system has never been made operational for either Unit 1 or Unit 2.
Presently, the A0G system is bypassed. Efforts are presently being undertaken to make the A0G operational. In the past, a detonation of the highly combustionable hydrogen off-gas mixture has occurred whenever the A0G has been placed in service. At present, the cause of these detonations are not completely understood.
8.
IE Circular Follow-Up IEC 78-08 Environmental Qualifications of Safety Related Electrical Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants.
The status of the licensee's review of this issue was discussed with a licensee representative.
The status is as follows: a.
All of the referenced material is not available at the site. The licensee has requested the material and has stated that review responsibility will be assigned.
b.
The licensee has compared their plant circumstances with the lessons identified to the extent of responding to issued applicable bulletins on the subjects.
c.
The licensee is formulating plans to review the qualification documentation for the Brunswick facility.
The site has sent a Task Assistance Request (TAR) to the Corporate Operating Plants Engineering Support Section, requesting their assistance in the review of appropriate qualification documentation. A m,eting has been held between site representatives, corporate representatives and Wyle Laboratory's representatives concerning the qualification documentation issue.
d.
The decision has not been made as to who will perform the review; consequently, the responsibility has not been assigned.
The licensee has been informed as to the urgency of this issue even though the review request was by circular rather than a bulletin.
The licensee's plans and schedule will be reviewed when finaltzed.
._.
.p ,
i . . . .
RII Rpt. Nos. 324/78-25 and 325/78-25-1-l e' gb (yEc.s/ ///f l-7[ L r s DETAILS II Prepared by: . H. L. Whitener, Reactor Inspector 'Date Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Peactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch f.H E. H. Brooks, Reactor Inspector 'll-6 - 7f Date Nuclc4r Support Section No. 1 Feactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branth Dates of Inspection:, September 26-29, 1975 //![[77 Reviewed by: [ UA xe R. D. Martin, Chief Dat( Nuclear Support Section No. I Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support BraL:h 1.
Persons Contacted
- A. F. Tollison, Plant Manager D. N. Allen, QA Supervisor
- S. E. Thorndyke, Operations Supervisor
- G. R. Peeler, Operation Engineer
- L. V. Wagoner, Maintenance Supervisor
- J. Pearson, Senior Engineer
- R.
Cribb, Quality Control
- R. C. Wyhlidko, Engineering Technician
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings No items of noncompliance, deviations, and unresolved items relative to shock suppressors remained outstanding. A number of items identified for further inspection in IE Report No. 324/325/77-25 were reviewed and are discussed in the text of this Detail.
3.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Two uncesolved stems disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5.d.2 and 5.e of this report.
'. .
- . gm,
. . . RII Rpt. Nos. 324/78-25 and 325/78-25-2-4.
Exit Interview Areas of inspection and inspection findings were reviewed with Mr. Tollison and members of his staff on September 29, 1978, and are discussed in this Detail. At this interview, the licensee agreed to submit to the NRC Region II office by November 1, 1978, a report on the status and planned activities relative to identifica-tion of snubber seal material and Unit 2 bleed rate measurements at rated load (see Details II, paragraphs 5.d.2 and 5.e).
Attendees at this interview are denoted in paragraph 1.
5.
Piping Supports and Restraints The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance activity for safety related piping supports and cestraints. This included a review of procedures for technical adequacy; examination of various installed dynamic and fixed supports and restraints; and review of recent surveillance records.
Pertinent aspects of this review are discussed below.
a.
Shock Suppressor Surveillance Procedures (1) Visual Inspection The inspector reviewed Periodic Test procedures, PT 19.6.0.1 (Inaccessit:e Snubters) and PT 19.6.0.2 (Accessible Snubbers) tor Technical Adequacy and discussed his findings with the licensee as follows: (a) Limits of operable piston rod travel have not been identified in the acceptance criteria and verified for the hot and cold positions.
(b) Use of baseline piston position data as a guideline to determine appropriate piston positions has not been specified.
(c) Procedure instructions and data sheets do not specifically delineate all items to be inspected.
Items to be inspected need to be defined to assure uniform inspection and to document the results.
(d) Inspection of vent holes to ensure the vents are open is not identified in the procedure nor included in the check off list on the data sheet.
(e) Procedure instructions and data sheets do not provide for recording piston rod position and the as found - sai as left fluid levels.
e ? J- r
-
- m.
., .W g
. . . RII Rpt. Nos. 324/78-25 and 325/78-25-3-(2) Functional Test The inspector reviewed Periodic Test Procedure (PT) 19.6.1, " Safety Related Snubber Functional Testing," for technical adequacy and discussed the findings with the licensee as follows: (a) Procedure instructions and data sheets do not provide for recording the measured lockup velocity and bleed rate.
(b) The range for bleed rate is not specified in the acceptance criteria for Bergen Patterson snubbers.
(c) The range for lock-up velocity and bleed rate stated in Table 1 for Grinnell snubbers appear to be production standards and may be overly restrictive.
(d) Procedure instructions do not require that bleed rate be determined at rated load conditon.
(e) A correction to measured lockup velocity and bleed rate to correct for the difference between test temperature and operating temperature in order to determine that these measured parameters are acceptable at operating conditions is not required by procedure instructions.
Licensee management stated that matters identified in 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 above will be evaluated and appropriate revisions made to PT 19.6.0.1, PT 19.6.0.2 and 19.6.1.
Revision to these procedures will be complete by January 1,1979. This matter was identified ' for followup review (324/325/78-25-01).
b.
Administrative Controls The inspector reviewed Administrative Procedure, AP-7, Revision 25 and Maintenance Periodic Testing Procedure, MP-18, Revision 2 to determine that the licensee has established adequate controls to implement the snubber surveillance schedule and revtes of test results.
Responsibility for visual inspection and f unctional testing has been assigned to the Maintenance Department and is tracked through the computerized maintenance surveillance program.
The inspector concluded that the licensee has estab-lished the necessary controls and considers the questions in this area which were discussed in IE Report 324/77-25 and 325/77-25 closed.
..
- .
gm, ,
. . . RII Rpt. Nos. 324/78-25 and 325/78-25-4-c.
Inspection / Test Results and Scheduling Snubber inspection results and scheduling data were reviewed as follows: Unit No. 1 The first visual inspection of inaccessible snubbers was performed June 14, 1977 during a plant outage. During this inspection, one snubber was found to be inoperative therefore, in accordance with the technical specifications the next scheduled inspection interval was 12 months 125% or September 14, 1978. A ten day extension was granted to the licensee, and the inspection was in progress during this visit.
The first visual inspection of accessible snubbers was scheduled July 26, 1978 (six months 125% after issuance of the technical specifications).
Results of the July 26, 1978 inspection showed six inoperative snubbers, therefore, in accordance with the technical specifications the next scheduled inspection was required to be within 62 days or by September 16, 1978. The second visual inspection of accessible snubbers was performed September 1978 and test results showed one inoperative snubber.
As a result the visual inspection schedule for accessible snubbers has been extended from 62 to 124 days in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
, No functional testing of snubbers is scheduled until June 10, 1979 (refueling outage) at which time a representative sample of snubbers will be tested.
Unit No. 2 , , Inaccessible snubbers installed in Unit No. 2 were visually inspected by the licensee November 1, 1976 at which time one snubber.as found to be inoperative.
In accordance the Technt-cal Specifications the second inspection was scheduled and performed 12 months later or December 1, 1977.
Again one inoperative snubber was identified and the inspection interval will remain at 12 months or December 1, 1978.
Accessible snubbers were inspected May 20, 1977 and all were found to be satisf actory. The second visual inspection was i conducted 12 months 125% later on August 2, 1978 and five ! snubbers were found to be inoperative.
As a result the required i inspection interval was changed to 62 days or October 3,1978 as required by the Technical Specifications.
No functional tests are scheduled before the next refueling outage.
.. i
- .e
.
. . . . RII Rpt. Nos. 324/78-25 and 325/78-25-5-d.
Acceptance Criteria /NRC Positions The inspector reviewed the basis of the hydraulic shock suppres-sor acceptance criteria and discussed NRC requirements with licensee personnel as follows: (1) Lockup Velocity and Bleed Rate The inspector reviewed the NRC interpretation of an adequate acceptance criteria for lockup velocity and bleed rate for functional testing as follows.
(a) Determine the operating range in which the snubber is designed to operate from the vendor.
(b) Determine the upper and lower limit allowable for lockup velocity and bleed rate which is consistent with the piping design analysis from the Architect Engineer.
(c) Determine the temperature correction factor required to correct the measured values from test temperature to operating temperature.and apply this correction to test data.
The inspector reviewed a letter from the Architect Engineer (AE) to CP&L dated December 15, 1977, relative to the above items.
From review of this documentation and discussions with the licensee relative to the above items and the items discussed in paragraph 5.a.1 and 5.a.2, it appears that additional information is needed to document adequate acceptance criteria.
The licensee has agreed to the following: , s From the Architect Engineer (a) Verify that the AE's concurrence with the 5-20 inch per minute lockup velocity range is based on the piping system design and Seismic analysis. This matter was not clear in the AE's letter of December 15.
(b) Obtain a range of bleed rates which are acceptable
on the basis of the piping system design and Seismic ' analysis. The AE's letter of December 15 referenced a Bergen Patterson manual which does not define a range of bleed rates based on system design and seismic analysis.
C'.'~;.
- . . . . RII Rpt. Nos. 324/78-25 and 325/78-25-6-From the Snubber Vendors (a) Determine and document the amount of reserve piston stroke necessary for snubber operability.
(b) Confirm and document the validity of the current fluid level acceptance criteria.
No reference to a criteria which would allow as much as six marks below the full mark could be found in the vendor technical information.
(c) Determine the correction factor for the temperature effect on lockup velocity and bleed rate.
The above information will be incorporated into the acceptance criteria of snubber inspection and test procedures.
(2) Seal Material The inspector discussed the NRC position that an expected lifetime for seal material other than EP must be established on the basis of an engineering evaluation which considers the effect of hydraulic fluid, operating temperature, moisture and radiation environment on the material, and the compression set characteristics of the material.
Other options available to the licensee were identified (1) install EP material in the suppressors and inspect as: in accordance with the Technical Specification frequencies, (2) replace the seals with the same non-EP material and establish the material lifetime as that period of time which the suppressors have operated in their environment without adverse effects on the seals and inspect in accordance with the Technical Specification frequencies, (3) inspect the suppressors with non-EP seal material on a 31 day frequency. The licensee had audited the construction records to determine the type of seal material in use, but has not completed the comparison of this audit against the safety related snubbers identified in the Technical Specification.
The licensee will report the status of this audit in a report to be submitted to the hRC Region II office by November 1, 1978, which will identify those cnubbers verified to have EP seals, those snubbers for which the type of seal material cannot be identified, the proposed plan of corrective action, the basis for proposed action. This matter was identified as unresolved.
Unresolved Ites: Identify snubber seal material; submit status of this audit, proposed actions and basis for ..
- .
00,
. . .
. RII Rpt. Nos. 324/78-25 and 325/78-25-7-proposed actions to the NRC Region II office for review by November 1, 1978 (324/325/78-25-02).
(3) Representative Sample The inspector advised the licensee that the te rm, "Repre-
sentative sample", as used in the Technical Specification, requires evaluation of the factors affecting shock suppressor operation.
The licensee agreed to develop written guide-lines for selection of the snubber test sample (324/325/78-25-03).
e.
Fol!ovup on Bleed Rate In October 1977 (IE Report 324/325/77-25) the licensee agreed to perform an evaluation of the home made test machine to determine the applied load during bleed measurement.
The electrical drive overloads on bleed and cannot apply rated load. The licensee's attempts to determine the applied force were not successful in that the applied load varied rapidly after lockup. At this point the licensee has determined for Unit 2 that the lockup velocity is in the acceptable range and that the snubbers do bleed and come out of lockup.
Bleed rate at rated load, however, is not kn own. This matter was identi-fled as unresolved.
Unresolved Item: Report the status of efforts to determine bleed rate at rated load; submit proposed corrective action, and the basis for proposed actions to the NRC for evaluation by November 1, 1978 (324/325/78-25-04).
f.
Inspection Tour The inspector, accompanied by licensee personnel, toured the Unit I drywell to examine installed piping supports, restraints ' and associated hardware.
Eighteen snubbers and a number of fixed supports spring hangers and structural components were obse rved. Systems inspected included Steam Relief Valve Discharge, M.ain Steam, Closed Cooling, Residual He.at Removal, Recirculation, and Sample System lines.
The inspector identified several discrepancies to the licensee as follows: Snubber Comment u l-No identifiable number Loose bolt in pipe clamp l (adjacent to MSIV just to l the left of airlock) l l l .. . d9 g
. ' - . .
. r RII Rpt. Nos. 324/78-25 and 325/78-25-8-Snubber (Continued) Comment (Continued) -1B21 26SS203 Apparent low fluid level-1B21 SISS106 Locknut loose ! -1B21 265S303 Floor support plate bolts rusted-Spring hanger Indicating above cold 1B21 34VS293 setpoint mark The licensee will inspect the above items to verify operability ' and correct the deficiencies prior to startup.
The inspector identified several generic problems as follows: '
(1) Identifica*. ion numbers difficult to read , ! (2) Spherical ball joints not adequately greased ! (3) Reservoir overf tll vent holes painted
The licensee will evaluate these conditions and implement corrective action as necessary. This matter was identified for inspector followup (324/325/78-25-05).
' i ( t ! ! ! ' -. -.
- * ge,
t ,--e, .~ -, }}