IR 05000322/1982029
| ML20028B613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1982 |
| From: | Gallo R, Higgins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028B605 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-82-29, NUDOCS 8212030083 | |
| Download: ML20028B613 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 50-322/82-29 Docket No. 50-322 License No. CPPR-95 Licensee: Long Island Lighting Company 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 Facility Name: Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Shoreham, New York Inspection Conducted: October 1 - 29, 1982 Inspectors :
JM
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J.[C7"Hig, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Date Signed
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Approved by:
h R. M. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A Date Signed Projects Branch #1, DPRP i
l Inspection Summaryy:
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Inspections On:
October 1 - 29,1982 (Inspection Report No. 50-322/82-291 l
Areas Inspected: Special onsite inspection by the resident inspector (27 in-
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spection hours). of allegations relating to corroded valves and faulty fiber-glass piping installed in the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
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Results:
No violations were identified and the allegations were not I
substantiated.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.
Sununary 2.
Background 2.1 Source of Infonnation 2.2 Identification of Involved Organizations 3.
Details 3.1 Scope 3.2 Persons Contacted 3.3 Allegations 3.4 Description of Systems 3.5 Findings and Conclusions 4.
Unresolved Items 5.
Management Meetings 6.
Status 7.
Exhibits
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Sumary The special inspection was conducted due to information provided by an anonymous individual, concerning corroded valves which were allegedly reinstalled without repair and concerning faulty fiberglass piping.
Interviews with various licensee and contractor personnel, tours of the areas involved, observation of the components and systems involved in operation, and reviews of pertinent records established:
first, that the systems and components in question were not nuclear safety related; second, that the described deficiencies had existed at one time; and third, that the deficiencies were identified by the licensee and adequately corrected.
2.
Background 2.1 Source of Information By letter dated July 11, 1982 from Mr. John L. Hall, Jr. to Judge Lawrence Brenner, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the NRC was provided a copy of two documents. One document was an interview with an Assistant Business Manager of the Boilemaker's Union conducted on November 28, 1979 discussing concerns regarding the main condenser.
These specific concerns were previously investigated by the NRC and were found to be not substantiated. The findings are documented in NRC Investigation Report No. 50-322/79-24 under allegations number 22 and 24. The second document provided by Mr. Hall consisted of two handwritten pages of concerns regarding corroded valves and fiberglass piping, which is included here as Exhibit 1.
These documents were forwarded to the NRC, Region I for action on September 16, 1982.
Region I then comenced a special inspection of these items on October 1, 1982.
2.2 Identification of Involved Organizations 1.
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (LIL 0)
175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 An electric utility licensed by the NRC to construct a nuclear power plant under NRC Construction Permit No. CPPR-95.
(Docket Number 50-322).
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2.
STONE AND WEBSTER ENGINEERING COMPANY (S&W)
245 Summer Street P. O. Box 2325 Boston, Massachusetts 02107 A company contracted by the licensee to perfom various construction management activities at the Shoreham site.
3.
COURTER & COMPANY (C&C)
317 West 13th Street New York, New York 10014 A company contracted by the licensee to perform various construction activities at the Shoreham site.
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UNICOCONSTRUCTIONORGANIZATION(UNICO)
c/o Long Island Lighting Company P. O. Box 604 Wading River, New York 11961 A construction organization, consisting of personnel primarily from Long Island Lighting Company and Stone and Webster Engineering Company, organized to administer the construction of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
3.
Details 3.1 Scope of Inspection The inspection included interviews with various personnel involved with design, purchasing installation, inspection, testing, and repair of the subject valves and piping, including those named in the allegations. The inspection also included tours to observe the valves and piping and witnessing of the systems in operation, including starting and stopping of pumps and cycling of valves. The inspector also reviewed pertinent documents maintained at the facility.
3.2 Persons Contacted
J. Higgins, Test Engineer (S&W)
T. Horner, Test Engineer (S&W)
W. Hunt, Assistant Manager, Construction and Engineerin (L)
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R. Jacquinto, Head of SE0 (S8 )
J. Kelly, Field QA Manager (L
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M. Lewis, Construction Engineer (L)
W. Matejek, Lead Advisory Engineer (S&W)
J. McCarthy, Section Supervisor - FQA (L)
i M.Milligan,ProjectEngineer(L)
W. Museler, Manager, Construction and Engineering (L)
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l T. Paulantonio, Lead Startup Engineer (S&W)
R. Perra, Assistant Superintendent FQC (S&W)
J. Powers, Engineer (S&W)
l J. Ricardo, Lead Startup Engineer (S&W)
C. Tiong, Area Supervisor (C)
l E. Youngling, Startup Manager (L)
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C - Courter and Company GE - General Electric i
L - Long Island Lighting Company S&W-Stone and Webster
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l 3.3 Allegations 3.3.1 Allegation on valves Butterfly valves in the saltwater. piping in the screenwell
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were badly corroded but waiv rainstalled without repairs. Also, check valves in the same piping were found badly corroded and were replaced with the same type of valve, which was not designed for use in saltwater and which contained intemal comon steel i
springs.
3.3.2 Allegation on Screenwell Fiberglass Piping
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The Screenwell Fiberglass Piping would not pass the system pressure tests and was only partially replaced with cement-lined iron pipe.
i 3.3.3 Allegation on A.C. Chiller Room Fiberglass Piping The fiberglass piping used in the air-conditioning (A.C.) Chiller Room on elevation 44' would not pass-its pressure tests and had been patched many times. The allegation further stated that LILCo expects the piping
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to rupture during operation and.hence has added watertight doors to the
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room and drilled hole's' through walls ~ at floor level to le't the water out.
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3.4 Description of Systems The fiberglass saltwater piping system in the screenwell area which contains the alleged valves, is the Screenwash System (N71). This system is non-safety related and is not described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
It is not required for safe operation or shutdown of the reactor plant. Also, failure of this piping system would not affect safety related equipment.
Nevertheless, allegations 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 on this system were reviewed to detemine their validity. The Screenwash
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System is used for cleaning the traveling screens in the intake of the screenwell and for educting water from the screenwell structure for maintenance purposes.
The fiberglass piping system in the A.C. Chiller Room is a portion of the Service Water System. The fiberglass portion is not safety related and is used to cool the non-safety related Main Chilled Water System.
There are two automatic isolation valves which isolate the fiberglass portion from the safety related portion of the Service Water System.
Failure of the fiberglass portion would not directly affect the safe
shutdown of the reactor but could affect safety related equipment located nearby.
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Flow Diagram FM-358-6, Screenwash System Engineering & Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) Nos. F-32519, F-32519A, and F-32519B E8DCR No. F-27971E Repair / Rework Request No. N71-112 Purchase Order No. 371607 Memo from M. Lewis to T. Horner dated January 7,1982 and reply Manufacturers infonnation on Duo'-Chek II valves by Mission TRW.
The inspector noted at the outset that all Screenwash System Valves were non-safety related and that their failure would not affect the safe operation or shutdown of the reactor plant. The allegation referred to three persons by name.
Discussions with two of the three (the third was apparently an incorrect name) indicated that there were four corroded valves identified in the screenwash system around the January,1982 time frame of the allegation.
During the design modification work, changing portions of the fiberglass piping to ductile iron, a butterfly valve and a check valve in both the East and West Screenwell valve pits were identified.
Discussions with the responsible Test Engineer indicated that sometimes prior to final repair a corroded component may be reinstalled temporarily until all circumstances are ready for the repair or replacement.
In this case, paperwork would be initiated to ensure work is completed.
Concerning the corroded butterfly and check valves from the valve pits, discussed above, all personnel involved stated that they were fully overhauled and replaced in good condition in the system. This repair was documented in the January 7, 1982 memo listed above. The inspector reviewed manu-facturer's data for the check valves in question (Type VCI-12E)
and noted that the valve internal trim material, including the
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springs was monel, which is suitable for use in saltwater.
Inspector review identified only two other Screenwash System check valves which had similar problems, valves 0033A and B and no additional butterfly valves in the subject time frame. the check valves (Type VCI-12E) were in the Screenwash pump discharge piping and were located in the Screenwell area below the pumps.
These valves had failed in service in December,1980.
New valves l
j were unavailable at the time so the valve bodies were reinstalled I
without internals until new ' valves were obtained. Several modifications were made to the pump discharge piping and new valves
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(Type VCI-128) were obtained. These valves also have Monel internal t
trim, suitable for seawater use. The two new valves were installed in 1982. The inspector noted that E&DCR No. F-32519A had been
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issued to change valve 00338,on FM-35B, from VCI-12E to VCI-12B, but that no EADCR had been issued for 0033A, which was also changed.
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L-7-The licensee issued E8DCR No. F-32519B, dated October 19,1982 to make that change.
Inspector observations of the Screenwash Systems valves identified no obvious discrepancies. The inspector had no additional questions regarding the Screenwash System valve overhaul and replacement and concluded that the Screenwash System valves had been adequately handled by the licensee.
3.5.2 Screenwell Fiberglass Piping The inspector reviewed the following documents on the Screenwell Fiberglass Piping:
Change Control Fom (CCF) N71/18, Screenwash Piping Discharge
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Piping Modification, dated September 22, 1980.
CCF N71/19, Screenwash System Piping Modification, dated August 3, 1981.
E&DCR Nos. F-27971 series and F-20268 series.
Pressure Test No. H-932 dated March 2, 1982.
Pressure Test No. H-972 dated March 5, 1982.
L Repair / Rework Request N71-112.
The inspector noted at the outset that failure of the Screenwash.
System Piping would not affect the safe operation or shutdown of the reactor plant. The only fiberglass piping in the screenwell area is in the Screenwash system. Based on discussions with personnel and document review the inspector detemined that the licensee had numerous problers with this fiberglass piping over
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the last several years. There was some initial leakage found during pressure or hydrostatic testing, several years ago. More
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recently, there were several failures due to dynamic system operation, such as pump starts and stops. As a result of all these problems over the years, the licensee took a number of actions, including:
system walk-downs and redesign by Engineering, modified pipe supports, new pipe supports, triming of the pump impe11ers to reduct high shutoff head,some' ^ valve and pipe configuration changes, rupture disc changes, partial change-out of fiberglass pipe to cement-lined ductile iron pipe, and extensive system testing. At the completion of all of the above modifications, the licensee successfully completed system pressure tests. The inspector reviewed pressure test results for both fiberglass and ductile iron portions and noted that they were acceptable. The l
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inspector discussed the current state of the fiberglass piping with responsible test and construction personnel, who stated that the leakage problems were now corrected and the system had been l
successfully operated in all modes. The inspector also observed the system in operation, including pump starts and stops and valve cycling. No leaks were observed in the fiberglass piping and dynamic effects appeared acceptable. The inspector concluded that the Screenwell fiberglass piping had initially had leaks and other problems but that these had been satisfactorily corrected.
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Pressure Test H-926, dated January 12, 1982.
Repair Rework Request P41-310, completed August 26, 1982.
Change Control Form No. M60/03.
E&DCR Nos. F-24173B, P-3895, P-2940G, F-40503 Memoranda on Fiberglass Pipe Failures and reworks dated October 2,1981, November 18, 1981 and November 30, 1981.
Shoreham FSAR Chapters 3 and 9.
Letter from S&W to LILCO dated July 10, 1981, " Stress Analysis and Supports for Fiberglass Pipes, Main Chilled Water System Condensing Water".
Selected Engineering design calculations associated with modifications.
Pertinent Piping and Instrumentation Drawings.
Cut Rebar monitoring drawings of Resident Engineering Office.
3.5.3.2 Piping Leaks with System in Normal Operation The Service Water (SW) System fiberglass piping is non-safety related and is not required to remain intact for safe oper-ation or shutdown of the reactor plant. The licensee had a number of problems with this piping during installation and testing. Problems were identified both during pressure tests and dynamic system tests. There were several installation and design problems identified and corrected over a period od time. The corrective action included design modifications, vendor assistance in installation, additional pipe supeorts and restraints, and additional fiberglass wrap at all joints. This licensee has completed all of these modifications successfully, pressure tested the piping, and is now preoperationally testing the system. The inspector discussed the piping with responsible construction and testing personnel, who stated that the operational leakage problems have been corrected. The inspector reviewed selected, completed pressure test packages and noted that the tests were acceptable. The inspector also observed the system in operation, including pump starts and stops and valve cycling, and noted no leaks. The inspector concluded that the Service Water System fiberglass piping had initially had leaks with the system in operation and undertest, but that
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these problems had been satisfactorily corrected. Another aspect of the fiberglass piping is discussed below.
3.5.3.3 Seismic Design of Fiberglass Piping While the SW System fiberglass piping is not safety related itself, its failure in the Elevation 44' Chiller Room of the Control Building could flood safety related equipment.
For this reason the piping was originally designed seismically, that is to withstand the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE).
Due to design difficulties in seismically qualifying the fiber-glass pipe, the licensee made an engineering decision (documented in the July 10, 1981 letter) to provide flood protection for adjacent safety related equipment rather than seismically qualifying the fiberglass pipe. This letter and E&DCR No. P-3895 detailed the flood protection items required, including; hydrostatic floor seals, flood curbs at room doors, and holes drilled in the wall at floor level to let excess water out.
Design calculations were perfonned
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on the floor te determine the acceptability of stresses with the new weight loading of flood water. Calculations also verified the structural integrity of the floor and wall with the flood holes drilled in them. Additionally, the licensee evaluated the effect of spraying water on adjacent safety related equipment.
Despite all of the above actions, the inspector expressed concern that there was no consolidated flood analysis for the elevation 44' chiller room. The inspector further noted that it appeared as if this flood analysis should be included with the FSAR Chapter 3 pipe break analysis.
The liceasee stated that a consolidated flood analysis would be prepared. This item is unresolved and is designated as Item No. (322/82-29-01).
During the review of the flood protection items provided for the chiller room the inspector requested to see the quality control (QC), inspections, and was informed that there were none, since the installation was designated QA Category II. The inspector stated that this did not appear appropriate. The licensee committed to perform QC inspections of all flood protection items installed for the chiller room and commenced these insp ctions immediately.
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No discrepancies have been identified to date by QC on these inspections.
Regarding the allegation, the inspector noted that the licensee does not expect the fiberglass pipe to rupture during operation and concluded that the engineering alter-native of post-DBE flood protection versus seismic design appeared acceptable.
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-10-3.5.3.4 Core Drilling
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Sometimes during construction, a hole must be drilled in a reinforced concrete wall and a concrete core removed, so that a pipe or other component can pass through. This core drilling may cut the reinforcing bars (rebar). Since no QC checks were made on the core drills for the flood drainage holes, which were through a QA Category I wall, the inspector questioned the application of QC to core drills through any QA Category I wall or floor. The inspector also questioned the cutting of rebar during core drills. The licensee stated that when engineering authorizes the core drill, their calculations assume the worst case number of rebar are cut and that no additional QC was provided. The inspector reviewed the calculations for E8DCR P-3895 on flood control and noted that this was the case. The inspector stated that, nevertheless, a QC inspection of the final core drill through a QA Category I wall or floor appeared appropriate to determine that the hole size and location were per the design. This item is unresolved and is designated Item No. (322/82-29-02).
3.5.3.5 Cut Rebar Monitoring
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The inspector reviewed the controls applied to rebar, in QA Category I concrete, which is cut for purposes other than core drills for example the installation of anchor bolts.
Engineering has designated specific areas by drawing where certain numbers of rebar may be cut without a case by case analysis. Other areas are designeted where no rebar may be cut without a case specific analysis and calculation. The Resident Engineering Office maintains control of this program, authorizes rebar to be cut pur-suant to the guidelines, and plots on structural drawings where rebar has been cut.
For each rebar that is cut, a field E&DCR is issued against the appropriate structural l
drawing to document the cutting. Since engineering is not performing specific calculations for each rebar, which is cut, the inspector stated that one of the following appeared appropriate:
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Final engineering review and calculations to determine that the as-built conditions of walls and floors are acceptable with all of the rebar that have been cut,or, 2.
A periodic QA audit to verify that the Resident Engineer-ing Office is properly applying the engineering requirements when authorizing rebar to be cut.
This item is unresolved and is designated Item No.
(322/82-29-03).
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Unresolved Items Areas for which more infonnation is required to determine acceptability are considered unresolved.
Unresolved items are contained in paragraphs 3.5.3.3, 3.5.3.4, and 3.5.3.5 of this report.
5.
Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this special inspection, rr.eetings were held with plant management to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection.
6.
Status The status of this special inspection and the allegations is closed.
7.
Exhibits
Copy of handwritten allegations titled "Some Questions for LILC0".
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