IR 05000320/1987004
| ML20236E922 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1987 |
| From: | Moslak T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236E861 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-87-04, 50-320-87-4, NUDOCS 8708030140 | |
| Download: ML20236E922 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Report No.
50-320/87-04 Docket No.
50-320 License No. OPR-73 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection C n acted: ft.ay 9, 19 A Olune 22, 1987 7/ / y /7/
Inspectors:
' nspector (TMI-2)
dMe 'sisnVd Mosl~, Reti
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7//7/PP
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m Bell, Seni'r R ia ion Specialist dd ' Vi ed
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D Collins, diation Specialist date' signed
/h 7!/b Approved By:
Am_
W. Travers, Dir4ctor, TMI-2 Cleanup Project dat/e signed Directorate Inspection Summary:
Areas Inspected:
Routine safety inspection by site inspectors of plant operations, defueling operations, control of radioactive materials, the causes of a spill of contaminated water when operating the Defueling Water Cleanup System, radiological and housekeeping conditions, and licensee action on I
I previous inspection findings.
Results: Two violations were identified: one violation resulted from a failure to take plant equipment out-of-service that resulted in the inadvertent operation of a pump and a subsequent spill of contaminated water.
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The second violation resulted from a failure to properly control the J
disposition of contaminated material.
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l 1.0 Routine Plant Operations Inspections of the facility were conducted to assess compliance with the
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requirements of the Technical Specifications and Recovery Operations Plan j
in the following areas:
licensee review of selected plant parameters for
abnormal trends; plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint, j
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including plant cleanliness; control of switching and tagging; fire
protection; licensee control of routine and special evolutions, including
control room personnel awareness of these evolutions; control of f
documents, including log keeping practices; radiological controls; and l
security plan implementation.
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Inspections of the control room were performed during regular and l
backshift hours.
The Shift Foreman's Log and selected portions of the
Control Room Operator's Log were reviewed for the period May 9 through (
June 22, 1987. Other logs reviewed during the inspection period included the Submerged Demireralizer System Operations Log, Radiological Controls l
Foreman's Log, and Auxiliary Operator's Daily Log Sheets.
l Operability of components in systems' required to be available for response to emergencies was reviewed to verify that they could perform their intended functions.
The inspector attended selected licensee planning meetings.
Shift staffing for licensed and non-licensed personnel was determined to be adequate.
No violations were identified.
2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
.1 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-11-01):
Review corrective actions of unplanned hand exposure.
The inspector has determined that a new shield unit was constructed, specific instructions posted, and training to workers given to preclude a recurrence.
The physical size of the new shield prevents close contact with a small calibration source.
The inspector had no further questions.
.2 (Closed) Unresolved (320/86-15-02):
Recall of out of calibration instruments.
The inspector has determined through reviews of surveys, tour observations, and interviews with technicians and supervisors that efforts have been increased to ensure the timely return of instrumentation for calibration.
The inspector noted that technicians now have assigned survey instruments. Closer attention is also being paid to the timely calibration of large, temporarily installed radiological instruments.
The inspector had no further questions.
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.3 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-15-03):
Stability of temporary shield walls.
The inspector has determined that a Revision 1 to Procedure 9200-ADM-3282.01, " Control of Shielding" effective April 23, 1987, addresses the problem of engineering and safety reviews of shielding placed in the plant.
Shields are required to be analyzed for effectiveness and safety.
from tipover and hanging loads.
The procedure describes the limits of shield placement on piping.
The inspector had no further questions.
.4 (Closed). Inspector Follow Item (320/87-02-01):
Review revised procedure for canister transfers.
On two occasions' loaded canisters of radioactive material were transferred from the reactor ouilding to the fuel handling building
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without. effective coordination with Radiological Controls (Rad Con).
Following.the first event, a requirement for such notification was incorporated into the applicable radiation work permit (RWP).
. Subsequent canister transfers were made without incident.
The second event (about a year after the first) indicated that a more positive method for assuring notification of Rad Con was des-irable.
As a result, the " Canister Transfer System" procedure (4211-0PS-3252.01) was revised to incorporate the notification of Rad Con as a prerequisite to implementation of the procedure and the transfer of canisters.
The inspector reviewed the revised procedure, interviewed affected personnel and determined that the use of the revised procedure has been effective in assuring appropriate notifications.
The inspector had no further questions.
.5 (Closed)Non-compliance (320/87-02-02):. Failure to follow surveillance procedure.
The inspector reviewed the implementation of corrective actions as described in the licensee's letter dated May 7, 1987, in response to Inspection Report 50-320/87-02.
The review included verification of changes to the ' Surveillance Procedure to ' clearly define the steps
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for returning the Control Room Bypass Fans to service following
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completion of fire protection system functional tests and interviews with licensee personnel regarding implementation of the procedural changes, i
The inspector had no additional questions regarding this matter.
.6 (Closed)Non-compliance (320/87-02-03):
Loss of control of radioactive materials.
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The ;nspector reviewed licensee implementation of the corrective actions described in report 50-320/87-02.
A review of related documents and irterviews of affected personnel indicated that the corrective actions have been effectively implemented.
Both the licensee's " Release Surveys" (9200-ADM-4200.02) and " Radioactive Material Transfer" (9200-ADM-4430.01) procedures have been changed to strengthen radiation survey requirements related to transfers of radioactive materials and to clarify requirements related to the completion and use of the transfer accountability tag.
The licensee has also taken several actions to inform workers and supervisors of their responsibilities related to radioactive material transfer and control. The inspector determined that these measures should be effective in preventing similar events.
The inspector had no further questions.
3.0 Defueling Operations The licensee continued pick and place defueling to remove partial length (stub) fuel assemblies and pieces of fuel pins from the ccre region and load them into defueling canisters.
A variety of specialized tools were
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used including the core debris digger, the fuel assembly jack and the
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fuel assembly puller. A total of 26 fuel assemblies out of 177 in the core have now been broken free from the lower grid and loaded in preparation for shipment.
During this reporting period, the following fuel assemblies.have been removed:
A-8, A-9, B-5, B-7, B-8, B-9, B-10, B-11, C-5, C-6, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-10, C-11, D-5, D-6, D-7, D-8, D-9, D-10, E-5.
To date, a total of 106,574 pounds (approxim?tely one-third of total core material) of core debris has been remuvad..
4.0 Defueling Water Cleanup System Spill Through discussions with licensee personnel and review of Control Room and Radiological Control logs, the inspector determined that a spill of approximately 200 gallons of reactor coolant system water occurred in the reactor building on May 24 - 25, 1987.
The cause of the spill is attributed to the inadverter.t operation of a pump, that is a comoonent of the Coagulant and Filter Aid Feed System (CAFAFS), a subsystem, r the Defueling Water Cleanup System (DWCS).
Details On May 24, 1987 at 2105 hours0.0244 days <br />0.585 hours <br />0.00348 weeks <br />8.009525e-4 months <br />, the "B" Train of the DWCS vas to be restarted from a temporary shutdown.
During the startup of the CAFAFS portion of the DWCS, the operator assumed that a slurry feed pump, DWC-P-108, would be started, vice DWC-P-10A, since the "B" DWCS train was to be on-line.
The operator was unaware that the discharge hoses for DWC-P-10B were disconnected from the system earlier as a result of the Instrument and Control (180) Department performing a flow calibration on that portion of the CAFAFS.
The pump controls for DWC-P-10B were not l
tagged to indicate its off-normal configuration.
The pump's operating controls are located in the Fuel Handling Building, the pump is located
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-At 0430 hours0.00498 days <br />0.119 hours <br />7.109788e-4 weeks <br />1.63615e-4 months <br /> on May 25, 1987, a routine entry was made into the reactor
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building by operating personnel for the purpose of refilling the diatomaceous earth (DE) slurry tank.
The slurry tank is on the suction side of DhC-P-10A/B and is the source of the filter-aid material for the DWCS.
During this entry, operators found a large amount (* 200 gallons)
of water on the floor near the pump's location (347' elevation reactor building) and observed water flowing from the (disconnected) discharge hose on DWC-P-108.
The Control Room was immediately notified of the situation. Operations personnel secured DWC-P-108, started DWC-P-10A, and verified the DWCS l
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valve / pump alignment. Subsequently, Control Room personnel issued a Switching and Tagging Order (No. 13238) to take DWC-P_-10B out-of-service.
A " CAUTION" tag was attached to the operating switch of DWC-P-10B to
indicate-its off-normal condition.
Following discussions with licensee personnel and examination of applicable documents, the inspector reviewed licensee procedure 4000-ADM-3020.04, " Switching and Tagging Safety" and determined that the failure on the part of licensee personnel, who authorized the performance of flow calibration, to' initially tag the controls of DWC-P-10B to indicate its off-normal condition was contrary to Section 4.1 of the procedure.
Section 4.1 states..." Personnel who are to perform tasks on TMI-2 facilities shall be required to first have the equipment taken out-of-service and put in a safe mode."
l The inspector informed the Site Operations Director that fa))ure to implement procedure 4000-ADM-3020.04 as required by Technical
Specification 6.8.1 is an apparent violation uf regulatory requirements.
(320/87-04-01)
The inspector determined that knowledge of this event was limited to the on-shif t and (on-call) duty personnel.
No formal administrative !
mechanism was used to communicate a broader awareness of the event to management and to the cognizant departments.
The inspector informed licensee management that events of this nature which may not be considered to be reportable by NRC criteria but due to their nature may have potentially significant impact on plant equipment, schedules, cr industrial safety should be documented to focus management attention on identifying the causes of such events, determining tne impact the spill may have on other plant equipment, and communicating the lessons learned to the approprutte epartments and personnel.
Such and ysis of the event causes should more-effectively ensure preventative measures are addressed to preclude or limit future occurrences.
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Safety _ Significance The Defueling Water Cleanup System (DWCS) was designed to maintain clarity of reactor coolant system (RCS) water by pumping water from the reactor vessel through a series of sintered metal filters and returning it to the reactor vessel.
However, water chemistry conditions resulted i
in the system as designed being ineffective in filtering the water. As a l
result, the reactor vessel cleanup system was modified by the installation of a coagulant and filter-aid feed subsystem (CAFAFS).
The
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CAFAFS enhances the performance of the DWCS by the injection of coagulants and/or body feed material, diatomaceous earth (DE), upstream of the DWCS filters.
The injected material improves the effectiveness of the DWCS filters in removing suspended material in the RCS.
The major
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components in the filter-aid system that are relevant to the event are the two slurry feed pumps DWC-P-10A/B, the slurry mix tank (DWC-T-1), and the associated hoses and valves for tie-in to the DWCS. The slurry pumps (low flow Moyno pumps rated at 27 gallons per hour) take suction on the l
i slurry mix tank and inject the slurry into the W S upstream of the filter canisters.
The slurry tank contains about a 300 gallon mixture consisting of DE and RCS water that is the effluent from the DWCS filters.
The filter-aid system can be operated in a hatch mode (fixed volume) or a continuous mode (automatic refill of the slurry tenk).
During the event, the system was being operated in a batch mode, thereby j
limiting the amount of water that could be spilled.
Operation of the i
slurry pumps is not dependant on which train ("A" or "B") of the DWCS is on-line.
Either pump can be used for feeding the DE slurry into DWCS.
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As a re.,lt of restrictions placed on the system due to its mode of operation, the event is considered to have minor safety significance.
These restrictions include limiting the maximum spill to the volume of the slurry tank (N 300 gallons) Dy operating it in a batch mode and the use of low capacity pumps (nominal flow rate of 27 gph) that limited the total spill to about 200 gallons during the 74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> that DWC-P-108 operated. Since the spill consisted in part of filteied RCS water, no significant increases in contamination occurred to building surfaces and associated equipruent.
5.0 Health Physics and Environmental Review a.
Plant Tours The NRC site Radiation Specialists performed inspection tours of the plant, including all radiological control points and selected radiologically controlled areas. Among the areas inspected were the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings, EPICOR-II, the Radiochemistry Laboratories, radioactive waste storage facilities, the Respirator Cleaning and Laundry Facility, the Radiological Controls Instrument Facility and the Waste Handling and Packaging Facility.
Among the items inspected were:
Access control to radiologically controlled areas
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Adherence to Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements
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Proper use and storage of routinely used respirators and
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associated equipment Maintenance and storage of emergency respiratory equipment
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Adherence to raoiation protection procedures
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Use of survey meters and other radiological instrumuts.
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- The inspectors reviewed the implementation;of radiological controls during normal hours, on backshif ts, and' on weekends.
Log books
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maintained by Radiological Contruls Field 0perations and-
= Radiological Engineering to record activities in the reactor i
building and the balance of the. plant were reviewed. 'All of the log books contdined appropriate entries.
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The inspectors conducted off-shift inspections on May 16 and June-21, 1987.
No violations were identified.
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Radioactive' Material Shipments
.The NRC site Radiation Specialists inspected radioactive materials shipments on May 13, 14, and 29, and June.19 and 21, 1987, including observation of.the preparation and dispatch of two railcar-mounted cask shipments of Unit 2 core debris.-
The inspector's review ~ covered:
Verification _ that the recipient is appropriately licensed
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Verification of compliance with_the 10 CFR 20.311 radioactive
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shipment manifest and tracking requirehlents Compliance with approved packaging and shipping procedures
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Proper preparation of shipping papers, including certification
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that' the radioactive matericls are! properly classified, described, packaged and marked for transport Warning labels on packages and placarding of vehicles
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Compliance with regulatory limits for radioactive contamination
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and radiation dose rates.
-The_ inspector's review consisted of (1) th. observation of shipping container preparation and loading, (2) the examination of shipping papers, procedures, packages and vehicles, and (3) the performance of radiation and contamination surveys.
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No violations were identified.
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Reactor Building Entries The inspector monitored the licensee's conduct of reactor building (RB) work during the inspection period.
The following were reviewed on a sampling b. isis during the inspection period:
The planning and coordinating of RB entries, including ALARA
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reviews, personnel training', and equipment preparation.
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The planning and implementat,n of radiological safety
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measures, including the use of RWPs, locked high radiation area access authorizations, specific work instructions, alarming self-reading dosimeters, and breathing zone air samplers.
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The training of individuals, making entries into the RB, on
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emergency procedures, the use of specifically developed procedures for unique tasks, and training with mock-ups, where
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warranted.
The use of appropriate communications equipment.
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Records Review The inspector reviewed selected licensee records related to occupational exposure with respect to their accuracy and completeness, including Radiation Work Permits (RWPs), Dosimetry Investigative Reports, TMI-2 Incident / Event Reports, Radiological-Awareness Reports, and Dosimetry Exception Reports.
The inspector also reviewed other licensee records and periodic reports concerning the radiological controls program, including current data and trends in such areas as person-rem per RWP hour, decontamination status, skin :.ontoainations, environmental monitoring, radiological events, whole body counting, training, dosimetry, shipments, progress toward achievement of goals and objectives, storage tank radioactivity content, airborne radioactivity, and person-rem by work category, effluent releases,
=(including sump releases and sources of sump contamination), and the cumulative dose (person-rem) to plant personnel.
No violations were identified.
6.0 Control of Contaminated Materials While performing a routine survey on June 8, 1987, a technician detected a contaminated wood callet inside a scrap dumpster in an unrestricted area within the owner controlled area. Materials in the dumpster were awaiting transport offsite to a disposal facility.
Daily radiation surveys of scrap collection units are required as a result of the July 15, 1986 finding of a contaminated metal tripod in a scrap dumpster.
The survey of the pallet showed removable contamination of 5000 dpm/100 cm2 on its underside.
Contact radiation levels were 160 mrad /hr beta and 2 mR/hr gamma. The pallet was worn from use and was weathered.
The technician reported the finding to supervision and isolated the pallet.
Radiological Controls supervision had additiona? surveys performed and initiated TMI-2 Event Report 87-047 to track and document the incident.
A critique of the event included personnel who could have placed the pallet in the dumpster in the course of their work.
However, no specific individual could be identified as placing the pallet in the dumpster. A general grounds cleanup was being done at the time.
This resulted in various materials being collected from areas all over the site. Analysis
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of a wood chip from the pallet showed Cs-137, indicating that the pallet I
was contaminated at TMI-2.
Corrective Actions Long term actions taken as a result of the incident include ensurino that technicians perform adequate release surveys of all material prior to its release from radiological control areas, that techr,1cians perform uniform and adequate surveys of dumpsters, and that surveys of' areas outside of controlled areas continued to be performed to establish that no other such material exists in these areas.
Findings The inspector determined that the pallet was in an unrestricted area and was found to have both fixed and removable radioactive contamination.
The-presence of the pallet in such an area is a violation of the provisions of the licensee's Procedure 9200-ADM-4000.02 Revision 1,
" Surface Contamination Limits" and Section 8 of the licensee's Radiation Protection Plan (RPP). RPP Section 4.1.2 states that less than 100 cpm above background as detected with a survey meter is acceptable for unrestricted release.
(320/87-04-02)
7.0 Airborne Contamination Incident On June 4,1987, while scabbling was being conducted by robot in the Auxiliary Building 281' elevation Seal Injection Valve Room (SIVR),
airborne radioactive contamination was detected by crea air monitors (AMS-3s) on the 347' and 328' elevations of the adjacent Fuel Handling Building (FHB).
Elevated readings were recorded on the FHB air exhaust duct monitors at the filter intake (HP-R-221A) and filter outlet (HP-R-2218). Also, the Auxiliary Building exhaust system monitors at the filter bank entrance (HP-R-222) and outlet (hP-R-228) showed elevated radiation levels.
HP-R-222 reached its " Alert" setpoint. However, there was no detectable increase on the plant stack monitors (HP-R-219, and-219A).
The scabbling operation was stopped and the airborne activity investigated.
Samples of airborne particulate taken at the Submerged Demineralized System (SDS) on the 347' elevation of the FHB showed levels of 1.1 times the Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) of Sr-90, and 0.33 MPC Cs-137 at 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br />.
A major increase in surface contamination occurred in Makeup Pump Room IC, on the 281' elevation of the Auxiliary Building.
Some increase in surface contamination levels was also detected in the Westinghouse Valve Room on the 281' elevation of the FHB.
Personnel were not contaminated and <1 MPC-br was assigned to personnel.
l Inspector Findings The critique held on June 5, 1987, identified the actions thought to have caused the incident. However, the general opinien was that the cause was not the out of the ordinary changeout of filter bags and the opening of the enclosure, but that some other mechanism was at work.
A team was
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selected which would investigate the ventilation pathways prior to the resumption of scabbling in the SIVR. As of June 26, 1987, testing of the ventilation had not been accomplished. tl0 other problems of this sort have manifested themselves to date.
This item will be subject to further inspector review.
(320/87-04-03)
8.0 Inspector Follow Items Inspector follow items are inspector concerns or perceived weaknesses in the licensee's conduct of operations (hardware or programmatic) that could lead to violaticns if left uncorrected.
Inspector follow items are addressed in paragraphs 2.0 and 7.0.
9.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are findings about which more information is needed to ascertain whether they are violations, deviations, or acceptable. An unresolved item is addressed in paragraph 2.0.
10.0 Exit Interview The inspectors met periodically with licensee representatives to discuss inspection findings. On June 26, 1987, the site-inspectors summarized the inspection findings in a meeting with the following personnel:
C. Dell, Licensing Technical Analyst L. Edwards, 0QA Monitor C. Incorvati, TMI Audit Manager W. Potts, Site Operations Director R. Rogan, Director, Licensing and Nuclear Safety F. Standerfer, Director, TMI-2
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D. Turner, Director, Radiological Controls, TMI-2
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R. Wells, Sr. Licensing Engineer At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the 'YJ.CPD staff except for procedure reviews pursuant to Technical Specification 6.8.2.
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